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JULY, 1921———OCTOBER, 1921.

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Edited by HAROLD COX

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The Edinburgh Review

JULY, 1921 No. 477

FRANCO-BRITISH RELATIONS

DURING the spring and the summer of 1918, while Bertha was reminding the Parisians that the war was far from being at an end, a French committee, composed of statesmen and representatives of several State departments, met at the Ministère des Colonies in order to study the Colonial conditions of the peace. This 'Commission d'étude des questions 'coloniales posées par la guerre' were particularly anxious to find out what the views of the British on kindred subjects might be, as it seemed to them that France and Great Britain had a close interest to walk hand in hand at the peace conference, whenever such a conference might take place.

Accordingly they paid some attention to a report that was drafted for them on that subject, in which it was pointed out that the horizon of the British Empire had lately undergone on all sides a very great change. As a result of their debate, they recommended that the French and the British Governments should exchange their views not only on one particular point, but on all outstanding colonial problems; that is on all problems outside Europe. This recommendation made, apparently, a strong impression on the mind of the French Minister of the Colonies, M. Henry Simon. He wrote an official letter to M. Pichon, who was responsible for foreign affairs, in order to ask him to approach the British Government and suggest a general conversation of that kind. The matter did not, however, proceed any further.

This is but one typical instance of the vain attempts made by well-meaning persons on both sides of the channel to infuse a new life into what, according to the mood of the day, is called either an alliance or an understanding. The experts of the French Colonial Committee were not the only advocates of a general exchange of views between the two countries. There were at the same moment in London, both at the Foreign Office and at the Colonial Office, men of a wide political experience who saw that it would be better for both countries not to approach the peace conference before having made together a mental tour round the world. Once the war was ended and the conference had begun, the same opinion was expressed from time to time by the most prominent of statesmen, as they watched the consequences of the lack of diplomatic cooperation between both countries. Still their advice was never acted upon. No exhaustive effort has yet been made to adapt the relations of France and England to the changed conditions of the world, either in Europe or elsewhere.

The result is not good. One need only look back on the history of the last two and a half years to see that, on the whole, the understanding tends, in fact, to become a chronic misunderstanding.

Roughly speaking, this recent history may be divided into two phases: that before and that after the Treaty of Versailles. During the first phase, both countries had to agree on a peace settlement. During the second, though the Turkish Treaty was still unfinished, the main question was how the Treaty of Versailles was to be carried out.

The only attempt made at removing every possible misunderstanding between Paris and London, as a prelude to the Peace Conference, consisted in a few conversations between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau, in which some broad topics, such as the question of naval armaments, were mentioned in a general way. There was much mutual good-will, but a fundamental uncertainty was allowed to obtain as far as almost every point of the coming settlement was concerned. Consequently the British and the French spokesmen were to be seen wrestling over every item under the ironical eyes of the other allies or associates. That things might have taken quite another turn was shown by some exceptions, which were like oases in the wilderness

of discussion. Thus a delicate negotiation concerning the partition of Togo and the Cameroons was conducted with the greatest success by Lord Milner. It was by no means an easy task, as this particular question was closely linked up with the rest of the African settlement, where Italian and Belgian claims had to be considered as well. The subject was, however, approached by Lord Milner with such a broad mind and such a will to have the problems not only defined but solved, that a solution was agreed upon about which there has not been one single complaint expressed on either side ever since.

There is little doubt that if the air had been cleared by similar methods in every other direction, the state of the Franco-British world would have soon become a satisfactory one. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Not only was each question taken by itself, without regard for the general settlement, but questions were often handled in a spasmodic way: what had been done on one day being undone on another. The most typical case was, perhaps, the debate on Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. There was no reason whatever why the solution which was reached at San Remo in April 1920 should not have been arrived at as early as September, 1918, when peace was in sight. During 1919 endless unfortunate disagreements occurred, one of the worst being when M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George had in May 1919 a geographical dispute over the frontier of Palestine. 'They 'were at once both up in the air,' said an eye witness, 'and one 'could but hear: tac-tac-tac. . . . I said to them: "I can't 'follow you."' . . . Nor could the bewildered public.

As a matter of fact, the harm done by these piecemeal proceedings was considerable. Leaving aside the Syrian affair, which after all was but a side show, there were at least two moments during the Peace Conference when the clash between France and Great Britain became almost disquieting. The first took place in March-April over the question of the Saar, when the French were on one side, the English and the Americans on the other. The second followed the German counter proposals in the beginning of June; this time President Wilson was more or less neutral, and the dispute was clearly between England and France.

Perhaps this could not be entirely avoided. The questions at stake were so gigantic that one could hardly expect an easy agreement. Moreover it would not be fair to hold any side or

any man specially responsible for the difficulties that arose. After all this has been said, it remains nevertheless true that the path might have been smoother if the attempt had been made to adjust from the start the interests of France and England, a process to which no other ally could have justly taken exception, seeing that both countries had been linked up in the war before every other. As things turned out, a regrettable impression was created on both sides of the Channel. In England, the public began to grow suspicious that France had tried to drag England into a bargain unfair to Germany, or even to play tricks in the Near East or elsewhere. In France, the feeling was that England had dropped the interests of France the moment she had ceased to dread Germany.

However it was but during the second phase, that is since the Treaty of Versailles came in force, that the unsatisfactory condition of Franco-British relations was clearly revealed to the world. On June 28, 1919, M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson came out from the Chateau of Versailles, a smiling trinity. The day after the French people were given to swallow at breakfast-time two solemn documents, signed by these great men, from which it resulted, though in a curiously intricate way, that Great Britain would stand by France in case Germany should attack her again, provided America was ready to do the same, and provided also France should really need such assistance. In spite of all these reservations—and other minor details—the undertaking was considered a sign that the links between France and England were stronger than ever.

Unfortunately the agreement, whether embodied in the Peace Treaty or in the subsequent papers, was entirely superficial, if not deceptive. Of course the attitude of the United States was partly responsible for some of our disappointments. It was certainly not England's fault if the documents of June 28 did not come into force ; nor was it her fault or France's if the secession of America complicated every question in the Near East as well as in Europe. It would not be fair however to make President Wilson, or the American Senate, a scapegoat for all our own joint sins. The truth is that France and England had no common policy on any capital point. They had had no exhaustive discussion either on Russia or on Poland. They did not really agree on the interpretation to be given to the Treaty of Versailles as

regarded reparations, disarmament, Upper Silesia or any other subject. They were not any more sure of each other with regard to the problems of Central Europe.

Outside the boundaries of Europe, the situation was not much better. They managed, it is true, to come to a kind of a settlement over Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, between December 1919 and April 1920. This settlement consisted, however, in France agreeing to transfer to the British zone of influence Mosul, which had been granted to her under the agreement of May 1916, without receiving any compensation elsewhere; while on the British side, the complaint was that France was disregarding the pledges of Great Britain to the Arabs. With regard to Turkey proper, in spite of the efforts made in December 1919 by Lord Curzon and M. Philippe Berthelot, no real understanding was arrived at, and both countries achieved the truly wonderful feat of managing to frame a treaty for Turkey while holding opposite views on Constantinople, Smyrna, Thrace and other minor points. They did not even manage to come to terms on questions which before the war had been nearly settled between them. Thus England discovered that Tangiers had a vital interest to the British Empire, the consequence of which was that France refused to give her final assent to some of the clauses in the Turkish Treaty which are of interest to Great Britain in Egypt and which are still to-day marked 'temporary.'

These however are but the most conspicuous of instances. One must have the courage to own that almost everywhere the relations between the representatives of France and England abroad have been very different since the beginning of 1920 from what they had been before the war. In the years preceding 1914, whenever a diplomatic incident occurred anywhere, the French and the British ambassadors or diplomatic agents were at once shoulder to shoulder, while their Austrian colleague was backing the German on the opposite side. Since the treaties have come in operation, or even before, it is a common experience to find that this friendly cooperation has been often replaced by a more or less open antagonism. Thus, the French members of the inter-Allied commission in Upper Silesia found from the outset of their mission that their British colleagues had sided at once with the Germans, while the British side complained that the French were backing the Poles. A prominent French

diplomatist remarked the other day, 'Les Anglais nous combattent désormais partout.' No doubt similar remarks are being made on the British side about the attitude of the French.

It is not very difficult to foresee what would be the ultimate consequences of such a state of things, were it allowed to endure indefinitely. Altogether, there have been during the second and last phase three main Franco-British crises. The first was produced by the French occupation of Frankfort in April, 1920. It was an ugly incident, for the British Government claimed that France had promised through M. Paul Cambon not to make the occupation without asking for the consent of Great Britain. Still public opinion was not embittered by the dispute, at any rate in France. The second crisis was worse. M. Millerand's sudden recognition of Wrangel produced in London an unfortunate effect, only equal to that produced in France by the news that Mr. Lloyd George was at the very same moment asking Poland to surrender to the Soviets. While the feeling in England was that France was provoking Russia, the feeling in France was that, in face of an immediate danger, that of a Bolshevik invasion of Poland, England was standing aside. But the third crisis, which followed Mr. Lloyd George's speech on Upper Silesia on May 13th last, was certainly the worst of the three as far as the effect on French public opinion was concerned. Perhaps, however, this was only due to the fact that the previous incidents had not been forgotten. In any case, the feeling in France was surprisingly bitter among all classes, the commonly accepted view being that what Mr. Lloyd George had certainly wanted to make clear was that the Entente had come to an end. It may safely be assumed that the corresponding utterances of part of the French press have not been far from producing in England an equally regrettable impression.

It is indeed difficult to believe that things can go on for ever on such an ill-defined basis. Naturally both countries must from time to time differ on some subjects. But a wholesome discussion is very different from the almost hysterical quarrels which are now recurring every six months and must certainly end in a final break if they are allowed to continue. Neither England nor France would find it very difficult to secure some new associates in Europe or elsewhere. France, for instance, would have but to lift her little finger to build up with Germany

a continental system which would not be exactly friendly to the British Empire and would find much encouragement in America. The result would be that after doing some harm to England, France would discover within ten years that Germany was to her an irreconcilable enemy. In the meantime, the whole structure of the New Europe, built up by France and England with the help of America, might go to pieces. As a matter of fact, a rupture of the Entente would not only be a moral disgrace, but an obvious calamity to two great nations, and to some small ones as well.

Under these circumstances, the fundamental question which needs answering is whether a general agreement between both countries is really possible. An alliance or an entente has no sense unless it corresponds to some common policy. Let us therefore make a frank inquiry and see whether a common policy is probable or possible either in Europe, or in other parts of the world where French and British interests touch each other.

Taking first the European side of the problem, one cannot help feeling at first a certain uneasiness about the future prospects of the Franco-British Entente. It has almost become a commonplace to say that the attitude of Great Britain towards Germany is just the reverse of that of France. The day an armistice was in sight the Commander-in-Chief of the British armies is said to have recommended that the Allies should only insist on the evacuation of France, Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine while Marshall Foch insisted on proceeding as far as the Rhine. Great Britain was for the minimum, France for the maximum. With the exception of the naval and colonial fields, the same opposition has asserted itself on every other occasion ever since. It reached almost a climax over the Upper Silesian affair, not to mention the question of the sanctions, that is whether the sanctions jointly accepted in March last ought to be suppressed at once. In one word England is apparently backing Germany against France as if France were again a dangerous factor on the continent. Moreover, while France has been backing the Poles, England has rather taken the opposite side. A similar opposition has made itself felt as regards Bolshevist Russia, with which England was anxious to resume relations, while France was not. Again, as regards the Austrian problem, it has looked at times as if English policy were rather in favour of attaching Austria to Germany.

The reason of this conflict is easy to perceive. British policy has been apparently dominated since the armistice by the desire to facilitate the revival of trade, which is far more vital to England than reparations or any other subject. Hence a desire to help Germany, regarded as an important factor in the world's commerce, and also to reopen the Russian market. Poland has been looked upon as a disturbing element. France on the contrary seemed to care for nothing but for making Germany pay, and at the same time making her as harmless as possible. The English manufacturer and the French peasant seem indeed to look upon the new Europe of to-day with totally different eyes.

However there is one ray of hope ; this conflict of opinions may have been due to temporary causes, and we may see it disappear as soon as the romantic period of the enforcement of the treaty will be at an end. A frequent mistake is being made in England as regards the true motives of French policy towards Germany. France is supposed to have acted since the armistice under the influence of a kind of shell shock combined with hatred and fear of Germany. It is not quite certain that the sentimental aspect of the situation is not just the reverse and that the France of to-day may not be inclined on the contrary to over-estimate her own strength. But what cannot be doubted is that sentiment has had very little to do with the policy of France in respect of Germany. The question has been simply whether Germany should be made to abide by the treaty she had signed, and compelled to disarm and pay. The sternest of critics will no doubt acknowledge that these two questions were settled in May last, after a two years' struggle during which France had to exert a great deal of energy in order to have the treaty carried out. But the critical period will not be completely over as long as such problems as the Upper Silesian settlement still remain unsolved.

A turning point had however already been reached at Brussels last winter when for the first time the German Government agreed to consider in what way the war damages could be paid for. More important still was the official acceptance by the German Government of the total fixed by the Allies for reparations. From that moment, the obvious interest of France was to help Germany, instead of bullying her. Unless Germany reaches a high degree of industrial development, France will not be paid,

that is she will not avoid bankruptcy. A very significant symptom can be found in the recent meeting between M. Loucheur and Herr Rathenau. Under these circumstances, the French standpoint cannot henceforth be on the whole very different from that of England. At any rate, one clearly sees a possibility of agreement on a common policy, the object of which will be to foster the economic reconstruction of Central Europe, while keeping the political and military safeguards which are necessary to the safety of the British Empire as well as to that of France. Provided no aggressive policy is contemplated against Germany, most Englishmen will very likely agree that a revival of Prussian militarism must be prevented at all costs.

The same basis—namely the two-fold necessity of reconstructing the economic activity of Europe and of maintaining the Treaty of Versailles—will make it possible to reach agreement in other fields as well. It is a mistake to believe that French policy is ready to back Poland even when Poland indulges in mad adventures. When Marshal Pilsudski and Prince Sapieha came to Paris last winter they were given clearly to understand that not only would France never recognise the Treaty of Riga, but that she strongly disapproved of the frontier thus imposed by Poland on the Soviet Government—a frontier which the Russia of to-morrow could never accept. As a matter of fact, France cannot abandon Russia for the sake of Poland, if only for this reason, that Poland cannot afford in the future to face a Russo-German coalition and that she must therefore make friends with Russia at all costs. Consequently, it is not difficult to see on what lines France and England could frame a common Polish policy. It ought to be fairly easy to come to an understanding regarding both Eastern Galicia and the Vilna affair, more especially after the efforts made by the League of Nations to settle that last irritating question. Once the Upper Silesian question has been settled there will remain no obviously important motive for disagreement to prevent Great Britain and France from adopting the same attitude towards the Polish problem.

It is more difficult to foresee how the chronic disagreement regarding Bolshevist Russia might be brought to an end or what will be the ultimate development of such questions as that of the independence of Austria. Although French policy is no longer aggressive against the Soviets, it is still doubtful whether France

will quickly go so far as to recognise the Bolshevist Government. Moreover the future of Russia is so dark that unexpected complications may at any time completely alter the terms of the problem now before the Western Powers. As for Austria, it is much to be feared that the time will come, in spite of our efforts to revive the country, when serious attempts will be made to make the Austrian Republic a part of the German Empire, an event which would mean death to the independence of Tcheco-Slovakia and upset the whole balance of Central Europe. It is not certain that Great Britain and France will see eye to eye on that matter. Other differences may assert themselves as time goes on. But we are justified in believing that these special difficulties will be less and less formidable when it has been made clear that England and France can have the same policy concerning Germany and Poland. After all one cannot expect the closest of alliances to amount to a universal agreement on every possible point. What is essential is that a genuine and deep similarity of purpose should exist on two or three vital problems. If both countries find that they have the same interest in bringing about the economic reconstruction of Central Europe and in maintaining its new political framework, if they follow the same line of action on the Rhine and on the Vistula, there will be no harm in postponing an arrangement on certain other subjects and in confessing, for instance, that we shall have to wait a little while before agreeing on what we shall both do with Russia.

Thus it may become easier than many people think to build up a common Franco-British conception of Europe. What then are the prospects of a real agreement outside Europe, namely, in the Near East and elsewhere ?

It cannot be disputed that, in spite of all the efforts made either in Paris or London or elsewhere to adjust the differences between the two countries, the standpoints of Great Britain and France in the Near East seem to remain distinct. The original hope of those who formulated the 1916 agreement was that both countries should follow a common policy towards the Arabs. Sir Mark Sykes thought it might be possible to set up a confederation of Arab States which would preserve a kind of unity although divided between British and French zones of influence, and would even maintain in both zones kindred institutions, for instance an identical system of education. As things have turned

out, and as had been foreseen by those who knew the differences in the administrative methods of the two Powers, not only is Syria organized on a basis very different from what obtains, under British influence, in Palestine or Mesopotamia, but the spirit is altogether different too. Here it is impossible to avoid seeing at least one subject of disagreement between the two mandatory Powers. After the short-lived experience of the Feisal kingdom in Damascus, the French have completely given up the idea of keeping a link with the family of King Hussein. They have more or less turned their back on the original Arab policy of Sir Mark Sykes and based their own policy on two principles : a local autonomous administration in Syria and a general agreement with the Turks. On the other hand, though the prominence given to the Jews in Palestine is not agreeable to the Arabs, British policy tends to lean more and more on a system opposite to that of the French, consisting in the creation of Arab kingdoms or principalities with the assistance of King Hussein and his sons. Where the difficulty of understanding each other becomes almost pathetic is when the British Government or the British press tries to prove to the French that the presence of Abdullah in Transjordania or of Feisal in Bagdad ought to be welcome to France. This is one of the most typical instances showing how painful the instinctive misunderstanding between the two countries may sometimes become.

Still even with Feisal on the Mesopotamian horizon and with the Franco-Turkish unratified agreement in Cilicia, it is not impossible to conceive that the Arab policy of Great Britain and the Turkish policy of France may ultimately be reconciled to each other. Though England has not given up the policy of the Arab kingdoms, and though she is clinging to the family of King Hussein as representing the Arab world, she has apparently given up the attempt to set up in Mecca a new Caliphate, that is, she is no longer directing her Arab policy against the Turks. The idea is obviously gaining ground in England that, without surrendering to the Turkish Nationalists, some settlement must be framed that in the end will make Turkey a fairly quiet neighbour to Mesopotamia as well as to Syria. On the French side there is no desire to irritate the Arabs. The only real point of difference is that the French do not believe in the theory that Feisal and his brothers are more important from the Arab point of view than the

other chiefs of the Arab peninsula. Should it however appear that Feisal may become a reliable king of Bagdad, the attitude of the French in Syria might quickly change.

For these reasons, it is not unlikely that some of the outstanding difficulties are but temporary. What is clear is that, once the Feisal question is put aside, France has the most obvious interest to build up a solid agreement with England in the Near East, while the same is true of England as regards France. Even after the completion of the railway line from Haifa to Bagdad through the British zone of influence, the economic interests of Mesopotamia will not be well served until an additional outlet is provided by the route of Alexandretta, that is through French Syria. From the standpoint of political and military safety, a Franco-British agreement is so natural and necessary in the Near East that it has already been prepared on many points. For instance, both countries have already agreed that the railway lines in Southern Syria may be used by British forces, while France has shown herself willing to place in Syria certain landing grounds at the disposal of British aviation. As a matter of fact, Syria under a French mandate is the safest buffer State England could find on the road to India, while France, on her side, must of necessity consolidate her rather hazardous position in Syria by leaning on the British system in the Near East. This seems to be already understood by the men in charge of affairs at Beyruth, Jerusalem or Cairo. Perhaps the best symptom of the present period is that the representatives of the two countries should have exchanged visits and adopted the wise practice of discussing directly with one another any subjects of difference that may from time to time arise.

Thus, a general agreement in the Near East is not impossible. Let us now cast a glance at the other world problems pending between the two countries.

France is the only country, besides Great Britain, which possesses a more or less continuous belt of possessions around the world. For this reason there are practically in every corner of the universe a number of petty Franco-British problems which may be either a source of friction or, on the contrary, an occasion of agreement.

In the first place, it cannot be disputed that in spite of the latest extradition agreements passed during the war, the very

existence of the French possessions in India, more especially at Chandernagoor, is a cause of trouble for the Indian Government, as it creates so many hiding places for undesirable Indians running away from the Anglo-Indian police. It is a pity no action was taken at the end of the war when both the India Office and the French Ministère des Colonies were not far from favouring a scheme which consisted in suppressing all French possessions with the exception of Pondichery, the territory of which was to be enlarged. There were also negotiations pending with regard to cables and wireless. In a letter addressed to M. Paul Cambon on February 23rd, 1913, Sir Edward Grey offered to allow one of the Laccadive islands to be used by France for a wireless station, provided the French Government agreed not to connect this station by cable with the Indian coast. It is difficult to explain why nothing was done in either of these two directions.

In the second place, there is still something to be settled as far as Muskat is concerned. Although France renounced in 1913 the commercial rights she held in the Persian Gulf under the commercial treaty with Muskat of 1844, there is still a Franco-British political agreement of 1862 which holds good and which hampers in a certain measure England's freedom of action. This, however, is a mere trifle.

Before leaving Asia, one ought to mention, in the third place, the necessity of an agreement with regard to the Chinese Province of Yunnan. While there is a French railway penetrating from Indochina as far as Yunnan-Sen, the British administration in Burma is apparently thinking of building a line from Katha, through Bhamo, to Ta-li-fu, in Western Yunnan. There should be no difficulty in arranging that these two undertakings should not clash with each other.

Under a fourth head may be grouped the general African problems. They have been much simplified since the arrangements made by Lord Milner and his French colleague regarding the Cameroons and Togoland. The old idea of negotiating certain exchanges of territories, more especially as far as British Gambia was concerned, is considered less and less acceptable as time goes on. Instead of suppressing friction it might increase it by creating discontented communities which would make each ceded territory a source of endless complaints. What is far more interesting is the view put forward by private merchants

as well as by prominent officials on both sides that economic arrangements of all kinds should be made in West Africa, and possibly elsewhere, between the French and the British Colonies. Much good pioneer work has already been done in that respect by such associations as that of the English West African Merchants and the French Union Coloniale which have decided to meet every year and consider problems of common interest with a view to making parallel recommendations to their respective Governments. It is needless to point out that an unlimited field of joint action is open in that part of the world as regards railways, telegraph, harbours, navigation, tariffs, finance and local laws.

In the fifth place, there is the Tangier question. If it had to be put in its proper place from the standpoint of the importance attached to it by France, it would have to be placed in front of all the outstanding problems. One circumstance ought to explain that importance to the English reader. In the general system of French policy, North Africa represents what India is to Great Britain. The future political condition of Tangier which is one of the keys of French North Africa, though it is surrounded by the Spanish zone, is a question France cannot afford to treat lightly. Fortunately after many useless diplomatic disputes, a wise step has lately been taken by deciding at last to start constructing the harbour which Tangier has wanted for years. The political solution however is yet to be defined. It cannot be settled without the consent of England, and raises the whole question of the mutual relations between England and France on one side, and Spain on the other. It is doubtful whether France will give her final assent to the British schemes in Egypt before the problem of Tangier has been settled.

Leaving Africa* and crossing the Atlantic one meets, in the sixth place, the question of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon. Those two French islands are apparently a source of trouble to Newfoundland and Canada as they have become a refuge for all the smugglers. The best solution from the British point of view would be that they should be ceded by France to Newfoundland. If this should be found impossible, mainly

* It seems needless to discuss the case of Mauritius where an agitation has been started in order to have the island retroceded to France, though the question has not gone beyond the range of local politics.

owing to the part played by Saint Pierre and Miquelon in the recruiting of men for the French Navy, some arrangement might at any rate be arrived at which would give satisfaction to both Dominions.

Finally, there is in the Pacific the famous question of the New Hebrides. As is well known, the Anglo-French condominium over the Archipelago is condemned by all parties as being inefficient and a cause of perpetual quarrels. Moreover, the question does not interest Great Britain as much as it does Australia. If there is to be a settlement of the problem, it must be found in a general adjustment of French and Australian interests in the Pacific.

It was in that direction that a solution was looked for during the stay of Mr. Hughes in Europe while the Peace Conference was at work. It appeared at that moment that Australia, now that she had on her hands the heavy burden of the former German Colonies, would be willing to let France take charge of the New Hebrides, provided proper safeguards were granted to the Australian missionaries and business interests in the islands, and provided also that France would enter with Australia into a more general agreement in the Pacific for the whole of her establishments in that part of the world. Both sides were not far from conceiving that these French establishments might join a British Federation of the Pacific, with a common representation in Sydney. Similar views were communicated at the same date in Australia to the French Mission headed by General Pau.

Whether a bold scheme of that kind is still practicable to-day, after having been neglected for so many months, is doubtful. The news that Mr. Hughes will come to France after the Imperial Conference and negotiate a commercial treaty cannot be interpreted as a first step taken in that direction. Still one cannot help thinking that the world association between France and Great Britain will only last if it is more or less based in the future on the general principle that was defined in the course of these conversations of 1919.

Such a principle consists, indeed, in creating wherever it is possible to do so, regional associations between British and French interests. In some part of the world, this would mean that France should adapt her colonial policy to the policy of the British Dominions. She might thus join hands with Australia and

New Zealand in the Pacific. Between Madagascar and South Africa she might agree to organize a better shipping connection and to lower the tariff wall which has shut out Madagascar from the rest of the African world. A similar cooperation might be organized between French and British Colonies, protectorates or mandates. Thus an economic and political understanding is possible in the Near East, another in West Africa, while the time will come when the railway system in Burma may have to be linked up with that of Indo-China, thus creating a centre of Franco-British forces in the Far East.

It is only by decentralising in this way the Franco-British Entente that one may hope to give it a new and enduring vigour. Such a decentralisation corresponds to the quick evolution that is taking place throughout the non-European world and makes it more and more necessary to set up everywhere, from the political as well as from the economic standpoint, a number of systems of autonomous, self-supporting forces. Undoubtedly our common experience since the war is far from proving that a renewal of the Franco-British association on these lines is really practicable. The slovenly methods, only excused by the pressure of events, in which both countries have indulged in the course of their mutual relations have rather created the impression that such a plan belongs to the world of dreams. On the other hand, one cannot help being struck by the fact that both the British and the French empires have a clear interest to stand by each other, be it in Europe or elsewhere, for they are the only two world Powers really interested in the defence of the new state of things. Moreover one does not see that there is either in Europe or in the wide world a single problem on which a Franco-British agreement is clearly impossible.

Perhaps it is not contrary to common sense to hope that the effort to frame a general agreement between the two countries will therefore ultimately be made. What shape such an agreement ought to take is of course a matter to be left for the Governments to decide. It might be a sound way to begin by asking the English Parliament to give force, without waiting for the assent of America, to the guarantee agreement of June 28th, though the form of the undertaking is from the French point of view somewhat objectionable. Another method would be to replace that document by a series of reciprocal arrangements bearing on the

various problems enumerated above. One thing only is certain, namely, that it is highly desirable that both Governments should exchange their views about the whole situation and no longer confine their diplomatic activities to piecemeal discussions going from worse to worse.

Sir Charles Dilke wrote in his diary, in 1882 : ' The French ' are not pleasant people to go tiger-hunting with.' Though he might maintain that they are at times troublesome and difficult to deal with, one wonders whether he would still express the same opinion after the experience which began in 1914. A similar remark may be made as regards England from the French standpoint. On the whole, the Franco-British association has proved for the last seven years a wonderful success. Would it be wise to let it go to pieces ?

PHILIPPE MILLET.

THE DILEMMA OF CIVILISATION

1. The History of Social Development. By Dr. F. Müller Lyer. Translated by E. C. and H. A. Lake. Allen and Unwin. 1920.
2. Social Decay and Regeneration. By R. Austin Freeman. Constable. 1921.

THE social outlook of the man of science is very different from that of the politician, and hardly less from that of the average social reformer. The biologist thinks in centuries and millennia; he looks before and after in a way which would ruin a politician, who is acute enough in predicting which way the popular breeze will blow to-morrow, but knows and cares little what will happen in the next generation. The man of science also believes that we can only conquer nature by obeying her; he does not think that human nature is likely to change appreciably even in a thousand years, except by the operation of natural selection or counter-selection, or if he is an optimist, by rational selection; he certainly does not believe that 'where 'God sends mouths He sends meat,' nor that vicarious charity will cover a multitude of economic sins. We breathe a different atmosphere when we leave the watchful observers of the jumping cat, and consult the men who patiently interrogate the great Sphinx—the 'elemental laws' which, as Walt Whitman says, 'never apologise,' the silent goddess on whose knees are the fates of nations, races, and species, and who makes them or breaks them impartially, according to their skill in reading her riddles, or their wilfulness in disregarding her unspoken but not unacted warnings. Science has not yet come to its own in forming the beliefs and practices of mankind, because it has been too much excluded from politics and too much repressed by religion. It is the purgatory of religion and politics alike, exacting expiation for every sin against truth and every dishonest concession to passion or prejudice. The futile attempts of the last century to 'reconcile' it with ecclesiastical tradition have died down. Science has captured a number of indefensible outworks, and religion is not a pin the worse. Science was materialistic while battling with superstition; since it has won its freedom it has been willing to learn much from idealistic philosophy. The

war of the twentieth century is no longer between science and religion ; it is between science and the irrational forces which make for social degeneracy and disintegration. It is not for nothing that revolutionists speak with hatred or distrust of 'intellectuals.' For they themselves are in revolt, not merely against the existing social order, but against economic law, and against society as an organic growth, with its roots in the past. In this country a new type of man is being evolved, who has no survival value ; his career is not likely to be merry, and will certainly be short.

And yet the prevailing tone and temper of public opinion have always reacted upon the progress and direction of scientific discovery. We have to admit that even the most independent thinker is the child of his age. The dreams of human perfectibility which intoxicated the French towards the end of the eighteenth century gave a stimulus to doctrines of evolution as the law of nature ; but while *la carrière ouverte aux talents* was reflected in the theory of Lamarck, the competitive industrialism of the next generation found its supposed justification in Darwin's doctrine of the survival of the fittest. At the present day, the popular faith that everything is possible to organized effort seems to correspond to the physics of energy, and it may be that the political and economic revolt against the belief in fixed laws of nature is more than accidentally synchronous with the theories of Bergson and his school. Few men free themselves from prejudices coming from without ; none perhaps from prejudices which have their source within. We never become independent of our temperament ; and group-influences, however we may account for them, seem to modify individual temperament in each generation, probably by constantly directing attention to some one aspect of experience.

Two recent books on scientific sociology, which resemble each other in the ability of their authors, in their wide knowledge of biology and kindred sciences, and in their general plan of treatment, may profitably be considered side by side, the more so as their conclusions are strongly opposed to each other. One is Dr. Müller Lyer's *History of Social Development* (Phasen der Kultur), written before the war and now translated into English ; the other is Dr. Austin Freeman's *Social Decay and Regeneration*, published this year with an introduction by Mr. Havelock Ellis,

himself a notable contributor to the scientific study of social problems.

Dr. Müller Lyer contemplates the species to which we belong as rising from insignificant beginnings to more and more elevated forms of life. At first, of course, man knew nothing of the marvellous destiny reserved for him ; but a great moment arrived when a knowledge of the path which he was treading crossed the threshold of his consciousness. From this moment instinctive striving began to be transformed into conscious and purposive action. He cherished hopes of being able to control the movement of his own progress. But this control has not yet been achieved, and cannot be ours till we understand the course of social evolution, which has passed through many successive phases. These lines of direction can be traced, and they must serve us as signposts for the future. Dr. Lyer attempts to interpret history in this manner. His subject comprises economic development, the family, the State, the human intellect, ethics, justice, and art.

Culture, he says, is a progressive movement, which we can trace back to its beginnings in the evolution of man from lower forms. The discovery of speech, of the way to produce fire, and of tools, are among the most important points of new departure. The use of tools increases steadily as man moves from the age of stone to that of copper and bronze, and thence to iron. The age of iron culminated in the machine-civilisation of our own day, which began in this country about 150 years ago, when a series of discoveries ushered in the industrial revolution. All purely mechanical labour is now in process of being transferred from man to the machine ; and we might have expected that the prophecy of Aristotle would be approaching its fulfilment : ' If shuttles would work by themselves, and the plectra and ' zithers could play by themselves, we should need no more slaves ' (Politics, 1, 2-5). But the development of social organization has not kept pace with that of technical art and of our general economic life ; so that the wage-earners have not yet emerged from quasi-servile conditions. The machine age is only in its preliminary phase.

Capitalism, as he shows, was highly developed under the Roman Empire ; private fortunes were on a larger scale than at any subsequent period before the nineteenth century. But its

basis was slave-labour, not machinery. (He might have added that improvements in machinery are always kept back by slavery.) Accordingly, when the supply of slaves fell off, industry decayed. For the ancients never kept human stud-farms like the planters of the Southern States in America ; and without this device, a slave population always decreases rapidly. From the end of the Western empire till the beginning of the industrial revolution capitalism was on a very small scale. It was discouraged by the Church and repressed by the feudal system. Either the desire for accumulation was weaker in the middle ages, or the opportunities for gratifying it were absent. ' Even in 1825 the whole ' merchant-fleet of Bremen did not number as many tons as an ' ordinary steamer of to-day.' Until steam came in to perform the work which had hitherto been done by the muscles of men and beasts, the large majority of workmen were small handicraftsmen, and many families were almost entirely self-sufficient. In the new economic era, the first strides were made by those older trades which had previously developed as handicrafts ; secondly came such newer trades as those in rubber, sugar, and chemical works. Thirdly, hand labour was driven from spinning, weaving, tanning, brick-making and pottery, which for thousands of years had been common domestic industries. The self-sufficing family disappeared ; for the factories herded the workmen together, and the old cottage with its kitchen garden and pigsty was crowded out. Individual production gave way to cooperative production ; division of labour destroyed the old craftsmanship and the old independent artisan. The greatest success of the capitalistic era has been the immense increase of export and import trade.

Dr. Müller Lyer is impressed by the truth of Kant's saying, ' As progress becomes more rapid its phases are shorter.' He thinks that the stage in which we now are will be far briefer than those which preceded it. Amalgamations, both of capital and labour, grow larger ; and socialised trade, conducted by the State, becomes more and more important. It is only the strong conservatism of domestic economy that has prevented large experiments in cooperative housekeeping, which would economise the greater part of women's labour. But such experiments, as he sees, are made difficult by ' our social sensitiveness, which ' has become self-conscious through our thousand divisions

' into classes and sub-classes, and by the tendency to exclusiveness ' inherent in every family union.' Such schemes as those of Fourier ' must be relegated to the dim future.'

It is impossible not to regret the loss of handiness which the machine age has brought with it. Savages always want to know whether the traveller has made all his belongings himself, and would be surprised if he confessed that he could not make one of them. An English visitor to Tahiti found that the natives could make a hut out of branches and leaves ; they readily kindled fire by rubbing sticks together. Clothing was woven during a walk to fetch fruit. Flasks, pails, and casks were scooped out of bamboo in a few minutes. These natives would have been astonished to hear that a houseless Briton has to bully the State into spending a thousand pounds of the taxpayer's money to build him a home, and that he is content to wait months for its completion. Moreover, while in the natural state man is able to live out his own life, employing himself in occupations which make use of all his energies equally, set his limbs in motion, excite his interest, and call forth his sagacity, ' we have all developed on one side only, ' and become slaves of labour, some of whom all their lives do ' nothing but dig, others bore or polish, or write or tend a ' machine.' Fishing and hunting, the daily occupation of the barbarian, are in civilisation amusements which only the well-to-do can enjoy.

But our author finds the greatest evil wrought by machinery to be the stimulus which it gives to covetousness, or ' pleonexia ' as he calls it, borrowing a useful word from the Greek. It has created a hard and hateful world, in which industry is regarded as the aim of existence, and time as mere money. This ' Americanism,' as the Germans call it, has attacked the nations of the West like an epidemic, and though the almost superhuman energy which it has introduced into life must excite admiration, it has brought with it no happiness, but rather envy and bitterness.

Culture in fact has made the lot of the majority worse rather than better. Man in his primitive condition can employ his ability in harmony with his own tastes. He is free from anxiety for the future and contented with his lot ; whereas in a highly industrialised community the great mass of people are crowded in a never-ceasing treadmill of specialised labour, hemmed in on all sides by duties and restrictions, consumed either by care or

by ' pleonexia,' and condemned to a troubled and stunted existence which would fill a savage with horror.

And yet there seems to be no escape. For the most highly organized communities have the greatest survival value, and the fate of the individual is immaterial to the advance of the process. Just as, in an earlier state of society, a slave-holding nation, which can devote itself more exclusively to the art of war, is more powerful than a nation of working agriculturists, so a modern nation which forces a majority of its members into the most unnatural division of labour can undersell and starve out another which has preserved simpler and more wholesome methods of production. A people which cares only for such progress as can be measured by statistics is likely to destroy another, higher on the scale of civilisation, which aims at making a better quality of life possible for its citizens. The blindly working forces of nature favour perfection of social organization rather than the welfare of the individual. In the most advanced animal communities this process has been carried to a hideous perfection. The beehive is an appalling object lesson in State socialism carried to its logical consequences.

Mankind, says Dr. Lyer, is in revolt against this doom. The two cries, ' individualism ' and ' socialism,' are only different expressions of the demand for happiness. If we take these two ideals as implying respectively the organization of freedom and the organization of labour, they are complementary to each other rather than antagonistic. It is only in States organized for war that the interests of the individual need be ruthlessly sacrificed. International commercial relations tend to unify the whole of civilisation, and when this process has gone further, the State may become, as it should be, the medium for the welfare of its citizens. This will not be brought about till a condition of relative stability is produced. But such a stabilisation is probable in the near future, since there are no more empty countries to be exploited, and there are already signs of a ' humanising of ' propagation,' by which the reckless and senseless increase of numbers may be brought to an end. Nothing, our author says, justly, has caused so much needless suffering among civilised nations, and has so completely neutralised the effect which culture should have in promoting happiness, as the swollen birth-rates of the nineteenth century.

When ' the science of social forces has itself become a social ' force,' ' we are justified in supposing that future development ' will rise to undreamed of heights, and will lead on to an era of ' perfect culture, in the light of which all the phases of our present ' half culture put together will seem like a kind of childhood ' of the human race. We almost receive the impression that ' throughout the tremendous drama of humanity there has been ' glimmering a secret plan of salvation and blessing.'

Dr. Lyer, it will be seen, is an optimist, and he ends on an almost religious note which sounds oddly from an avowed secularist, who has nothing but contempt for the faiths by which men have lived in the past. His outlook is what we have learned to call *pre-war* ; and nothing makes us realise so clearly the profound change which a terrible catastrophe has made in our judgments about the world in which we live, than the fact that we can tell without difficulty whether a book on social science was written before or after 1914. For Dr. Lyer, the assumptions of evolutionary optimism are taken for granted ; the course of civilisation has been not only from a simpler to a more complicated structure, but from an irrational to a partially rational order of social life ; and though for a time the development of machine industry seems to have diminished human happiness, he has no doubt that this maladjustment will before long be set right. He is not free from the fallacies of Karl Marx, and more than once assumes that the present economic system tends to make the rich richer and the poor poorer. The statistics of the national income in the years before the war entirely refuted this favourite argument of the Socialists. He looks for a solution of the economic difficulty to nationalisation and State management. Such a view is intelligible in a German, for State administration in Germany before the war was undoubtedly very efficient, and free from the reckless wastefulness and incompetence which has made public ownership a byword in England. But this efficiency was the result of a bureaucratic system organised from above ; it has yet to be proved that national trading under a democracy can be either economical or business-like. And it is generally agreed that the German system was prejudicial to personal initiative, and to that adaptability on which the Americans have long prided themselves, and which we may fairly boast that we displayed during the war. Dr. Lyer is also obliged to postulate

a recovery from the evil spirit of ' pleonexia,' which he considers to be a result of modern industrialism. But it is very doubtful whether the western European is really more covetous either than his ancestors before the industrial revolution, or than the picturesque and romantic Asiatic. If we are looking for the man who would betray or cut the throat of his best friend for a few dollars, it is not in Chicago or the City of London that we are most likely to find him. We cannot cure the acquisitive spirit by limiting its opportunities. The peasant proprietor is perhaps the greediest skinflint alive.

The unexamined postulate of evolutionary optimism is that all social evils have a natural tendency to eliminate themselves. There is no sanction in history for this assumption. Increasing complexity of organization is not necessarily progress, if by progress is meant the passage from a less desirable state of life to a more desirable. The more complex structure of society may impose itself because it has a greater survival value ; it is not certain that any measures of social reform can make life in a highly industralised community agreeable to the individual, without sacrificing the efficiency on which the existence of the community depends. This is the great problem of sociology ; and it must be solved, if there is any solution, without assuming, as Dr. Lyer does, that there is some mysterious power which has already determined that the human race shall advance to some unimagined perfection. It is often forgotten that highly organized animal communities, such as the bees and ants, must have passed through a period of rapid ' progress,' during which their social life attained its present complexity, and that this period of evolution was followed by a condition of stable equilibrium which appears to be permanent. Our own species probably passed through many millennia without appreciable change, and the restless spirit of progress may, for all we know, come finally to rest at some time when man is once more in complete harmony with his environment. The shocking revelations of depravity which war-conditions have brought to light in many countries have made such a possibility less unwelcome to us than to our fathers. The progress on which they prided themselves now seems to us to have been mainly illusory. This disillusionment has been well illustrated by Mr. Max Beerbohm. He has drawn for us a picture of the Nineteenth

Century in the person of a large and comfortable man in side-whiskers and a white tie, looking complacently at his vision of the future—a still larger and more comfortable man with an ampler white tie. His companion picture of the Twentieth Century shows us a young man with a mourning band on his arm, contemplating his vision of the future—a large note of interrogation. So completely has a sudden convulsion shattered our rosy dreams, and left us gazing anxiously into the void.

Dr. Austin Freeman's book reflects the post-war temper of disillusionment and perplexity. But his main subject is the reign of the machine, and its reactions upon the life of mankind. The part played in human activities by muscular exertion has decreased very rapidly in the last hundred years. A century ago, our muscles were the chief motive power. Now, machinery is finding its way even into the smallest establishments. So with transport. A hundred years ago journeys were chiefly made on foot or on horseback, and our ancestors thought nothing of a thirty miles' walk. Now we scramble into an omnibus to escape the exertion of walking a few hundred yards. It is well known that the disuse of function results in loss of function and atrophy of the disused organs ; to counteract which the modern man uses dumb-bells and developers, which would astonish a savage as much as anything else in our civilisation. The factory hands, the chief victims of the machine, are as a rule of very poor physique ; they are small and stunted, with bad teeth, and suffer much from pulmonary and digestive troubles. Their death-rates are far higher than those in rural areas. Dr. Freeman might have added that in spite of the advance in medical science, the expectation of life after 60, in all classes together, is slightly less than it was half a century ago ; a clear proof that we are not living healthy lives. From the point of view of health, our urban civilisation is a failure.

Progress, as Dr. Freeman sees clearly, is of two kinds. It may refer to changes in the environment, including the store of transmitted experience ; or it may mean those changes by which man himself has been improved. The two aspects by no means coincide.

Intrinsic progress was great, and may have been rapid, when man was first becoming human. The decisive modifications were doubtless due to variations which established themselves,

and which definitely lifted our species into a condition in which men could begin their conquest of nature. But from an early date, say 3000 B.C., progress has been almost entirely environmental. The change in the relation of man to his surroundings has been amazing. The little hairless animal that once crept, naked and forlorn, over the face of the earth, the sport of the elements, the prey of the larger beasts ; behold him now in all the opulence of his great inheritance of knowledge, lording it over the world through which he once sneaked in momentary peril of his life. He burrows into the bowels of the earth ; he traverses its surface at a speed which leaves the fleetest beast as stationary ; he follows the leviathan into the depths of the sea ; he soars to heights inaccessible to the eagle. In time of peace we congratulated ourselves on the humanising effects of these discoveries ; but we know now that primitive barbarism was only dormant, and ready to be roused into active savagery at the first beat of the drum. And under the conditions of modern warfare, the lives and property of non-combatants are exposed to dangers which are the direct result of the new knowledge. The discovery of flying has so far been an almost unmixed curse to humanity, and is a menace to the very existence of civilisation. Nor can we congratulate ourselves without hesitation on the rise in the standard of comfort, which only means that we make increased demands on our environment. ' There is much truth in the saying ' of Diogenes, that a man's wealth may be estimated in terms of ' the things which he can do without.' The accumulation of wealth and the increase of numbers, without any real advance in individual character or mental capacity, do not make for happiness.

The theory and practice of government are divided between sociologists, who have knowledge but no power, and politicians, who have power but no knowledge. ' The professional politician ' whom democracy has brought into existence differs entirely ' from other professional men. He is totally unqualified.' Such knowledge as the old parliamentary hand has acquired teaches him only how to get office and to keep in office ; it has no relation to political wisdom or statesmanship. For example, the First Lord of the Admiralty may be a brewer, a publisher, or a stockbroker. And yet this is a time when the functions of government are being extended every year.

The division of Labour has destroyed the old craftsman. Not a man in a boot factory is able to make a pair of boots. Even in the Art Schools the pupils are being trained, not to be artists, but to be Art School-masters and mistresses ; and the Technical School scholars are being trained to be Technical School-masters. The old apprenticeship produced very different results at a small fraction of the cost.

Everyone who knows the inside of a Government department notices its incapacity as compared with a private business concern. The business men who joined the army, and were seldom employed in the work of management, were unanimous in their verdict that ' if any private firm were conducted in this way, it ' would be bankrupt in a week.' And yet the clamour for nationalisation goes on. It is a clamour to substitute a system of proved inefficiency for one which has worked well as a method of production. Another manifest evil is the splitting up of the community into minor aggregations, each tyrannically ruled from within, and antagonistic to each other and to the community as a whole. ' A spirit of mutual hostility and of collective ' selfishness and greed replaces the patriotism, public spirit and ' citizenship on which civilisation grew and on which alone it ' can be maintained.'

The scheme of elevating the social organism as a whole without improving the individuals who compose it has only the results of degrading the individuals still further ; for the ' social ' organism ' is a very low type of organism, a simple aggregate of complex units ; and by absorption into an organized aggregate of this low type the individual, as we have seen, becomes functionally atrophied.

Having thus dealt faithfully and somewhat severely with our modern institutions, Dr. Freeman girds up his loins for an attack on machinery. These chapters might have been the exhortation which persuaded Samuel Butler's Erewhonians to destroy all their machines and forbid the manufacture even of a watch. ' Mechanism is an independent entity governed by its own laws ' and having no necessary connection with human needs and ' human welfare.' The development of the machine is in the direction of ever-increasing automatism. The total elimination of the human worker is the goal towards which it is moving. Man is being driven from the principal field of his activity.

The reign of the machine has, for the first time, made the earth hideous. The old town was an improvement to the landscape ; the new town is an eyesore. The old sailing ship was a thing of beauty ; the new steamer wastes no effort in vain attempts not to be ugly. A more important indictment is that before the age of machines the inroads made by man on irreplaceable material were moderate, and offered no menace to posterity. ' Pre-mechanical civilisation had left the original ' environment of man largely undisturbed, its outward aspect ' little changed, its store of mineral wealth almost intact ; and ' in so far as it had reacted upon human environment, the result ' of the reactions was to increase the habitability of the world ' for man.' The last hundred years have seen a complete change in these conditions. The power-machine is an insatiable consumer of coal and iron. Pre-mechanical man lived on the interest of his environment ; mechanical man lives very extravagantly on the capital. Nobody supposes that the world's supply of coal will last for as much as a thousand years, even if our miners (animated, no doubt, by far-seeing forethought for posterity) refuse, at frequent intervals, to bring it to the surface. The forests of the world are also being rapidly destroyed, largely to gratify the insatiable demands of the newspapers for wood pulp. Many of us will think that ' one impulse from the vernal ' wood ' might teach us more than ' all the sages ' who write for the daily press. But the vernal wood is being cut down. The visible tokens of the triumphant machine are our horrible factory towns with their forests of tall chimneys ; their unending rows of mean houses, peopled by crowds of dingy workers ; and the pall of black smoke above their heads which pours down a shower of soot through the twice-breathed air, and devastates the country for miles beyond the radius of the town itself. If those philosophers are right who hold that beauty is an attribute of the Deity, and that ugliness of every kind is displeasing in His sight, our modern civilisation is a blatant blasphemy.

Dependence on the smooth working of this complicated mechanism has made western society much more vulnerable than it was before. Even in Russia the paralysis of commerce has turned the towns into cemeteries ; and our trade unions have made the welcome discovery that they can ' hold up ' the community as successfully as ever Dick Turpin waylaid a coach.

A revolution in England would condemn millions to actual death by starvation.

Aesthetically the influence of the machine is bad, because it destroys variety and individuality. We do not want to find the same furniture, carpets, wall-papers and ornaments in every house ; such uniformity is as dull as a picture-gallery filled with replicas of a single picture.

Dr. Freeman sums up the reactions of the power-machine on industry as follows : (1) the disappearance of the skilled craftsman and his replacement by the manufacturer and the semi-skilled or unskilled factory hand ; with the like disappearance of the skilled shop-keeper and his replacement by the vendor of factory-made goods ; (2) the disappearance of small local industries ; (3) the disappearance of commodities made by hand with conscious adaptation to human and even personal needs, and their replacement by goods produced by machinery and adjusted to the needs of machine production. The characteristics of the new production are great quantity and small variety, low price and debasement in the character of products ; (4) lowering of standard in production ; (5) wasteful habits and disrespect for the products of industry ; (6) lowering of public taste by frequent contact with things tastelessly designed and badly made. The worker has hitherto been the chief sufferer : but now the solitary virtue—cheapness—of machine-made articles is passing away, and the consumer also is to be pitied.

Dr. Freeman pursues his relentless attack, and considers the reaction of machinery upon man collectively. The industrial revolution was the greatest revolution that has ever occurred. Formerly, the surroundings of the worker were usually pleasant. The hours were long, but the conditions of labour were easy, enlivened by chat with neighbours over the loom or through the smithy door. The worker was also a master who determined his own hours of work, and, since he dealt directly with the consumer, he received the entire profit of his labour. One of the earliest results of machinery was to break up the little society in which the workmen were amicably distributed among the rest of the population, and to concentrate the ' hands ' in separate aggregates, with habits and sympathies different from those of other classes. The conditions of factory labour were for half a century and more thoroughly bad, and feelings of resentment

and antagonism were rooted more and more deeply in the minds of the labourers. The result has been that they have formed combinations held together by a tyrannical organization and discipline, and constantly engaged in acts of war. They lean to collectivism, which is the total suppression of personal liberty ; they have no ambitions to return to craftsmanship of the old kind ; they have never known it and are quite unfit for it. ' That ' the working-class consists largely of men of very slight skill ' was clearly shown during the war, when so-called skilled men ' were called up for service and easily replaced by admittedly ' unskilled men, or even by shop-girls and domestic servants.' The most sinister development of class-consciousness is syndicalism, which is frankly anti-social as well as anti-democratic. It aims at setting up class antagonism and conducting class warfare. It tends to make a good fellow (for so the average workman is) into a very bad citizen.

Another evil of the present system is the opportunity which it gives to a few individuals to amass enormous fortunes which are a curse to themselves and their families and a scandal to the world. Dr. Freeman traces the evolution of an enterprising retailer into the proprietor of shops scattered all over the country, who often becomes his own grower, importer, shipowner, manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer—with profits on every stage of the business. The final stage is the amalgamation of several huge competing concerns of this type into a combine or trust, holding a virtual monopoly. The spectacle of even a few multi-millionaires of this kind is a *reductio ad absurdum* of our whole system, and a potent factor of unrest and discontent. The plutocrats try to protect themselves by buying up and controlling the press, whereby democracy is poisoned at its source and is even coming to be regarded as an obstacle to social reform.

One other bad result remains to be noted. There are not enough consumers at home to keep the great industries running at their maximum profit, and so the surplus must be unloaded on foreign countries. Hence the scramble for markets, and the constant danger of wars for trade. Population has been stimulated on the assumption that the possibilities of export were unlimited ; unfavourable trade conditions produce at once a vast amount of unemployment, which means that a large fraction of the population

who, through no fault of their own, are contributing nothing to the wealth of the country, have to be supported by doles levied on the producers. Over-population and unemployment are the inevitable result of machine civilisation.

Man, individually, is a heavy loser. The majority of workmen are, as it were, parasitic on the machine which has ousted them from natural human occupations. Let us consider the fate of a shipload of factory hands cast on a fertile but uninhabited island. Could they, like the Pilgrim Fathers, found a self-contained and civilised community? Obviously they could not. If they did not die of starvation, they would be found six months later living as savages. Dr. Freeman has watched three hundred African natives caught by a storm on the borders of the great forest in West Africa. The natives, who carried cutlasses, disappeared into the forest, from which they presently emerged carrying bundles of poles and coils of monkey-rope. In about an hour he was amazed to see a village ready for habitation. This story resembles the experience of the traveller in Tahiti, mentioned by Dr. Müller Lyer. Let us turn our thoughts once more for a moment to the Government's 'Housing Scheme'! Our ancestors 'would no more have dreamed of asking the State 'to build their houses than to comb their hair.'

A melancholy chapter follows on Social Parasitism. Dr. Freeman spares no class in this part of his indictment; but he sees the greatest danger in what he considers the evident intention of 'Labour' to become parasitic on the community. The essence of parasitism is the demand for remuneration determined by the desires of the producer, irrespective of the value of the work which he produces. He has no difficulty in showing how the blood of the industrious is sucked in a dozen places to feed the idle, the incompetent, and the egregious bureaucracy which exists mainly to extort and squander the fruits of productive toil. 'That fabulous community whose members lived by taking in 'each others' washing was an economically sound concern 'compared with one in which a vast majority should subsist 'parasitically on the earnings of a dwindling minority. Yet this 'is the social state towards which our own society is advancing.'

Dr. Freeman next (after an adverse criticism of collectivism, which he has anticipated in some earlier chapters) gives his experiences of the British 'sub-man' as he saw him while

inspecting conscripts. The evidences of degeneracy were painfully apparent. 'Compared with the African negro, the British 'sub-man is in several respects markedly inferior. He tends to 'be dull; he is usually quite helpless and unhandy; he has, as 'a rule, no skill or knowledge of handicraft, or indeed knowledge 'of any kind. The negro, on the contrary, is usually sprightly 'and humorous. He is generally well-informed as to the flora 'and fauna of his region, and nearly always knows the principal 'constellations. He has some traditional knowledge of religion, 'myths and folklore, and some acquaintance with music. He is 'handy and self-helpful; he can usually build a house, thatch a 'roof, obtain and prepare food, make a fire without matches, 'spin yarn, and can often weave cotton cloth and make and mend 'simple implements. Physically he is robust, active, hardy and 'energetic.'

Over-population is a phenomenon connected with the survival of the unfit, and it is mechanism which has created conditions favourable to the survival of the unfit and the elimination of the fit.

The whole indictment against machinery may be summed up in Dr. Freeman's own words: 'Mechanism by its reactions on 'man and his environment is antagonistic to human welfare. 'It has destroyed industry and replaced it by mere labour; 'it has degraded and vulgarised the works of man; it has destroyed 'social unity and replaced it by social disintegration and class 'antagonism to an extent which directly threatens civilisation; 'it has injuriously affected the structural type of society by 'developing its organization at the expense of the individual; 'it has endowed the inferior man with political power which 'he employs to the common disadvantage by creating political 'institutions of a socially destructive type; and finally by its 'reactions on the activities of war it constitutes an agent for the 'wholesale physical destruction of man and his works and the 'extinction of human culture. It is thus strictly analogous to 'those anti-bodies by which the existence of aggregates of the 'lower organisms is brought to an end.'

We turn eagerly from this terrible diagnosis to the consideration of remedies. 'The ultimate anti-condition is the suspension 'of natural selection.' To deal with this, elimination of the unfit is more practicable at present than eugenic attempts to breed

supermen. Nevertheless, the adoption of Dr. Rentoul's method of sterilisation is beset with difficulties. (Personally, I think that public opinion would be so much shocked by the advocacy of it that it would set back incalculably the whole cause of racial hygiene.) So Dr. Freeman falls back on the Old Testament doctrine of a 'remnant.' A 'nucleus of superior individuals' might render possible, even at the eleventh hour, a social reconstruction. He suggests a 'voluntary segregation of the fit,' a society of men and women who would determine to lead healthy lives under natural conditions, free from the tyranny of mechanism, and supplying each other's modest needs by hand labour.

It is much to be feared that this scheme is quite unworkable. To collect a society of eugenic craftsmen and professional people in local centres would surely be impossible in such a country as England. And even if they could establish themselves in certain districts, they would not escape the burdens which the State is imposing on all hard-working citizens. They would be taxed, as they are now, to support the swarming progeny of the unfit, to make the wastrel comfortable, to provide soft jobs and pensions for the civil servant and the politician, to inject useless knowledge into the children of the slums, and to provide doles for the growing army of the unemployed. The experiment would be started under conditions which would foredoom it to failure. Moreover, the trade unions would certainly attack and destroy the new society before it could grow. And, lastly, from the point of view of stirpiculture, the effect of the experiment, while it lasted, would be to drain off the best, leaving the residuum worse than before.

These objections seem fatal to the establishment of a segregated 'remnant' in Great Britain. But there is no reason why the experiment should not be tried in a new country. A Company might be founded to acquire a sufficient tract of land in Rhodesia, Tasmania, Western Canada, or Southern Chile, on which a community of picked emigrants might settle and try to live in the good old fashion, as Dr. Freeman wishes. It is most desirable that sociological experiments should be freely tried; for it is only by experiment that the value of proposals for an ideal commonwealth can be tested. The trade unions might easily put their theories into practice if they wished; they could start cooperative production without paying any toll to 'functionless

'capital'; but apparently they are too prudent. The Communists, to do them justice, have not shrunk from experiments; and they have demonstrated conclusively that on a large scale Communism means the swift death of all human industry except agriculture. Small Communistic societies have sometimes lasted for a considerable time, but only when two conditions have existed—a religious basis, and celibacy. All other attempts to realise Utopia on these lines have ended quickly and ignominiously. Dr. Freeman's society would be less ambitious. It would aim only at reproducing the simple, self-contained social life of the age before machinery. In any country where unoccupied land of good quality can still be bought, such a community might live very happily; but not in England.

The constructive part of the book which we have been considering is therefore very disappointing. It leaves us with no remedy for a state of things which the author thinks almost desperate. So lame a conclusion to a very able social diagnosis should make us realise how deep and difficult the problem is. Civilisation is faced with a great dilemma. It has grown, like every other organism, in response to its environment. It has strengthened itself by utilising that environment to the uttermost. The secrets of nature have been penetrated, and its forces, one after another, have been harnessed to a car of Juggernaut, which seems now to be crushing its own worshippers. No society which has refused to use the new mechanical discoveries can hold its own in competition against the highly industrialised societies. Even in Europe, the Latin countries, which are poor in mineral wealth, have fallen behind in the race. The quick-witted and ambitious Japanese have bowed the knee to Baal, and their ancient culture, so pretty and gracious, is being vulgarised and brutalised before our eyes. Some of the nature-peoples, like the South Sea islanders, have withered at the first touch of the men with the machines, and seem to be dying of mere despair. And yet the all-conquering civilisation of the West now appears to be stricken itself. In Dr. Freeman's language, its own activities have generated toxins which are poisoning it. The machine, though it is our master, cannot work without human auxiliaries; and these, at the moment when they seemed about to be themselves thoroughly mechanised in its service, are in violent revolt.

The Erewhonian policy of breaking up the machines is manifestly impossible in this country. It would condemn more than half the population to starve. We are and must remain the slaves of our machines, so long as we are unable to feed our own population. If our workmen refuse to work on economic conditions, the machines will certainly go out of use ; and then we shall have a terrible famine. A far-seeing Government would realise that a gradual reduction of the population is imperative, and would take steps to bring it about. The best method would probably be to penalise large families by reimposing education fees. There is no doubt that this would have the desired result, if a knowledge of birth-control were diffused over the whole of the nation. If the prejudice against payment for education proved insuperable—though 'free' education is in fact the most unjustifiable of all existing taxes—it would be possible to make all parents pay for a good square meal given to the school-children once a day. This would be wholesome for the children, and very unpleasant for the poor and prolific parent who at present claims the right of throwing on his neighbours the whole burden of his recklessness. This just and reasonable provision would not encourage childlessness, which no one desires to see ; but it would be an effective check upon large families.

Unless the devastating torrent of children can be stemmed, our condition will certainly go from bad to worse. But a mere check on population will not solve the problem how we are to return to a more natural and healthy type of civilisation. The remedy may be partly in our own hands. If, for example, we chose to clothe ourselves in homespuns which would last half a life-time instead of in cheap machine-made garments which wear out in two or three years, one old industry might be revived. There is much to be said for making national dress-reform a practical question. Women would no doubt resist it furiously, and it could not be forced upon them ; but the male sex cannot be enamoured of the ugly, costly and inconvenient garments which fashion compels them to wear. An exhibition of new costumes would be very interesting, and would be popular enough to cover expenses. There are many other ways in which life could be simplified ; and every unnecessary concession to fashion increases our slavery to the machine. We have seen a welcome improvement in the furniture of living rooms, which

forty years ago were so encumbered with useless tables and chairs and cheap ornaments that there was hardly room to turn round. We ought to accustom ourselves to think of the conditions under which everything that we buy is produced. We should then take much more pleasure in a hand-made article, with some individuality in it, than in a standardised product of a great factory, which speaks of nothing but soulless and irksome labour. There are still opportunities of encouraging good craftsmanship, in wood-carving, for instance, and house-decoration. The real difficulty is that the uneducated do not seem to wish for good articles, unless they can boast of the price they paid for them. We are now suffering from standardised minds as well as from standardised commodities ; and they suit each other. It would be a very wholesome sign if workmen were to refuse to be bound either by trade union rules or by the ' customs of the trade,' and were to insist on working according to their own bent, and selling the works of their own hands. So far, the outcry against mechanism has come mainly from artistic disciples of Ruskin and Morris ; the workman aims not at humanising the quality of his labour, but at diminishing its quantity. We may however trust with confidence to the permanence of that best side of human nature, which makes good and beautiful creation one of the chief pleasures of life. Opportunity only is needed.

Behind all this, there is the strange question whether man the toolmaker did not, when he made that momentous choice, forfeit the possibility of further intrinsic progress. Can we say that as is the photographer to the painter, so is man as he is to man as he might have been ? We all admit the blunder of slavery ; it is not good for man to compel other men to fetch and carry for him till he becomes almost as helpless as Lord Avebury's slave-holding ants, which cannot even feed themselves. But must we also pay the penalty for our lavish use of ' lifeless instruments,' as Aristotle called our non-human slaves ? Is the man of the machine age condemned to progressive functional atrophy of all the aptitudes which are useful to the savage but unnecessary for himself ? And is this functional atrophy the beginning of a deplorable atavism such as Dr. Freeman found in his British ' sub-men ' when compared with his West African negroes ? We seem to be getting near the position of Edward Carpenter's ' Civilisation ; its Cause and Cure.' And yet, if we were given

our wish, and transported back to a century when human muscles did nearly all the work that was done, we should be intensely irritated at the waste of time and energy which we should find everywhere. It would not be long before we began to write a book called 'Barbarism; its Cause and Cure,' for the benefit of our benighted contemporaries.

It is probably very much too late to reverse the decision which our ancestors made tens of thousands of years ago, and which may, for aught we know, have preserved our valuable species from being nipped in the bud. For better or worse, man is the tool-using animal, and as such he has become the lord of creation. When he is lord also of himself, he will deserve his self-chosen title of *homo sapiens*. It is something that we can see before us the dilemma of civilisation. Diagnosis is not the same as cure; but in some diseases it is more than half of the physician's task. The two anthropologists whose books we have been considering agree in their diagnosis, though they differ as to treatment. Both are convinced that civilised man, in enslaving the forces of nature, has become less of a man than he was before. He has succeeded in partially superseding himself; many of his natural activities are left unused; and in consequence he is neither healthy nor happy. Outraged nature, as Gibbon says, has her occasional revenges; and civilisation is in danger of becoming a systematic and sustained outrage against nature. The German savant sees the remedy in more perfect organization; in other words, our conquest of our environment is to be made more complete. The Englishman advocates the practice of eugenics and of the simple life for those who are willing to submit to this discipline; he has, apparently, no hope that the mechanization of life can ever be turned to the real improvement and happiness of mankind. It may be that as the German, writing before the cataclysm, underestimates the disruptive forces in society and proposes to 'heal too slightly' the wounds of modern life, so the Englishman is too ready to assume that the disorders which have followed the war indicate a final break-up of our whole social order The future will show whether civilisation, as we know it, can be mended or must be ended. The time seems ripe for a new birth of religious and spiritual life, which may remould society, as no less potent force would have the strength to do.

W. R. Inge.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ERROR

ANYONE who reads the history of opinions in past ages must be struck by the large ingredient of error with which the truth has been so invariably adulterated. If we read ancient history, error appears to occupy men's minds fully as much as truth. The ancient Greeks probably represent the highest level of genius and intellectual power that the world has ever seen; yet to our modes of thinking, their theoretical philosophy and their practical conduct of life were alike sodden in error. They believed in a strange hierarchy of gods and goddesses, each of whom exercised power within some special sphere; they had totally erroneous ideas about the origin of the Universe, which Empedocles believed to consist of earth, air, fire, and water. They thought that the sun went round the earth, that Greece was the geographical centre of the world, that the earth was flat; while as regards animal life and the nature of man, their beliefs were a mere tissue of error.

In their practical life, what we regard as errors confront us at every turn. Their system of morals was according to modern conceptions rooted in error. Their mode of government was wrong, though in so far as it approximates to our own, it was less wrong than that of other contemporaneous peoples.

What is true of ancient history, is also true of mediæval history. The Middle Ages were dominated by false conceptions of life and the universe, that in some ways are more extreme even than the errors of the ancients. For the Middle Ages laid more stress on their beliefs, they were more intolerant of differences than were the earlier civilizations. The mediæval Catholic Church entertained errors which it branded upon the people by the aid of the thumbscrew and the rack. Such science and philosophy as existed were choked with error; morals were atrocious; error seems to bulk in their opinions even more largely than truth.

If from the history of the past, we turn to uncivilized races of the present day, we are again met with error at every turn. The savage believes in a savage mythology; his idea of man and man's soul is so erroneous as often to be ludicrous; his notion

of cause and effect is radically erroneous. His mode of government tends to be tyrannical and cruel; his arrangement of his life is not usually such as to promote happiness; he is the slave of convention and superstition. Error, rather than truth, appears to govern the main principles of his existence.

It is only when we consider our own times and our own civilization that error seems to have been brought at last into some sort of subjection to truth. We regard ourselves, in a way that we regard no other race, as a rational people, ordering our lives on a logical basis, and guided in the main by true views of life. We may disagree here and there with specific conclusions of science, but we do not question that, on the whole, our science represents a great body of truth, from which error has been extensively purged. In matters of religion, we do not all agree; but whatever our individual views, we think that they are right, that we have at last attained the truth. Nor in fact are the apparent differences between us so great as they seem. The modern agnostic and the modern churchman have far more in common than has either with the religion of mediæval times or of ancient times. A churchman may easily become an agnostic, or an agnostic a churchman; such changes are universally familiar and excite no surprise; but neither would ever go back to the mythology of Zeus and Apollo; and neither would advocate a return to the mediæval inquisition, or argue on the relative merits of the homoousian and the homoiousian. Even here, where we differ most, the grosser forms of error seem to have crept away with the advent of modern learning and scientific methods.

In other spheres, we seem no less fortunate in our attempt to grasp the truth. Our code of morals is not seriously questioned by anyone. We often deplore the failure of individuals to live up to it, but the main principles themselves are scarcely in question. Here and there a reformer starts up to advocate certain changes in the code; but the changes so advocated are from a wide point of view extremely slight and superficial; and even then the reformer is looked upon and regards himself as a most revolutionary individual. He would be scandalized by many of the most commonplace doctrines of the Grecian moralists; he would be revolted by various precepts of the mediæval church.

Our system of government furthermore is one which appears

to us generally to be based on juster principles than any which have ever gone before. The representative principle has ceased to be a controversial doctrine, and has become an axiom. Democracy has established itself among us, free as we nearly all believe, from the crude errors which lie at the basis of personal and oligarchical government. So we nearly all believe, but not quite all. Probably universal agreement is never met with on any question that the mind of man can raise. There are always aberrant individuals, who take aberrant views. There are some now living in our civilization, who believe that the sun goes round the earth, just as there were a few aberrant individuals among the ancient Greeks who believed that the earth went round the sun. But such persons do not count. As a race, we believe in democracy, just as we believe in the solar system or in the evolution of species. As a race, we believe in certain principles of religion, science, and morals. As a race, we believe that on the whole we have attained true views of life and of the universe ; and we do not believe that our philosophy or social institutions are rooted in fundamental error, as was the case with the philosophy and social institutions of all past races, and of all present races outside the pale of modern civilization. So it is with all of us in the ordering of our daily lives. Our hopes, our desires, the purpose for which we live, appear to us to be based on a true view of the meaning of life. Our ambitions and strivings are not vitiated by any lurking fallacies. They represent a view of life which appears to us to be the true view.

Now from the individual point of view, all forms of error possess a certain very remarkable property : viz., that they are only found in other people. Everyone believes that other people occasionally entertain erroneous opinions ; but no one believes that he himself does so. Of course every sensible person admits that he *has* entertained errors ; and every sensible person admits that among his present opinions there may be errors, which, if properly exhibited to him, he will be ready to abandon. But the admission of an error is the same thing as an abandonment of it. It is not possible to admit that a certain opinion is false, and at the same time to continue to believe it. If we continue to believe it, we do not admit that it is false : if we do admit that it is false, we reject it from our general system of beliefs. We believe a thing because we think it is true. Indeed

this is only a different way of stating the same proposition. It follows that, of our present collection of opinions, every one appears to us to be true. We see no error in ourselves; we readily admit as an hypothesis, and even as a probable one, that there is error; but we do not see it. We see it only in other people; for every individual the outlook upon the world is that of a true view confronted with views which contain error. We may go even farther, and say that what each of us considers as error is any opinion which conflicts with our own. That is the definition of error which everyone adopts in practical life. It is an accurate definition of what we all mean when we speak of error.

As it is with individuals, so it is with peoples or races. A society naturally considers that the collective set of beliefs which prevail in it are true; hence it considers that beliefs of a contradictory character are false. We think that our outlook on life and our social institutions are founded on justice and truth; but the ancients thought the same of their outlook, and so did the Middle Ages, with a conviction probably far greater than our own. However false our beliefs, it is inevitable that we should think they are true; for otherwise we should not entertain them; and the question thus arises as to how much error there may really be in our modern modes of thought.

The question is exceedingly difficult to answer; for whatever errors there may be are necessarily invisible to us who hold them. Supposing we knew for certain that in all past times there used to exist invisible, inaudible, intangible beings who moved about among the people; supposing we knew that the people were always unaware of these beings, whose existence only became evident by the lapse of centuries; by what logical process should we set about to determine whether similar invisible beings move about among ourselves? We can only say we do not see them, we do not hear them, we do not feel them; but that implies nothing if they are such that in any case they cannot be seen nor heard nor felt. We can indeed argue by analogy. These invisible beings become visible when they are moving among people removed from ourselves, either in time or in degree of civilization. And in every other people removed from ourselves, without any exception whatever, invisible beings are found to swarm in every department of human life. Everywhere, except

in our own civilization and our own era, we find error to be a leading characteristic of popular belief and of universal public opinion. It requires no small degree of self-complacency to believe that we alone are exempt from the universal misfortune of mankind. On the face of it, it would appear more probable that our opinions, our outlook on life, our social institutions, our ethical codes, are tainted with fundamental error ; that we, like all other peoples whom we can view objectively, are enmeshed in a tissue of falsity, so that we pass our lives in the pursuit of false ends by means that perhaps are no less false.

But, it is often argued, we do differ fundamentally from all pre-existing races and from all existing non-civilized races. We differ in that we alone of all races have at our service the vast fabric of natural science ; and further that we recognize the principles of logic and reasoning as the governing processes for the attainment of truth. The objection is singularly naïve. It is true that some of us render lip-service to the principles of logic and reasoning, but there is not a man alive who governs his life by them. Our motives are not based on logical formulæ : they spring from habit, from early training, from opportunity, from sentiment, from emotion, just as they always have with every other race of men. What indeed do most people know of logic ? They cannot know much, for there is not much to be known. The average textbook of logic consists of more or less intelligible platitudes, which may be of some theoretical interest, but are not of the slightest practical assistance either in the conduct of life or in the discovery of truth. And as for natural science, it may have assisted somewhat to the purging of error from our philosophy, but only to a small degree. The man of science as a rule is no more than a very highly skilled artizan, with an intimate knowledge of certain natural phenomena, but just as likely as anyone else to entertain childish opinions outside his own department, and with no special proclivity towards a rational philosophy of life, and no more capacity for sound judgment than the average lawyer or clergyman. The great and much boasted success of science lies chiefly in the sphere of practical achievement. As regards philosophic insight, it has given us something but not much. Some great cardinal principles undoubtedly have emerged :—the doctrine of evolution, the principle of relativity ; and these, especially the former, have been

instrumental in purging error from our universal beliefs. But they have not greatly affected the conduct of real life. They have upset the convictions of mankind, where those convictions were most absolute and unquestioned. They have shown us the presence of error, where it was least of all suspected ; and their discovery suggests the question—how many other of our fundamental assumptions are also based on error ? For error lurks chiefly, not where it is suspected, not where open controversy is carried on, but in the basal assumptions of life : those assumptions which are common to us all, and which have not yet so much as been called in question.

The main triumph of science however has been in enhancing the material conveniences of life—in directing the forces of nature into channels of practical utility, in making the world a more comfortable place materially to live in. Science has indeed done much in bringing nature under the control of man ; it has done scarcely anything towards rationalizing the ideals and aspirations of humanity, which remain what they always have been ; the product of sentiment, prejudice, and early environment.

It seems therefore probable *a priori* that error enters largely into our deeper conceptions of life, as we know it always has done in former times and among other races. As to what these errors are, no writer can hazard even a guess. They are fundamental and all-pervasive. All that can be done is to set forth certain considerations tending to establish the fact of error somewhere. It may be possible to show that we do not stand upon a pedestal in the history of the world, as the sole race of men whose conceptions are based on truth. It may be possible to bring forward a number of cases, where error is widely entertained and obviously affects the conduct of life ; and it may then be inferred that other errors are entertained, deeper, more universal, and affecting to a still greater degree the conduct of life.

Most writers on errors or fallacies have attempted to ascertain by what process they arise. Thus writers on logic have classified errors as *petitio principii*, *ignoratio elenchi*, etc., etc. These may be convenient names for fallacies, but offer no explanation as to why people make them, or why they are so prevalent. In the same way, sociologists, inquiring into the beliefs of primitive peoples, ask by what *logical* process their superstitions have arisen.

We have to go deeper, and seek out the psychological processes, not the logical processes, that are at work.

The fact is that no special explanation is needed for the origin of error. An erroneous belief is just as natural to the mind as a true belief. If the Greeks thought that the sun went round the earth, and that the earth itself was flat, they were only believing the most natural and obvious interpretation of what they saw. Truth has no special signs by which it may be distinguished from error. To an uneducated mind, one thing is just as likely to be true as another, if it is not contradicted by immediate experience. Any belief is readily accepted, merely as the result of suggestion or the thoughts happening to light upon it. Anyone may observe this with young children. They believe anything that they are told : they acquiesce in any suggestion that is made to them. Any theory which is presented to the mind is already partly believed in : by a child it is generally wholly believed in. Primitively there is no distinction between understanding a theory and believing in it. The states of mind are identical. The theory occupies the attention, and the individual acts as though it were true. The question whether or not it is a true theory is a fresh consideration which arises only at a later stage, and implies an increased mental development.

At first, therefore, all forms of belief come naturally. It is not the fact of error that requires explanation : it is the fact of disbelief. The primitive stage is simply when the theory is impressed upon the mind, no question arising as to its truth or untruth, but the individual acting and speaking as though it were certainly true. The second stage involves two operations of the mind : (1) that of attending to the theory ; (2) that of questioning whether it is true or false. This is a far more complex state of mind than the first, and demands much higher intellectual development. No further explanation is needed therefore as to the origin of primitive error. It merely has not occurred to the individual to question what he has been told, or the ideas that happen by chance to have found their way into his mind.

This simple, natural, and universal form of error is, however, not the only form. It happens in a more advanced state that errors continue to be entertained, even after they have been called in question, and notwithstanding logical arguments calculated to expose them. In short there is a resistance to

the abandonment of error, an illogical determination to persist in it, which is far less easy to explain. To take for instance a common superstition, many people hold the view that it is 'unlucky' to sit down thirteen at dinner, or to walk under a ladder. That is to say, they 'believe' that such procedure is likely to be followed by some misfortune: and they continue to hold this 'belief' even after it has been called in question, and although it is entirely opposed to all evidence and to all considerations of logic. Most persons are so conscious of the irrational nature of such opinions, that they are reluctant explicitly to confess belief in them. Nevertheless their conduct shows that they are in a state of mind which, to say the least of it, is closely allied to belief; for they will put themselves and others to much inconvenience, merely in order to avoid being in the situation referred to. A man's actions are the ultimate test of his beliefs, and the truest test that can be reached; for few persons are so practical in self-analysis as to be aware of the actual workings of their own minds. In other cases belief is not denied at all. If in very simple superstitions, such as these, error is so dominating and powerful, can we wonder that in more complex problems, where the truth is really not particularly obvious, error maintains itself with a prodigious resistance against removal? If in an elementary case, where the logical view is perfectly simple and quite unanswerable, it is still unable to assert itself against the heavy inertia of preconceived error, what are we to expect in cases where the logic is far more obscure, and the preconceived error far more deeply rooted? Clearly the rational view will count for nothing; error will reign all-powerful. And thus it is, that in nearly all questions closely affecting human life, where logical principles are usually hard to disentangle, belief is based wholly on sentiment and preconception, too securely rooted even to bend under the gentle pressure of a logical induction or a syllogism. This is the state of affairs generally characteristic of such a belief as that in spiritualism; as regards political beliefs, it is very nearly universal.

Whence comes this inertia of error? It is not an inertia of error only; it is an inertia of belief. It is just as characteristic of true beliefs as of false beliefs. Here again, there is no natural mark of distinction between truth and error. They represent an objective difference only; subjectively they are identical.

But why is belief so persistent? Why is it to so small an extent based upon reason? The true answer appears to be similar to that by which we accounted for primitive credulity. Whatever occupies the mind is *pro tanto* believed in. Belief follows attention. It is a matter of mental orientation. Whatever point of view we see, that is the point of view in which we believe; and if our attention is powerfully concentrated on any special aspect of a theory, our conviction that that aspect is the true aspect is correspondingly high. The great outer world presents to our minds an infinite variety of impressions and combinations. It may be viewed in an infinite number of different aspects; and in fact, no two human beings see it exactly alike. For human attention is not of infinite capacity. On the contrary, it can, generally speaking, concentrate only on one aspect at a time; and for any one individual, the possible range of attention is extremely limited. Attention is an eclectic faculty. It singles out from among the infinite alternatives presented by the external world, one alternative—one set of events or of facts, which is different for the biologist, the chemist, the painter, the hosier, the politician, the idler, etc. And so it is with every problem, disputed or undisputed, that the world confronts us with. The problem may be viewed in many different ways, but our natural limitations confine us to one of those ways. We see only certain elements in the problem: others see in it other elements, and do not see those which present themselves to us. Our minds are not large enough to take in the whole of the details: inevitably most of them are omitted. Hence two of us may look at the same objective fact: but we do not see the same thing. We are looking through differently coloured spectacles: and the aspects which penetrate the one are different from those which penetrate the other. No one of us sees the world quite the same as any other.

Now there is an old proverb, truer than a great many, which states that 'seeing is believing.' What we see is what we believe: and since what we see in the world is so very diverse, it follows that our beliefs are also diverse. The diversity is most marked where the elements of a problem are most numerous, and where there is the most room for difference as to which of these numerous elements are selected by our attention. Take for instance a great political problem, such as that of Socialism *v.* Individualism. Here the various factors are far too numerous to be grasped

in toto by any ordinary mind. One mind is taken up by a feeling of the injustice arising from the inequality of wealth. Another is chiefly concerned with the restrictions on liberty involved by compulsory establishment of equality. One mind places itself in the position of the poor, another dwells on the economic factors and the efficiency of industry. The unconscious operation of self-interest largely determines the point of view. The great majority of those who would stand to lose by Socialism are opposed to it : Socialism is chiefly found among those who would stand to gain by it. Quite unconsciously, we are far quicker to see arguments favourable to our interests, than arguments opposed to them.

It is of course true that the arguments of the other side may be carefully studied. But this is very much the exception. If a man sees one particular aspect of a problem, it is very difficult for him to see any other, at least when the problem is at all complex. The perspective seems all wrong, the reasoning is disjointed, it is difficult and tiresome to follow, involving an effort that inclines to be painful. The mind being already orientated in a certain direction, a laborious re-casting of ideas is necessary before it can be orientated in any other, and few people are prepared to make the necessary exertion. Even among those few, the opposite aspects do not impress the mind equally. The view first adopted is deeper than the secondary view, which is comparatively superficial, and does not sink into the mind. On rare occasions, individuals are capable of lending their attention to two or more aspects to an equal degree : they *do* see more than one point of view. It then usually happens that their convictions are greatly weakened. Their belief in either side is not full and unqualified. Their 'native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er 'with the pale cast of thought.' Those in whom belief is strong are those who see one aspect, and are blind to others.

Thus the foundation of error is no different in complex problems from what we found it to be in simple superstitions. From the many different points of view in which external facts may be regarded, the mind and thoughts are occupied only with one ; that one guides the actions of the individual ; and action is the mark of belief. Where the external situation is quite simple, we may easily take up several aspects of it, and make our selection among them according to the principles of reason. But where

it is complex, we cannot contain more than one point of view. Belief follows, and whether it is a true or erroneous belief is a matter of chance. What is complex and what is simple depends upon our mental development. A situation which is quite simple for us may be very complex to an uneducated savage. Our minds might take it in from various points of view; the mind of a savage is not large enough to hold more than one. Our belief may thus be based on reason, while his is determined by his mental constitution.

Are there any principles by which we may ascertain what determines the point of view? Ultimately the point of view depends on our nervous organization—on cerebral structure, which like every other structure is moulded by heredity and environment. Some people are born with aptitudes for particular modes of seeing things; artists, poets, mathematicians, etc. They could never be *made* what they are, without some congenital predisposition. The qualities cited are perhaps somewhat peculiar; but innate disposition appears in most spheres of life. Some men are by nature cautious and conservative; others bold and iconoclastic; some are mystical or spiritualistic; others matter-of-fact or materialistic. And the world which they see is reflected in their overt beliefs. Belief, and therefore error also, depend in part on congenital nervous organization.

They depend also very greatly on early training. The mind of a young child is exceedingly plastic; and the things that are put into its mind in very early years determine its outlook for the rest of its life. The Jesuits sometimes say that if they have control of a child up to the age of seven, they care not who carries on its subsequent education. The Freudians also emphasize the enormous importance of the first year or two of life towards making up the mental outlook of the adult. Environment plays a far larger part, or at least a far more conspicuous part, in determining mental development than it does in determining physical development. Minute cerebral modifications can bring about mental differences, that appear at all events very great.

Although the mental capacity of human beings is extremely limited, it is in one and the same individual a very variable and elastic quality. There are a great many factors which tend to constrict the mental vision within much narrower confines than

the normal full capacity of the mind. Chief among these factors is emotion of all and every kind. Emotion is a very powerful and compelling form of mental activity. It takes up much mental energy, and tends to constrict the vision narrowly upon one point of view—that which conforms to the emotion ; while abruptly shutting off rival points of view. The emotions of self-interest for instance dominate the judgment in all questions where those emotions are involved. An ordinary human being sees only what his self-interest permits him to see. What he sees is what he believes : and he believes with perfect sincerity that the truth lies on that side of an argument which is favourable to his personal desires. Love exercises a similar constricting effect. A lover sees none but the favourable qualities in his mistress. The emotion blinds him to other points of view, obvious though they may be to other persons whose minds are not constricted by the same emotion. What he sees is what he believes : he believes he has a paragon of virtue, and the error into which he may be led is proportional to his amatory concentration.

Hate, on the contrary, shuts off the favourable aspects : and the person hated is regarded as a demon. Fear similarly limits the vision, and sets up a readiness to believe in the real existence of the thing feared. Hope works in precisely the same way. The very large number of new commercial ventures which come to grief testifies to the profound influence which hope exercises on belief.

Emotion of social origin similarly constricts the mental outlook. The power of suggestion has often been emphasized. Suggestion merely puts into the mind, which might otherwise have been vacant, a certain point of view : and the presence of that point of view generates belief. Patriotism—a love of country—is a deep and powerful emotion, no less blinding in its effects than the love of women. Wars arouse complex emotions of various kinds which become welded together into one great sentiment, which sharply limits the outlook and brings about the firmest convictions. This sentiment involves patriotism, hate, fear, etc., which unite to block out from our minds every possible point of view save one—that which is favourable to our own country, and unfavourable to the enemy. Irresistible as this effect is upon each individual mind, its force

is still further increased by the power of suggestion. We find that everyone around us ' thinks ' as we do ; that is to say, that everyone sees that point of view which has already formed in our own mind. This aspect is thus enormously accentuated ; and it becomes a sheer nervous impossibility to take any other point of view. It is obviously a pure chance whether beliefs thus established represent truth or error. If nations A and B are at war, then anyone who has been born in nation A, and lives in their country and speaks their language, will normally see the facts of the war in a particular light, which generates a particular opinion. Individuals of nation B for the same reason hold the diametrically opposite opinion. In short, opinion depends entirely on social environment and the accident of birth ; considerations of reason do not enter into the matter at all. From the high logical point of view, the opinion of both sides is likely to be entirely worthless ; for both sides are under the influence of emotion which consumes the whole energies of the mind, and paralyses the critical faculty.

All forms of emotion, then, severely constrict the mental outlook. They do so by cutting out the critical faculty, and by admitting only that point of view which is consonant to the emotion at the time. This point of view becomes so vivid and sharply defined, as to carry with it the firmest convictions. It should be remarked that emotion works to a great extent unconsciously. Self-interest, *amour-propre*, etc., often colour the whole philosophy of persons who have not the least suspicion of the existence of these subterranean emotions.

A sense of pleasurable surprise always serves to concentrate attention, and hence to fix belief. Love of the marvellous is proverbial in this respect. Persons are more likely to believe a story which excites thaumaturgical interest, than one which is dull and commonplace ; so long of course as the story is not too flagrantly in opposition to experience. So strong is this tendency that a story is often believed, notwithstanding a very high degree of obvious improbability. It has deeply and pleasurably impressed itself on the mind ; and that is enough ; it is itself a state of belief. A thaumaturgical element enters into a great many of the common superstitions, and accounts for much error in higher spheres as well.

Religion is by its nature emotional ; it is therefore restrictive

of the outlook, and compulsive of belief. There are perhaps a dozen major forms of religion in the world ; and these are split up into innumerable different sects. Supposing there are 1001 different sects in the world, then the law of probability would indicate that the odds against any one sect representing the truth are a thousand to one. There are nearly three times as many non-Christians in the world as there are Christians : hence if universal democratic opinion is a test of truth (as is often assumed), it is about three to one that Christianity is not true. These figures assume of course that some sect somewhere or other has found the truth. As far as mathematics is concerned, it may be that none of them have. Yet each sect is firmly convinced that it is the repository of truth, and that all other sects, in so far as they differ, are victims of error. The illustration shows how wide and universal error must be in the world ; for whatever tenets we hold, we are committed to the view that the vast majority of our fellow residents upon the earth are in the wrong. But there is no need for surprise when we reflect how people usually come by their religious beliefs. In the great majority of cases, they believe what they were taught when they were young. Thus the son of a Quaker is likely to be a Quaker : the son of a Jew is a Jew : the son of a Mahomedan is a Mahomedan, and so on. Our religious convictions depend wholly upon the accidents of birth and environment ; they are not in the least based upon any faculty of reason ; and whether what we believe is really true is obviously a chance, in which the mathematical odds are very much against us. Now the doctrines taught in religion are of an exceedingly impressive nature, invoking many emotions and sentiments, the emotion of wonder, of fear, of self-interest, of morality, and so on. There is little scope for any exercise of the critical faculty ; the trend of belief is imperiously marked out. An overmastering vision dominates the mind, with its necessary accompaniment of critical paralysis.

Mental restriction is a universal quality of mind, which by no means always carries with it disadvantages. On the contrary, it is as necessary for visualizing truth as error. It is a condition of belief of any kind ; and without it the mind would be utterly unstable. We all have a certain philosophy of life ; a general way of viewing things, which cuts out all contradictory ways. Thus, any new problem presented to us is judged in the light

of our preceding habit of mind. If, for instance, we are astronomically inclined, and someone informs us that men have been discovered on the moon, we shall at once disbelieve it, because we know that conditions on the moon are not adequate for the support of human life. We shall not waste our time enquiring into the evidence for the statement, nor shall we hold our judgment in suspense. Our minds are closed to the possibility of the suggested new point of view. Our pre-existing philosophy of life has narrowed our outlook, so that only beliefs in conformity with that outlook can be entertained. If our philosophy happens to be correct, this is clearly a very great advantage ; for it sets up an insuperable bar to the acceptance of error. If our philosophy is not correct, we are equally debarred from the acceptance of truth. In very many walks of life our philosophy is charged with error thus it is that error tends to perpetuate itself by the accretion of new error and the rejection of truth. Nevertheless such mental constriction is necessary if we are to have any stable opinions at all. A mind that was entirely a *tabula rasa*, that was totally devoid of any preconceived philosophy of life, would be a general receptacle for any rubbish that might be shot into it by the first chance suggestion. True, that rubbish would be evicted by the next contradictory suggestion ; but then there would be no stability of conviction. Truth and error would trip over one another in a series of kaleidoscopic changes : no advance in the knowledge of truth would ever be made. Mere vacancy of mind is no recipe for the avoidance of error. A true general philosophy, which shuts the mind to all but truth, is what is needed. And then the great question arises, what is a true general philosophy ? What indeed is truth ? It is a question which modern civilization is yet very far from answering.

At all events it is clear that there is nothing more remarkable in the existence of error than there is in the existence of truth. We believe simply what we see, and what we see depends ultimately on cerebral structure. It is, like all other structure, formed by heredity and environment. The fact is tacitly admitted in the common language of life. If anyone desires to know what our beliefs are on some particular subject, he often inquires what our views are. Our belief is the same thing as our view. There is however a physical limit to the amount of

error which we can contain. If it passes a certain point, it will bring us into direct conflict with external fact, and if we continue to act on the erroneous belief, we shall suffer and fail in the struggle for existence. Natural selection must on the whole favour true beliefs, in the same way that it favours other useful variations : but there is a very large sphere in which belief is irrelevant to prosperity in life, and it is here that error largely flourishes. Natural selection, moreover, has no special predilection for truth, as such ; its predilection is only for what is useful : and it may be that certain erroneous beliefs are of real value to the individual and are therefore selected for survival. Various religions and political opinions are probably of this order. They supply a motive to mankind to do what is right—what is useful for the species, though it may be deleterious to the individual himself. Without some such superstition the motive to right conduct might often be insufficient. Sir James Frazer in ' Psyche's Task ' has shown how superstition in various ways has conduced to the welfare of the community ; and it may well be that, but for the controlling force of superstition, the whole foundations of our social structure would collapse. It is the utility of a belief, not the truth of a belief, that causes its survival and perpetuation. There is no truth in the saying *Magna est veritas et praevalebit*. It is a pious aspiration, exciting sentimental pleasure, and thus closing the mind to a contrary view.

Under these circumstances, it may be asked whether the exposure of error is a desirable undertaking. To this question, there are several answers. In the first place, the exposure can never go very deep. We are all tarred with the same brush, and the really big fundamental errors lie in the root of our minds, where their existence is probably altogether unsuspected by any man alive. As regards them, we are all of us in the state of primitive credulity ascribed to the savage. We see things from a certain point of view, and we accept them uncritically, just because that point of view is in our minds, and it has never occurred to us to inquire whether there is any other possibility. All we can do towards the exposure of error is to scrutinize certain modes of belief which are not so deeply rooted as to escape our powers of observation.

In the second place, natural selection has ensured that those

errors which have a practical utility shall be fortified and supported by the strongest buttress of human belief:—namely by emotion. Such errors are proof against any attempt at logical exposure. To argue with an emotion more often strengthens it than weakens it. If for a moment we can induce a new point of view, it is only for a moment. The emotion closes in and obliterates it almost at once. It is like writing upon water. It is well known that philosophic doctrines do not affect human conduct. The doctrines may be true and beautifully wrought: and in a state of mental calm we may survey them at ease, like a spider's web on a calm day. But the first gust of emotion drives into fragments the most perfectly spun web of philosophic theory. And the emotions of practical utility do not blow in gusts; they blow in gales.

In the third place, whereas we may readily admit that certain branches of knowledge or certain aspects of truth are not desirable for universal consumption, it does not in the least follow that they should be totally ignored. Knowledge and learning are for the few, not for the many. As regards the average man, as Sir Thomas Browne remarks, 'his head was never squared nor 'timbered for it.' True learning must always remain on an aristocratic basis; it can never be democratized as politics has been: for true learning involves a physiological burden too heavy to be carried by those whose lives are devoted to practical affairs. No effort to democratize knowledge can result in anything but universal sciolism. Further, no questions present greater difficulty than as to whether or not certain items of knowledge are or are not desirable for dissemination among the public. It is widely held for instance that certain kinds of medical knowledge are best withheld from the public: but no one suggests that those kinds of knowledge should be altogether eradicated from our civilization. In matters of more profound import, it is almost impossible to say whether the general knowledge of some theory will react to the general advantage or not.

In the fourth place, philanthropy is not the one and only concern of life. The pursuit of truth for its own sake is an ideal which may be set up against that of the public welfare. Among the many millions of individuals composing modern civilization, is it necessary that the minds of every one of them should be occupied only with thoughts that are useful? May there not

be a few here and there whose minds run only on what is true—even though it is of no use, even though it is deleterious? Why is truth to be pushed into the gutter, to serve the convenience of the multitude? The risk of its being accepted by the public is too slight to count; but even if it did count, even if it were deleterious, is human welfare so precious a thing that the banner of truth itself is to be trodden under foot for its perpetuation? And if it comes to that, what after all is the worth of human life? Is there more happiness or unhappiness in modern society? Most men will answer in the light of their personal experience, but in truth it is impossible to tell. Truth might undermine the foundations of society; but then it may be that a society founded on error is in the main unhappy, so that its undermining is a gain and not a loss. One thing is certain: truth for its own sake is far too thin and remote an ideal to carry with it any motive power of the kind imagined.

Objectively the world is a thing of infinite possibilities. From our human point of view, it comprises an infinity of good and an infinity of bad. But we see it only in one light, and that light different for each of us. For each of us the world is what we see in it; for some of us good, for some bad, for most a mixture of the two. Whether the world presents itself to us as good or bad thus depends in great part on our mental constitution. 'There's nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.' For the sake of our own happiness, the point of cardinal importance is to see the world in a true light. If our mind must be closed to all aspects but one or two, let it be closed to the erroneous aspects, and attend only to those that are true. Orientation of attention is the whole problem. If we are but occupied by the right kind of thoughts and feelings, we may indeed make mistakes, but they are not fundamental. If on the other hand we are occupied by the wrong kind of thoughts and feelings, error is fundamental, and more readily admitted than truth. In that case, the path of life is likely to be bumpy; pain and disappointment will be our probable fate. Unexpected dragons rise up in our way; things seem to go wrong; we think ourselves unlucky, and we blame the world for a fault which lies within ourselves. And yet if that fault exists, it is very hard to eradicate. We did not make ourselves; we were made by others; we cannot alter our heredity, nor escape the effects of early environment; the

vices of one generation follow inevitably from the folly or ignorance of previous generations. *Tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner.* The mere exposition of error can do scarcely anything towards its eradication. No theory could avail much to alter our physical appearance; nor can any theory greatly affect the cerebral structure which we have developed, and which governs our outlook upon the world. Yet there are many whose natural instincts are sound, but who have been led astray superficially by a dominant environment. A true theory serves to confirm their instinctive views, and to ensure as far as possible that those who are in harmony with it shall make their influence felt, instead of drifting helplessly in the main current. But for the enunciation of a theory, such truth as the community is capable of seeing is lost through mere lack of expression.

Hugh Elliot.

THE ORIGIN AND FUTURE OF PARLIAMENT

1. The Evolution of Parliament. By Professor A. F. Pollard. Longmans, Green. 1920.
2. The House of Commons and Monarchy. By Hilaire Belloc. George Allen & Unwin. 1920.

I.

NO institution can go untouched by criticism. Indeed, one may say that the health of any institution depends upon its undergoing purgation by criticism from time to time. Perhaps there have been critics of parliaments ever since they existed. Certainly parliaments had their critics by the end of the eighteenth century ; and they have had them abundantly in the nineteenth and early twentieth. To Rousseau ' representatives in council ' were like mercenaries in war ' ; he held that the people had the divine right of immediate self-government in a primary assembly ; and his followers, seeking the closest possible approximation to the unattainable ideal of the master, have advocated, and in many of the Western States of the U.S.A. have secured, the practice of popular ' initiative ' of measures over the heads of the people's representatives, the submission of measures passed by those representatives to popular ' referendum,' and even the right of popular ' recall ' of officials. To Carlyle, worshipper of heroes who communed with themselves, parliaments were ' talking-' shops ' whose *habitués* had far better be sent about their business ; and Bismarck, acting the hero's part, and putting his trust in government by power rather than in government *par la parole*, almost realised the ideal of Carlyle in his contest with parliamentary government in Prussia some sixty years ago. To Sorel and to socialists of his type parliament, representing the bourgeois State, is a thing alien to the proletariate ; and Lenin, advocate of the dictatorship of the proletariate (that is to say, of its leaders ; and that again is to say, of himself), has no place in his scheme for Dumas which would only impede the finding and the building of Utopia. In our own country we have (as yet)

no referendum, no Bismarck, no Lenin ; but we are face to face—so all observers tell us—with a weakening of the House of Commons, and a strengthening of the Cabinet, which have shifted the balance of the constitution and impaired the sovereignty of parliament. There has taken place among us (we are told) an elision, as it were, of the House of Commons—an elision due to the closer approximation and more immediate contact of the electorate and the Cabinet ; and this in turn is due to the three great P's of our time—the Party, the Platform and the Press—which have all strengthened the dominant executive personalities of the hour by giving them followers for their policies, megaphones for their voices, and limelight for their actions.

It is interesting to trace the different ways in which Mr. Belloc and Professor Pollard address themselves to this situation. The one attacks the House of Commons, which he has tried and found wanting ; he is an anti-parliamentarian monarchist with syndicalist proclivities ; as long ago as 1912 a German writer spoke of his philosophy as ' a tangled skein of Catholic-English-' French-syndicalist-reactionary influences.' The other loves Parliament for what it has been in a long and storied past, and what it can be in the future ; he is a parliamentarian democrat, with leanings to imperialism. Mr. Belloc is an impressionist with a broad brush, using a few strong colours : Professor Pollard's picture has the minute and delicate detail of a Flemish painter. Both are historians ; but Mr. Belloc's history is ancillary, and written in terms of class and the successive dominance of different classes within the structure of parliament ; Professor Pollard's history is primary, and written in terms of law, round a thesis of Parliament as essentially constituting, in its origin and for centuries of its history, the great ' High Court ' of the realm. To the one Henry VIII. is the black sheep of English history (' most of the evils from which this country ' suffers to-day find their ultimate seed in the perverted will of ' one monarch who had real power four hundred years ago ') : to the other he is almost the avatar of the genius of our people—a king who took Parliament into partnership, and by that partnership nationalised the Church and generalised liberty, setting his people free alike from the bonds of Rome and from those mediæval ' liberties,' or franchises, of the nobility, which were the greatest enemies of freedom.

II.

There are two questions which arise in any enquiry concerning the English Parliament. The first is a question for the historian : whence has parliament sprung, and what has been its history ? The second is a question for the publicist : what is parliament like to-day, and how is it likely to develop in the future ? It is with the first question that Professor Pollard primarily deals, though he ends with a discussion of the second ; it is with the second that Mr. Belloc is mainly concerned, though he begins with some consideration of the first.

If we are to understand the origin of Parliament, Professor Pollard tells us, we must begin by banishing most of what we have hitherto believed. We must not think of two houses : if there were parliaments by the middle of the thirteenth century, there was no house of commons before the reign of Edward III., and ' the earliest reference to a house of lords occurs in the ' reign of Henry VIII.' We must not think of three estates ; estates, in Professor Pollard's view, are in any case unimportant ; there were originally more than three ; the idea of three estates was possibly an importation from France at the time of the Treaty of Troyes in 1420 ; and when men commonly talked of three estates in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they intended by that designation not what we mean to-day—the clergy, the nobility and the commons—but the king, the lords and the commons.

Banishing houses and banishing estates, we must begin from the notion of ' the King in Council in Parliament.' There is a text around which Professor Pollard's book may be said to be written, which states the foundation and origin of parliament as he conceives it. It is a text from a law-book of the reign of Edward I ; and it runs as follows :—' The King has his court in his council ' in his parliaments,*. . . where judicial doubts are determined, ' and new remedies are established for old wrongs.' We may gloss the text by saying that parliament begins as a meeting (an act of meeting, or ' parley,' and not a body of men), in which the king sits surrounded by his council, as the inner core of the meeting, with representatives in attendance round that inner core—a meeting held primarily for the purpose of resolving

Habet enim rex curiam suam in consilio suo in parliamentis suis.

knotty points of law, with the representatives contributing to that purpose by bringing forward, in the form of petitions, the legal knots which need to be untied. The council surrounding the king may be the inner council of professional 'clerks' or officials; it may be the wider council which embraces, along with these, the greater feudatories of the king. That is relatively unimportant; what is really important is that we have here, as a single, original, undifferentiated body, the High Court of Parliament from which our parliament of to-day, and indeed most of our constitution of to-day, may be said to flow.

The evolution and differentiation of this simple original body with its one primary function of jurisdiction, may be stated as follows. The representatives in attendance cease merely to stand round the king in his council: they withdraw from the 'parliament' in the King's palace at Westminster to the refectory or chapter-house of Westminster Abbey, and there they deliberate as a House of Commons. In the Council in parliament which remains the greater feudatories (including the bishops, who sit by feudal right) gradually become dominant, at the expense of the professional clerks: they establish the hereditary principle; and so, by the reign of Henry VIII., the House of Lords is formed. In the same reign the Commons move their deliberations from Westminster Abbey to Westminster Palace, where the members of the Council have always remained; and now and henceforth there are two houses meeting as one parliament under the same roof. Meanwhile the functions of a parliament have grown. To its original function of jurisdiction have been added taxation, deliberation, legislation; by the time of Henry VIII. there is nothing—not even the breach with Rome—which an omnipotent parliament cannot effect. But, in Professor Pollard's conception, it is in the time of Henry VIII., rather than in that of Edward I., that parliament as we know it makes its entry on the stage.

Parliament, as thus conceived, is legal in its origin; legal in its growth; legal even to-day in the judicial powers of the House of 'Lords'—those curious modern representatives of the king's counsellors, wise in the law (as the professional 'clerks' or officials of Edward I.'s time indubitably were), who resolved knotty points of law in the Middle Ages. The legal—or perhaps, more strictly expressed, the judicial—aspect of parliament,

which it has always worn, and of which it still shows traces, explains to Professor Pollard why it has established itself triumphantly as the great institution of English political life. If parliament had been only a tax-voting and decree-registering body—if the English had been like the French, who had a *parlement* for judicial purposes distinct from the *états généraux* which voted taxes and registered decrees—the English parliament might have perished, as the French States-general perished, from the growth of the power of a king who took the imposition of taxes and the passing of decrees into his own sole and magnificent hands. But the English parliament was a law court as well as a political assembly ; and as law-courts are always and constantly necessary—particularly if they are ' high courts ' which resolve the knottiest points—the English parliament maintained a constant and continuous existence.

The general thesis here expounded has been suggested to Professor Pollard by Maitland's introduction to a volume edited by him for the Rolls Series, under the name of *Memoranda de Parliamento*, which contains the proceedings of a parliament of 1305. In his preface Professor Pollard regrets that this introduction has been ' generally ignored by instructors of youth ' for nearly a generation.' One who has instructed English youth in history at Oxford for almost as long a period can only plead that he has steadily referred his pupils to it and used it as the basis of his lectures on the subject ; and, so far as he knows, his colleagues have done the like. But Professor Pollard is certainly right in directing attention to this introduction. Where he is on less sure ground is in making it the *tota lex et prophetae* of its subject—just as others, enamoured of groups, have possibly erred in doing the like by Maitland's preface to the chapter of Gierke's great work on corporations which he translated under the title of ' Political Theories of the Middle ' Age.' Maitland, remarkable at once as a scholar and as a stylist, could illuminate with a dazzling light some aspect, some facet, some angle of a theme on which—writing, as in these cases he was, an essay and not a volume—he had concentrated his attention. He would probably never have claimed for a second that he had exhausted the theme : he would probably have said that he had ' tried to throw some light on a corner.'

A dazzling illumination, intended to give an instantaneous

view of one angle of a subject, necessarily leaves many others in obscurity ; a careful picture, intended to delineate the whole subject, must be based on a just perspective. If there is any fault in Professor Pollard's book, it is that, with all its stimulus and all its learning, it is constructed, as it were, in one dimension. In a word, there is too much law about his account of the origin and the early history of parliament. He sees law where there is probably no law, as when he turns into matters of law, brought as such before the High Court of Parliament, petitions which request the grace and favour of the king ; and in his zeal for law he leaves out of account, or at any rate in comparative obscurity, factors and considerations which are of primary importance in any account of the genesis of parliament.

The chroniclers of the thirteenth century, when they write of parliament, write of it as a place of taxation and legislation. Trivet, for instance, the Dominican annalist of the reign of Edward I., will tell us under one year of the king ' holding a ' parliament at London, in which there were set forth statutes,' and under another of the king ' excusing himself, in a parliament ' he held, to the people, for the exactions made on the realm ' through the necessities of divers wars.' The chroniclers must be checked and supplemented by legal and documentary evidence ; but at any rate they can tell us what parliament was to ordinary men, such as they were themselves, even if they cannot tell us what it was in the high lore of the lawyers. It would appear from what they tell us that parliament to ordinary men was a meeting, at which representatives generally attended, to vote taxes and to confirm laws. Now the voting of taxes (not to speak of the confirming of laws, or canons) was a thing in which the clergy had been engaged for some time ; and when they were so engaged, the clergy repeatedly used in the thirteenth century a phrase which Edward I. borrowed from them in 1295—*quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbetur*. They insisted, in other words, that taxation involved representation ; and when Professor Pollard says that ' Edward I.'s maxim ' (which was really *their* maxim) ' was the antithesis of the principle of papal sovereignty,' he is forgetting that it was the essence of clerical opinion in the England of the thirteenth century.

Some of us even believe that the clerical opinion about representation, and the clerical practice of representation in

church assemblies, preceded and helped to produce the opinion and practice of the laity in the matter of representation. There was representation in the church, as a regular method of procedure, before there was any such representation in the State; and if there was any borrowing, there is some reason for thinking that the clergy were the lenders. At any rate there were churchmen as well as lawyers in mediæval England; and when one reflects on the width of clerical knowledge, and the disciplined methods of clerical action (among which the method of regular and binding procuratorial representation is not the least), one cannot but feel that the clergy must be taken into account in any sketch of the evolution of parliament. The Church had given to the England of the seventh century writing, written laws, a model of political unity: it had still gifts to give in the thirteenth. Mr. Belloc is hardly extravagant, even if he is not exactly precise, when he writes that 'these parliaments, springing up spontaneously 'from the body of Christendom, were based, of course, upon 'the model of the great monastic system, where the representative 'system was born.'

As in tracing the evolution of parliament we have to take into account the clergy, so too we have to pay heed to the Continent. *Si veritatem quaeris, circumspice*: if you seek the truth about our mediæval institutions, take a broad European view. Constitutional history in the middle ages must mainly be based on comparative study. The middle ages were a time of common roots and common institutions. This is true of feudalism; of municipalism; of parliamentarianism. We have been taught of late years that we cannot draw any contrast between English and Continental feudalism: there is a common European feudalism, and the English species only differs (perhaps owing to the peculiar conditions created by the fact of a conquest in 1066) in being more completely logical than any other variety. The same is true of municipal institutions: they develop on common lines in England, in Northern France, and in Flanders. Much the same, again, may be held to be true of parliamentary institutions. If this be so, we must not be too insular in our study of the origins of such institutions. Professor Pollard, it is true, has much to say of the French States-general in comparison with the English parliament; but the comparison is always a contrast, and the contrast is always—or almost always—unfavourable to the

French assembly.* It is perhaps more just to assume that the French and the English assemblies both start from a common root, however widely apart they may subsequently grow.

On that line of enquiry—a line of search for connections, affinities, sympathies—there is much that we shall have to notice in France—in France, and also in Spain. There are notable assemblies of a parliamentary sort in the south-west of France in the early thirteenth century—all the more notable when we remember that Simon de Montfort, one of the fathers of our parliament, once governed that region for the English Crown. There are notable assemblies of the same order, at a still earlier date, in the north of Spain ; and Mr. Belloc even ventures to say that ' probably ' the first parliament arose in that crucible of all our history . . . ' the Southern issues of the Pyrenees.'† And one may even remember that in the early days of the Roman Empire a *concilium*, containing representatives elected by the cantons of the three provinces of Gaul, met to determine the distribution of taxes and to lodge petitions against imperial officials—just as a similar

*Professor Pollard, as we have seen, distinguishes between the English parliament, which was a law-court and much more, and the French *parlement*, which was only a law-court, distinct from the States-general. But the term *parliamentum* is used in mediæval France for sessions of the States-general ; a French writer of 1368, using a phrase very like that of the law-book of Edward I.'s reign, tells how ' the king held his parliament, there being present the three estates of the *langue d'by*, for the having of counsel . . . wherein the court was occupied on many days.' In this passage (see Viollet, *Institutions de la France*, III, p. 186) the very words *parliamentum*, *consilium* and *curia*, on which Professor Pollard has much to say in the process of interpreting the text of his English law-book, are all to be found ; and Viollet, in quoting the text, remarks that ' les états sont si bien le conseil ou le parlement agrandi qu'on les voit . . . se réunir dans la Grand Chambre du Parlement.' In the light of these facts, which show almost an exact parallel between mediæval England and mediæval France, Professor Pollard's repeated contrast of the two seems much too sharp.

†I would not myself hazard any guess about the origin of parliaments to the South or the North of the Pyrenees. But I would refer any reader who may be interested in the matter to a little book, privately printed in 1901 by the Rev. Wentworth Webster, under the title of *Les Loisirs d'un Etranger au pays Basque*, in which he will find among other things an essay on ' Simon de Montfort and the English Parliament,' which touches on these matters.

body met also in Spain. Representation was not unknown in the ancient world ; and an interesting essay might be written on that theme. The Athenian Council of the fifth century B.C. was perhaps based on proportionate representation of the Attic demes.

On a broader and more continental view Professor Pollard's scepticism about the three estates in mediæval England hardly appears cogent. The England of the thirteenth century was closely connected with Western Europe ; and if there were three estates in Scotland, in France, and in Spain (as there were, except in Aragon, where owing to the sub-division of the nobility there were four), it is difficult not to believe that there were three estates, generally recognized as such, and recognized for parliamentary as well as for other purposes, in England also. The forms of the parliamentary writs confirm this view. If the *Modus tenendi parliamenti* speaks rather of six ' grades ' than of three estates : if the rolls make no mention of three estates—yet there are three forms of parliamentary writs for three classes of men. There is one for the bishops and their clergy ; there is one for the great barons ; there is one for the knights and burgesses, who are both, with only a formal difference of wording, summoned together through the sheriff. We would not pretend, on the basis of these facts, that the three estates were three separate legal bodies, separately voting as such. That is a view which has never been held. We would only suggest that there was a general conception of three estates of men, which at any rate affected the form of parliamentary summons. The three estates may not fit nicely into the language of the law book of Edward I.'s time quoted by Professor Pollard, or into his general conception of the High Court of Parliament. But we suspect that they were nevertheless there.

Professor Pollard's account of our mediæval parliament is full of erudition, full of vigour, full of stimulus. But he stands somewhat aloof from the middle ages ; and he has not, as it were, lived in them. His mediæval world is not the mediæval world of many other scholars : it wears a strange and, at times, a frigid air. He seems resolved to make the middle ages undemocratic—perhaps in order that he may celebrate the real democracy of a Tudor Age which generalised liberty. Magna Charta is to him a feudal and reactionary document : it is sad that he should have given the great weight of his authority to that view, which can

hardly stand. The common people of the middle ages are for him villeins, and his villeins are villeins suffering from all the disabilities enunciated in the law-books. He forgets the multitude of freemen, socmen, and burgesses; he forgets that the villein in actual life was far less of a villein than he is in the law-books, as Sir Paul Vinogradoff has abundantly proved. When he tells us that the legal definition of villeins was 'cattle,' and doubts whether the mass of these 'chattels' were baptized in the early middle ages, he is carrying a protest against what he calls 'romanticism' to the lengths of counter-romanticism.

III.

So far of the past of parliament—or rather, of one small part of its past, the mediæval, with which alone space permits us to deal here. What of its present; and, still more, what of its future? Mr. Belloc has his answer ready. The present of parliament is decadence: its future will be death. Parliament, as he conceives it, was in its hey-day a sovereign body, drawn from, and drawing its strength from, a limited aristocratic society, which enjoyed prestige and found acceptance among the nation. By a long process—beginning with the triumph of the Lancastrian party in 1400; hastened, unconsciously and involuntarily, by Henry VIII. through his suppression of monasteries and enrichment of the gentry; completed in 1688 by the 'glorious' revolution—the English aristocracy climbed the throne and almost clutched the crown. The monarchy became a shadow; the many-faceted society of England, which ought to have been represented by a many-faceted parliament, became for parliamentary purposes a single aristocratic society: landlords, dominating the shires and controlling the boroughs, dominated and controlled Parliament and central government, just as, through the institution of the Justice of the Peace, they dominated local government also. Deep called unto deep—the J.P. to the M.P.; far from checking one another, and ensuring liberty, as Whig theorists amiably believed, they came from the same class, represented the same class, and worked in harmony for the well-being of the same class. That class was allowed to govern for some two hundred years and more—from the end of the seventeenth to the beginning of the twentieth century—because its members respected themselves and were respected

by others; because they showed a high aristocratic gravity and could, on occasion, show a high aristocratic spirit of self-sacrifice.

It is all gone. Plutocracy has invaded the old aristocracy: aristocratic society, forgetting its old self-respect, worships the new mammon, and has lost its cachet. Forgetting to respect itself, it has ceased to be respected by others: the spirit of democracy has invaded the masses; the grandees are no longer grand in the eyes of any man. Therefore, 'since the fates of 'death stand about us . . . let us go forward'—and let us go forward by going backward. Mr. Belloc accordingly proposes a rehabilitation of monarchy—not necessarily hereditary: 'You 'must have one man sufficiently removed from temptation by 'his own absolute position and vested with sufficient powers' —a thing which German theorists of monarchy, claiming that the monarch alone is lifted high enough above society to compose its strife, have said before. He proposes, too, for the representation of a many-faceted society, something which will altogether displace Parliament—something as plural as that is singular—a system of councils, representing real interests, and based on Trade Unions and the professional guilds of doctors, lawyers, teachers, policemen and soldiers. This is monarchical syndicalism—or, if you will, syndicalistic monarchism. It explains why the German writer, whom we quoted before, can only describe Mr. Belloc's philosophy in a five-barrelled adjective. But how it shall come to pass, or what it would be like if it did come to pass—that is a thing not easy to explain.

One would naturally expect Professor Pollard's view of the present, and his vision of the future, to be evolutionary. His book is entitled 'The Evolution of Parliament': he speaks of parliament repeatedly as 'a living organism,' which 'no one made,' that 'has grown, and not been concocted.' Of the validity of that philosophy we will speak presently; but if we assume its validity, it is a logical consequence of that assumption that parliament will 'grow' in the future into harmony with the new environment of social forces (unions, for example, and guilds) which have grown round about parliament, and also that it will 'grow' into some harmony with the new environment of imperial dominions by which, in the last hundred years, it has come to be surrounded. At this point, however, one may trace a certain omission, and a certain inconsistency, in Professor Pollard's

method. While, in a penultimate chapter on 'the State in 'Parliament,' he has something to say about syndicalism; while, in his last chapter, he mentions, in passing, the growing practice of extra-parliamentary consultation with unions or guilds affected by proposed legislation, he does not consider the probable reaction on parliament of the new social forces of the day. This is his omission; he is, as it were, a little short-sighted on the social side.

Where inconsistency appears to enter is in the plan for imperial federation with which he concludes. Apostle as he is of growth, he constructs—or, as he would say, concocts—a scheme of federation which is certainly not in the category of growth. But no scheme of federation, in its nature, can come within that category; and Professor Pollard himself, upon interrogation, would probably admit, as by his own action he implies, that federations *fiunt*, *non nascuntur*. The federation which he proposes to make has four features. In the first place, the judicial committee of the privy council, which is the final court of colonial appeals, is to make tours or eyres of the dominions, for the garnering of judicial experience which may result in the drafting of statutes for submission to an imperial parliament; while, in the second place, the judicial committee, ceasing to be only the final court of colonial appeal, is to be fused with the House of Lords, in its capacity of final court of British appeal, so as to constitute a single supreme imperial court of imperial justice.

Next, the second chambers of the United Kingdom and of the Dominions are to be fused into a single imperial second chamber, leaving a unicameral system, both in the United Kingdom and the Dominions, for domestic legislation and domestic affairs. Finally an imperial executive or cabinet is to be instituted, responsible directly to the imperial chamber, and indirectly (since the power of the purse will remain, at any rate in the first instance, with these bodies) to the unicameral legislatures of the United Kingdom and the Dominions.

It is impossible adequately to discuss these proposals at the end of an article. They demand an article, or a series of articles, to themselves. One can only say that Professor Pollard—in earlier pages a strenuous and rigorous (perhaps too strenuous and too rigorous) critic of the institutions of the United States of

America—is in his latter pages doing homage to those institutions. He has insisted on the unitary sovereignty of Parliament and criticised separation of powers ; he is now advocating a separation —not it is true between executive, legislature and judicature, but between imperial and domestic legislatures and cabinets—which may be no less pregnant with difficulties. And one may add another consideration. Professor Pollard defends his imperial chamber, composed of appointed representatives of the United Kingdom and the Dominions, by the analogy of the American Senate. But the United States offer no parallel for a system under which the second or imperial chamber* represents one area—the whole commonwealth—while the first or domestic chambers represent different areas—the several parts of the Commonwealth ; for the Senate and the House of Representatives represent the same area. Nor does the unicameral constitution proposed for the parts of the commonwealth find any parallel in the constitutions of the parts, or States, of the American federation, which are all bicameral.

We are more inclined to believe in ' growth ' in these high matters of Empire. But what is ' growth ' ; and what do we mean when we speak of the growth of institutions ? In any answer to that question, it is the first and fundamental consideration that human institutions are in the domain of action, or of making. Man makes himself, and his institutions, for better or for worse :

> ' It is not growing, like a tree,
> In bulk, doth make man better be.'

When we speak of growth, in this sphere, we are using a metaphor or simile. The institution of which we speak has not actually grown ; but if we look at the whole process—act piled upon act, purpose upon purpose, making upon making—we may feel and say that it is *like* growth. Just in the same way the State is not an organism, but it is *like* an organism. Things may be like one another, and yet different. The State is like an organism,

*It should be noted, for the sake of clearness, that Professor Pollard's imperial chamber is not only an imperial chamber for the whole commonwealth, but also a second chamber for its parts. It can, for instance, refer to the electorate of any part a measure, passed by the unicameral legislature of that part, which is seriously contentious. This is a very dubious policy.

and yet different—different in many and very important respects. The development of its institutions is like growth, and yet different —different in a very important respect. If there were actual growth, we could fold our hands, and say ' let these things grow.' Because there is only a likeness to growth, we remain responsible. We have been making all along ; and we are responsible for further making—along the lines of the past making, if they have been right ; or along new lines, if the old have been wrong. We have made, for instance, the institutions of the British Empire, as they now are. Professor Pollard argues for further making, along new lines. Others would prefer further making along the old lines, just because they believe that the old lines, which have tended to the increase of the independence of the Dominions, have been and are right. But in either case there is *making* ; and in neither case is there *growth*.

But what is the similarity which makes men talk of the growth of institutions, when all along there is really a making of institutions, which is only *like* growth. It is this. We make such and such an institution, for such and such an object, with such and such a purpose. Then, step by step, conscious at each step only of that step, we add new purposes and fresh objects : we remake and remake our institution, not saying to ourselves, or realising, that we are remaking it, but only saying, and realising, that we are pursuing *this* purpose, that *object*. If at a given time we stop and take stock of what has happened, we may be surprised, and we may say of the institution, ' Why, this is what ' it has grown into.' Strictly speaking, this is what we have made it into ; but it remains true that the institution, as it stands at the time of stock-taking, is not what men proposed to make when they started out ; and though each element of the process has been in the realm of purposive action, and *in that sense* the whole process has been in that realm, yet the whole process *as such* has not been purposed, and the metaphor of growth thus comes naturally to the mind. No set of men would or could have made the British Parliament what it is to-day from one purpose by one making. But it is men whose actions, step by step, century by century—line upon line, line upon line, here a little, and there a little—have made it what it is.

If in the light of these ideas, we try to forecast the makings and re-makings of our parliamentary institutions in the future, we

may perhaps set down the following propositions, each of which —for the future is the domain of Perhaps—must be qualified, and doubly qualified, by perhaps upon perhaps.

(1) Parliament will continue much as it is—a body co-ordinating in its working legislative, executive and judicial powers, but with some change in its upper house, which may be (as the proposals made by the Irish Conference of 1917-18 suggest) along the lines of the representation of interests—interests social, or local, or both ; interests in the nature of churches and professions, or of regions and provinces.

(2) Parliament will have to shed many things, and will be rejuvenated by shedding them. There will be much devolution—in matter of education ; in matter of health ; and the like—to provincial authorities. As India comes to be governed by Indians, and Ireland by Irishmen, the Atlantean load on the shoulders of the Imperial Parliament will be further lightened.

(3) There will be, organized or unorganized (probably organized), a sort of fifth estate. Besides the Press (freed, one hopes, from the incubus of proprietors' control) there may well be an industrial or labour council, not as a formal part of the legal constitution, but informally suggestive, consultative, advisory to Parliament and the Cabinet.

(4) The 'deferential' spirit being dead, we are likely to have the electorate, when it has recovered from its present temporary paralysis, asserting itself more vigorously than in the past. It is possible that we may come to experiment with the referendum : it is possible, on the other hand, that a purified fourth estate, and a new fifth estate, may provide sufficient channels.

(5) The general instinct for games will continue to keep politics a great game between the 'Ins' and the 'Outs' ; but it will be more and more the electorate, and not the House of Commons, which decides who shall be in, and who shall be out. We are likely therefore to retain our cabinet system—a system opposed to the periodic executive of the United States—and not to develop any form of monarchy, presidential or otherwise. Temporarily, a prime minister may dominate the Cabinet or the Commons : normally we shall be governed by the free and rational discussion of equals—in the Cabinet, the Commons, the Electorate —for the British method of government is essentially a method of government by discussion, than which there is no better. It

is more likely that the Government of the United States will approximate to the British, and develop along the lines of a cabinet system, than that a presidential system of government will be established here.

(6) Parliamentary government, being government by discussion, must in the last resort depend upon the broadest area of discussion : it must be government by general public discussion, as conducted between general public parties. At the present moment public opinion is, as it were, stunned and apathetic. We have had a surfeit of the State and its politics and its wars ; we are bewildered by the behaviour of money and of prices in the economic world in which we live : we have had our area of discussion—our electorate—swollen to dimensions not yet easily manageable. But public opinion and public discussion between parties will revive. They were vigorous enough in the great debates of 1885-6, of 1905-6, of 1909-11. They will be vigorous again. Everything depends upon the re-establishment of healthy, evenly-balanced parties, based on definite principles, and serving as the organs—the only possible organs—of public discussion. There were ' discontents ' in 1770 : they were cured eventually by the cure which Burke advocated—a healthy party system. There are ' discontents ' in 1921 ; and there is the same cure. ' Let us get back to party ' is no unpatriotic cry ; it is the reverse. *Patria* and party are not antitheses : they are complements.

(7) The British Commonwealth is a free partnership of communities, each endowed with its own genius. We may exercise our minds with schemes for their regulation (*et ipse in Utopia fui*) ; but are they needed ? Federations are made when the units which make the federation find themselves suffering economic or political disabilities in their isolation which are intolerable. Is there evidence of such intolerable disabilities among the parts of the Commonwealth to-day ? If there is not, let us not disturb the partnership. If there is, and when there is, let all the parts of the Commonwealth send their representatives to talk business in a common convention for the making of a common constitution. But do not let us, in that hour, complicate the problem by trying, at one and the same time, to reform the second chamber of the Mother Country and to institute a new chamber for the Empire.

ERNEST BARKER.

MODERN DEMOCRACIES

1. Modern Democracies. By VISCOUNT BRYCE. Macmillan. 1921.
2. The Hindrances to Good Citizenship. By JAMES BRYCE. Yale University Press. 1909.
3. Studies in History and Jurisprudence. By JAMES BRYCE. The Clarendon Press. 1901.
4. The American Commonwealth. By JAMES BRYCE. Macmillan. 1888 and 1920.
5. Essays on Reform. By various writers, including one by JAMES BRYCE on "The Historical Aspect of Democracy." Macmillan. 1867.

IN the year of the appearance of Darwin's 'Origin of Species,' James Bryce, then aged twenty-one, published his 'Flora ' of the Island of Arran,' thus winning his spurs in the world of science. In his later works it is evident that he has never quite forsaken his old love, but in 1864 he sought and found his true field in that slender volume we all know so well, 'The Holy ' Roman Empire.' From that year to this two generations have been instructed and delighted by the penetrating studies in political philosophy he has given to the world. Now in his eighty-fourth year Lord Bryce provides us with two volumes on the course of modern democracy, which are marked by all those judicial qualities so long associated with his pen. There is no sign that the author's intellectual eye has even begun to grow dim or that his pen has lost any of its strength. His record already almost equals that of Leopold von Ranke. At the age of eighty-five the great German historian informed his publisher that he proposed to write a new work on universal history; when he died six years later seven volumes of his *Weltgeschichte* had been dictated. Ranke, however, remained a professor his life long. Lord Bryce has served his country not only as a teacher but also as a statesman. He has won distinction for himself and done good work for the world as a member of parliament, as a minister of the Crown and as ambassador at Washington. And his experience in the realm of action has given additional value to his work in the realm of thought.

Lord Bryce is a distinguished Ulsterman, belonging to a race which has produced able men out of all proportion to its

numbers. It has given nine presidents out of twenty-seven to the United States. In the roll of honour of the men of Ulster we find in the ranks of statesmen and administrators such men as the Cannings of English and Indian renown ; Lord Castlereagh, whose fame steadily increases ; Lord Lawrence, who saved India in 1857 ; Lord Dufferin, ambassador and viceroy ; and Sir Robert Hart, the Inspector-General of the Chinese Customs. In the ranks of sailors there are such men as Sir Francis L. McClintock of the Franklin Relief Expedition. Among soldiers John Nicholson stands out, the Bayard of India. Among men of science we find Sir Hans Sloane, the founder of the British Museum, Joseph Black, the discoverer of carbon dioxide, and Lord Kelvin, the Napoleon of science in the nineteenth century. Among other famous Ulstermen or Ulsterwomen are William Hazlitt, the Brontes, and Sir Samuel Ferguson, the real precursor of the Celtic Revival, and great lawyers like Lord Cairns, who was perhaps the greatest judge of the whole nineteenth century.

In his latest volume Lord Bryce sets out by discussing considerations applicable to democratic government in general. He uses the word democracy in its old and strict sense, ' as ' denoting a government in which the will of the majority of ' qualified citizens rules, taking the qualified citizens to constitute ' the great bulk of the inhabitants, say, roughly, at least three- ' fourths, so that the physical force of the citizens coincides ' (broadly speaking) with their voting power.'* This is, in effect, the view adopted by Sir Henry Maine, by M. Edmond Schérer, and by J. R. Lowell. Of course, it is possible to argue that democracy is as much a form of State or a form of society as a form of government. We simply note the restriction Lord Bryce imposes on himself in considering the problem to which he devotes his attention. He proceeds to trace the historical evolution of democracy, its theoretical foundations, its relations with liberty, equality, education, religion, and the power exercised by tradition and by the press in controlling the action of the voter. There is an illuminating account of the share taken by public opinion in this process.

Dealing next with the republics of classical times, Lord Bryce

* Vol. I p. 26.

points out, as he did in his 1867 essay, that the democracies of Athens, Syracuse, and Mitylene differ in respect after respect from the democracies of our own day. The classical State was a City-State, built on slavery. Besides, its business was simple when compared with the complexities of a modern State. There was then no moral or spiritual bond to link men of different races together. Men then invariably regarded a stranger as an enemy. The feeling of human brotherhood, transcending race and colour, estate and privilege, was entirely unknown. From Athens Lord Bryce turns to the republics of Spanish America, and he only allows two or three of them any title to be called a democracy.

The rest of the first volume is devoted to France, Switzerland—a land receiving a warm meed of praise—and Canada. Able as is the survey of French political institutions, we could have spared some of it for more consideration of Canada, especially of its attitude to the United States and of its relationship to the Mother Country. The second volume deals with the United States, Australia and New Zealand, and concludes with a masterly criticism of the democratic institutions in these six democratic countries. That it was impossible for Lord Bryce to cover the whole of the ground of all the countries which to-day are the subjects of democratic experiment is obvious ; nevertheless we are unfeignedly sorry that he has omitted all consideration of our own islands. This, he explains, he did of set purpose on the ground that he did not feel confident of his impartiality in discussing controversies in the British Isles where the ashes of many hot disputes are not yet cold. But few of Lord Bryce's readers will share his lack of confidence in his own impartiality. A man is truly impartial when, though convinced that one side is right, he sees the arguments for the other side, sets them down fully, and then refutes them to the best of his ability. In this sense Lord Bryce shows that he is impartial. He is convinced that the democratic side is right, but he sees the arguments employed by its opponents and gives full weight to them in his own conclusions. He himself, in his ' Studies in ' Contemporary Biography,' quotes the example of Bishop Fraser, who was so anxious not to overstate his own case that when he came to speak at a public meeting on behalf of some enterprise, he was not content, like most men, to set

forth its claims, but went on to dwell upon possible drawbacks or dangers, with the result that the more ardent friends of the scheme thought that he was pouring cold water on them, and called him a Balaam reversed. In the same spirit Lord Bryce is so honourably anxious to say nothing more than he thinks true in favour of democracy, that his defence of this form of government is sometimes embarrassing to its friends.

To take one example—the extent to which bribery and democracy go hand in hand in the United States—Lord Bryce writes :—

'Bribery is, or recently was, common in some districts, such as parts of Ohio and South-Eastern New York, as well as in some cities, where a section of the less intelligent voters, especially the negroes in the Middle States, have been corruptible. Though prosecutions are sometimes instituted, the offence more often goes unpunished, the two parties agreeing not to rip up one another's misdeeds. The commonest method of corruption has been to give an agent a lump sum for all the votes he can deliver, and many of these he got without payment, perhaps by persuasion, perhaps, until Prohibition began to conquer State after State, by drinks and cigars.'*

He adds that in Congress 'there is plenty of jobbery and log-'rolling, the latter not necessarily corrupt, but mischievous and 'wasteful even when no bad motive is present.'† Nor are the States a whit behind Congress.

'The carnival of jobbery and corruption which private Bills have induced in State legislatures has done more than anything else to discredit those bodies. Secret arrangements are made between the lobbyists who act for the promoters of the Bill, the members whom these lobbyists approach, and other members who usually have similar jobs of their own, and thus by the system called "log-rolling" support is obtained sufficient to put the Bills through. Unscrupulous members use their powers in another way, introducing Bills designed to injure some railway company or other wealthy corporation, and then demanding to be bought off. This form of blackmail is called a strike, and has been frequent in almost every State where there are large corporations to be squeezed. The threatened interests, obliged to defend themselves, justify their methods by the plea that their shareholders must be protected, and when legitimate means fail, because the composition and rules of the legislatures afford no protection, illegitimate means must be employed.'‡

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* Vol. II., p. 55. † Vol. II., p. 67. ‡Ibid, p. 86.

The judges of the Supreme Court and those of six or seven States are above reproach. In most of the other States—there are close on fifty altogether—

'The justices of the highest court are tolerably competent, even if inferior in learning and acumen to the ablest counsel who practise before them. Almost all are above suspicion of pecuniary corruption, though some are liable to be swayed by personal or political influences, for the judge cannot forget his re-election, and is tempted to be complaisant to those who can affect it. In these States the justices of the lower courts are of only mediocre capacity, but hardly ever venal.'*

Of the remaining States Lord Bryce speaks out vigorously:

'All that can safely be said is that in a certain small number of States the bench as a whole is not trusted. In every court, be it of higher or lower rank, there are some good men, probably more good than bad. But no plaintiff or defendant knows what to expect. If he goes before one of the upright judges his case may be tried as fairly as it would be in Massachusetts or in Middlesex. On the other hand, fate may send him to a court where the rill of legal knowledge runs very thin, or to one where the stream of justice is polluted at its source. The use of the mandatory or prohibitory power of the court to issue injunctions, and of the power to commit for some alleged contempt of court, is a fertile source of mischief. Injunctions obtained from a pliable judge are sometimes moves in a stock-gambling or in a political game, especially if the lawsuit has a party colour.'†

Apart entirely from the question of corruption, there is the fact that even yet Judge Lynch has not abdicated his functions, and widespread lawlessness prevails in the Southern States. In all the States ex-President Taft, who had both exceptional experience and exceptional judgment, holds that 'the lax 'enforcement of the criminal law' is one of the greatest evils from which the people of the United States suffer. It is indeed obvious that the *advocatus diaboli* will have no trouble in penning a grave indictment against not only democracy in the United States but against democracy in general. For it would be as unfair as it would be untrue to prefer the charge of lawlessness against the people of the United States in particular. We have only to look at our own country to see how, concurrently with the increase in legislation, there has been a decline in the spirit of obedience to law. The Reform Bills of 1832, 1867, and 1884

* Vol. II., p. 93. † Ibid, pp. 93-4.

ushered in the new idea that there must be many measures passed in every session of Parliament. We tremble to think of the effects of the 1918 Reform Bill in this respect. It is true to say that more Acts are passed to-day in a single session than were passed during almost the whole of the seventeenth century. Has the habit of obedience grown to the same degree? During the great Civil War of the seventeenth century the judges went their assizes as if not a single Cavalier or Roundhead were in arms. Contrast this striking fact with our recent records. The Nonconformists, headed by Dr. John Clifford, refused to pay rates on the ground of conscience. The suffragettes refused to pay them on similar grounds. The example spread to the doctors who threatened their refusal to execute a Public Health Act. There was no need for Ireland to follow the example of England: she was able—and willing—to set her own example. The Sinn Fein movement began in 1906, and turned to drilling as early as 1909. The Ulster Covenanters, to meet the contemplated assaults on their lives, armed themselves in 1912. The Munitions of War Act prohibited strikes, but, in spite of it, the Welsh miners struck. Yet these miners received complete indemnity for their breaches of contract, which had imperilled thousands of lives at the front.

It is the fashion of foolish people to laugh at the idea of the divine right of kings. If they laughed at the divine right of Parliaments we might understand them much better. For the divine right of kings taught the people that the duty of obedience was a sacred one. It is easy to belittle this theory, but it is far more important to understand it. It may be laughed at as a sentiment, or a prejudice. Still, that sentiment or prejudice bound the allegiance of the people to its government. 'It is 'most true,' taught Thomas Carlyle, 'that all available authority 'is mystic in its conditions.' The divine right of kings has passed away for ever, and in its place all we can teach is the utilitarian theory of obedience. But if we pursue this theory to its logical conclusion it means that whenever calculation shows that there is a pecuniary gain in disobedience then the law ought to be defied.

In the past we believed in freedom slowly broadening down from precedent to precedent. We believed that there was a continuity in our history. But if the habit of disobedience to

law grows, how long will this continuity last? All over the world democracies are enacting laws. Is there a habit of obedience also being enacted? Some indeed seem to imagine that liberty is licence. On the contrary, liberty involves self-restraint. As one peruses the pages of 'Modern Democracies,' one perceives, not only among ourselves but also in the United States and in our daughter nations beyond the seas, the same impatience of restraint and the same impatience of discipline. A law has been broken. What does it matter? Here let us record the measured judgment of Sir Henry Maine:—

'If any Government should be tempted to neglect, even for a moment, its function of compelling obedience to law—if a democracy for example, were to allow a portion of the multitude of which it consists to set at defiance some law which it happens to dislike—it would be guilty of a crime which hardly any other virtue could redeem, and which century after century might fail to repair.'*

De Tocqueville taught us that it is never the downtrodden who make revolutions; on the contrary, it is rather those who have been downtrodden and are no longer so, who organise rebellion. To-day we are witnessing this phenomenon all over the civilised world. The poor, so far as we are able to learn, are almost as patient of their conditions of life as their fathers were. On the other hand, the men in well-paid positions in the industrial world are passionately in revolt against the existing social order. The conflict to be dreaded is not the conflict between capital and labour, grave as that undoubtedly is; it is the conflict provoked by the writings of men who plead for what is in essence anarchy. There is a day coming on which we shall find ranged on one side law, liberty and true democracy, and on the other side anarchy, licence, and true oligarchy.

It is plain that Lord Bryce entertains fears akin to those here outlined, for he holds that:

'Democracy has become, all over Europe and to some extent even in North America also, desired merely as a means, not as an end, precious in itself because it was the embodiment of liberty. It is now valued, not for what it is, but for what it may be used to win for the masses. When the exercise of their civic rights has brought them that which they desire, and when they feel sure that what they have won will remain with them, may they not cease to care for the further use of

* Popular Government, p. 64.

those rights ? . . . If the spiritual oxygen which has kept alive the attachment to liberty and self-government in the minds of the people becomes exhausted, will not the flame burn low and perhaps flicker out ? The older school of Liberals dwelt on the educative worth of self-government which Mazzini represented in its idealistic, and Mill in its utilitarian aspects ; but who would keep up the paraphernalia of public meetings and of elections and legislative debates merely for the sake of this bye-product ? Much will depend on what the issue of the near future is likely to be. If that which the masses really desire should turn out to be the extinction of private property or some sort of communistic system, and if in some countries such a system should ever be established, the whole character of government would be changed, and that which is now called democracy would (as indicated in a previous chapter) become a different thing altogether, perhaps an industrial bureaucratic oligarchy.'

There was a day when some of us used to read our Mill and our Mazzini for the sake of the ideals of freedom that both thinkers dreamed. Now part of their dream is simply dismissed as a bye-product, and we are invited to contemplate a time when we shall be at the mercy of Sidney Webbism or Leninism. The danger is not as remote as many people may imagine. To realise the dreams of a large section of the artisans of Great Britain we must have a despotism akin to that now flourishing in Petrograd. Even now we are being drilled and disciplined in a way our fathers would never have tolerated, and the outcome of this drill and discipline is an oligarchy of industrial bureaucrats. Needless to say this is not a prospect which appeals to Lord Bryce. Put into blunt English, present tendencies mean that the mass of mankind will be content with the modern equivalent for *panem et circenses ;* they will be satisfied with subsidised wages and cheap cinemas, and will take little interest in public affairs. For the moment Carlyle is out of favour, and the Carlyle that wrote after 1850 deserves to remain out of favour. But there were two Carlyles, and the man who wrote before 1850 belongs to a very different class to his successor. It is not a little curious to find that the earlier Carlyle and Lord Bryce attain, if we interpret the latter rightly, a substantial measure of agreem nt in their outlook on the future. Carlyle unquestionably taught that democracy could not in the nature of things be permanent, that it was merely an expedient ensuring the transition from an old order which is dying to a new which is coming to birth. All present indications show that Carlyle was quite right in his

forecast; and Lord Bryce does not substantially disagree, though he is reluctant to admit the painfulness of the labour pangs through which the world will have to pass.

It is quite obvious that the ideal of the new regime will be equality, not liberty. 'L'essence de la démocratie,' points out M. E. Schérer, 'c'est l'égalité.' In his 'Democracy in America,' de Tocqueville emphasises the fact that equality is the leading conception involved in the very principle of democracy. Of course there is no difficulty in showing, as Treitschke does, that human beings are fundamentally unequal in capacity. Some of our middle and working class advocates of anarchy turn this very argument of Treitschke to their purpose of pressing home the truth that under their enlightened guidance they must tyrannise over the majority. There is, however, a real sense in which in a democratic society there is a general equality of rights and a similarity of conditions. Indeed in 1867 Lord Bryce was at pains to lay stress on the view that democracy in its true sense is the product of Christianity, whose principle has always been the spiritual equality of all men before God. It is natural to expect that Mazzini should emphasise this aspect. 'If anything ever 'profoundly surprised me,' he said, 'it is that many persons 'have hitherto been blind to the eminently religious character 'of the (democratic) movement.' Equality, then, is an ideal. There is a spiritual dignity attaching to each member of the human race. But liberty is also an ideal, and it is not at all certain that it is possible to combine these two ideals of equality and liberty. As Lord Acton pointed out, the underlying cause which rendered the French Revolution so inimical to liberty was its theory of equality.

Madame de Staël used to say that her countrymen were a vain race, and therefore they demanded equality, whereas the English being a proud race demanded liberty. Behind this *obiter dictum* there is much matter for reflection. What is the ideal of the working man in the six countries surveyed by Lord Bryce? Is it liberty or is it equality? It is perfectly plain that the artisan can have either liberty or equality. What is no less certain is that he cannot have both at the same time. He can have liberty to develop his capacities to the utmost. He can work by the piece, he can become a foreman or a manager, as he does regularly in the United States. On the other hand, he can

have equality. He can earn the same wages as the rest of the artisans, but he can earn no more and no less. It is manifestly impossible to combine liberty and equality in this sense. Unquestionably the chief desire of organized working men all over the world is the securing of equality. Liberty spells efficiency, but is equality likely to spell this magic word ?

The special advantage of Lord Bryce's new book is that it enables us to compare and to contrast conditions over a wide range of experience. Of course, it is difficult to compare French and Swiss experience with our own. It is less difficult to compare the experience of our overseas dominions with our own, and we learn much from the comparison. In all the lands under the British flag there are Labour parties, and the experience of Australia and New Zealand probably forecasts much of the future that lies before ourselves. On the other hand in the United States with its population of some one hundred and ten millions there is not a single Labour member in the House of Representatives. In a singularly informing chapter in the 1920 edition of ' The American Commonwealth ' Lord Bryce reckons that no less than thirty million people have left the shores of Europe for those of the United States. Even for the lands and the cities of the far West this constitutes an enormous addition to the number of labourers. Does this immigration account for the fact that in all but a few occupations the trade unions exercise comparatively slight influence ? This no doubt is a part reason, but another lies in the fact that in no country perhaps in the world does the capable working man realise so keenly the possibilities of the industrial world. He knows that he can certainly become a foreman, and that, provided he has ability, he can also rise to the rank of manager on a small scale. Nor is managerial work on a large scale in any wise outside the scope of his ambition. The millionaire capitalists of America have been for the most part men who once were members of the lowest rank in the industrial scale. Some of these capitalists, it is rumoured, give an able working man promotion when he deserves it. But with this promotion comes the question : If there is a strike, where do you stand ? If the artisan stands with the employer, there is an extra sum added to his wages. The outcome is that the working man with brains is tempted away from the trade union ranks in America, and this furnishes

another reason for the notable lack of success of these unions in the United States. True, the longshoremen of the Great Lakes possess a trade union which has a vigorous life of its own, but this case is exceptional.

The quality of a democracy largely depends on the quality of its leaders. In the past France could point to Gambetta, Jules Ferry and that fine character, Waldeck Rousseau; Switzerland to Welti, Ruchonnet and Numa Droz. We have had such men as Peel and Palmerston, Gladstone and Disraeli. Canada produced two striking men in Sir John Macdonald and Sir Wilfred Laurier, and the United States produced one of the great men of all time, Abraham Lincoln, not to mention such men as Calhoun, Clay, and Webster. Australia possessed such strong personalities as Robert Lowe, who there contracted his fierce dislike to democracy, Sir Henry Parkes, Sir Graham Berry, William Bede Dalley, C.C. Kingston, G. H. Reid, and Alfred Deakin. In New Zealand there is the noble figure of Sir George Grey and there is the figure of J. Seddon. As we survey a roll like this, we are driven to ask the question: Have these statesmen successors of equal rank? When we answer the question in the negative, as we are bound to do, we come to the conclusion that though our age has been an age of great events it has not been an age of great men. Lord Bryce regretfully admits that, in spite of the case of Abraham Lincoln, universal suffrage and the growth of equality in opportunity have not enlisted men of the highest ability in the service of the State. This is specially true in the United States, where not only able men but also decent men stand aside from political life. Our cousins possess men of outstanding qualities in business, and these qualities they devote to the accumulation of wealth. In a land where there are no rank and no eminence to be achieved in politics, the possession of the dollar seems to make a man almighty. There is some point still in the gibe of John Stuart Mill that America had produced nothing but dollars and dollar hunters. In his 'Etudes d'Histoire Réligieuse,' Renan inquired:—

'If it were necessary that Italy with her past, or America with her future, should be blotted out of existence, which would leave the greater void in the heart of humanity? What has all America produced that can compare with a ray of that infinite glory that adorns an Italian town, even of the second or third order—Florence, Pisa, Siena, Perugia? Before New York and Boston reach in the scale of human

greatness a rank that is comparable to these towns, how many steps have they still to make ? '

It is sixty years since Renan penned his indictment ; thirty years later J. R. Lowell stated that :—

' Democracy must show a capacity for producing, not an higher average man, but the highest possible types of manhood in all its manifold varieties, or it is a failure. No matter what it does for the body, if it does not in some sort satisfy that inextinguishable passion of the soul for something that lifts life away from prose, it is a failure. Unless it knows how to make itself gracious and winning, it is a failure. Has it done this ? Is it doing this, or trying to do it ? '

It is characteristic of the fairness of Lord Bryce that he does not hesitate to reproduce this quotation, though he clearly thinks that this is asking more from democracy than any form of government can be expected to give. Still, the political godfathers of democracy used to claim that it possessed a stimulating power such as belongs to no other form of government. Were they right in preferring this claim ? Monarchy in the sixteenth century gave that passion of the soul Lowell longed for. Mary, Queen of Scots, gave it, and her rival, Queen Elizabeth, gave it. Monarchy in the seventeenth century gave it. At its beginning Henry of Navarre evoked that passion, and at its close Louis XIV. evoked it. No one can read the history of the eighteenth century without seeing how splendidly our aristocracy also evoked it. Examples like these prove how lofty is the standard to which democracy has to attain. Yet it has attained that standard both in a past and in the present generation. In the great struggle between north and south during the sixties when Abraham Lincoln dominated the United States, democracy showed its capacity for high endeavour ; it showed similar capacity in the great war which engrossed all our energies from 1914 to 1918. The past attainment belonged to one nation : the recent attainment belonged to all the nations who were fighting to defeat German ambitions. It was as manifest in Belgium as it was in Great Britain.

Among the good points which Lord Bryce puts to the credit of democracy are : its maintenance of public order, its efficiency in civil administration, its legislative enactments for the welfare of the poorer classes, its patriotism or courage, and its freedom from the charge of inconstancy or ingratitude. As regards the

last point E. A. Freeman used to insist with all his wonted vehemence that the Swiss were loyal to a degree to their leaders. R. Michiels dwells on the presence of the same quality in the ranks of the German Socialists. Nor does this quality belong only to the Old World. Canada displays it as strikingly as either Australia or New Zealand. The charge of ingratitude might be far more fairly preferred against monarchy than against democracy. Let any one compare the treatment Francis Joseph accorded Benedek after the war of 1866 with that accorded, also after 1866, by the men of the Confederacy to the general whom Lord Acton almost ranked with Napoleon, Robert E. Lee.

If democracy is not to be a failure men must have restraint and discipline. They require to note what they can and what they cannot do in order that their leaders may supply what they lack. It used to be an argument against the enfranchisement of women that the bloom might fade from the flower. Is it not a point to be borne in mind in considering the leadership of democracy? In the effort for a leader from the ranks to arrive, is there not a tendency in his case for the bloom to fade from the flower? He is tempted to offer higher wages or shorter hours of work, even when he thinks them disadvantageous. Must he not outbid his rivals? The people are on the lookout for a man with initiative, with the power of grasping their wants, with the force of eloquence. Yet his initiative may prove to be simply that of getting ahead of his rivals, his power of grasping may be the quality of grab, and his eloquence may be so much claptrap. The leader requires insight into the past and foresight into the future. Will the democratic leader possess this insight and this foresight?

> 'The echoes of the past within his brain
> The sunrise of the future on his face.'

These are among the qualities of the great statesman. Do the echoes of the past resound in the minds of the leaders of democracy? Does the sunrise of the future irradiate their faces? On the answers to these questions depends the future of modern democracies.

ROBERT H MURRAY.

SOME LIBRARIES AT CAMBRIDGE

JUST one hundred years ago Thomas Dibdin, librarian and bibliomaniac, published a book over the production of which he had taken infinite pains, 'A Bibliographical Antiquarian and 'Picturesque Tour in France and Germany.' A learned member of Cambridge University, whose right to speak on the matter is unquestionable, writing in the 'Dictionary of National Biography,' gives short shrift to the author of this work. Remembering, however, the collection of books, now in the Rylands Library at Manchester, which Dibdin was instrumental in accumulating for Lord Spencer at Althorp, and allowing for a feeling of charity very natural on the occasion of a centenary—not to mention a feeling of gratitude for many an hour spent over some curiously entertaining writings—one may be pardoned for selecting Dibdin as one whose example it would do no harm for more people in these days to copy, if in no other, at least in one respect. In plain words it may be suggested that those who wish to find a novel and a pleasant form of holiday, might do worse, or even could not do much better, than undertake a bibliographical tour; and further, improve upon Dibdin by making that tour in Cambridge.

The choice of Cambridge needs defence. In part it is close to town; in part it is very beautiful, especially at Easter or in the summer months; in part it is one of the few places in England in which during the lengthy vacation days it is always easy to find good lodging. But above all it is the happy hunting ground for those who love to see a noble book or turn the pages of a stately manuscript. At Cambridge, unlike Oxford, they have never centralised their treasures, and in the thirty libraries of the University, the Colleges or other institutions, there is to be found not only a collection unsurpassed in England but one whose component parts are housed in a diversity of setting, a fact which in itself adds variety to the viewing of it.

He who sets out upon this academic Odyssey will find himself following in the footsteps of high company. The notes remain of scholars from outside who have visited these libraries before; and to those who come after they make interesting reading. It is

something to handle a book which the hands of Casaubon or Burnet or Burman or Uffenbach or Tischendorf or Delisle have enfolded, and to have explained to one this or that problem upon which men like these have passed their judgment. Listen to the words of Bishop Richard de Bury, tutor to King Edward III., for it is pardonable to twist words written of the libraries of Paris to apply to the libraries of Cambridge :—

'There are delightful libraries, more aromatic than stores of spicery ; there are luxuriant parks of all manner of volumes ; there are Academic meads shaken by the tramp of scholars ; there are lounges of Athens ; walks of the Peripatetics ; peaks of Parnassus ; and porches of the Stoics. There is seen the surveyor of all arts and sciences, Aristotle, to whom belongs all that is most excellent in doctrine, so far as relates to this passing sublunary world ; there Ptolemy measures epicycles and eccentric apogees and the nodes of the planets by figures and numbers.'

The Bishop has been accused of preferring to rhapsodise about a book than read it. What then is to be found inside these libraries at Cambridge ?

To the geologically minded among our bibliographers there looms up one cataclysmic event ; an event which caused a chasm dividing the libraries of Oxford and Cambridge as they are at present from their predecessors of the Middle Ages by a great gulf which very few books have ever crossed. The visit of the commissioners of Edward VI. resulted in a wholesale destruction of books and manuscripts so complete that it was left for the succeeding generation of library builders practically to start afresh. As the intentions of the commissioners can hardly be written down as merely mischievous, for their use of the phrase *libri vetusti et inutiles* proclaims them self-appointed administrators of a new dispensation, it is a standing warning against the danger of trusting too implicitly the judgment of any one generation, or of any one class, in the community at any time. Oxford, I have heard tell, suffered from their ravages in an especial degree : at Cambridge, though its fate was little better, on the shelves of the University Library—the oldest great library in England—as also upon those of Peterhouse, Corpus Christi and of Gonville and Caius Colleges a few books remain which have been there since the fourteenth or the fifteenth century. To judge from what remain, the books in a typical College library of the middle ages, though profoundly interesting to the historian of learning and of

education, were neither rare nor beautiful. The collections were formed for strictly practical purposes. They were the stock in trade of the scholars who were housed in the Colleges, the text books for their lessons. Some college statutes contain regulations governing the taking out of books and provide for an annual audit of the volumes to insure against their disappearance. Elaborate precautions were often taken, if the following entry in the register of Merton College, Oxford, quoted by the late Mr. J. W. Clark,* may be regarded as typical. On December 14, 1498, the Warden of the College wished to borrow a book from the library, whereupon a record of the following formalities was drawn up :—

'On the same day a book of College Orders (on the second leaf *ter posita*)† was taken out of the library with the consent of all the Fellows. And leave was given to the Warden, in the presence of the four senior Fellows, to make use of it for a season. As a caution for this book the aforesaid Warden deposited a certain other book, viz., St. Jerome's commentary on Matthew and the Epistles of Paul (on the second leaf *sunt*). This book lay in our possession as caution for the other book of College Orders; but, because this book was an insufficient caution, there was deposited with it as a supplementary caution another book, namely: Jerome on Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel.'

The Warden kept the book a year, at the expiration of which we find the following entry :—

'On the last day but one of the same month (1499) the Warden returned to the Vice-Warden the book of the College Orders (on the second leaf *ter posita*) which he had had out of the library for his own use for a season on depositing a sufficient caution. Whereupon the Vice-Warden returned to him his cautions, namely, the commentary of St. Jerome on Matthew (second leaf *sunt*), and another, namely, St. Jerome's exposition of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel (second leaf, *Audi cela*).'

It is interesting to note that in this point, as in many others, we are returning to the habits of the middle ages. The modern librarian at Cambridge has to think, sometimes to an excessive degree, of the daily needs of those reading for examinations in times when book prices are ruling very high.

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*The Care of Books, p. 141.

† The first line of the second leaf of books was often quoted, so that the MS would be identifiable if the first leaf were torn away.

Whence then come the treasures, dating even from the fourth or fifth century, to which the Cambridge Colleges can point with pride? They are almost all the gift of donors since the Renaissance and the Reformation. Thus Corpus Christi had the princely bequest of Archbishop Mathew Parker; Trinity the gift of Whitgift; Pembroke had its Bishop Andrewes, Emmanuel its Sancroft. Of one great addition the University Library was cheated. In 1645-6 the University took advantage of the abolition of episcopacy to petition Parliament that Archbishop Sancroft's library might be transferred from Lambeth to Cambridge in accordance with the provisions of his will.* Parliament was in an accommodating mood. It granted the petition, adding to the total of books demanded those placed in the Lambeth library since the death of Bancroft. Within a year, moreover, it voted £2,500 for the purposes of the Library, £500 of which materialised and was spent on Hebrew books. In 1662 Archbishop Juxon put in a successful claim to have Bancroft's library restored to Lambeth. But a list of benefactors, or of benefactions, though stimulating to Cantabrigian piety, might be prolonged indefinitely. The fount of generosity still flows. As these lines were penned the writer had but recently returned from a visit to the library of Queens', the library which Erasmus must have used, where preparations were in progress for the reception of the valuable collection of works upon Assyrian antiquities, formed by a former learned member of the College.† It is a good home for a benefaction, this most picturesque of Colleges in Cambridge. The right spirit for an Ancient House speaks in an inscription, to be found at the head of a list of benefactors to Queens' library, dating from the seventeenth century:—

'Nomina eorum qui Bibliothecam hanc suis donariis locupletarunt, ne per ingratam oblivionem intercidere sinant memoriam tanti beneficii Musae Reginales.'

Any study of Cambridge College libraries should begin with that of Trinity Hall. Though less ancient than that of the University the rules for the management and use of the Library contained in the Founder's statutes, dated 1350, formed a model

*Bradshaw, Collected Papers, p. 195. A Memoir of Henry Bradshaw, p. 158.

†Dr. C. W. Johns, late Master of St. Catharine's.

which was copied at many other Colleges—at Oxford as well as at Cambridge. What will strike the visitor's eye, however, more immediately is the most interesting furniture of the room. The earliest bookshelves in mediæval libraries resembled lecterns rather than modern bookcases. On the sloping sides of these the books rested in a continuous row, placed like the Bible on a lectern in a church. As libraries grew to contain more than a few books, this pattern gave way to one in which the books were chained in a row, upright and side by side, beneath the lectern, to which the particular book needed could be lifted from below when required. The Trinity Hall bookcases are of this type. Moreover the library was designed at a time when fashion was crystallizing into an arrangement by which these cases were arranged at right angles to the walls, parallel to, and at equal distance from, each other. An aisle, as in a pew-filled modern church, ran down the middle of the room. The bookcases were divided each from the next by benches where, if the reader chose, he might read sitting, using as a desk the sloping tops of the bookcases which were kept appropriately low. Light from windows, which were on both sides of the library and regularly placed between each case of shelves, would reach the reader in abundance. This was the typical arrangement of the middle ages, as also of Tudor, and of early Jacobean times. It can be seen in the library of Queens' (mediæval) where the windows are decorated, but not obscured, by stained glass from a Carmelite house which once occupied the site; in that of Jesus (Tudor), where stained glass emblems in some of the windows indicate the subject of the books to be found in the neighbouring bookcases; in that of St. John's (Jacobean), where in addition the end panel of each bookcase, as it abuts upon the central aisle, opens on a hinge to display behind it a catalogue on parchment of the actual works upon the shelf concerned. In these latter libraries the practice of chaining books either had never obtained or else had been abandoned. As it was consequently possible to remove the books at will, the necessity for the reading desk on the low cases disappeared. The lectern tops then were abandoned and the shelves were raised to a height of eight feet or more, in the modern manner, in order to secure a maximum accommodation.

Having seen these libraries in which one catches 'the last 'enchantments of the middle ages,' it is well to pass direct to

the library which Christopher Wren built for Trinity. It is indeed a change of atmosphere. The stately proportions of this building in the classic style, together with the rich effect produced by the juxtaposition of a marble floor and Grinling Gibbons carving, indicate that the aim here was not merely to provide a receptacle for books, but also to construct a palace for their readers. The dullest task of collation loses half its tedium amid surroundings of this kind.

In writing of Cambridge libraries it is perhaps less reminiscent of the guide book to proceed, not by an enumeration of the objects to be seen, but rather to distinguish between the various motives which may draw the visitor to see them. These collections may be approached in a spirit of curiosity as to the light thrown by the books upon the life and habits of the past. For this purpose nothing equals the interest of chance inscriptions in the books, which often preserve a flash-light picture of a man or woman, or of an age now long forgotten. Thus in a volume of Dean Colet's lectures, in the Corpus Library, Bishop Tonstall notes that the mutilation of the author's writings on St. Paul is due to the carelessness of the boys of St. Paul's School. Sometimes the inscriptions are very quaint. In a note in that ancient work of the tenth century, the Red Book of Darley (not, it is now held, 'Derby') also at Corpus, one may read in a sixteenth century hand: "This "booke was sumtime had in such reverence in darbieshire that "it was comonlie beleved that 'whosoever should sweare "'untruelie uppon this booke should run madd.'" Sometimes an idle reader has scribbled mere doggerel which no ingenuity can in these days explain. Thus on the pages of a fifteenth century manuscript at Clare (Gregory's homilies on the Gospels) one finds

> 'A Jake Juggelar that guggyll wt a cake
> Etyng vp fleche, blode, bonse, I besh(r)ew your pate.'

What 'infinite jest' of five hundred years ago may these words not conceal? Again listen to a crayon note in a Trinity MS of the thirteenth century:—

> Aldman witles
> Yungman recheles
> Wyman ffameles
> betere ham were lifles
>
> } Aluredus King

The commonest form of inscription is in the nature of a precautionary curse aimed at the abstractor of a book. Of this some verses in a fourteenth century hand on the fly-leaf of a Gonville and Caius manuscript furnish an instance :—

> ' Where so euer y be come overall
> I belonge to the Chapell of gunvyle hall
> He shall be cursed of the grete sentens
> That felously stelyth and berith me thens
> And whether he bere me in pooke or sekke
> Ffor me he shall be henged by the nekke
> I am soo well beknowen of dyuers men
> But I be restorid theder ayen.'

Very beautiful is the donatory inscription in the famous Anglo-Norman thirteenth century Apocalypse at Trinity of which, although there are many 'runners-up,'* it may perhaps be said that it is the most beautiful of all manuscripts in Cambridge. Thus it runs and to this day has power to command our tears :—

' I commit this booke to the custodie of the right Reuerend Father in God Raffe Lo: Bishop of Exon, when times are better setled (which God hasten) it is with my other booke and my coines given to Trinitie Colledge Librarie in Cambridge, God in his good time restore her with her Sister Oxford to there pristine happines, the Vulger People to there former obedience, and God bless and restore Charles the Second, & make him like his most glorious Father. Amen.

Anne Sadleir.

August the 20tie
1649.'

Often the notes are by way of gloss or explanation. Thus Stephen Batman, the secretary of Archbishop Parker, in another Trinity Book writes in comment on a passage :—

' The opinion of Sartaine Saxons is that whosoever wareth in his hat or cappe Pocokes fethers or bearith them in there handes ; yf thei charnce to Stvmble they shall break som parte of there body, as Arme, Legg, Ribb or neack.'

Occasionally a donor in presenting a work turns the occasion to the moral profit of prospective readers. Thus when Lady Scrope gave, in the fifteenth century, a book of prayers to a

*Including the recently presented Isabelle Psalter in the Fitzwilliam.

monastery in Yorkshire, she writes these verses at the end of it :—

> ' Ihesus est amor meus.
> ho that lust for to loke
> or for to rede on this boke,
> Be he of cyte, toun or thrope
> Pray he for my lady scrope.
> And think ye neuir to done amys
> But think on hym that gaf you this.
> For ihesu love have hym in mynde
> that this sette on yowre boke behynde.'

Then apart altogether from the interest aroused by inscriptions, there are books famous in their associations. There is the Codex Bezae, fourth oldest manuscript of the Gospels known. This occupies the place of honour in the Library of the University. There is the famous fifth or sixth century copy of the Latin Gospels sent, so a venerable tradition has it, by Gregory the Great to St. Augustine. This, with the fragments of an Irish Gospel book, the finest Celtic manuscript in Cambridge, is part of the Parker bequest to Corpus Christi. There is at Trinity the eighth century copy of the Pauline epistles, reputed as early as the fourteenth century to be in the handwriting of the Venerable Bede. There is the handwriting of Bishop Grosseteste (of Lincoln) in manuscripts at Corpus and at Pembroke, and in the library of the University. That in the case of the Corpus manuscript this occurs in a Greek Psalter of the twelfth century is an interesting side-light upon the man, who brought the Franciscans to England and established them at Oxford, as well as a noteworthy comment on the indiscriminate employment of the phrase ' dark ages.' Corpus has a Latin Psalter, written at Tours in the eleventh century, which belonged to Thomas à Becket, as well as Becket's presentation copy, written by John of Salisbury, the author of the ' Polycraticus,' that most popular compilation of reflections by a lovable character upon the world in general.

In the Corpus library too may be seen a very large proportion of the historical materials available for the writing of English history. Beginning with the oldest manuscript of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle and the oldest collection of the so-called Anglo-Saxon laws, it includes in its compass such treasures as best, or only, manuscripts of Mathew Paris' ' Chronica Majora,'

Florence of Worcester, Henry of Huntingdon, Fordun's 'Scotichronicon' and the 'Scalachronica.'

It is in the library of the University or that of Corpus Christi that the development of handwriting may best be studied: as that of the art of illumination is best followed in the collections at the Fitzwilliam or at Trinity. It needs no profound knowledge of palæography to trace the general stages by which handwriting in uncial and half-uncial letters succeeded to handwriting in capitals; to note how these in turn gave way to the crabbed efforts of the various 'national' schools, Insular (or from the British Isles), Burgundian, Lombardic, Visigothic, when men were vainly trying to find a way of writing with ease, lucidity and speed. Thus too, one may quickly get familiar in outline with the scientific examination of the 'national' handwritings, carried out in recent years by scholars like Traube of Munich or Lindsay of St. Andrews: work which has indeed rendered their classification under any such broad titles obsolete, by narrowing down the locality of each handwriting, sometimes indeed to a particular monastic school, with accuracy unknown to former generations. Then as the river Rhine, formerly a tumultuous and muddy stream, issues from the broad waters of Lake Constance a clear and noble river, so handwriting issues from the schools of Charlemagne in the ninth century purged of its obscurities, never wholly to lose again the effect which the Carolingian scribes made upon it. Thenceforward can be studied the ramifications of the differing schools of the English and French hands; a study more pleasantly pursued if taken in conjunction with that of manuscript decoration, from the conventional stiffness and golden ground work of Byzantine illumination to the soft colouring and luxuriant design of the illustrators of the fifteenth century.

It is not, however, merely the contents of a library that is important: what matters most is the work done upon it, and the spirit in which that work is undertaken. Is it possible in an article to give at all satisfactorily an insight into this? If it proves possible it is because the development of book lore and palæography presents certain analogies to that of other sciences. In a word that there came a stage in which they ceased to be arts and became sciences, reaching a point at which empirical

methods were discarded for logical processes based upon demonstrable premises. In other fields it is usual to term the man whose intellect superintended this change the ' founder ' of the science, as Grotius of International Law, or Darwin of Evolutionary Science. In this sense Henry Bradshaw, librarian of the Cambridge University Library from 1867 to 1886, can be termed, at least so far as England is concerned—and the English development was in many respects *sui generis*—the founder of modern bookcraft.

Contemporaries have described his methods. In them profound learning and instinctive genius were combined. The manuscript or book he studied was made to yield up every piece of evidence and his vast stores of experience were drawn on to link even the smallest scraps of evidence together into a constructive story. Thus he could turn historian as well as bibliographer. Listen to this anecdote that Dr. Norman Moore tells of Bradshaw :—

' One evening he gave me an autotype of the deed in which the Archbishop of York recognises the supremacy of Canterbury, marked with the rough ' signum Wilelmi regis ' and the fine ' signum Matilde regine,' and he pointed out the Great Hiberno-Saxon hand of the only Saxon Bishop, ' Wolfstan Wigornensis epŝ,' and the foreign hand of Lanfranc, and the Italian writing of Hubert the Papal legate. He remarked how one page of writing brought the whole history of the time before us ; the great king who made his rough cross by way of signature, and the scholarly Lanfranc of the new learning of that day, and Wolfstan of the old bygone English school ; and how it showed that the old Norman part of Lincoln Cathedral was not yet begun, for Remigius, who was to have been its builder and first bishop, was yet at Dorchester, while the Norfolk bishop was not at Norwich, but at Thetford, so that the transference of bishops from villages to large towns had hardly yet come in. He made the whole come out of that deed without any word-painting or rhetorical ornament, but merely by letting it tell its own story.'*

On Mommsen, when the latter paid his visit to England in 1885, Henry Bradshaw produced a great impression. After his visit to Cambridge, Mommsen said to Bishop Wordsworth :—

' I will tell you one thing ; it is a small one, but it is characteristic. I told Mr. Bradshaw of a contraction I had seen in a manuscript of the British Museum, which with all my experience of Pandect

*A Memoir of Henry Bradshaw, p. 337. In my account of Bradshaw I have drawn largely upon this book.

manuscripts, I had never seen before. The British Museum people, who have also great knowledge, had not seen it either. When I told it to Mr. Bradshaw he said nothing, but presently brought me a manuscript and shewed me the very thing.'

A travelling companion tells of Bradshaw's visit to the library at Orleans. While at work there, they were joined by M. Bimbinet, president of a learned society at Orleans, who was conversant with the treasures in the library. M. Bimbinet showed Bradshaw an early printed Bible. 'How nice!' he exclaimed at once; 'printed at Paris in' such and such a year. M. Bimbinet looked up astonished. 'You will find the imprint at the end,' he continued, and the date was as he said. M. Bimbinet then brought him a second Bible, and then a third, and Bradshaw, without hesitation gave the place and date of each. When asked how he could know them so accurately, he replied, looking at his friend, 'Just as I know *him*. I know every line of his face and could 'never mistake him for anybody else'; and then placing the Bibles side by side, he pointed out the minute variation in the forms of the letters which sufficed to enable him to distinguish them at a glance.

These three quotations give some idea of Bradshaw's method. By means of it he not only revolutionised the ideas of scholars as to both manuscripts and early printed books, but in more than one controversy of scholarship he laid the ground work for an important advance of knowledge. In the words of a fellow worker in the same field :—

'From an early period he perceived that to understand and master the internal evidences contained in every old book, the special peculiarities of their workmanship must be studied and classified, much in the same way as a botanist treats plants or an entomologist insects. This he called the 'natural history system.' To make his work more effectual and scientific, he did that which many a bibliographer has to his great loss omitted to do—he made acquaintance with the technicalities of book-making. He knew how punches were cut, how matrices were struck, and how types were cast. To this he added a knowledge of how paper-moulds were used and water marks made. . . . . About twelve years ago, a well-known bookseller of London found two printed slips of paper in the binding of an old book. Each slip measured three inches by nine inches, and had been cut down from the fore edge of some waste sheets, the ends only of the line being preserved all the way down the page. . . . After a few minutes examination he said "Yes, these slips are part of signature *b*i and *b*ii

of a most rare book called L'estrif de Fortune, printed at Bruges about 1400, by Colard Mansion." He had never seen a copy of the book, but this identification of fragments by his knowledge of types was everyday work with him.'

He published little but he superintended the reorganization of the library under his charge and, by vast acquisition of books printed before 1500, especially those printed in the low countries, gave to the library in this respect an unrivalled position in Europe. He did epoch-making work upon the two famous New Testament manuscripts, the Codex Sinaiticus and the Codex Alexandrinus. He laid the foundations of the modern critical study of the manuscripts of Chaucer; but the first and the last love of his life was Celtic Scholarship. His examination of manuscripts in the university and college libraries revealed to him that scattered about the margins of some of the most ancient of them were notes or glosses in the earliest of British languages. From the day when as a comparatively young man he discovered the now famous Book of Deer in the University Library he set himself specially to collect and investigate, particularly among the Oxford Bodleian and the Cambridge Corpus books, all Celtic texts and glosses. He may be said to have re-discovered the old Breton language. He not only found many traces of it previously unknown, but he distinguished its earliest remains, hitherto confused with Cornish or Welsh, from those of the sister dialects. He elucidated in a fashion unknown before the connection which existed in old days between Brittany and Ireland.

When conducting these researches he lost all sense of space or time; and would hasten carelessly upon the quest of the moment like a schoolboy after a butterfly. In January 1866, after jotting down in his notebook the results of a day's work in the British Museum, spent to elucidate a point of doubt raised by a Cambridge book, he concludes: 'What does the Paris copy want? On to 'Paris by the 8.30 train.' To Paris he went, looked up the point in the Bibliothèque Nationale, and thence home again, stopping at Canterbury to verify a reference. Not the least interesting pages of his Memoirs are the notes or letters, written while on journeys of this kind upon the continent. The end came suddenly and most appropriately. He was found dead by his servant in his college rooms one morning, an Irish book before him on the table. It seemed as if he had sat down to do a little work before going to bed and had fallen asleep.

Now a true good fame is to be commended, according to Abraham Cowley, because it is the shadow of virtue ; not that it does any good to the body which it accompanies, but because it is an efficacious shadow, and like that of St. Peter, cures the diseases of others. The life of Bradshaw, the inspiration of other more recent work in the libraries at Cambridge—not least of which is the comprehensive catalogue of College MSS, issued by the present Provost of Eton (a great event in mediæval scholarship)—must be known if a bibliographical tour among the Cambridge libraries is to be undertaken with due profit. That is the reason for its inclusion in this article, which is introductory, or persuasive, to a bibliographical tour. It has been necessary to exclude much other information about the manuscripts and books in the famous library of Samuel Pepys at Magdalene and in the interesting departmental libraries that have grown up in the last few years. The article began with Dibdin, and it is amusing, before taking a bibliographical tour in Cambridge, to ponder the words which he prefixed to the account of his tour upon the continent in 1821. *Mutatis mutandis* they may be not inapplicable.

' I was resolved on quitting England to leave behind everything in the shape of petty prejudice and national antipathy. I found everywhere civility ; and I hope and believe that I brought what I found. There was no time to form friendships ; although, in some instances a difference of language and of religion would have been no bar to their cultivation. When I least expected it, I found an excess of civility ; and when I most needed it, an equal excess of generosity. I had very frequently only to express a wish and it was complied with ; only to hint at a possible want, and it was supplied.'

GEOFFREY BUTLER.

THE ANIMALS OF ANCIENT ROME

Histoire des ménageries de l'antiquité à nos jours. By GUSTAVE LOISEL. Paris : Doin et fils. 1912.

WHEN the site of Rome was yet a wilderness, a band of robbers established themselves on the Aventine. They took the wolf as their symbol or token, and probably honoured him with human sacrifices. When this band of robbers became peaceful husbandmen, tilling the fields like their neighbours and worshipping the gods of grove and meadow, they adopted field sports as an amusement, and at the Feast of Flora they hunted the hare, deer, fox, and other harmless beasts of the country-side.

The two observances continued distinct through the long course of Roman history. The Floralia remained a living force, although retaining almost completely its pristine condition ; the Lupercalia became an archaic and, in many respects, incomprehensible ceremonial. The sacrifices of the Lupercalia were modified as circumstances changed ; the offerings of human victims were discontinued, or only continued in the form of criminal punishment of death by wild beasts, and funeral games borrowed from the Etruscans took their place. Such games are a recognition of another existence, with its concomitant idea of servants and food for the future life, an animistic conception common among primitive tribes.

The practical Romans soon took a further step, combining the sacrifices to the gods for success in war with gladiatorial combats and the death of men and animals to imbue the soldiers with courage through the hope of a glorious after-life of luxurious ease if they fell in battle. Generals usually sought to placate the gods further by vows of offerings from the spoils of war. When the triumph took place, prisoners were led to the altar and solemnly slain, and sacrifices from flocks and herds were made.

The *venationes* are an offshoot of this ceremony, but they appear late (186 B.C.) in the history of the city, and have no religious significance. They began with the opportunity afforded by the fall of Corinth, the emporium of the wild beast trade,

and they increased to such an extent under the stimulus of an easy supply of animals from Africa as to outrage the stern simplicity of the old school. Cato fulminated against the new craze, and the Senate prohibited all importation of foreign animals. This decree of the Senate was effective for over sixty years, until the greatly increased wealth and growing luxury of the republic asserted itself in a demand for wild animals.

One sees this desire for wild animals in every nation, from the earliest epochs to the present time. Chaldea was exchanging gifts of animals with China 2500 years before the Christian era. Each nation uses animals according to its own idiosyncrasies ; Germany has more than half the zoological gardens of Europe and studies the specimens systematically ; England likes to see rare and curious beasts—' any strange beast there makes a man ' (*Tempest*) ; France cares nothing for system and little for the beasts, but her sons delight in dare-devil animal performances. Similarly, in former days, the Chinese studied the minds of animals ; the Egyptians, who had an excellent zoological and botanical garden at the Temple of Ammon in Thebes, made it a show in honour of their gods ; the Assyrian kings amused the citizens with foreign animals, the gifts of neighbouring princes or the fruits of conquest, but themselves regarded the beasts as a royal quarry, which they hunted in great enclosures stocked for the purpose. The hunting pictures of Assur-bani-pal in the British Museum illustrate the various chases, on foot, on horseback and in chariots, with bow and arrow and with lance. No. 45-46 deserves particular attention. It shows the tall Assyrian mastiffs ready in leash to turn the lion, and the supporting line of spearmen and archers standing at ease behind a barrier. To-day in the Nilgiri Hills the tiger is similarly hemmed in with nets and spearmen.

These Assyrian preserves were maintained by the Persians, and subsequently fell into the hands of Alexander. They had a strong, though indirect, effect on the Roman exhibitions. There can be no more vivid contrast in the characters of the two great pioneers of European civilisation than is shown in their use of animals. The Greeks loved small animals—parrots, doves and fawns. They indulged in nothing more bloodthirsty than fighting quails, and never enjoyed the shows introduced later to please their Roman masters. The store of animals that

fell to Alexander furnished Aristotle with the material for his excellent natural history. The Romans used a similar windfall to arrange all manner of fights between men and animals ; they gloated over the bloodshed and suffering, and wagered on the result. At first the fights were held in rough enclosures without scenic accessories ; but in later years the whole of the arrangements were profoundly modified through contact with the religious processions of Egypt. Ptolemy, the first of the line of Egyptian monarchs established by Alexander, entered his new kingdom while still dazzled with the luxury and splendour of the barbaric East. He adopted the animal cult of his subjects, and conducted with the greatest magnificence the annual cattle procession in honour of the gods. The development of trade with India brought still more wealth to Egypt ; it introduced the Egyptians to the richest and most diversified fauna in the world, and gave them a new animal god. The worship of Dionysus was superimposed on that of Isis, and the royal and sacerdotal procession became a marvel of zoological display.

One of the processions during the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus (B.C. 280–247) was composed as follows :—

An elephant carrying Bacchus.

Troops of asses—harnessed in gold and silver.

24 cars drawn by elephants.
60 ,, ,, ,, goats.
6 ,, ,, ,, oryx.
15 ,, ,, ,, buffaloes.

12 cars drawn by lions.
4 ,, ,, ,, wild asses.
8 ,, ,, ,, ostriches.
7 ,, ,, ,, stags.

6 by camels.

Some hundreds of dogs.

150 men carrying branches to which were fastened beasts and birds.

Cages with parrakeets from India. Peafowl, guinea-fowl and pheasants in great numbers.

150 African sheep.
300 Arabian ,,
20 Eubœian ,,

26 Indian zebus.
8 Ethiopian bulls.
24 Immense lions and many other wild beasts.

2,000 bulls.

A giraffe, an African rhinoceros, a large white bear (probably an albino from Mount Lebanon), 14 leopards, 16 panthers (whatever the difference may be), 4 lynx and 3 little bears.

These wonderful displays must have been familiar to the

leading Romans in the last century before Christ, when Egypt came under the tutelage of Rome. It was probably as a result of what he had seen in Egypt that the general, Aulus Scaurus, conducted his Aedile Games (63 B.C.) with such lavishness that they became the standard of comparison for all future shows in Rome. The influence of Egypt on Rome showed itself further in a marked increase of elephants for ceremonial purposes. Egypt also provided, either directly or by importations from India, a series of startling novelties for Roman shows, such as the giraffe, the hippopotamus, the crocodile, the rhinoceros, and the tiger. There was the Cepus also, the man-handed ape, a small troop of possibly the Nismas monkey (Cercopithecus pyrrhonotus), seen only at Pompey's games B.C. 55, though monkeys were common enough even at that early date.

These novelties are only incidents in the development of the *venationes*, for there is no doubt that Asia, not Africa, was the main source of animal supply. Pompey's victory over Mithridates, which placed the whole of Asia Minor in Roman hands, affected very greatly the shows in Rome. The new provinces swarmed with lions and leopards to the very seaboard of the Mediterranean, and these beasts, which had been comparatively rare before, afterwards became the permanent basis of the animal shows. No fewer than 610 lions and 400 leopards were shown by Pompey in the games of B.C. 55, and Cæsar had 400 lions at his games in 48 B.C. The wealthier citizens of Rome, grown rich with the spoils of Egypt and the East, all required their quota of wild animals for funeral games or marriage feasts.

To meet this enormous demand the newly conquered peoples were unsparingly exploited. Marcus Caelius, when preparing his Aedile games, was continually pestering Cicero, proconsul in Cilicia (B.C. 51), for panthers. 'Patiscus, your lieutenant,' says he, 'has sent ten to Curio, and surely you can get more, who have 'only to order to get as many as you want.' Cicero's reply is an evasive quibble, born of a desire to be just in his government. Men not so noble were less considerate.

The wants of the general public were provided by private speculators, and we may judge of the magnitude of their operations by the fact that the inhabitants of Megara* turned out the lions

* Corinth, the ancient emporium for wild beasts, was at this time in ruins.

of Caius Cassius, a Roman dealer, in the vain hope of thus defending their city from Julius Cæsar after the battle of Pharsalia.

Seventy arenae have been unearthed within the confines of the Roman Empire; more temporary structures existed in other towns of the empire. One may roughly calculate the number of lions and leopards yearly required at 2,500 lions and 5,000 leopards. Other writers have put the figures much higher, but Dion Cassius warns us that the numbers in the arena were habitually exaggerated; only 3,500 animals, of all kinds, were killed in the twenty-eight *venationes* of Augustus, which approximates very closely to the conventional 100 killed at each performance, however many (sometimes 300 or 400) were turned into the arena. The survivors were driven to the cages with whips loaded with hard clay balls and were shown again. Even so the numbers are enormous. At the present time the annual demand for lions for the 150 zoological gardens of the world is not more than 300 specimens, and of that number many are menagerie bred. Under the Roman Empire lions were at an early date made royal beasts, and no one might capture one or even kill one in self-defence without incurring a heavy penalty; but the supply both of lions and leopards within the bounds of the empire finally ran short, and had to be supplemented by purchases beyond the frontier.* Bears, the remaining pillar of the shows, were always plentiful, but not easy to capture and they were expensive in carriage.

The modern civilised hunter compares unfavourably with the Romans and their allies. Although science has revolutionised all transport facilities, it has done little or nothing for the actual capture of wild beasts. The rifle and pump-gun have largely displaced the skill and patience of other days. The Rhinelanders, dressed in goat skins, drove partridges to the nets; the Lithuanians took the terrible bison by means of greased skins. 'The 'urus' (the aurochs), says Cæsar, 'is taken in pitfalls, and those 'who kill numbers are held in great honour.' Bears were often taken with bird-lime, but generally speaking the box-trap and the springe were the staple method then as now. Ælian tells us

* There was an import tax of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on Asiatic lions, leopards, pards, and panthers. Senatorial givers of games were exempt.

that rotten meat was used as bait for panthers—a contribution to a controversial point of to-day. Bears, wolves, and foxes would take such bait—lions, too, though rarely. Lions were often taken in pits covered with brushwood. Pliny would have us believe that 'a cloth was thrown over their heads to keep 'them quiet. It is wonderful how feeble they become when so 'blinded, as though all their strength lay in their eyes.' Rhinoceroses were caught in pits; so were hippopotami—or with harpoons, as still in the Soudan. Elephants were taken in the Keddah, with the aid of tame elephants.

In a villa at Bona, in Algeria, a very large and excellently preserved picture of a Roman hunt (*c.* 400 A.D.) recently came to light. It represents a drive, the basis of all great captures. A Numidian, riding bareback and stirrupless, is throwing a lasso at a wild ass; others, each armed with a couple of spears, are driving ostriches, gemsbok, and beisa antelopes. The curious hartebeest, the so-called cow-faced antelope, and the aoudad or Barbary sheep are shown already corralled. We have as the main effect the graphic finish of a chase of carnivora, in which the hunters are Romans working on foot. Picked Numidians on horses painted with curious designs, amulets probably, their breasts protected with a trellis of wood or leather, have driven the beasts in the right direction to where a long net is spread behind a fence of prickly ficus. The ring of Romans, each bucklered and carrying a flaming torch, presses closer, and the artist has depicted the tense moment when the lions and leopards perceive the snare, and make a bold and dangerous dash for liberty. The detail is complete to the rough canvas shack with a black boy preparing a fowl for the pot, and a two-muled cart with boxes for the beasts. These boxes are of wood strengthened with iron, insufficiently ventilated, and too dark for our ideas, but the slide door is neat and worthy of imitation.

When game was plentiful in South Africa the Boers drowned immense herds by driving them into the elbow of a river. In the British Museum there is a picture of a similar water-trap, but the Romans, less wasteful, spread nets in the shallows, and took their captives alive. Hunts organised on this scale were of inestimable value to the provinces concerned, and soon cleared enormous areas for tillage and pasture. But they greatly increased the cost of beasts in the future.

Rome, with a fine mercantile marine, with ships up to 1,800 tons, was within fourteen days of any port on the Mediterranean Two days' sail, transhipping across the Isthmus of Corinth, landed animals from Asia at Brundusium, whence a fortnight or so by ox waggon to Rome. Animals could be caged in the capital within three weeks of capture on either the eastern or western coast. Cages were cheap and could be hired, slave labour cost little, the mortality among the beasts would be low, and, allowing for wages of superintendence, a lion could possibly have been delivered in Rome at £10, and leopards at £1 each, in the time of Cæsar. Three times as much would be a dealer's price.

But each step backward to the hinterland made a great difference. Adult specimens of the larger carnivora live as a rule only a short time after capture, and the most savage die the soonest. If the period sufficed to put them in the arena, they were the best beasts for the purpose, but every added day increased the risk of mortality very considerably, and the survivors had to bear the total cost. Honorius passed a law (406 A.D.) that towns *en route* should provide food* for passing convoys. The hunting centre was distant Hierapolis, in the Euphrates province, and the supply was so meagre that three or four months were required to collect a consignment.

The upper classes soon tired of what Marcus Aurelius calls the wearisome monotony of the animal shows, but the plebeian interest was maintained by the provision of new animals, of which almost every remarkable species in the Roman world appeared sooner or later, and by the addition of costly scenic accessories. The shows were usually begun at daybreak, when the wealthy were still abed.

Claudius is marked with the stigma of cruelty, because he loved the spectacle of *bestiarii* rent by wild beasts that appealed so strongly to the populace. These *bestiarii* were condemned criminals, unarmed, or so inadequately armed that the weapon only prolonged the struggle. As a variation there were occasionally set executions with the victim dropped into a den of lions, or fastened to a stake to be worried by a bear, or tied

* A lion eats 100 lbs., a leopard 20 lbs. of flesh per week. Meat was dear in the Roman Empire.

to a post in a cart driven quickly round the arena with a hungry lioness in pursuit.

The trained and armed venators were more than a match for the beasts. One Carpophorus slew twenty in a day. The bravest venators were not afraid to meet, and often conquered, their ferocious antagonists without weapons, and with no protection but a leather band wound round arm and leg Sometimes a number of beasts were opposed to several gladiators. Promoters were continually seeking to hit the popular taste by devising fresh matches for the beasts. Julius Cæsar, for example, made a great score by the introduction of bullfighting, but his other innovations did not outlast his own life.

The *venationes* were in a continual state of change, and so was the arena in which the contests took place, until it became perfected in the Coliseum, about 100 years after the first amphitheatre, the work of Julius Cæsar, had replaced the temporary structures of older times. Among the chief improvements we may note that the wall was made high enough to keep the Emperor and his guests safe from the elephants, so that the 'euripes' or ditch was no longer required. Nets suspended from elephant tusks fixed to the wall prevented danger from the carnivora, and revolving ivory rollers made the angry leaps of the animals a source of amusement to the spectators. The circle of the seats was shaded by awnings and made gay with flowers and parrots and singing birds. Fountains cooled the incense-laden air, and the strains of military music drowned the cries of the victims in the arena.

The animals were kept in well-lighted quarters under the Podium, or on the lower floor, whence they were taken in wheeled trucks to an opening in the side wall or hoisted to the floor of the arena, and admitted to the stage as from a lair. The cages themselves were not more than fourteen feet wide and eight feet deep, iron-fronted, but with a small opening at the back. This size is extremely well adapted for cleansing purposes, and not large enough for a lion to escape the course of teasing and irritation which, along with hunger, was a necessary part of his education for the show. He must have been taught to rush upon his tormentors and been awarded with some bits of food, probably human, and in this way have overcome that dominant fear of man which would force him, even against the pressure of hunger

to seek a refuge under any wall or shelter from the shouting thousands of spectators and from the glare of the arena. Evidence is not wanting that many needed proddings with iron bars or the argument of burning straw to force them from this poor refuge. Troops of spearmen drove the animals together for the combat or on to their victim, and the rarity of a good man-eating lion is succinctly proved by the popular clamour (unheeded by Marcus Aurelius) for the manumission of a trainer who had arranged such an entertainment. Those who know the quiet and patience required to move wild animals can imagine the use of the small openings at the rear of the dens, and the hot irons, fire, and other cruelties necessary to make the beasts move promptly into the transport cage. The gangways between the cages were narrow and it is possible that the beasts were turned into the gangways from a whole row of cages, and were then pushed forward into the arena by means of a movable partition. The contrivance was probably similar to the one that has been installed in the Scottish Zoological Society's Gardens in Edinburgh. There the cages of the larger carnivora open on to a rectangular passage along which a door slides. Spring catches working in teeth on the roof and floor withstand the most violent assaults of the imprisoned animals, which are by this means transferred to other cages or pushed into travelling boxes with astonishing ease and celerity.

The great arches on which the Coliseum stood were well adapted for the storage and manipulation of the scenery which was used to an extent quite unknown in our day. At one time a great ship, fully rigged, was devised to fall in pieces and release hundreds of animals. On other occasions a mountain rose with streams and vegetation on its slopes, and in this garden the trees bent down to give their fruit to Orpheus playing on his lute, the birds came round him, and the beasts fawned at his feet. But Orpheus was a wretched criminal, devoured by a bear at last. Alexander Severus, and later Probus, turned the whole arena into a wood where the people could hunt at their will—'a sight more surprising than agreeable.' Other emperors had tokens scattered in the seats to be scrambled for, and animals were the prizes. Speculators bought the chances of success won by burly ruffians. Respectable people left the seats before this part of the entertainment.

The citizens liked frolic in the arena. They loved to see hares chased by tame lions, and they thoroughly enjoyed the triumphs of the *mansuetudinarii*—such as lions in chariots, performing bulls, clever elephants, calculating monkeys, talking seals, and all the rest of the music-hall type of animal attraction. These turns were probably hired from contractors, mostly Alexandrians, who made large fortunes by training beasts. They, no doubt, contributed some of the lions and other carnivora that were led, gilded and bedecked with gold or silver, in the great processions held in connexion with the principal games. The very rare animals, such as the elk, and Central African antelopes, the rhinoceros, hippopotamus, etc., were exhibited to the public on these occasions, and almost invariably kept alive and either distributed in the courts of the temples for the benefit of nature lovers, or sold, as Aurelian's lions were, in the open market.

Augustus had a tame tiger; Nero and Heliogabalus had leopards; Caracalla was always accompanied by a lion, grimly named 'Acinaces'—the scimitar—and the Aediles' edicts* show how largely the Emperors' example was imitated in the capital. That wild animals were equally popular on country estates we may infer from the fact that camels, ostriches, and antelopes served as lottery prizes, and from Martial's advice to a man to buy a gazelle for his son. How vividly the poet limns the home of the country squire—

'The Baian villa of our friend Faustinus is artless but honest.
. . . fiercely in the deep valleys roar the bulls,
And the steer, with brow unhorned, itches for the fray.
All the crowd of the untidy poultry-yard wanders here and there;
The shrill cackling goose, the spangled peacock and the bird
That owes its name to flaming plumes; the painted partridge too
And speckled guinea-fowls and the impious Colchians' pheasant.
(LVIII.)

* Digest: *de Aedilitio edicto*, laws 40, 41, 42.

He is no less happy with the varied fancies of the city man—

'If my Flaccus delights in a long-eared lynx* and Canius an Ethiopian grim,
If Publius is consumed with love for a tiny lap dog,
And Cronius likes a long-tailed monkey, ugly as himself;
If a mischievous ichneumon is a joy to Marius,
And you, Laurus, are attracted by a talking pie;
If Glaucilla round her neck entwines a clammy snake,
And Telesilla sets a monument over her nightingale:
Who, seeing such monsters, please, who should not love
The winning face of Labycas, Cupid's boy?'

Pigeons were the greatest craze of all. The 'pigeon keepers,' says Pliny, 'are mad with the passion for these birds . . . and 'will relate the high breeding and ancestry of each.' Before Pompey's civil war, Lucius Axius used to sell a single pair of birds for 400 denarii (£13). In Columella's day the price had risen to £32† or more, and we may well conclude that these private collections were no less complete than those of distinguished modern amateurs, and that they compared not unfavourably with the renowned fish-ponds of Crassus and Lucullus, the deer-park of Hortensius, and the aviary of Varro.

The passion for wild beast shows continued in the Eastern Empire when Rome had perished, and the passion passed on to the conquering Turk who kept his fighting lions in his new capital, Constantinople. Meanwhile, the ducal leaders of the free towns of a revivified Italy continued to adorn their courts with rare beasts. The wealthy kings of Western Europe imitated and surpassed Florence and Genoa in collections which reached their height in the royal menagerie of Louis XIV. placed in and around the *manège* at Versailles‡—the forerunner and type of the modern zoological garden.

GEORGE JENNISON.

* This beast is probably the Fennec.

† To-day a very fine pair of pigeons costs £120—more than a good lion.

‡ Manège—whence menagerie.

THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

ANDRASSY the Elder in an *exposé* circulated to the members of the Congress of Berlin on 28 June, 1878, submitted the following analysis of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina :—

'The Sublime Porte will have to take in hand the solution of the agrarian question, the chief source of the periodical disturbances which have afflicted these countries, a problem bristling with obstacles in the midst of a population torn by social rancours and religious hatreds, a problem which only a strong and impartial Power can solve in a land where all the landed property is in the hands of the Musalmans while the Christian farmers or farm-labourers constitute the majority of the inhabitants.'

Upon which the Congress, on the proposition of the British delegate, Lord Salisbury, proceeded to hand over Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary.

Forty years later, in November, 1918, when the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy collapsed, the agrarian question in Bosnia-Herzegovina still stood very much where it did when the Emperor Francis Joseph succeeded to the heritage of the Turks. In 1878 there were in Bosnia-Herzegovina according to estimates made some years later—the Turkish Government before the Austro-Hungarian occupation had no reliable statistics—about

6,000–7,000 Agas (landlords), all Moslem ;
77,000 'Free peasants' (small land-owners) also nearly all Moslem ;
85,000 Kmets (peasants working for landlords) nearly all Christian.

Thus the percentage of peasant labourers to peasant owners was as 52.47 to 47.53.

In 1910, the population having increased enormously as a consequence of the peace and order which resulted from Austro-Hungarian rule, the figures according to the official census were :—

40,450 Landlords, of whom 35,719 were Moslem ;
634,791 Free peasants, of whom 334,813 were Moslem ;
650,619 Kmets, of whom 428,767 were Christian ;

which gives a percentage relation of peasant labourers to peasant owners of 50.70 to 49.30. In other words Austria-Hungary in forty years had failed to make good Andrassy's promises. It was time that another should take her place.

The first impulse of the outsider revisiting Bosnia to-day is to think the Bosnians ungrateful for the blessings of Austro-Hungarian rule. He sees the material development which the Austrians brought to the country, the superb high-roads, the excellent light railways, the flourishing tobacco industry. He remembers the amenities of travel under the old régime, the enlightened and easy-mannered officials, the efficient gendarmerie, the smart and well-kept watering-places, the clean and cheap little Government hotels. The gendarmerie have been replaced by rough and often illiterate Serb military : the hotels have sunk into Slavonic squalor : and the bands and light blue uniforms and Viennese frocks of Ilidze are no more. The attractions of Bosnia for the tourist are sadly diminished : but the mass of the Bosnian people know and care nothing for the tourist. Eighty-five per cent. of them are agriculturists, of whom not one in ten can read or write. Their lives and thoughts from birth to death are centred entirely on the land. To them the political change means only that a great burden which has lain on their shoulders for centuries has been removed, and they know that the new Government neither could nor would replace it. Why should they be grateful to their former rulers, who promised to remove the burden and failed to do so ?

It was not from ignorance or neglect of the land question that the Austro-Hungarian administration failed to solve it. It was impossible to ignore it. In 1916 Dr. Feifalik, a well-known official of the old Government, with intimate practical experience of the work of administration, wrote that the question of the peasant labourer ' appears in every phase of the ' legal, economic and administrative life of the country.' This agrarian question closely affected such matters as projects for canalisation, hospitals, drainage, and water-supply. It shaped political parties, and determined the lines of constitutional development. In 1910 it had assumed an acute form in an important district of North Bosnia (Banjaluka). Several landlords were put to death by their peasants : and the movement was with difficulty restrained by the Government from assuming the

dimensions of a general agrarian revolt throughout the two provinces. But there were always pretexts for delay. In the days of Baron Kallay, who is generally described as the Cromer of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1882–1903), it was the policy of the authorities not to alienate the land-owning class, partly because their co-operation was thought essential to the establishment of the local administration, partly because it was desired to show, with a view to future eventualities in the Balkans, that Austria too could rule Mahomedan populations. Lastly there was the argument, which has been used in every country and in every age to justify systems of serfage and *adscriptio glebae*. It was said that, since under the Kmet system the Kmet's home could neither be sold nor mortgaged, Kmetage prevented the formation either of a landless peasantry as in England, or of an indebted land-owning peasantry as in Poland and Russia. Dr. Grünberg, a well-known scientific authority on peasant land-tenure in the old Austro-Hungarian lands, long ago warned the Austro-Hungarian authorities that their procrastination in the matter was playing with fire. 'The policy of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia-'Herzegovina,' he wrote in 1909, 'resembles the attitude of 'Vienna to the corvée in the period 1790–1848. *Video meliora* '*proboque : deteriora sequor*. The Galician peasants' rising of '1848 taught Vienna nothing.'

Meanwhile the peasant labourers were beginning slowly to draw political conclusions. They knew—for, though they did not travel and could not read, every Serb agitator was at pains to inform them—that east of the Drina in Serbia there were peasants of like tongue and faith to themselves, who owned their own land and had no landlords and were rid of the last traces of the hereditary Moslem foe. At one of the last sittings of the Bosnian Diet the Serb Radical Deputy Lazarevic exclaimed :—

> 'The Government is always promising the solution of this question : and always leading us astray. I tell you the guns are ready and waiting, which will solve the question.'

Prophetic words! But the prophet was doubtless behind the scenes. The speech was delivered on 20 June, 1914. The atmosphere was taut and pregnant in those days in Sarajevo. On 28 June the Archduke fell to a Serb bomb in the Franja

Josipa Ulica, and with him fell (though few knew it in Bosnia or elsewhere) the rule of the Hapsburgs in the Yugoslav lands.

It is difficult for Englishmen, and still more difficult for Americans, to realise what the agrarian question means to the populations of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and of much of Central Europe as well. Agriculture in England and America has been industrialised ; it is an industry like any other industry, conducted as a commercial business and by capitalist methods. To think of the agrarian question in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in terms of English or American economics is like speaking of a distaff as if it were a steam loom. The cultivator in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe does not cultivate the land with a view to selling the crop, but with a view to consuming it. If he has a surplus, he may take advantage of any opportunity that arises for selling it, if he is enterprising. But few will work hard enough to create a surplus where Nature has not provided it. In the Yugoslav lands they say ' *Bog i mir* (God and Peace),' by which they mean, ' Give me religion first, and after religion ' a quiet life ! ' Appeals to their pockets leave them cold. Last year in Croatia a young peasant in the prime of life, and (I was told) an exceptionally intelligent farmer, said to me : ' *Glavno 'je zdravlje i da dobro jedem, zakaj bi se mučil—komu čemu ? Pa ! 'Bog i mir !'* (The chief thing is health and good food for me to eat. Why should I wear myself out—what is the use of it ? Pah ! God and peace).

There are plenty of districts in South-Eastern Europe—the Serbian uplands for example—where the peasant can perfectly well exist without the use of money. If he has money, he uses it to buy luxuries, such as machine-made boots and clothes, soaps, soda and the like. But the luxuries are never necessaries in his eyes. His grandfather did without them : and now that they have become unattainable again, with the paralysis of trade which has accompanied the continuance of war in Eastern Europe and the blockade of Austria by the new States, he has learnt without effort to dispense with them himself. His women can make him clothes and foot-gear ; and the oil of his olives takes the place of soap. So the ready-made suit of Bohemian shoddy and the cheap army boots, which he was given on demobilisation, are carefully put away for Easters and holidays : and home-spun frieze and shoe-sandals of withy, such as the old

men wear, take their place. The silver roubles or dinars or crowns, which he cannot spend, lie buried in a hole under his bed. And the land, which fed his father and his father's father's father, feeds him still. He never felt himself closer to the land than he does now, when he is entirely dependent on it.

The extent to which the land fills the horizon of the East European peasant is incomprehensible to anyone who has not lived and worked and suffered with him. Many Englishmen and Englishwomen lived and worked and suffered with the Serb army during the war. One of them in a book of charming stories full of insight says :—

> ' To be really part of this world . . . it is not enough to dance at their fairs, to live in their cottages, to work for and with them. To do it thoroughly, as an American once remarked to me, you really ought to live with their animals too . . . In this world the animals take part in your daily life—they live with you, and hold converse with you just as they do for the matter of that in the " Tales of Grimm." Grimm is to Serbs what Arnold Bennett is to the people who live in the Potteries. His tales are absolutely realistic to them. . . .
>
> ' It is not only animals. Their intimacy extends to plants. The leaves and the weeds of wood and meadow-land have meanings which they have not to us. . . . They are all sharply characterised, and the children grow up amongst them in the same intimacy as with goats and pigs and hares.'

In his heart perhaps the peasant feels himself at one, not only with the animals and the plants which live with him, but with the soil itself which he tills. Beneath all the many religions of the tillers of the soil in Eastern Europe there is a substratum of old, old earth-worship. Himself and his cattle and his crops are all kindred phenomena in his feeling. The earth bore them, and will take them back to herself again, when their work is done.

Whatever may be thought of such speculation on peasant mentality, there can be no doubt that the agrarian question in all Eastern and South-Eastern Europe—and in much of Central Europe as well—is at the bottom of all the questions The ratio of contented to discontented cultivators constitutes a kind of index-number of social and political conditions. In most countries the ratio is that of the land-owning to the landless peasants. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the terms of the ratio are slightly different. The Bosnian-Herzegovinian peasant (Kmet) was in a sense the owner of his land ; but the landlord (Aga)

owned a percentage of the crops. This percentage was calculated on the basis of the Government land-tax—a system than which it is scarcely possible to imagine anything more vicious either from the social or from the economic standpoint. A Government commissary first assessed the value of the Kmet's crop, and fixed the amount (supposed to be 10 per cent.) due from him to the Government. The Kmet and the Aga then divided the remaining 90 per cent. of the crop in a proportion varying in different districts and varying also on the different products of the soil. An average rate for the Aga's portion was one-third. For example, if in a certain year the total yield of a Kmet's land was 1,000 kg., it was divided as follows :—

To the Government	100
To the Aga	300
To the Kmet	600

If in the following year the Kmet, by bringing a new piece of land under cultivation or—rare event in the case of a Bosnian Kmet—by the purchase of fertilisers, increased his yield to 1,500 kg., the division was as follows :—

To the Government..	150
To the Aga	450
To the Kmet..	900

That meant that the Kmet had expended labour or money to obtain his extra 300 kg., whereas the Aga had obtained his extra 150 kg. without having expended anything at all. The one object of the Kmet, in so far as concerned his Kmet-land, was to keep down production ; and to do so he was in the habit of leaving the tares in the land, mixing the crops in each field (to make assessment more difficult), and as much as possible devoting himself to live-stock, on which he paid nothing to the landlord. As a result the market value of a Kmet farm before the war was rather less than half that of a free peasant's farm.

The payment to the landlord was made in kind, principally in cereals and tobacco but also in green produce, fruit, wine and hay. Perhaps the Kmet might arrange to supply the Aga with butter instead of hay, or with a lamb once a year instead of fruit and vegetables. But commutation for money was rare. Down to 1895 the land-tax was also payable in kind ; and money played very little part in Bosnian-Herzegovinian peasant economy. In 1895 the Austro-Hungarian Government introduced a system

of fixed amounts for the land-tax calculated on an average of the ten preceding years' harvest and the then prevailing market prices. Great care was taken in the adjustment of the new tax, and the collection of it was elastic and humane. The Austro-Hungarian administration as a whole indeed was never lacking either in elasticity or in humanity. But the transition from a system of kind to a system of money was a heavy strain on the Kmets. Few were in a position to find cash enough to pay the landlord's share as well as the land-tax money ; and the social economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina is still therefore only to a limited extent based on the use of money.

This backwardness rendered particularly difficult the introduction of land reforms. For no European State before the war could have contemplated expropriation of landlords without compensation ; and how was compensation to be financed on a system of payments in kind ? The Austro-Hungarian officials, who were in far closer touch with the Kmet than anybody else, knew well that, if he could barely find cash enough to pay his taxes, he could not find cash to pay redemption dues. On these grounds the Austro-Hungarian administration opposed, or sought to delay land reforms, and confined itself to a series of palliatives. The Kallay régime lent the Kmet who wished to redeem his land 50 per cent. of the redemption money at 7 per cent. ; the remainder he had to save or borrow from other sources at very much higher rates. The Burian régime tried the experiment of lending Government support to a private bank. The Pester Kommerzialbank of Budapest advanced the Kmet the whole of the redemption money, the Government guaranteeing losses by non-payment of instalments for a period of ten years. The privileged position thus accorded to a Hungarian bank led to opposition in the Austrian Parliament, with the result that in 1910 the Government at length brought a bill before the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Diet (which became law on 13 June, 1911) introducing a system of voluntary land purchase on the lines of the scheme adopted by the Hungarian bank. The Act of 1911 somewhat accelerated the process of land purchase. But none of these measures did more than scratch the surface of the problem. Before the law of 1911 was passed, it was estimated that at the then rate of redemption the last Kmet would be freed in A.D. 2025. The war stopped the operations of the

Act of 1911. The Diet held its last sitting on 20 June, 1914, when it passed a further measure of land reform dealing with forests and commons. This measure never received Imperial sanction; and on 6 October, 1915, by an Imperial decree all powers of the Diet in respect of agrarian questions were transferred to the Government, and land reform in the Province came to an abrupt end.

The Yugoslav administration is now confronted with the same difficulties as the Austro-Hungarian administration. In the general unsettlement which followed on the collapse of Austro-Hungarian rule, it was comparatively easy to take heroic measures; and political and economic considerations both pointed in the same way. Accordingly in the land reforms which the Belgrade Government proclaimed for all the Yugoslav lands at the beginning of 1919, special provisions were inserted declaring at an end the whole system of Kmetage. No peasant in Bosnia-Herzegovina has paid anything to his landlord since that moment. The Agas live on as best they can. They generally have land of their own which they have never farmed on the Kmet system but always by hired labour. On this they contrive to exist. Some of the younger ones, it is said, are mortgaging this last resource and leaving the country with the proceeds. None of them have up to the present received any compensation. The Belgrade Government is now finding, what the Austro-Hungarian administration always maintained, that the Kmet is not economically in a position to pay compensation. His inability to pay is strikingly shown by the arrears in the redemption dues under the Voluntary Purchase Law of 1911. In May, 1915, the Kmets availing themselves of this law were in arrears to the astonishing extent of one-third of the total amount; and 7.5 per cent. of the defaulters were in arrear with four or more instalments. This was at a time when owing to war conditions more ready cash was circulating in the hands of the peasants than they had ever known before. The writer has studied land purchase schemes in many countries from Ireland to Poland, and never come across such high figures of arrears. Any student of agrarian economics knows how meticulous peasant-purchasers are in the payment of redemption dues. There is no reason to think that the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Kmet is less honest than the peasants of other countries. The arrears must be taken as evidence of genuine inability of the Kmet to pay.

Another test of the Kmet's inability to pay is to be found in the amount of litigation over agrarian questions. According to some figures which were furnished to the writer for the years 1907–1909, for every 1,000 Kmets there were 143 lawsuits brought by Kmets against Agas or by Agas against Kmets. It is true the Bosnian (and, it is said, the Herzegovinian more than the Bosnian), has a natural taste for litigation, as the Serb has for politics. In Serbia, when the peasants gather in the village inn after church on Sundays, they talk politics ; in Bosnia they talk litigation. Besides lawsuits of Kmets against Agas, there were always plenty of suits of Kmet against Kmet. Nevertheless the figures quoted are evidence of the rottenness of the Kmet system.

Even if the Yugoslav authorities had wished to maintain voluntary purchase, it would have been a financial impossibility. Under the law of 1911 the Government lent the redemption money to the peasants at approximately $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. There is no money in all capitalist Europe in 1921 which is to be borrowed at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. ! The Government has made more than one attempt to preserve the principle of compensation for expropriated landlords. At first it was hoped that the richer Kmets (that is to say the Kmets with the largest land holdings) might be compelled to pay on a graduated scale for each hectare of their holding above a certain limit. For instance, each head of a family would receive six hectares without compensation and two extra hectares for his wife and each child. For any land which he might hold above this amount he would pay dues out of which the State would compensate the landlords. The proposal broke down on the opposition of the Kmet organisations. Dr. Poljak, who was Minister of Agrarian Reform in two of the numerous Governments at Belgrade in 1919, worked out a scheme by which the new peasant proprietors in all the Yugoslav lands were to contribute to a common compensation fund, and in effect the richer provinces (such as Croatia and Slovenia) were to pay for the poorer provinces (such as Bosnia and Herzegovina). That was as if Piedmont and Lombardy had been called upon to finance reform in Naples and Sicily in the sixties of the last century. No political enthusiasm could stand such an economic burden ; and this project also has come to nothing.

Meanwhile the pressure from the peasants in Bosnia has

been continuous and increasing. I attended a Conference of Bosnian-Herzegovinian peasant delegates in Belgrade in the middle of July, 1919. The conference was called by the organisation of Orthodox Co-operative Societies in Bosnia—the Catholics have their own organisation, which is in dependence on a land bank in Croatia. The leaders of the Co-operative movement belong to the intelligentsia ; and they probably were the only persons present at the conference who could read and write. It was astonishing therefore to perceive how the business of the conference was shaped from first to last by the peasant delegates from the country districts. Illiterate Kmets, dressed in the semi-oriental Bosnian costume, addressing one another by their Christian names and speaking in the second person singular, were perfectly acquainted with the ramifications of each question which came before the conference ; and the task of M. Perin, the general secretary and guiding spirit of the Co-operative movement in Bosnia, and of his companions on the platform, was for the most part confined to drafting resolutions in the sense of peasant speeches. No one is in a position to estimate the mighty forces, unchained by the Russian Revolution, which are at play in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, who has not learnt that the land movement which is sweeping over these lands is essentially a movement ' from below up ' and not ' from above down.' It is not in the ante-rooms of ministers nor in the lobbies of parliaments in Prague or Belgrade or Warsaw that the new States are being shaped, but on the land and by the men who live on the land.

The following is a translation of some of the resolutions passed by the delegates at the above-mentioned conference :—

I. The whole land belongs only to those who cultivate it.

II. The Kmets receive the land as Kmet-holdings without compensation of any kind to the existing landlords, whether from the State or from any one else. Landlords who are left without livelihood may be supported by the State, if they are fit for cultivating the land ; but such support must not be looked upon as compensation, but only as a means of enabling them to live by their work as others do who work on the land.

V. The Commissions determine the maximum size of holdings according to climatic conditions and the fruitfulness of the land, varying with the district and with the numbers of members of families.

VI. State land or communal land is distributed only to those cultivators who have none or have too little to live on ; and that only in those villages in which such distribution can be carried out without affecting the communal pasture. Where no such land is available in the neighbourhood, the poor must be settled in other districts where such land is to be had.

IX. Cultivators are entitled to take what wood they need for fuel from the forests.

X. All communal or State land appropriated for afforestation must be handed over to cultivators who are prepared to afforest it.

The Delegates of the Cultivators
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Belgrade, 20 *July*, 1919.

It is not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina or in Yugoslavia that reforms of the above character are being carried out, by force or by agreement, with or without compensation, according to the local circumstances and the temperament of the peoples. The wiser Governments (such as those of Yugoslavia, Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania) are moving, more or less willingly, with the storm. The unwiser Governments (such as those of Hungary and—though it too is being forced in the same direction—Poland) are trying to oppose reform in the interests of the rights of property, as the latter have hitherto been understood in capitalist Europe. In the industrial lands the capitalist system has its roots so deep in the social life of the peoples that it may well be that it will maintain itself in the coming century, when its excesses have been remedied and its abuses curtailed. But in the agrarian lands it is otherwise. The land, and the social system which is based on it, are older than the capitalist system, and subject to different laws.

Note.—Since the above article was written, an arrangement has been come to, as a result of somewhat complicated manœuvres on the part of political parties in Belgrade, by which 260,000,000 dinars are to be provided by the State as a compensation fund for the dispossessed proprietors in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

SEA POWER IN THE PACIFIC

Sea Power in the Pacific. By HECTOR BYWATER. Constable, 1921.

A POLITICIAN of Mr. Lloyd George's experience must really be supposed to intend the consequences of his acts. Therefore when we hear him speak to the Empire representatives on June 20th of 'the most urgent and important of foreign 'questions—the relations of the Empire with the United States 'and Japan,' ordinary politeness forbids us to assume that he dwelt on this theme only because it affords an excuse for resounding phrases. Indeed, he laboured the point, he expatiated, and deducted, not at any inordinate length, but comprehensively, till he had put before the Colonial Premiers and the Indian delegates, a quite sufficient warning as to the dangers and the complications which are latent, or rather are already stirring ominously, in 'the relations of the Empire with the United States 'and Japan.' Let us look for a moment at Mr. George's heads of discourse, and note what an array of possible causes of conflict they roll out.

Japan is our faithful ally and did the British Empire great services in the late war.

We desire to maintain that well-tried friendship, and to apply it to the solution of all questions in the Far East.

To begin with we wish to avail ourselves of that friendship to smooth away all risk of collision between the special interests of Japan in China, and the desire of the British Empire, and the United States, for equal opportunities. (The open door, be it observed, in what for us is the Far East, and for the Japanese is their own immediate neighbourhood and sphere of influence.)

There could be no greater calamity for the world, and certainly not for the British Empire, than a division by races. The loyalty of His Majesty's Asiatic peoples demands full unity.

We look to the United States for sympathy and understanding in this respect.

Friendly cooperation with America is for us a cardinal principle.

We want stability and peace, as do the United States.

Therefore, we are ready to discuss with American statesmen any proposal for the limitation of armaments.

In the meantime, we cannot forget that the very life of the United Kingdom, and also of Australia and New Zealand—indeed, of the

whole Empire—has been built upon sea power ; and that sea power is necessarily the basis of the whole Empire's existence. We have, therefore, to look to the measures which our security requires. We aim at nothing more. We cannot possibly be content with less.

A student of international politics in search of a scheme for a big book could hardly work out a better than is supplied him in the Premier's wide ranging speech. Think for a moment of all that lies behind his airy reference to divisions of races, and the loyalty of His Majesty's Asiatic peoples. In the limited space of an article it is necessary to keep to one point, and the most important is that to which Mr. Lloyd George led up, namely, what is implied when we speak of ' Sea Power,' disarmament, security, and so forth, in connection with the relations of the United States to Japan. A leading case and ' a chose in action ' can be more instructive than a long ministerial speech of generalities. We propose to take one which in our opinion brings the whole debate to a definite issue.

The United States Navy Department has decided to dredge and fortify the anchorage of Apra in the island of Guam, subject, of course, to the consent of Congress to vote the necessary money. Guam, which is short for Guajan, is the most southerly of the Marianne, or Ladrone Islands. It has belonged to the United States since it was ceded by Spain in 1898. America has a right to do what it pleases with its own. Nothing could look more reasonable than that the island should be equipped to serve as headquarters for whatever naval force Washington may consider necessary to be maintained in the part of the Pacific where it lies—about half-way between the Philippines, which also belong to the States, and the Marshall Islands, for which Japan holds a mandate since the late peace.

Seeing that it is likely to turn out to be of great importance, a precise statement of its position, and of its bearings to neighbouring lands (as neighbourhood goes in the enormous spaces of the Pacific), will not be superfluous. Guam then is an island of about thirty miles long by four to five wide, lying on latitude 13° 26′ N., and longtitude 144° 39′ E. of Greenwich. The Japanese arsenal and dockyard, Yokosuka, is almost due north of Guam at a distance of 1,360 miles. Well to the west of Yokosuka is Sasebo, another Japanese naval port near to Nagasaki in Kiushiu. Manila, an American possession, is 1,510 miles off

almost due west. The voyage to the Philippines from Guam may be lengthened slightly, by bending to the south, and taking Yap in the Pelew Islands on the way. We have all heard of this ugly, but at present rather appropriate, variation of the original name Eap in the papers lately. Tutuila in Samoa or the Navigators Islands, an American station, is 3,120 miles off to the south-east. To Pearl Harbour in Honolulu, also American, the course is north of east 3,330 miles. To Dutch Harbour in the Aleutian Islands, near Alaska, another possible American station, there are 3,388 miles going north-east. In short, Guam holds a central position in the Western Pacific. Therefore, it is exactly the spot on which to fix for an American Naval Station. More will be found concerning it, its resources, and its bearings, in Mr. Bywater's recently published ' Sea Power in the Pacific,' an excellent book as far as it goes. The limit to its usefulness is that it is confined to the relations of Japan and the United States, which form but a part, and not the one which touches us most closely, in the whole problem of the Pacific.

A strong American naval force based on Guam would be at hand to counter any Japanese enterprise against the Philippines, the distances from it to Manila being about equal to the space dividing that harbour from Japan, with its naval stations at Yokosuka and Sasebo. The latter station is not quite so far off Guam as is Manila. So far Congress has shown a marked disinclination to vote money to be spent on fortifications, and naval harbours in the Western Pacific. So that though the States have controlled the Philippines since 1898, their hold has been but loose. As things have stood, and do at this date still stand, a Japanese expedition on a large scale could invade the Philippines and seize Guam long before any American force starting from the Pacific ports of the Union, or even from the American port in the Sandwich Islands could intervene. Once they were deprived of the Philippines and Guam the Americans would fight at a great disadvantage, for they would be without base, repairing docks, or store house, in the Western Pacific. Their ships of all kinds must be brought over huge distances subject to attack, with a great expenditure of fuel, and no security that they would find a supply at the end of the voyage.

A modern fleet is no doubt immeasurably stronger than a force of sailing ships of the old kind. But vessels which depended

on the wind had one notable advantage. They could rely on finding their motive power everywhere, and were not compelled to carry it with them, or to wait for supplies to be brought in swarms of weak transports. If the wind failed them it equally failed the enemy. The dead calm or the storm affected the just and the unjust alike.

If we suppose now that Japan, believing that a struggle with the United States had become inevitable, or would for any reason, good or bad, be to her advantage, were to lay hold on the Philippines and Guam she would cover herself against attack at home. The American Navy is far larger than hers, twice as large at least, but it would be unable to get within striking distance of anything vital to her. Among the things vital to her we must include her power to maintain unbroken intercourse of trade with Europe by the routes leading west and south-west through the Indian Archipelago, or along the south sides of Java and Sumatra. On the other hand if the United States can put these two possessions beyond the danger of being rushed in the first weeks of the war, can turn them into store houses, repairing places, and all that is meant by the term naval base, then Japan could be cut off from the outer world, and confined to her own sea, and to intercourse with China. In view of the fact, of which the Japanese are certainly not ignorant, that the Chinese have scant reason to love them, even this limited opening would be very far from safe. With this prospect before them would it be wonderful, would it even be blamable in turn if the Japanese were to declare that the creation of great naval bases within striking distance of their shores by the Americans, amounted to a menace to their safety and their independence ?

Dr. Johnson's advice, ' Clear your mind of cant,' is good at all times and in all relations of life, but is nowhere more useful than in international affairs. The security of a nation is endangered when any other people obtain possession of any space of land or water from which it can be attacked. When the possessor is weak then his command of that particular spot of the earth's surface is a negligible danger. When he is strong it is not. There is a risk that one may become offensive when quoting particular examples. Therefore I shall not go beyond the general observation that there are many places which the British Empire can afford to leave in the hands of their present

holders, but which it would not allow to pass into the control of stronger masters without a fight. Every country must be judge of what is needed for its own security. When it thinks itself menaced, even by a danger which for the moment may seem remote, it takes its precautions. Mr. Gardiner, who was no militarist, did not hesitate to lay it down as a sound rule that any people must be expected to act at times on the motto of the border robber, 'Thou shall want ere I want.'

We have to put ourselves in the place of Japan if we wish to understand, as it is but good sense that we should, the considerations by which the Japanese are likely to be influenced. They know why the United States did for very sufficient reasons decide that the Panama Canal must be brought wholly under their control. The history of the Republic of Panama is as well known to them as to us; they judge that they are menaced when their country is put in such a position that it might be 'cribb'd, cabined or confined,' whenever the United States saw cause to apply pressure, and being of that opinion they may take what they look upon as reasonable precautions. They may be unwise, they may incur the very peril they wish to avoid, but they will be acting as the British Government did when it forbade Spain to set up modern fortifications with long range guns in them at and about Algeciras, which is over against Gibraltar. To condemn them on the ground that the United States ask only for equal opportunity and the open door is irrelevant, and is sentimentality. What did Mr. Lloyd George mean when he said that the British Empire is based on Sea Power, and must possess it in order to be secure? He meant that we must be stronger at sea than any possible assailant—or his words were mere empty noise. And that is what the Japanese will mean if they are offended by the intention of the United States to establish a naval base at Guam.

If the issue were only between these two Powers, the rest of the world could look on in a neutral spirit, prepared to applaud if diplomacy succeeded in finding a way to reconcile direct contraries, or, if it failed, then equally ready to weigh 'strategical' principles and tactical devices. It would be quite an interesting game to work out the moves, to show how the prompt seizure of Guam and the Philippines by Japan might well reduce the war to a stalemate at the beginning. The vast distance between those

places and the Pacific coast of America would make it impossible for the combatants to get at one another. The length of the line of communications, and the insuperable difficulty of providing fuel and stores for their respective fleets at such distances, would render it equally difficult for America to recover the lost territories, or for Japan to assail the Pacific seaboard of the States. Indeed this second operation would be fantastic. A blow at the canal is one of those undertakings which fascinate the authors of ' Battles of Dorking,' but would not occur to sane men. Paper puts up with everything, but Admirals, Generals, and Statesmen have to work with lives which are precious, and instruments which, however ' scientific ' they may be, are limited in their powers, and subject to damage.

Japan would be crazy to send her ships to meet the chances of war thousands of miles away from any port where they could refit and re-coal. The American fleet is twice the size of her own, and half of it is stationed on the Pacific coast. Even if some ' Battle of Dorking ' enterprise did obstruct the canal, or, which is far more probable, an earthquake or landslip were to block it for a time (the thing has happened and may happen once more, even many times more), still Japan would be inviting disaster by assailing the Pacific seaboard. To take what lies within three or four days' steam of its own territory, and would when taken be a sure barrier against attack, would be the manifestly sound policy.

Whoever supposes that he has exhausted the question of Sea Power in the Pacific when he has stated the possibilities for and against as they directly concern the United States and Japan, would be woefully mistaken. The interests of all nations which possess territory in the eastern seas, of the British Empire first and foremost, of the Netherlands which are richly endowed, and of France which holds more than it could resign itself to lose, are on the hazard. When it is stripped of mere separable accidents and irrelevancies the issue is nothing less than this :— Is there to be a new, and probably a far less liberal, dominating authority on the great trade route of the East ?

The struggle, if it comes, will and indeed must take place on, and for the command of, the much frequented belt of waters which stretches from the gates of the sea at the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Straits of Ormuz, down the west or Malabar coast of

India, and away eastward through those other 'gates of the 'sea,' the Straits of Malacca and of Sunda, to the seas of China, and Japan, and the North Pacific. Centuries before the Christian era, trade, facilitated by the regular blowings and counter-blowings of the monsoons, was active on this, the oldest, and still the richest, of all the trade routes. The first wars of Europeans in the Eastern Seas, with native peoples, or with one another, were fought to obtain and keep control of it. That they all, Portuguese, Englishmen, and Hollanders came by way of the Cape of Good Hope is a mere detail. Now when Europe has long spread itself over North America, a new competition coming not from West to East but from East to West, has begun to take a share. And yet another newcomer has arisen on the route itself. But the issue is still the same. Who is to hold the gates and to work the road ?

The Spaniard came once from his conquest in Mexico, and intruded for a time on the Moluccas, but he was bought out by Portugal. Henceforward he contented himself with the Philippines which his missionary friars won for him, and his clergy kept. Portugal dominated till two strong men armed, the Englishman and the Hollander, came and forced her aside. Then they fought and for three generations or so the Hollander was the master, and drove the Englishman from the Spice Islands, limited and hampered him everywhere. Then the Englishman struck deep roots in India, gathered strength, while the Hollander, if one may put it that way, 'lost his punch.'

From the middle of the eighteenth century the thalassocracy has belonged to the Englishman. Under his direction the Eastern and Southern Seas have been explored. Great lands and myriads of islands which were as completely unknown to the traders of Asia and Africa, as they were to Europe, have been revealed by English enterprise, and settled by England. The Englishman has been a generous thalassocrat. Much as he has fought, he has justified Carlyle's description of him, which to superficial knowledge seems so strange, as the most peaceful of men. When he first came to the Eastern Seas he told the Dutch who were eager for dominion that he saw little need for fighting Spaniards or Portuguese, seeing that he could beat them by fair competition of trade. And in this spirit he has ruled, whenever and wherever he was allowed security for his trade. He has been

a protection to all such as go on the seas upon their lawful occasions and has never, when he was himself left in peace, tried to close the door to others.

So he would do now, and go on doing. But his rule is disputed. The fact that America and Japan are rivals to one another, and have conflicting territorial aims which may bring about a collision between them to-morrow, must not be allowed to mislead us into supposing that they alone are directly concerned. Both are rivals of ours,—not unfriendly so far and let us hope they never will be—but they in pursuit of their own good, and by means of which we have no right to complain, have sailed into what was our kingdom, and are growing daily stronger. Nothing has happened which was not natural and inevitable. The solitary reign which the British Empire has enjoyed in all the seas of the globe since the Peace of Paris in 1815, if not before, was perhaps not a thing which could endure for ever. As other peoples recovered, or grew, or developed, the time was sure to come when it would be disputed.

There are some among us who have persuaded themselves that there must always be one Sea Power which is superior to all others, and that it can be equally superior in all seas at once. Captain Mahan's teaching has been exaggerated by pedantry. That by the nature of things there cannot be two navies of equal strength in existence at the same time is an absurd proposition. And so is the other that the navy which is more numerous than any other must be superior at one and the same time in all seas. It is quite possible that the British Navy should be far stronger in European waters than (I name it for purposes of illustration only), the Navy of the United States, and would yet be at a disadvantage in America and in the Pacific. It is equally possible that Japan should be able to secure such a position that she could not be attacked except at a great disadvantage in seas which it is essential to what she considers her interests that she should control. The supremacy of the single British Navy all the world over was a novelty which has been visible only since, to put it as far back as possible, the Peace of Utrecht in 1712. It was made possible by the decay of Holland, the distractions of France, the torpor of Spain, the weakness of the East, and the undeveloped state of America. The East is now represented by Japan, and the power of the United States is

developed in America. The time has passed when the British Navy as it has hitherto been—that is to say the Navy maintained by the resources of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland—can hope to be as much superior east of the Cape of Good Hope and west of Cape Horn as it has been.

When Captain Mahan began his exposition of the working of Sea Power in history he very judiciously started with the Dutch Wars of the seventeenth century A universally dominant Navy had never been heard of before during the thousands of years of recorded history—not even when the Roman Empire ruled the Mediterranean because it dominated all the shores. Throughout mediæval history no navy was predominant except on its own coasts, and in its own seas. There was division and balance of sea powers. The ships of those ages, their seamanship, and the resources of States were not equal to the exercise of dominion in remote seas. But the balance which was produced by general weakness, may equally be brought about by equality in strength. To-day the United States Navy must be taken to be on a level with the British Navy in material strength, when we allow for the fact that the geographical position of the Republic puts it far beyond the reach of such pressure as we could apply to Germany with comparative ease. Distance from a possible assailant is an element of strength. We enjoy it as against America. The States have it as against us. Japan has it so long as the American Navy is not stationed on the verge of its home seas. It is possible that there might be a balance of naval powers as there was when England could not have waged wars with Venice in the Mediterranean, nor Venice have assailed England in the Channel, and when the Hanse League dominated all the North.

There is indeed an alternative. It is that the British Navy should be turned into a British Empire Navy. Of course, it is that already in a certain sense. It is there to defend all parts of the Empire at need. Hitherto it has been equal to the task, because for two centuries or thereabouts, there has been no equipollent foe to contend with in the remoter seas. That is no longer the case. The United States Navy, when all is taken into account, is a match for our own. Public men who are bound to speak with caution (some of them might obey that obligation more carefully than they do) and sentimentalists, who are born

to be the sport of ' imaginings as one would,' combine to assure us that war with the United States is ' unthinkable.' They mean that it would be repugnant to them. And all men know that it would be very dangerous. If as a matter of fact they are right, if under no circumstances are we to oppose America by force, one consequence of the first importance follows for the question of Sea Power in the Pacific. It is that we simply withdraw from the game. The United States will dictate their terms at all times, and we shall always submit.

If that is to be considered as settled, we can proceed at once to effect wholesale economies in the Navy. The German Navy which was the great danger for us has ceased to exist. France is not and is not likely to become a competitor. We could quite safely cut our naval establishment down to the level of 1885—and our victory over Germany which was to be our final deliverance from all danger, will have had the unexpected result of reducing us, with our own consent, to the modest position of a second rate naval power.

It is a *reductio ad absurdum*. Mr. Lloyd George told the truth when he said that the Empire is based on Sea Power, and that Sea Power is essential to our existence. If that statement has any meaning, it means that the British Empire must be stronger on the sea than any possible assailant. We hate the very idea of having to come to open war with the United States. We know that a breach would be a grievous misfortune. But the British Empire cannot live at the mercy of another Power—not even the United States. It must have the means to defend itself, or it ceases to be what it still is. That the scene where the interests and ambitions of peoples are striving with one another has been moved from the Four Seas to the Pacific does not alter the nature of our task, but only shows that it may possibly be more costly, more laborious to discharge.

We need not, to be sure, assume that if armed strife does begin in the Western Pacific, the British Empire will find itself opposed to America. The case might be that we two shall be banded together to secure equality of opportunity and the open door. But this is not a probable contingency. Japan cannot but know that even if she fended off the United States she would still be dependent on communications with Europe, and that the British Empire could cut them in a moment. The problem

we may have to solve will be something more like this. Shall we intervene on behalf of the United States if Japan takes 'offensive defensive' measures in the Philippines and at Guam?

Whether we could act in the mildest way as the friend of Japan is a very delicate question. But there is no sense in pretending to ignore what is notorious to all the world. Every man, woman and child in the British Empire knows that to talk of ignoring 'race distinctions' in the conduct of our policy is nonsense. We in the United Kingdom may be guided by what we know to be due to His Majesty's Asiatic peoples, but we are only a part of the British Empire. There are others who do make 'race distinctions' and will insist upon our showing a becoming deference to their opinions. This is not the occasion to go into the infinitely complicated puzzle how we are to reconcile a just regard for His Majesty's Asiatic peoples, and for a faithful Asiatic ally, with the well known views, or, if the reader prefers it so, the fears and prejudices, of the Western States of the Union, which are pretty generally shared by the Eastern, and cannot be disregarded at Washington, on the one hand, and the exactly similar feelings of our own colonies on the other. But everything in the universe is connected and even Sea Power in the Pacific cannot be rationally treated as if it were in a watertight compartment. In itself it is merely an instrument which may be used wisely or unwisely. We must not forget that those fears, or prejudices, and racial sentiments are all operative, and that they are mutually hostile.

On one point we might be and we ought to be agreed; if the Pacific does become the theatre of a conflict of interests and racial passions, then the Power which intervenes with the greater measure of strength will be in the best position to impose moderation on all the parties. When we say that the British Empire is based on Sea Power, and say it in connection with the unrest in the Pacific, we mean, if we are talking with good sense, that the British Empire must put itself in a position on the sea which will enable it to speak with authority to the combatants. It must be able to take care that the struggle—if there is to be one—does not end by establishing a master in seas where we have many interests. I have tried to show above that this might very well be the result of the development of naval strength in America and Japan. There is only one way in which we can secure this power of control

and it is by creating a much larger and stronger navy than any other.

Let us by all means clear our minds of sentimentality which is the mother of all cant. If we are to lose our position on the sea we would rather lose it to the United States than to anybody else. But since the British Empire is essentially based on Sea Power it will cease to be what it has been when there is a greater fleet in existence than our own. We have no need to be anxious as to bases of operations, naval or other. We possess them in quite sufficient measure not only in India but in the archipelago and on the coast of China. We are in no danger of failing except in the number of ships. We cannot stand aside if only because the Western Pacific melts into the Indian Ocean. But if we are to act with effect, we ought to possess a navy which, when all factors, geographical position included, are taken into account, is about as much superior to the American as that is to the Japanese. The test would not be mere numbers, but all that goes to give naval superiority. The Empire which holds a long coast and good harbours on the west side of America, and includes Australia, New Zealand, India, and a sufficiency of coaling stations which are just naval bases, does not need to be two to one in ships in the Pacific in order to enforce attention to its interests. But it must have a margin of superiority to draw on.

It is very doubtful whether the United Kingdom can any longer support a force on that scale in face of the growth of one big Navy in America and another in Asia, both of excellent quality. The British Empire must do what the law by which it lives imposes on it as a necessity. After all the whole dispute as to Sea Power in the Pacific must come to the point—who is to be the stronger? We must be, so Mr. Lloyd George has assured the Empire representatives. And whoever wishes to see us keep our place in the world must agree with him. Thence it follows that the colonies must be prepared to do a great deal more than they have done so far in the way of contributing to the support of an Imperial Navy.

Space would fail for an adequate examination of all the methods or of the various degrees by and in which the Colonies and India, (for India is as much concerned as Canada, New Zealand or Australia) can take their share. The Conference now sitting will have wasted its time egregiously if it separates without

giving us something to go on. But the preliminary question can be settled without waiting for the details. It is one of principle. Is the burden which must be taken up in the interest of all, to be shared by all in proportion to the strength of each? When once we have settled that point, the details can easily be sorted out.

Even that rather ticklish matter, the government and command of the British Empire Navy which is to be raised by the contributions of all, and recruited by all, does not present inconquerable obstacles to be overcome. One can easily conceive of a species of federal arrangement by which each member of the Empire would have its own navy—including India which has had a navy already—and the whole would be under a single direction in war. Given good will, and an intelligent perception of a national interest all problems of government and administration can be solved. That the different members of our supposed federal but also Imperial navy, might have to abate certain prejudices, and put up with a disregard of 'race 'distinctions' not to their taste is no doubt true, but if the communities which go to form the British Empire cannot make that amount of sacrifice, it becomes perfectly idle to talk of Imperial unity. It is to be presumed that we all desire to maintain that Sea Power by which we have become what we are. Without it we shall not cease to be, nor shall we be inevitably reduced to ruin, but we shall not be the British Empire we have so far known. And sea power is a mere abstraction until it is embodied in a sufficiently numerous and well-appointed navy.

As for the proposed conference, or discussion, or private arrangement, to be held in order to find whether the three surviving naval powers cannot reach a friendly arrangement, I fear that there is no salvation in it. Of course we can all three agree to reduce *pro rata*—and then the proportions would be the same—the stronger would still be the stronger, and nothing would be altered except ciphers, and perhaps the severity of the call to be made on the taxpayer's pocket. What happens in such discussions, as the leading example of the Hague conference proves, is that those who have the superior power expect the weaker to reconcile themselves to being inferior. The weaker try to find a way of reducing the superiority of the big ones.

The British Government may be ready to discuss the whole matter in a friendly way with the United States and Japan. Mr. Harding is, it seems, inclined to favour preparatory conversations 'without prejudice.' When it comes to actual conference at a round table or at none, the results will certainly be what they ever have in such cases. The British Empire will be quite ready to reduce if the United States will consent to reduce rather more. The United States will reduce only if they are still left on an equality.

And there the discussion will end.

DAVID HANNAY.

BOLSHEVISM IN CENTRAL ASIA

DURING a recent sojourn in several of the countries of Central Asia the writer formed the opinion that tendencies hitherto alien to that region are fast gaining ground and are so altering its political character that it can no longer be regarded as the world's sleepy hollow. In the course of last winter he spent some considerable time in Afghanistan, where it was obvious that conditions had undergone an almost total and startling change. Both in its material and moral aspects the mountain kingdom now bears little resemblance to the Afghanistan of the days of Abdur Rahman or even of the late Amir Habibullah. It would be rash to try to predict what part the Afghans might play in the event of a general uprising of the States of Central Asia against the British Imperial power in the East. But that the several countries of Central Asia are being encouraged to adopt a hostile attitude towards the British raj must be abundantly clear to anyone who has studied conditions on the spot. Should hostilities eventuate, Afghanistan will certainly range herself on the side of one combatant or the other. It is to be hoped that she will throw in her lot with Great Britain, but much depends upon the freedom of action permitted to the forces now at work in Kabul, where sinister agencies are at present engaged in a propaganda of the most unprincipled character, the undoubted object of which is the overthrow of England's Eastern Empire.

That this effort had its inception in Moscow is already notorious. One of the first acts of Bolshevist foreign policy was to dispatch the apostles of Bolshevism to Bokhara, Khiva and Kabul. Since 1916 the present writer has endeavoured to the best of his ability to foreshadow the catastrophe which Bolshevism will almost inevitably bring upon the countries of Central Asia and the resulting disturbances and unrest which will ensue in the Indian Empire. A brief recapitulation may not be unwelcome.

On the collapse of the Czarist power a Bolshevist envoy appeared in Bokhara at the season when the Khan was celebrating the festival of the Ramazan at Shirabad. His ostensible object was to convey the good wishes of the Soviet Government.

'No Feringhees,' said the Khan to the Bolshevist ambassador, 'shall be permitted to enter my dominions. I am now an 'independent monarch and Kaufman's spirit shall not trouble 'me henceforth.' Such a doctrine was no more acceptable to the 'pacific' Reds than it would have been to their 'tryannical' predecessors. Though Bolshevists and protagonists of Communism, they were still Slavs, and what the Slav has once enjoyed he will not readily abandon. Naturally, like all revolutionary governments, the Soviet was able to advance the best of reasons for the assumption of a protectorate over Central Asia. The chief of these was that, if it neglected to do so, the khanates would speedily become the prey of the unscrupulous British power. What Skobeleff and Kaufman failed to do by the sword, MM. Brevin and Suritz have accomplished by craft and a cunningly organized propaganda.

This was so devised as not in any way to clash with the traditions and religious scruples of the Central Asian peoples. It cleverly presented a superficial agreement between Bolshevist principles and the doctrines of Islam. In the numerous pamphlets issued the similarity between the gospel of Lenin and that of the Prophet was strongly insisted upon. The people of the khanates were assured that, just as all who embraced Islam were brothers and equals, so all those who adopted the ethical system of the Soviets were encompassed by fraternal influences and were on the same social plane. The ingenious pamphleteers at the Oriental Institute in Moscow who were responsible for this adjustable philosophy, went so far as to render it applicable to the several racial and traditional requirements of Uzbeks, Turkomans and Afghans. But, unsophisticated as the peoples of Central Asia are, they possess a strong natural capacity for discernment and their common sense revolted at theories which in many ways are at variance with their mode of life and the patriarchal habits to which they have been accustomed for generations. Realizing this, the promoters of the Oriental Institute resolved upon a more elaborate effort than any they had so far put forth for the political conversion of the peoples of Bokhara and Khiva. They ran special railway trains manned by skilled lecturers and equipped with printing-presses through the territories of these States. Not only the Uzbeks and the Tajiks, but even the nomads of the Kazil Kum desert were

bombarded by clouds of pamphlets preaching 'Liberty, Equality, 'and Fraternity,' and assuring these peoples of their equality with or even superiority to the races of Europe.

By these means Bokhara and Khiva, together with Tashkend, were brought under Bolshevist influence with comparative ease, but the Slavonic pseudo-philosophy was not permitted to cross the Oxus and flaunt itself at Kabul. The late Amir, Habibullah Khan, having pledged himself to friendship with Great Britain, desired to remain neutral. The liberation of the German and Austrian prisoners at Tashkend greatly assisted the Bolshevist cause, for these very considerable forces not only strengthened the hands of their revolutionary saviours, but by their presence helped to overawe the rulers of Khiva, Bokhara and Afghanistan. A carefully organized propaganda, delivered by word of mouth as well as by pamphlet, completed the work, and the entire country north of Afghanistan to the gates of Orenburg became almost wholly Bolshevist.

From this time dates the threat to the Khan of Bokhara. Although the Bolshevists were so generous as to say that, with the extinction of Czarism, Bokhara and Khiva had automatically become independent States, it was still obvious to the peoples of those countries that the Slavonic grip upon their territories had not lessened to any appreciable extent. The personal power of their rulers was subject to many limitations, discontent was sown broadcast among the Uzbeks by the Russian envoys, and the Khan of Bokhara, who naturally resented interference with his authority, found himself the especial object of Soviet displeasure. A secret society was established at Samarkand, the leader of which was one Usman Beg, and the high-sounding title of 'The Young Refined Uzbeks' was bestowed upon this company of conspirators, whose avowed objects were the liberation of the Tatars from the rule of all non-Tatar races, and the establishment of autonomy and Soviet government. In this body it is easy to discern the remains of a once-powerful movement adapted to Bolshevist ideals. The Pan-Turanian Society is no new thing. At one time it was in a measure identified with the Pan-Islamic movement under the leadership of Syed Jamaluddin of Paghman, whose hopes were destroyed by Sultan Abdul Hamid. But what might be described as its two wings fell apart, and the junction of the Pan-Turanian portion with

Bolshevism illustrates the contention that no possible method of furthering the Red cause has been neglected.

But although every effort was made to penetrate Afghanistan, neither the rulers nor the people of that country were found to be so amenable to Bolshevist influence as their neighbours of Bokhara. The Amir, Habibullah Khan, was definitely opposed to the dissemination of Soviet doctrines in his dominions and it is an open secret that it was ordained in Moscow that he must either be brought to reason or removed. But Habibullah, trained in the acute diplomacy of his father, Abdur Rahman, easily penetrated the Bolshevist designs and refused to exchange a forty years' friendship with Great Britain for an alliance with the ramshackle Soviet Government. Moreover, he was not ignorant of the danger to the welfare and morals of his people from the mischievous doctrines of Leninism, and his attitude towards the envoys of the Red Republic was so studiously distant as to show them plainly the hopelessness of attempting to enlist his sympathies. Disappointed in this, they seized every opportunity to create discontent among his subjects, who were assured that his neutrality during the war was to be accounted for by the circumstance that he received a pension from England. At first these allegations were scarcely taken seriously, but eventually their reiteration began to have its effect, especially with that section of the nobility which had regarded the war as an occasion for self-assertion on the part of Afghanistan. Habibullah's younger brother, the Shahzada Nasirullah Khan, who had ever been ambitious and desirous of popularity, was approached and assured that an alliance with the Soviets would result in his being placed on the throne. The greatest possible capital was made out of the charge that Habibullah had abused the confidence of the people by identifying himself with a Power which sought the downfall of the Sultan of Turkey, the head of Islam. The Afghans were told that he was selling the independence of his country for an annual subsidy from the British Government. They were also told that the Shahzada was by far the most capable of the sons of Abdur Rahman and that he possessed the confidence of the Afghan priesthood.

The general impression in Kabul and in the khanates generally, is that the late Amir's assassination would never have come to pass unless Bolshevist treachery had planned it. Without

doubt matters were complicated by court intrigues at Kabul, in which the prime movers were Sirdar Inayatullah, the General Nadir Khan, and possibly the present Amir. On the death of Habibullah the next heir to the throne, Sirdar Inayatullah Khan, renounced his claim in favour of Nasirullah, his uncle and father-in-law, who proclaimed himself Amir at Jalalabad. The present Amir Amanullah was then at Kabul and was in charge of the treasury. He at once communicated with Nasirullah, telling him that he was not justified in proclaiming himself as sovereign while the dead body of his brother lay unburied. Having done so, he gained the suffrages of the army by increasing the soldier's pay by one-half, and proclaimed himself as Amir at Kabul, where, it is alleged, he invited his uncle and his brother to confer with him. On their arrival they were immediately seized and placed in confinement by order of the Durbar. Nasirullah Khan died in prison.

Opinion in Kabul regarding the rise of hostilities between the British Government and Afghanistan is somewhat conflicting. That most generally entertained is that the present Amir was desirous of justifying himself in the eyes of his people as a strong man and an independent ruler. The people were in a state of uncontrollable excitement, the assassination of the Amir had brought about a condition approaching to national panic, and Amanullah, unable to calm the popular storm, gave way to their demands. But from the moment of the fall of Habibullah it became clear that Bolshevist influence grew in importance in the country. The envoys of the Reds made every effort to conceal their complicity in the murder of the Amir, and even attempted to place the odium for it on the shoulders of the British Government. They circulated the report that Habibullah had discovered too late that the British had departed from the bargain by which Afghan neutrality was to be rewarded by certain territorial acquisitions and had represented to him that they would scarcely be justified in fulfilling their promises, as the outlook in Central Asia had completely altered. It is also averred that the British pointed out that the Bolshevist menace to India was a much more actual peril than the old Czarist bogey of an invasion which was always about to happen but which never came. Habibullah, it is said, was greatly irritated by this contention, lost his head, and saying that he had been deceived,

made it plain that he would take steps to lay hold upon that which he thought had been wrongfully withheld from him. That threat—according to the Bolshevist tale—led to his removal by British secret agents !

As regards the actual manner of the Amir's taking off, the best informed people in Kabul believe that he was murdered by an assassin in the pay of the Bolshevists. In this connection I read a translation of a contribution to ' L'Intransigeant,' of Paris, by a French lady, who had been in Angora, where she had been present at the trial of a certain Indian, Mustafa Saghir, said to have been a secret agent in the pay of the British Foreign Office, who was charged with the attempted assassination of Mustafa Kamal Pasha. In the course of the article she stated :— ' The accused then explained the reason why he was entrusted ' with the delicate and dangerous mission of assassinating Ghazi ' Mustafa Kamal Pasha was that he brilliantly organized the ' assassination of the late Amir of Afghanistan.'

To return to the present situation in Central Asia : no one who has any knowledge of the inner political conditions of those countries can for a moment doubt that well organized and untiring efforts are being made to bring about the downfall of British prestige therein, and to do everything possible to antagonize the people to the British regime in the East. Nor is it otherwise than plain that it is Moscow's intention to retain the khanates in a state of vassalage, if at all practicable. So far as Bokhara is concerned she has already achieved this, and the khan of that country is a refugee, living at present as a guest of the Afghan Government at Killah Murad, a fortress about seventeen miles north of Kabul. He is in close touch with the Afghan authorities. His country, having been ' emancipated ' by the Reds, now enjoys a form of representative government under the paternal care of the Soviets. The steady growth of a parliamentary system is noticeable in Bokhara and a representative of this body recently visited Kabul, where it is reported that the Bokharians are willing to welcome their deposed ruler as chairman of the new legislative assembly, but not as an autocratic Khan.

To the Khan at Khiva it does not much signify what particular kind of government obtains in his dominions so long as he is at the head of it. He has therefore made no effort to stem the

progress of Bolshevism in his country, and has, indeed, allowed matters to drift. Khiva is now also under the guidance of Moscow, but its representative government, so far as can be judged, is rather of the nature of such institutions as are to be encountered in the pasteboard regions of comic opera.

The chief protagonist of Bolshevism in Afghanistan was M. Brevin, who paid for his apostleship with his life, his propagandist work being cut short by assassination. But there is every evidence that he had succeeded in laying the foundation of a belief in Bolshevist ethics in the Afghan mind. M. Suritz, the present Bolshevist envoy at Kabul, continued the work, and was instrumental in bringing about the recent Russo-Afghan treaty, in which the Merv oasis was ceded to the Afghans, an Afghan plenipotentiary was established at Moscow, the complete independence of that country acknowledged and a substantial subsidy promised. On their side the Afghans agreed to the presence of trading agents at Kabul, Ghazni Maimana, Mazar-i-Sharif and Kandahar, and a Soviet ambassador at Kabul. They also granted rights in a telegraph line by way of Merv, Pandjeh, Herat and along the Safed Koh, Kohi-Baba range to Kabul, and thence along the Lughman-Jalalabad-Dekka road. A telegraph line is reported to have already been laid down between Kushk Post and Herat, but the Jamshidis, being anti-Bolshevists, have harassed the surveyors.

It would, of course, be merely idle to allege that the Bolshevist regime had accomplished no work of usefulness in the khanates, although practically the whole of its endeavour has been directed to the attainment of its own purposes. Recent improvements have been made in the mines at Badakshan, where Russian engineers and mining experts are employed. Government power-houses have been established in the Paghmen Valley, and the River Kunar, near Jalalabad, is being harnessed for the production of electric power. An elaborate system of roads suitable for motor traffic is in course of construction between Herat and Farah, Washir and Kandahar, and heavy motor-lorries are already taking the place of pack animals. The great Central Asian highway in the north of Afghanistan now actually connects the Bokharian region with India. The long-planned railway which was intended to serve this populous route has at least one branch line running from Bokhara to Karki, and extends

along the right bank of the Oxus to Turmez and Hazrat-i-Imam. An alteration of importance has been made in the road, for, whereas it once extended to Mazar-i-Sharif, it now passes that place at a more easterly point and proceeds to Tashkurghan and thence to Haibak. Crossing the Iskar at Khinjan, it descends to Kabul, and thence to Jalalabad and the Khyber Pass, thus opening up regions which have hitherto been considered as too hostile to permit of the passage of traders and caravans. All this has been accomplished by Bolshevik engineers.

In one of the khanates at least, the policy of the Reds has been productive of no little heart-burning. In Bokhara the entire population, old and young, male and female, is compelled to an extremity of labour to which it has never before been accustomed, and which is entirely alien to its traditions. If Bokhara was not precisely an Eden prior to the Bolshevist advent, anything of the nature of hard and constant toil was practically unknown. The labour system now imposed upon its people by the apostles of the higher liberty provides for a strenuous day on the land, or in the mines, or in other work; the alternative for the male population being conscription. It is perhaps no disadvantage to the dupes of Bolshevism that they are remunerated in food and clothing when the exchange value of Russian currency is taken into account, None the less they have become mere helots, hewers of wood and drawers of water for their cunning 'emancipators,' as can be testified from personal observation. That the Reds have resolved to exploit the natural resources of the country in every possible way is obvious from the feverish activity which they are displaying in the cultivation of the Ferghana district, where they have tapped large supplies of naphtha. They have also erected factories for the manufacture of small arms. When Lenin visited Ferghana in April last, he regarded the progress made with the greatest satisfaction.

The present unrest on the North-Western Frontier has, of course, a close connection with the situation in Afghanistan. No time should be lost by the Indian Government in arriving at a good understanding with Afghanistan if peace is to be maintained in this region. There is little doubt that the Afghan Government, rightly or wrongly, regards itself as the natural suzerain of Waziristan, and it would surely be no great sacrifice

to India to grant this Afghan desire for superiority over a region which has proved an incubus to the Indian Government since it was first taken over. If the boon were granted, the very best impression would be made at Kabul; the wish to be friendly would have been demonstrated, and could certainly not be misconstrued as weakness. The Khyber railway does not appear to the writer as an undertaking of any lasting value, as it could only be effective were the Afridis to remain anti-Afghan, which is highly improbable.

What, then, is being done to combat the influence of Bolshevism in Central Asia? So far as one is able to judge from a first-hand study of the problem on the spot, very little indeed. Commercial negotiations with Russia on the part of the Imperial authorities will certainly do nothing to relieve the situation. Judging from the general conditions now prevalent in Central Asia one has not the slightest hesitation in stating that the recently concluded trade agreements between Great Britain and the Soviets had no effect on the Bolshevist propaganda in Turkestan. No attempts have as yet been made to abstain from furthering the Red philosophy in regions beyond the Oxus. On the contrary, the trade delegations to the Kabul Government seem to possess very clear orders as to what they ought to have in view when superficially endeavouring to open up trade relations between Soviet Russia and other countries in the East. The reason of M. Suritz's efforts to establish 'trade agents' in Mazar-i-Sharif, Ghazni and Kandahar can no longer deceive anybody.

In this connection a document setting down instructions to the Bolshevist trade agents is illuminating. It was signed by N. Bukharin and Y. Berezin, for the executive committee of the Third International, under the seal of Pavlov-Veltman, Responsible Director of the Council of Action and Propaganda in the East. It runs as follows:—

Instructions regarding the Work of Political Trade Delegations.

'In aiming at the achievement of a world revolution and the destruction of the capitalist régime, the following instructions must be seriously and conscientiously observed:—

(1) Trade relations must always serve the interests of Communist propaganda of the Third International under the direct control of

its executive committee. In connection with the above statement we submit the following lines on which work is to be conducted :—

The object of primary importance is the spreading of discontent among workmen and soldiers, and the preparation of strikes and disturbances. The Russian Soviet Government proposes to its foreign representatives to enter into negotiations with foreign firms on the question of gigantic commercial transactions. In all these negotiations with representatives of firms or with manufacturers, the question of a State guarantee should always be raised before the order is acknowledged.

NOTE.—This point should always be raised at the very end of the negotiations.

Bearing in mind the fact that none of the great Powers have recognized the Soviet Government, no guarantee could ever be given and the foreign capitalists concerned would have to refuse the order. Simultaneously, special Communist comrades should agitate in the factories and among the employees of the firms concerned, explaining to them that their owners had refused large orders from the Soviets because their Capitalist Governments did not want to trade with Russia. Agitators should emphasise that, owing to such an uncompromising attitude, the friend of all the proletariat—Soviet Russia—is compelled to approach other firms of friendly States to fulfil her orders.

The general work in connection with the above scheme should be directed by our comrade of the General Staff, Pogoryelov. After necessary preliminary agitation, it is essential to bring about a strike of protest. In case of a favourable outcome of such a strike, the workmen participating should be granted a subsidy, permitting them to prolong the strike and thus cause economic difficulties in every country with a view to bringing about a social revolution. The Trade Delegation should always be representative of a great nation, and no expense must be spared in creating this impression. Office premises should be obtained in the centre of the commercial district ; they should be luxuriously fitted up and furnished.

The delegates themselves should always stay at the best hotels, give large dinner parties and receptions to foreign representatives, and should in general entertain on a large scale, always bearing in mind that apart from the world proletariat, the recognition of Soviet Russia depends mainly on the capitalists, as the present imperialist policy of the bourgeoisie is entirely influenced by capital.

(2) All endeavours should be made to organize a Communist Party.

(3) Efforts should be made to buy the Press.

NOTE.—Experience has taught that apart from the organization of a proletariat newspaper it is essential to have a Press organ which does not openly display any political tendencies.

(4) One of the important tasks of the delegation is the establishment of Communist embryos among soldiers and sailors, who would undertake

energetic propaganda for the purpose of organizing soldier and sailor Soviets as well as unmerciful persecution of officer class. (Special attention should be paid to work among foreign legions.)

(5) *The organization of Workmen's Soviets.*—These Soviets should be of a militant character and prepared to struggle for dictatorship of the proletariat and the usurpation of State control. The Soviets should control strikes and labour movements.

(6) Special emphasis should be laid on the idea of arming the workmen and forming fighting embryos.

(7) *Agitation among demobilised Soldiers.*—Propaganda on the lines of not giving up arms to the authorities. The following should be the watchword of the propagandists: International Soviet Republic. A war on wars of the capitalists. Soldiers desert the front. Down with the bourgeois Parliaments. Long live the Workmen's Soviet Government. Factories, works, mines, railways—to those who work them. Down with the managers and speculators. All economic organization in the hands of the workmen. Election system in the Army. Down with the gaolers and executioners.

(8) The idea of concentrating all economic and industrial organization in the hands of the working class should be widely spread and the main propaganda should be based on this.

(9) New war scares should be invented. All measures should be taken to combat the organizations of White Guards. The application of terror is not excluded.

(10) All demonstrations should be organized and centralised. On no account must any organization be disunited. Secret revolutionary staff should be firmly established.'

N. Bukharin, Y. Berezin, *For the Executive Committee of the Third International.*
Pavlov-Veltman, *Responsible Director of the Council of Action and Propaganda in the East.*

The above shows what Russian trade expansion in practice means. One must see the Bolshevist at work to understand his methods and his mentality.

Ikbal Ali Shah.

THE GERMAN INDEMNITY

THE elaborate arrangements in the Treaty of Versailles for the assessment and collection of the indemnities imposed upon Germany were as unprecedented as the war which gave rise to them. The ideas of tribute and of ransom are, of course, as old as the human race and pillage was an ordinary feature of active warfare in all times ; but the idea of inflicting a crushing indemnity, to be paid over a long series of years as part of a peace settlement, is a commercial conception of comparatively recent origin.

Until the nineteenth century the natural fruit of a successful campaign was the acquisition of territories rather than the receipt of money payments, and such money as passed at the close of the war was less frequently paid to the victor than to the vanquished as compensation for the loss of territory. The growing sense of nationalism, however, made the arbitrary transfer of territories and of their populations from one sovereignty to another a more and more difficult and dangerous expedient, and the concurrent growth of international finance and of the cost of war led, not unnaturally, to its replacement by a money payment. As the history of wars is usually written by the victorious nation, this money payment is frequently represented as a fine or penalty imposed upon the guilty party ; a useful financial expedient has thus become hallowed by considerations of justice and of morality.

If the Allied statesmen who met in Paris to setttle the destinies of Europe in 1919 had had time to spare from their immediate preoccupations to study the precedents of history, they might well have weighed in their minds the policies of their predecessors at the conferences which closed the Napoleonic wars. In 1814, after a generation of war, during which Europe had had to maintain the gigantic French armies, and had suffered spoliation of every kind on a colossal scale, Blücher urged, as forcibly as Clemenceau a century later and with almost as much justification, the necessity of reparation for Prussia. He was, however, resolutely opposed by Castlereagh and Wellington,

who insisted that a hard peace, as proposed by Prussia, could not be of long duration. The arguments of the British statesmen were supported by Russia and by Austria.

Taking account of the relative wealth of the country at these different periods, it is probable that the Napoleonic wars imposed on Great Britain a strain four or five times as heavy as that imposed by the recent world-war. Yet the first Treaty of Paris imposed on France no war indemnity: she was allowed to keep her historical frontiers, with some additions; she received back the colonies which she had lost, and she was not even required to restore the art treasures which the Napoleonic armies had carried off. Only after the escape from Elba and the fresh war that followed was restitution required and an indemnity of 700 million francs imposed, which was reduced, within three years, to 265 millions. In the final struggle with Napoleon, the allied armies had frequently proclaimed that they did not regard the French nation as responsible for the misdeeds of Napoleon and that the war was directed exclusively against the Emperor: and the treaties of peace gave effect to these proclamations. The rapidity with which peace and prosperity were re-established in Europe is a tribute to the wisdom of that settlement.

Unfortunately, the memories of the Franco-Prussian war and of the Peace of Frankfort were closer to mind. The Prussian was then alone in his victory and magnanimity was not his nature. Bismarck imposed on France an indemnity more than sufficient to cover the cost of the war to Prussia and he retained his armies of occupation till it was paid in full. This indemnity was a precedent natural to follow, but the circumstances in which it was imposed and the results which followed should have been remarked. The situation in 1871 was very different from that of 1919. In the first place, the Franco-Prussian war had been of comparatively short duration and neither side was really exhausted by the struggle. In the next place, the indemnity was definitely fixed and, though at the time regarded as crushing, it represented probably not more than 5 per cent. of the total wealth of France at that date. Further, much of this wealth was represented in deposits abroad which could be readily mobilised, and the French Government largely used these deposits in making its payments. For the rest, the operations of the French Government were not restricted by any attempt at foreign control,

and its international credit was good enough to enable it to raise large loans abroad without difficulty. None of these conditions applied to the Germany which signed the Treaty of Versailles. On the other hand, the accession of wealth resulting from the French payments led to a sharp increase of prices in Germany and was followed in a few years by the severest industrial depression ; so that, while France rapidly recovered, Germany had to effect a great programme of internal reorganisation before she could establish her industrial supremacy. These unexpected results of his policy were a life-long wonder to Bismarck ; he could find no better explanation for them than that his indemnity was too low. Bismarck was one of the statesmen who had no use for economics.

The precedent set by Bismarck was not easily to be exorcised in 1919. By the terms of the armistice, the Allies had renounced all claims to reimbursement of their war expenses proper ; but beyond this there could be no concessions. The world-war was essentially a war of democracies in which national sentiment was more closely engaged and played a more decisive rôle than ever before. Public sentiment, shocked from the outset at the deliberate defiance by Germany of international law, had necessarily been kept at the tensest pitch in all the Allied countries to sustain the national effort. On the sudden collapse of German resistance in 1918, it was in no mood for taking long views : a voice here and there had called for a peace by negotiation, but the overwhelming majority had stood out for a decisive victory and, now that it had been won, they demanded its realisation in full. It is possible that a great statesman could have imposed a cool and considered judgment on his people ; but it is more than probable that the first statesman to suggest moderation would have been precipitated from power. The Prime Ministers, both of England and of France, had been called to office by something like the general acclamation of their countries ; and they were, in negotiating peace, merely the instruments of the popular will. They did not exaggerate the demands of the Allied nations ; they had no mandate to accept less. If their conduct is open to criticism, it is in that they did not take upon themselves the odium of undeceiving their peoples as to the practical impossibility of realising these demands.

The prolonged delay in settling the terms of peace gave

time for these demands to crystallise. It was evident that the German people should not be left at the end of the war in a more prosperous condition than the Allies whose wealth had been drained in opposing the German aggression. It was evident that a renewal of such aggression must be made impossible for the future, and it appeared probable that a heavy indemnity would be a more serious handicap to the restoration of German national power than any mere cession of territory. The financial and economic obstacles in the way of actually recovering an indemnity on the scale contemplated were not entirely lost sight of; but neither the practical difficulty of keeping the German nation in a state of indebtedness for generations nor the economic danger of attempting to derive a stream of wealth from their labours could counterbalance the moral and political necessity of claiming the heaviest indemnity (consistent with the terms of the armistice) which Germany was capable of paying.

When, however, it came to fixing the amount of this debt and the method of payment, it was less easy for the Allied statesmen to reconcile their national interests. The actual heads of the bill were agreed, the President of the United States, at the expense of logic, accepting the view that military pensions could be regarded as civilian damages. But as to the amount of the bill, all sorts of different estimates were current. While the American experts suggested a maximum figure of £5,500,000,000 (gold), the French would not be content with less than £15,000,000,000 (gold); and their view was upheld by the British Prime Minister who was bound by his election pledges. Nor was it easier to get agreement as to the means of payment. Mr. Norman Angell's book 'The Great Illusion' had, a few years before the war, attracted attention to the economic advantages of claiming payment in kind rather than in cash; and various plans were embodied in the Treaty for the delivery of coal, ships, dyestuffs, securities and raw materials. But it was obvious that such deliveries could not go far towards reducing a debt of the dimensions then discussed, and provision was made for the issue by Germany of several series of bonds in milliards of gold marks. Finally, the Peace Conference had recourse to the expedient usually adopted whenever governments cannot reconcile their differences—they created a special Commission of Reparations and gave it the widest powers to settle both the

amount of the debt and the means of payment. The Commission was also given important powers to remit or postpone payments, in so far as it was satisfied that Germany could not fulfil the demands imposed upon her.

The delay in the settlement of the debt greatly aggravated the situation. The time thus given, instead of serving to smoothe away the divergencies in the Allied policies, accentuated them. The dual aims which underlay the Treaty provisions became more and more prominent and any concrete programme that could be devised was bound to excite fierce opposition in some quarter. This dualism was most clearly reflected in French politics. France ended the war with an immense burden of foreign indebtedness and she had immediately to face very heavy capital outlay on reconstruction. Each year since the war, her budgets have only been made to balance by recourse to borrowing and to the printing-press, the gulf between revenue and expenditure being disguised by transferring the deficit to a special budget of 'Recoverable Expenses,' *i.e.*, recoverable from Germany. French Ministers of Finance might well say: 'Unless France 'recovers her debt from Germany, there is nothing before us 'but national bankruptcy.' But the economic revival of Germany is an indispensable condition to the realisation of this financial programme; and the peace-makers have taken no little pains to retard—if not to prevent—that recovery. Apart from the cession of important territories, they have obtained the transfer of the whole German mercantile marine, and have taken power to retain the German properties abroad which had been sequestrated under the war legislation. And these provisions were not only inserted as being equitable in themselves; they were regarded as a safeguard against the revival of German power. Twice within fifty years France has felt the full weight of German arms, and the fear of a revival of that danger is a natural and constant preoccupation to the French public. The argument 'Germany cannot pay till 'her economic prosperity is restored' was countered by the reply 'If she is allowed to recover, she will refuse to pay; nay, more, 'she will start a fresh war of revenge.' If Germany showed any signs of recovery, therefore, France demanded fresh guarantees against aggression; if she affected inability to pay, France demanded fresh guarantees for her debt. For two years French policy circled between the two horns of this dilemma and

the flimsy structure of European peace was agitated by one crisis after another.

The delay was even more unfortunate for Germany, as the uncertainty of the charges to be imposed upon her and the control retained by the Allied Powers over her Government acted as an effectual bar to any active reconstruction. The blockade, continued for months after the armistice, had cleared out practically all available stocks of raw materials and the armies of occupation and the Commissions of Control in Germany took possession, under various pretexts, of most that remained. Germany's most urgent need after the armistice was to raise capital abroad so as to secure food and raw material with which to restart her industrial machinery. But she had practically no foreign resources left. Her holdings of foreign securities had been largely drawn on during the war to cover expenditure in neutral countries; and a large proportion were Russian and Austrian or Hungarian securities which had been rendered worthless by the collapse of these countries. The holdings in Allied countries had been sequestrated during the war and could be retained by the Allies, under the Treaty of Peace, for the settlement of pre-war debts. The general lien on all her assets and revenues given to the Reparations Commission made it out of the question for her to raise any foreign loan. As early as March 1919 the Allied representatives at the Brussels Conference were forced to approve the exportation of nearly one-half of the gold reserve of the Reichsbank to ensure the food required to keep the population from actual starvation. When this had been used up, in September, the German Government was resourceless. Erzberger, indeed, produced a bold scheme of taxation, but it involved a reorganisation of the tax machinery, and for the moment it increased rather than solved the financial difficulties. The Government could devise no better means of securing foreign values than the unchecked use of the printing press and the wholesale disposal of the resulting paper. On the expenditure side, the lavish measures of compensation adopted to satisfy the interests which had suffered as the result of the Peace Treaty led to the issue of milliards of Treasury Bills which gave rise to further inflation. The immediate difficulties in each case were met at the expense of the future recovery of the country, and the depreciation of the mark which resulted makes any estimate of

German wealth at the moment practically impossible. The German Government is not alone to blame for this position. Democratic institutions have not yet had time to take root, and since the early days of the revolution no considerable figure has arisen to guide the destinies of the new Commonwealth. The division of parties at home and the constant tension with the Allies made an opportunist policy inevitable; there was no foundation on which to build a far-reaching programme. So the improvisations of a weak government completed the disorder begun by the Treaty of Versailles.

Such being the general situation, it was clearly impossible to treat the problem of reparations as an abstract question to be settled in the comparatively calm atmosphere of an inter-allied Commission. It was a question of vital interest to the whole of Europe, and during the two years which followed the signature of the Treaty, conference after conference met and considered and failed to settle it. At the time of the signature of the Treaty, Germany had been invited to submit an offer of the indemnity which she would undertake to pay, and there is no doubt that any reasonable offer would have been given careful consideration. But, although the invitation was renewed early in 1920, the German Government was still too weak to face the facts and to prepare a definite plan which would have helped it out of its difficulties. The Spa Conference (July 1920), which was intended to settle such a plan, ended in an obscure agreement between the Allied Governments as to their respective shares of the prospective payments, and an ultimatum to Germany in regard to the deliveries of coal. The financial discussion was to have been renewed at Geneva, but M. Millerand, who had had a rather noisy reception from the Chamber on his return from Spa, now had eyes on the Elysée and was not anxious to embarass his candidature by any more unpopular commitments. He wisely confined himself to some vague discussions with the Allies about annuities, and left his successor the onus of settling with the Germans.

The Geneva Conference accordingly degenerated into a meeting of experts, which was held in Brussels last December. This meeting, surprisingly enough, led to an agreement, both between the Allies themselves and with the Germans, fixing annuities for five years, subject to reconsideration thereafter.

The Paris Conference, which met in January of this year and reviewed the work of the experts, happily did not accept it, or Europe might have been doomed to a generation of quinquennial crises. Instead, it elaborated a scale of its own, ingeniously combining a fixed annuity (rising, by successive stages, from £100,000,000 in 1921 to £300,000,000 in 1932 and continuing on that basis for 31 years) with a variable annuity corresponding to 12 per cent. of the value of German exports, so that the actual amount to be obtained could be left to the imagination and was variously estimated at between £4,200,000,000 and £6,200,000,000. This scheme was sent to the Germans with an invitation to them to accept or discuss it in the following month. The monthly meeting of the Supreme Council, held in London for that purpose in February, was the most lively of these affairs. The Allied Prime Ministers no doubt expected some request for a modification of the Paris terms, but they were apparently impressed with the moderation of their figures and thought that only some small concession as to the method of assessment would make them acceptable to Germany. Instead, they were met with a solemn proposal that Germany should pay about half the fixed annuity, without the percentage addition, and this proposal was subject to half-a-dozen obviously inacceptable conditions. The Germans may honestly have held that their offer represented the maximum they could undertake; and the Allied Prime Ministers may have been—and, indeed, probably were—unduly optimistic. But the German Government was badly advised as to the time when they made their offer, as to the amount of that offer, and, most of all, as to the manner of its presentation. The Conference did not waste time discussing it, and the good German cheers which greeted Dr. Simons on his homeward journey cannot have obliterated the stinging rebuke with which Mr. Lloyd George dismissed him. The Entente, which at that moment the German Government might possibly—without much difficulty and with considerable advantage to itself—have divided, was left more firmly cemented than ever before.

But the disappointment caused by these constant conferences which led to no practical results was trying French public opinion too far, and the patriotic cheers with which Dr. Simons was received on his return to the Fatherland evoked profound indignation across the frontier. The London Conference had

ended with the announcement of the so-called 'sanctions': Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort were to be occupied; a tax of 50 per cent. was to be imposed by each of the Allies on all imports from Germany, and a new customs barrier was to be erected on the Rhine. But these sanctions were obviously not likely to produce any serious financial result, and a formidable demand arose for effective guarantees. The French press sedulously fostered this natural, if unreasoning, demand (for who has yet found an effective security for the payment of its debts by a bankrupt nation?) and discovered a new pretext for advancing it. One of the articles of the Treaty (Art. 235) required Germany to pay the sum of twenty milliard gold marks (£1,000,000,000 gold) before the 1st May 1921, either in cash or in deliveries of ships, coal, etc. The deliveries had been coming in more or less regularly but their value was not sufficient to pay the costs of the Armies of Occupation, which were a first charge upon them under the terms of the article, and little remained available for reparation. It had been obvious, since the Brussels Agreement of 1919, that the liquid resources of Germany were not equal to the payment of these twenty milliards; the Spa agreement, under which the Allies undertook to advance money for feeding the coal miners, was a tacit recognition of the fact. The article therefore fell into abeyance and was practically forgotten. Suddenly, under the stimulus of the London Conference, the Reparations Commission woke up to its usefulness. It calculated that the value of the deliveries up to the 1st May 1921 would, at most, not exceed eight milliards—£400,000,000 gold—and it put in a 'strong' letter to the German Government demanding the cash payment of the balance—£600,000,000 gold—before the 1st May. It was obvious that in the two months still left to run, it was impossible for any Government to put up so huge a sum in cash; but the futile demand aroused widespread enthusiasm in France and '*l'échéance*' of May 1st became a sort of fetish with the public, the press and the politicians.

May 1st was the time-limit for another operation of the Treaty. It was the due date by which the Reparations Commission had to assess the total obligations of Germany. Until the breakdown of the London Conference it had always been hoped that some settlement would be arrived at which would make a detailed examination of the claims of the Allied Powers

unnecessary. In the event the work had to be done and the Reparations Commission spent some feverish weeks examining *dossiers*. Within the time at its disposal it made a comprehensive study of the subject and repeatedly took evidence from the German representatives. In the end the Commission arrived unanimously at the total of 132 milliards of gold marks (£6,600,000,000 gold)—less than half the figure suggested by eminent politicians during the peace negotiations. While the discussion of the total damages has an abstract flavour, rather remote from realities, the work of the Commission was useful in establishing once and for all the *maximum* obligations of Germany, and its decision proved that the Paris Conference proposals were not much, if anything, of a concession to the Germans. But it still left undetermined the means by which the bill was to be paid and the capacity of Germany to pay it.

By the time the figure was published however, French public opinion was thoroughly aflame and the French Government, even if it had desired to exercise patience, would have found it difficult to allay the storm. On all sides, the cry was that on May 1st the Ruhr must be occupied and its coal deposits worked in the interests of reparations. The difficulty of occupying or managing this densely populated industrial area was ignored ; it was a real ' pledge ' and the crudest estimates were circulated of the profits that were to accrue from this liability. M. Briand had spoken of sending in the gendarmes to collect the debt and the mobilisation of the army was daily anticipated. The excitement alarmed Mr. Lloyd George and forced him to activity. Pre-occupied though he was with Ireland and with the coal strike, he summoned a further conference to London and induced M. Briand to postpone ' direct action.' A revised offer, embodying the most favourable elements in the Treaty, was hastily framed and presented to Germany as an ultimatum, to which the mobilisation of the French 1919 class added point. The Germans wisely accepted this last chance without reserves, and one chapter at least of the tangled controversy was definitely closed.

The schedule of payments decided upon by the London Conference was a great step towards the restoration of the European common weal : it will live, perhaps, as the most memorable achievement of our Prime Minister in international affairs. It is easy to gain a transient popularity after an

embittered war by dictating drastic terms of peace ; it is not so easy to choose the crucial hour when those terms must be re-written. Time, it may be said, is required to heal the wounds of war, so that the passions it has engendered may subside and cooler counsels may obtain audience. But, as experience has shown, in the settlement of international affairs, delay too involves danger. Europe had suffered enough from the delay in fixing the debt : last April it was on the brink of a fresh disaster, and to Mr. Lloyd George must be given the chief credit for averting that disaster. Incidentally, he saved France, too, from a great disillusionment, for assuredly the popular faith in the efficacy of the Ruhr as a ' pledge ' would have been doomed to very early disappointment ; the threat, no doubt, assisted the German Government to take the fence, but it was only useful as a threat. M. Briand also deserves credit for the sagacity with which he accepted the new scheme and for the courage with which he defended it against the inevitable criticism of the French Chamber. M. Tardieu and his friends spent five days denouncing the way in which the just claims of France had been renounced, but the world was tired of irrealisable promises. The vote of confidence which M. Briand received justified his policy of realism and illustrated the fundamental good sense of French democracy.

Whether the new scheme will work is another matter. The essence of the arrangement is that the German debt is to be divided into three series, each represented by 5 per cent. gold mark bonds. The first and second series, amounting together to £2,500,000,000 (gold), are to be issued at once. The balance is not to be issued till the Reparations Commission has funds available to meet the interest and sinking fund charges ; until then, it remains a book debt on which interest is not chargeable. The effective obligations of Germany take the form of annual payments of two milliard gold marks (£100,000,000 gold) plus a further annual payment equal to 26 per cent. of the value of the German exports, or any alternative index, calculated to produce the same result, which may be proposed by the German Government and accepted by the Reparations Commission. Provision is also made for a Committee of Guarantees to control the service of the bonds and to administer selected revenues on which they are secured, among which is to be a levy of 25 per cent. on the value of all German exports.

The aim of the Allied Governments appears to have been to produce a marketable security which could be issued to the public, thereby securing much-needed capital for their requirements, while at the same time involving German commercial credit in the payment of her reparation debt. But a 5 per cent. gold mark bond is not a marketable security in any country with a depreciated currency, as the investor will see his capital reduced as his national currency improves. The only country, therefore, that could absorb such a bond is the United States and, as recent issues have shown, the market rate for a well secured government bond is nearer 10 per cent. than 5 per cent. The discount which would have to be allowed on any issue of German bonds is so high that the Allied Powers will probably find it more profitable to keep the German bonds in their own hands and issue domestic loans secured on the annual interest they receive.

But is the annual interest secure? If Germany were an exporting country, the fixed annual payment of £100,000,000 would not represent any heavy burden; before the war she could have taken it in her stride. But at present she has a very heavy adverse trade balance and, as her invisible exports are greatly reduced, it will probably take a considerable time to rectify this balance. Meanwhile, every increase in her exports involves an increase of her obligations, for the index of her payment, after the fixed sum, is 26 per cent. of her exports. As all international payments must eventually be represented by exports, Germany must be able to sell her goods at such a price as to realise a profit of 26 per cent. plus the fixed annuity. Assuming that she could pay on an average 26 per cent. of the value of all her exports (an assumption which, even with the advantage of the present depreciation of the mark and of her lower labour costs, is little less than fantastic), how is she to pay the fixed annuity of £100,000,000? Perhaps the answer may be found in the invisible exports, which will clearly be stimulated by these provisions just as the normal export trade will be discouraged; but taking into account the adverse trade balance and the budget deficit (86 milliards of marks in 1920 and estimated at 49 milliards in 1921, without providing for the new annuity) few would care to guarantee the prompt payment of the German obligations, reduced though they are.

The motives which led to the adoption of the value of exports

as an index of German prosperity, and to some extent those that led to the proposed levy of 25 per cent. on exports, were, as usual, somewhat mixed. At first sight, the growth of exports may appear to give a rough and ready test of national prosperity ; but a little study will show that it can only be accepted with considerable qualifications. The real exports of a country are represented by the goods produced from the native resources of that country and by the services performed by it in working up raw materials produced elsewhere, *less* the value of the imports which it has to obtain from abroad. Many of the items which figure in ordinary trade statistics as exports represent goods in transit or goods originally imported from abroad and only worked up to a small extent before being re-exported. The amount of national wealth derived from such goods represents only a fraction of their total value, and an actual levy of 25 per cent. on this value would simply kill these trades which cannot be carried on in uneconomic conditions. Unfortunately there is more than a suspicion that one of the motives for this levy on German exports, as for the previous Reparation (Recovery) Act tax, is the desire to protect Allied industries from German competition. If this is, indeed, the object, it may be successful, but only at the expense of European reconstruction. The development of German export trade is essential to the fulfilment of the obligations laid upon her ; if that development is hampered or destroyed by prohibitive duties, she cannot be expected to recover or to pay her debt to the Allies. Germany will remain a ruined country, but her fate will be shared by the rest of Europe. The idea of getting reparation out of Germany while restricting or prohibiting her power to export is folly, and the sooner the schedule of payment is modified on this point the better.

A more hopeful provision in the schedule is the arrangement for the supply of labour and goods for the reconstruction of the devastated areas. Under the Treaty, Germany has been making regular deliveries of coal and occasional deliveries of machinery, timber, etc., for this purpose. But there have been technical difficulties about prices which have prevented the full utilisation of these arrangements ; and French public opinion—or, perhaps, rather the opposition of French contractors—has hitherto prevented the adoption of any large scheme for securing the assistance of German industry in the rebuilding of the ruined departments.

The schedule makes a new departure by requiring Germany to supply any demands approved by the Reparations Commission for reconstruction purposes, but by providing that the value shall be fixed by an independent arbitrator. The French Government, supported by the *sinistrés*, who are beginning to resent the slow progress of the work of reconstruction while it was undertaken by French nationals alone, have already taken advantage of this provision and have sent in an order for 5,000 wooden houses which will go some way to mitigate the appalling housing conditions in the devastated areas. Further schemes for the employment of German labour in these areas, under suitable conditions and safeguards, are being considered, and it is not too much to hope that a really vigorous effort will at last be made to restore the material condition of these ruined departments. It will certainly profit France more to re-equip the factories and re-house the population in these districts than to stand out for distant prospects of remote milliards ; and if the annuity is to be paid by Germany, it must be paid largely by such means.

While, therefore, the schedule of payments represents a definite and considerable step towards a rational settlement of this disturbing question, it cannot be said to have closed the door to further discussion. Many difficulties must inevitably arise in the execution of the arrangement. At the moment, the German Government is certainly showing good faith and it is making a firm effort to meet its obligations ; and it is a good augury that Allied ministers have publicly recognised the fact. But deeds, rather than words, are required : and the Allies on their side, must show good faith if they expect good faith from Germany. The sanctions imposed by the London Conference are a good test. These sanctions had little or no juridical foundation and they were deliberately imposed to secure the acceptance of the Allied ultimatum. Now that this ultimatum has been accepted, the sanctions serve no useful purpose, and their cancellation becomes a matter of ordinary honesty. Upon the decision taken by the Allies on this point largely depends the possibility of the execution by the German Government of its obligations. If, for the future, the Allies will refrain from actions which weaken the position of the German Government or which impair the financial capacity of the German people, there is a reasonable chance that the obligations as now

fixed will be duly met. If however the revival of Germany is delayed and the terms prescribed by the London Conference prove impossible of fulfilment, there is still a loophole left. The Treaty empowers the Reparations Commission from time to time to consider the capacity of Germany and to postpone demands which it is satisfied cannot be fulfilled; and if concessions subsequently prove necessary, it is to be hoped that the Allied governments will not rule out the possibility of some revision of the schedule of payments. Both in Germany and in the Allied countries, the time has passed for living on mirages. Germany has got to set to work and pay off her debt, and her Government must enforce a policy conforming to her obligations. The Allied countries, on the other hand, must not expect the impossible of Germany, and they would be well advised to rely primarily on their own efforts rather than on the revenues they will derive from reparations, in reconstructing their national economy. Persistence in unrealisable demands is not a proof of strength but of weakness, and a policy of this kind in financial matters defeats itself.

The problem of reparations will, however, in all probability not be settled till it can be handled as part of a general settlement of inter-allied indebtedness. The war has created an immense burden of international indebtedness, of which the German debt is only a special form. These debts act as a deadweight on the restoration of normal commercial relations and, so long as they exist, there will be no end to international exigencies. While Great Britain owes £1,000,000,000 to the United States, she can scarcely be expected to remit her claims against France and Italy, but until she remits them France and Italy cannot afford to remit their claims against Germany. The new German bonds could not be better employed than in cancelling these debts and so relieving Europe of the present economic nightmare. The creditor countries would only have to undertake to accept the German bonds in settlement of the war debts owing to them and the debtor countries would assuredly hand them over with alacrity in order to obtain release from their foreign indebtedness. In a few weeks the balance of interest in reparations would be completely changed. The smaller Powers would disappear from the picture. Italy's share would become so small that her views could in future be disregarded; a result which, in view of her

intransigeant policy towards Austria, could only be welcomed by all concerned. France's share would be reduced to the same level as Great Britain's, and the United States would become one of the dominant partners in the business. The ultimate debtor and creditor nations created by the war would then be put into direct relation, and the difficulties resulting from the exigencies of the intermediate creditors would be diminished. The policy of America in this matter remains to be settled, but she has an opportunity by this means to claim the final voice in the settlement of German reparations, and the benefits she could obtain from such a settlement would more than counterbalance any loss she might suffer from the cancellation of the Allied debts.

THE MATRIARCHAL STATE

1. Das Mutterrecht. By J. J. BACHOFEN. Stuttgart. 1861.
2. Ancient Society. By L. H. MORGAN. 1877.
3. House and House Life of the American Aborigines. By L. H. MORGAN. 1881.
4. Studies in Ancient History. By J. F. MACLENNAN. 1886; 1896.
5. Historical Jurisprudence. By SIR PAUL VINOGRADOFF. 1920.
6. Herkunft und Geschichte des arischen Stammes. By K. G. ZSCHAETZSCH. Berlin. 1920.
7. The Natural History of Law. By J. E. G. DE MONTMORENCY. Oxford: University Press. 1921.

THE position of woman in the family and in the community is so vital to the evolution of the race that it is essential to ascertain the facts as displayed in history and in the customs of innumerable tribes. The question was first brought forward by J. J. Bachofen in his work entitled *Das Mutterrecht*, issued at Stuttgart in 1861 and republished by his widow in 1897. He announced a new theory of the evolution of human institutions, derived from his discovery of matrilineal institutions in Europe, by which he placed, as a universal fact, a matriarchal before the patriarchal stage in human institutions, that matriarchal stage being an evolution from a curious system of group marriage. It is a very remarkable work, almost epic in its idealism and deserves the tribute paid to it by the late Professor E. C. Clark. He regards the work as exhaustive and able, though fanciful, and shows that Bachofen explains his Matriarchy as an upward step from the 'natural' condition of absolute promiscuity: 'The prominence of the Mother, he makes to be, 'if I understand his argument aright, not a part of her condition 'as the wife of many men, but a phase of early religious development decidedly humanizing and beneficial, though 'replaced, in its turn, particularly at Rome, by the later and 'more developed Paternal principle.' There can be no doubt that the material used by Bachofen and much tribal information collected since his time, show that there has been and is a stage in the evolution of certain races in which women hold a predominant position, while there is a vast volume of evidence from all parts of the world, showing the frequency with which

descent is traced through the mother rather than the father. There is, however, no evidence to show that there has been a stage of evolution during which men and women have lived in a normally promiscuous state. There is indeed much to be said from an *a priori* view against the possibility of such a stage, since the more highly organized animals do not live in this state, while jealousy (whatever that may be) in respect to sexual matters does not lessen in virulence as man emerges from the beast. The weakness of Bachofen as a scientific thinker, and even as a poet, is his insistence on a promiscuous state of nature and his dogmatic assertion of the universal precedence taken by matriarchy over patriarchy.

This *place aux dames* theory came like a bomb-shell on those few persons who in 1861 were thinking about social evolution. One man, Mr. Lewis H. Morgan, had been working at the subject in America before 1861, and it may be that he should really be regarded as the first worker in the field. From 1846 onwards, he was examining in detail the customs of the American Indians, of what he calls the Ganowanian [Bow-and-arrow] family, and he maintains that descent in the female line was once universal in that group of tribes. In his doctrine of original promiscuity and group marriage he has much kinship with Bachofen. The denunciation of his work as 'utterly unscientific in character,' by J. F. MacLennan is unjust, and is perhaps characteristic of the critical methods of the early days. It would be difficult to pay too high a tribute to the labours of Lewis Morgan, and such a tribute should surely be possible without accepting his conclusions.

J. F. MacLennan was the third of a remarkable trio of workers who placed the subject of matriarchal institutions on a substantial basis. MacLennan was wrestling with the subject as early as Bachofen, though probably later than the first days of Morgan. His work was independent of the labours of the other two, and he was not less dogmatic, and therefore not more 'scientific' than his fellow labourers. He held the view, which probably few thinkers hold to-day, that 'all races of men have had, to speak 'broadly, a development from savagery of the same general 'character.' He held that society did not begin with the family but with the tribe, and he invented the term 'exogamy' for those tribes which practised the exciting art of capturing women for

marriage, and 'endogamy' for those who practised marriage, placid and domestic, within the tribe. In the former case he sees the rise of patriarchy, in the latter of non-patriarchal institutions based on mother-right. The tribe is broken into divisions and within these division or hordes, sexual union is forbidden. MacLennan argues that the tribal stage is polyandrous, and he traces the early supremacy of woman as a result of these unions, a result which Professor Clark, who had a pen not less caustic than that of MacLennan, describes as being not only revolting but improbable, a view well confirmed by our knowledge of the Khasi and other matriarchal races. MacLennan was not afraid of his views, which were largely based on ancient Greek and Roman, and therefore, to his mind, Aryan material. He sees the original supremacy of women illustrated by the Grecian legends. He indeed attacks Sir Henry Maine on the very point:

'Sir Henry Maine and others who agree with him are no longer entitled to say that the proposition that kinship through mothers only, preceded kinship through fathers, rests upon the observation of scattered communities of other than Aryan races.'

MacLennan probably did not realize the large non-Aryan element in the European stocks.

Others thinkers came rapidly upon the scene when the lists had been fairly set. The passion for generalization even seized Sir John Lubbock, who produced an ingenious theory that there was in the beginning a universal system of communal marriage, which was gradually broken down by marriages between warriors and women captured in war, a process that led to the more pleasing system of monandry. Mr. C. N. Starcke in 1886 took a different line. He admits matrilineal and possibly matriarchal institutions, but he insists that they invariably come after patriarchal institutions and that a system of patriarchy begets a system of matriarchy. He collected masses of material to illustrate his theory, but his collection is more valuable than his conclusions. In more recent times Westermarck and Malinowski have stood for universal patriarchy based upon individual pairing or sex jealousy. There has indeed been a welter of argument and a great deal of bitterness on a subject of such extraordinary interest as to be worthy of unimpassioned treatment.

It is worth while to turn to some of the actual material and consider it *de novo*. First of all, it is plain that there is no direct

evidence relating to man in his really primitive state. It is true that there are races which appear to have survived unchanged from an extraordinarily remote antiquity, in India, Ceylon, New Guinea, Australia, Central Africa and even Europe, but even the least advanced of these races are neither primitive nor unsophisticated. The Australian tribal races are palæolithic and have been in the South Pacific probably for many thousands of years. Yet these tribes seem to show a process of descent rather than ascent. It is useless to dogmatize about the first stages of men, though it is possible that some assumption as to their lives may be made, drawn from the period of helplessness of the human child and the necessary dependence of this child on both mother and father. There is in these facts an *a priori* argument, which could hardly be displaced, in favour of the family as the first cell of the social structure. The higher wild beasts have family life even where they also have ' pack ' life. Yet the only safe form of ascertaining the facts as to Matriarchy is to examine the material where we know that some form of dominant female influence exists.

The remarkable thing about the Australian material is that there, as indeed in North America, we find patriarchy in an elementary form riddled through with vestiges—the beginning or the end—of a system that has some relations to a matriarchal system. There is something, indeed a good deal, to be said for the view that in Australia we see a matriarchal system in the last stages of decay. The legends look back to a period when woman was dominant and god-like, the creator and organizer of the tribes. The contrast between these radiant creatures and the tribal women is great, though these latter women are not slaves, and indeed slavery is entirely unknown. There is, underlying the treatment of tribal women, a curious fear of women as such. They are rigidly excluded (except in the islands of Melville and Bathurst) from all part in the great tribal ceremonies of initiation. The children of the Great Foundress are so afraid of women that an initiate must not eat any food that has been secured or even handled by women. The initiate must not let a woman see his mouth open or his teeth. Women are clearly bringers of ill-luck at these times. It almost seems like a memory of a revolt against the dominance of women in some remote age.

Yet in certain tribes there are some old women who seem to know a great deal of the inner secrets, and in the secluded island tribes women freely take part in the ceremonies. The exclusion of women seems to become stricter as we move south. Some of the restrictions on women are very strange. Certain foods are forbidden them in some tribes. The ban of silence can be thrown over women for varying periods. This they do not resent, and talk freely with their fingers, since sufferance is the badge of all their tribe. A Kakadu man may never speak to his younger sisters, and only at a distance of thirty or forty yards to his elder sisters. He may shout to his mother-in-law, but only if she is a very long way off. Yet there is no lack of affection, while the conception of sex relations is so extraordinary that a European is almost incapable of grasping it. The child is not regarded as the result of these relations. It is a manifestation of an immortal spirit, and in certain tribes it is held that the spirit adopts alternate sexes at each incarnation. The sex question is, therefore, not fundamental; and in fact the laws of descent vary in the most puzzling fashion. Sometimes descent is reckoned in the maternal line, sometimes in an indirect, and sometimes in a direct paternal line.

Some of the mistakes of Morgan and MacLennan, and later investigators, if mistakes they be, are due to the intense complexity of the system of descent and relationship. There is class relationship, but there is no evidence to show that that relationship springs from or is in any way related to a period of promiscuity. The highly technical form of tribal totemic organization points, indeed, in the other direction. Forms of property-holding seem to show a drift away from a matriarchal system. Property in land exists rather by virtue of a right of exclusion than a right of possession. There is tribal land-holding, and land-holding by sections of a tribe on this footing, and there is (at any rate) personal land-holding in the case of men who have charge of sacred tribal instruments. This land and the instruments pass to the male heir in our sense, and always on the male side. On the other hand, other personal property passes from a dead man to his mother's side of the tribe, and strangely enough his widow passes in the same fashion. We seem to see here the emergence of the priest and tribal head in the most elementary form, the beginnings of a patriarchal system; we see also the last form of a

system in which the mother or her kin stand in the dead man's place.

It is perhaps dangerous to dogmatize on the Australian evidence, but it does seem to indicate an epoch in very remote ages when matriarchy existed and was overthrown at some terrific moment of dispersal. Even if this is the case, it does not follow that matriarchy was the earliest form of social organization. It might well be the organization that would fit a prolonged epoch of peace, but one that could hardly survive the practice of endemic war.

It is interesting to see what support can be given to such a suggestion by the evidence from America. There is a great deal to be said for the theory that man had no original place in North or South America; that he entered these vast continents in successive incursions from his Asiatic home. America does not appear to have contained the experimental creatures who must have led up to those epic moments in the history of our planet when man himself, looking before and after, came, saw and conquered all things but himself. It may be accepted without great fear of present contradiction that the American or Ganowanian race is Asiatic—quasi-Aryan, if such a term may be admitted—and possesses remarkable resemblances to the race that somehow or another drifted into Australia. They are both totemic races; that is to say, races that recognise fictional ancestors which took specific animal, or even vegetable forms, such forms being the sacred token of the tribe which sprang from the source; they are both races in which the tribe is broken into sections which provide a machinery for marriage of the most complex kind, apparently designed to avert incestuous relations; to avert, in fact, the very evils which promiscuity would promote.

The Ganowanians are farther away from the full matriarchal stage than the Australians. The race memory has grown fainter, though we can trace a looking back to Great Ancestresses, to what is a memory common to both peoples. There is a good deal to be said for Morgan's contention that descent in the female line was once universal in America, though it must be remembered that the incursions from Asia probably lasted through many centuries, and those who came last were more probably in the patriarchal than the matriarchal stage, since tribal formations tended among Asiatic peoples towards the dominance of chiefs.

This fact is not affected by the further fact that in various tribes the office of *Sachem* or chief, was hereditary in the female line. The long Houses were a notable feature of the American tribes, as they are, or were, of tribes in the South-Eastern Pacific. There is the barest trace of these Houses in Australia, and it is apparently clear that such communal dwellings, despite the alleged fact that they were governed by women, mark a stage away from matriarchy. They are the beginnings of tribal settlement, the elemental form of the joint family, and from settlements of this type, as fully developed in Mexico and Peru, we can trace the beginnings of the feudalistic organization which seems, to the present writer, a phase of social evolution of a significance that overshadows the alleged conflict between matriarchy and patriarchy.

It would, however, be idle to overlook the feminine element in that evolution. It may well be that the communistic life of those Houses was based on 'mother-right,' as alleged by Morgan, who claims that these communities were similar to the Hindoo joint family. That family as we see it, is dominated by the male head, but in other Asiatic variants where the woman is still the dominant element, the joint family is indistinguishable in kind from the joint family of India. It is not insignificant to recall, as Morgan does, Strabo's statement that the Gauls lived in great Houses of the same type.

Yet, after all, how far does this American evidence, co-ordinated with evidence from Asia, lead us? If we link it up with the Australian evidence, as I think we may with some reasonable conviction, we seem to see, behind Americans and Australians alike, a race-memory of an epoch when women played a dominant part in social affairs, and we see apparent survivals of that dominance in the frequent inheritance by males of positions of control through the female and not the male line. If we assume, and it is the most that we can assume from the evidence, that there was a pre-historic moment of equilibrium in perhaps the plains of India or China where women wielded complete power in vast organized communities—for if race-memory is anything it must refer to startling outstanding facts—then such a moment of time is not necessarily or even probably one that represented primitive conditions. It would only mean that an economic equilibrium had produced that matriarchal phase

succeeding to, and to be succeeded by, many other phases. Yet the existence of such a phase on a large scale as the product of special conditions of economic equilibrium would readily account for all the phenomena of matrilineal descent and matriarchal institutions that are written large on all the elements of some vast Asiatic dispersal.

The traces which remain seem to point back to the evidence of a great matriarchal State. We have race-memory in Australia and America alike, pointing back to great women-rulers ; tribal peoples carrying these memories, carrying also in their institutions traces of matriarchal influence. Nor are these traces limited to peoples who in their far wanderings to Australia and America have carried with them the outward signs of a matriarchal age. Bachofen's work is largely devoted to the traces of such an influence in the Europe of classical times, while in Ancient Egypt, as is pointed out by Professor Flinders Petrie ' all ' property was vested in the female line, and a man had only a ' life interest in it.' It is true that with respect to India, Professor Petrie hazards the view that ' matriarchy was aboriginal,' but as the term ' aboriginal ' has many meanings, I do not know that this view militates against the conception of a matriarchal State on a vast scale in early pre-historic times. Moreover, the fact must not be disregarded that the Greeks had a specific legend on the subject, the Amazonian legend of a race of warlike women who in north-east Asia Minor, in the vicinity of the Black Sea, formed an independent State composed exclusively of women, whose matrimonial relations with men of neighbouring States or tribes were of a strange type, only the female issue being retained as members of the matriarchate, the boys being slaughtered or sent out of the State to their fathers. Scythian and North African States of exactly the same type are also included in the Amazonian legend.

Sir Charles Lyall in his introduction to Colonel Gurdon's excellent work on ' The Khasis,' describes the social organization of the isolated Khasi race in Assam as :—

' One of the most perfect examples still surviving of matriarchal institutions, carried out with a logic and thoroughness which, to those accustomed to regard the status and authority of the father as the foundation of society, are exceedingly remarkable. Not only is the mother the head and source, and the only bond of union, of the family ;

but in the most primitive part of the hills, the Synteng country, she is the only owner of real property, and through her alone is inheritance transmitted. The father has no kinship with his children, who belong to their mother's clan; what he earns goes to his own matriarchal stock, and at his death his bones are deposited in the cromlech of his mother's kin. In Jowai he neither lives nor eats in his wife's house, but visits it only after dark (p. 76). In the veneration of ancestors, which is the foundation of the tribal piety, the primal ancestress (*Ka Iawbei*) and her brother are the only persons regarded. The flat memorial stones set up to perpetuate the memory of the dead are called after the woman who represents the clan (Maw Kynthei, p. 152), and the standing stones ranged behind them are dedicated to the male kinsman on his mother's side. In harmony with this scheme of ancestor worship, the other spirits to whom propitiation is offered, are mainly female, though here male personages also figure pp. 109-113). The powers of sickness and death are all female, and these are those most frequently worshipped (p. 109). The two protectors of the household are goddesses (p. 114) though with them is also revered the first father of the clan *U Thawlang*. Priestesses assist at all sacrifices and the male officiants are only their deputies (p. 121); in one important State, Khyrim, the High Priestess and actual head of the State is a woman, who combines in her person sacerdotal and regal functions (p. 70).'

It may be noted that the legends of a primal ancestress are the same in Assam as in Australia, and that there is in both cases a first father of the clan.

It is very desirable that the customs of Australia, America, and of the peoples of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills should be carefully collated. That there is some common source I have very little doubt. The totemic stage is different, for though the Khasi clans bear the names of animals and vegetables, the people do not shrink from eating either, and Colonel Gurdon declares that there is no evidence that the Khasis ever regarded them as clan totems. It is, however, difficult not to think that they are totemic in origin. It should be noticed that the clan is formed out of the family, that the clan formed village settlements, and that the State is a voluntary association of villages and shows the beginning of a feudalistic stage. The origin of the race is not clear, but it may be well that they are the remnants of a people who moved west out of Indo-China. Among the Khasis as among the Australians there is a survival of snake worship. It should also be pointed out that in Sumatra there is a strong survival of the

matriarchate. Colonel Gurdon gives us the following significant passage :—

'M. Aymonier, in 'Le Cambodge,' mentions the matriarchate as having been prevalent apparently amongst the primitive races of Cambodia, and notes that the ancient Chinese writers spoke of queens in Fou-nan (Cambodia). If the Khmêrs were the ancient people of Cambodia, here we have an important land mark in common between them and the Khasis. M. Aymonier goes on to speak of priestesses, and the Cambodian taboo, *tam* or *trenam* which Mr. Lowis, the superintendent of ethnography in Burma, suggests may be akin to the Khasi sang (the timber taboo of the hearth).'

Without going into detail on the subject, it is plain enough that there is material which, *prima facie*, seems to support the idea of a great matriarchal State lying under the shadow of the Himalayas, which dissolved and spread its elements north and east on the way to the Behring Straits and America, south-east on the way to Australia and west towards the Mediterranean and Africa. The possibility is worth very close investigation. That investigation might do something to clear up the mystery of the Basque people, who even to-day show strongly marked traces of a matriarchal system in a form of land-holding which has much in common with the system that obtains among the Khasi people. It is interesting also to note that the custom of *La Couvade* exists or existed among the Basques, the custom by which the husband fictionally takes the place of the mother in the nurture of the child, and that the great serpent plays a part in their legends. It is not impossible that the Basque peoples represent one element of a great matriarchal dispersal. One of the Basque superstitions seems in a strange way to throw a beam of light on the date of that dispersal—the superstition that the Pyrenean forests are haunted by Le Seigneur-Sauvage, a monster with a human face. One might almost conjecture that the Euskarian or Basque peoples arrived in Europe in the age when the Neanderthal experiment was still in progress.

The theories of Morgan and MacLennan as to the matriarchal phenomena seem to fail because of the erroneous assumption that they are dealing with really primitive peoples, peoples in the opening stages of human evolution. Man has never been seen in this stage and certainly close consideration of at any rate Australian and American races reveals an already very remote

social heredity. The Australian tongue in its many variants is extraordinarily complex, more complex than Greek. That is only one instance of many that indicate in the case of both the Australian and American peoples that they belong to an ancient civilization and by the circumstances of their environment have marked time or fallen back while the main army of humanity was pushing forward.

It is not always realised how wonderfully remote is the earliest civilization of Central Asia. Professor Flinders Petrie has some startling figures on the subject. Europe was in the elemental stage while Asia was full of organized human life. About the year 3000 B.C. ' the hey-day of Egyptian art—Britain was all ' in one with the Continent, and much of the North Sea was ' dry land ; our present sea-level and general coast line was ' not reached until about 1600 B.C.' Elam, *circa* 7000 B.C., was ' in full artistic development ' five thousand years before China began to realize her powers. Many thousands of years before Elam came to its prime, the preparation of Central Asia for its full humanism must have been in progress, and it is in that age of preparation that we must look for the great dispersal which was to humanize Western Asia, Europe and North-East Africa, and to populate America, Africa and Australia. It is not inconceivable that before the dispersal there existed a great matriarchal State in Asia. Such an hypothesis seems to account for widespread matriarchal institutions, though it does not solve the origin of matriarchy or patriarchy.

If the family is taken as the basis of society, the evolution of a matriarchal or patriarchal system would seem to turn, as is urged by Sir Paul Vinogradoff, on purely economic conditions. There seems to be no necessary order of social evolution, but there seem to be laws that determine evolution in accordance with economic environment. A matriarchal State may well have come into existence in remote pre-historic times, not as the first effort of man to govern himself, but as a particular effort at a particular time made possible by a particular environment, subsequently destroyed by the pressure of races moving-westward, in search of food, or fulfilment of fancy.

J. E. G. de Montmorency.

THE COST OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

1. A Return of Expenditure under certain Acts of Parliament. No. 160. 1920.
2. Parliamentary Debates. 1918—1921.
3. Reports of the Select Committees on National Expenditure. 1918, 1919, 1920.
4. The Slippery Slope. By W. A. Bailward. John Murray. 1920.
5. Reports of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws. 1906—1909.

THE rise in the expenditure from the rates and taxes on direct public assistance in recent years, quite apart from the present industrial crisis, requires more serious consideration than it has yet received. The figures show for the United Kingdom an expenditure of £25,000,000 for 1891, £39,000,000 for 1901, £69,000,000 for 1911, £173,000,000 for 1919 (according to a return which is defective and includes figures as old as 1917), and for the year ending March 31st, 1921, £332,000,000, as far as can be ascertained from parliamentary statements.

The number of beneficiaries is not given for earlier years, but for 1919 it appears that 28,000,000 persons out of a total population of at the outside 48,000,000 received public assistance. This figure no doubt includes overlapping as well as fraud, but it would seem that any deduction made on that account would have to be balanced against the understatement of those in receipt of payments from the various public funds for the unemployed. Taking the figures as they stand it looks as if there were an expenditure of £6 17s. 4d. per head of the population, the beneficiaries amounting to 58 per cent. of the population. Even subtracting education, which, as will be shown later, has now become in very fact a part of the Poor Law system, we should still have an expenditure of £4 2s. 11d. per head of the population for the benefit of 46 per cent. of the inhabitants of the United Kingdom.

The vast total mentioned is now expended under many authorities, central and local, and the Acts concerned include: (1) The Acts relating to the relief of the poor; (2) the Old Age Pension Acts; (3) the Education Acts, including the Provision

of Meals Act, 1907, and the Administrative Provisions Act, 1908 ; (4) the Public Health Acts, (*a*) as to hospitals and treatment of disease, (*b*) as to maternity and child welfare ; (5) the National Health Insurance Acts ; (6) the War Pensions Acts and Ministry of Pensions Acts ; (7) the Housing of the Working Classes Acts ; (8) the Unemployed Workmen Act ; (9) the Unemployed Insurance Acts. The bread, coal and railway subsidies are excluded, as they affected the whole population.

Earlier figures than 1891 were refused by the Government, but some figures are nevertheless available, as practically the whole of the expenditure on public assistance before that date fell under the Poor Law. The figures for 1881 for England and Wales show an expenditure of 6s. $3\frac{3}{4}$d. per head of the population with 3.1 per cent. of the population as beneficiaries, whereas the figures for 1871 show an expenditure of 7s. per head of the population for the benefit of 4.6 of the population.

If we go further back we find a corresponding movement in the figures in each century since the institution of the Poor Law in the 43rd year of the reign of Elizabeth (1601). Public opinion in England has oscillated between extreme leniency in granting public assistance and then a return under the pressure of financial necessities to greater restriction. The last example of extreme leniency was in the period from 1783 to 1832. The figures for 1783 (£2,000,000) and 1803 (£4,269,000) show that the expenditure had more than doubled in those twenty years, and continued to rise till it reached in 1817 £7,870,800 for a population of 11,000,000, that is an expenditure of 14s. per head of the population as compared with a rate of 7s. per head in 1871, when in addition to the old expenditure new and costly institutions such as asylums, infirmaries and district schools were provided.

The change was due to the report in 1834 of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law. Till then the nation looked on ' in a kind of paralysis at the inordinate growth of moral abuses, ' of industrial disaster, of ruinous expenditure.' The Commission produced a moral and industrial reformation by laying down and carrying out the following principles : (1) that the recipient of public charity (in that blunter age called a pauper *tout court*) should not have a position more eligible than that of the independent labourer of the lowest class ; (2) that while destitution must

be relieved by the State, destitution must be proved as to able-bodied persons by the test of willingness to enter the workhouse ; (3) the appointment of a Central Board to centralise knowledge and to frame and enforce regulations as to the distribution of relief and the uniformity of accounts ; (4) that while knowledge and supervision should be centralised, power should be localised, for local knowledge is of the essence of sound administration in public assistance.

These reforms were carried out by Act of Parliament and within fifty years a moral revolution had taken place. Not only did working men come to trust their own initiative and self-reliance instead of turning in every emergency to the State with the cry of ' O Baal hear us,' but they had in their Friendly Societies, Trade Unions, Building Societies and Co-operative Societies amassed a capital of something just under £100,000,000 and provided a practical solution for all sections of the social problem, by insurance against sickness, accident, old age and unemployment, by provisions for arbitration and conciliation in industrial strife, by facilitating the building and purchase of their own dwellings and by bringing the necessaries of existence in good and cheap form within the reach of the working classes. In this great development they taught themselves invaluable lessons in thrift and self-help and in the conduct of business undertakings and prepared themselves for the task of local self-government.

The great enquiry of the Royal Commission on Labour, 1891–4 showed how this beneficent movement already embraced all the skilled workers and was bringing in also the unskilled, with the result that Mr. Ludlow the famous Registrar of the Friendly Societies could say in his evidence : ' Now the black ' spots in the country may I think almost be counted on the ' fingers. In former days it was very nearly all black with but ' few white spots.'

What was it intervened to prevent the further development in the right direction ? Two things : Socialism, and that mixture of Socialism and water which is known to politicians as Social Reform. The Socialist doctrines were, for the time being, exploded by the cross-examination of the Socialists before the Labour Commission, but unexpected allies were already at work among the politicians, who saw in the Socialist movement a

means of winning elections. The Socialist doctrine that the State should take over all the means of production governed public policy in the war and after the Armistice. As a result we have learnt that in practice Socialism means the substitution of a greedy, inefficient, and despotic official for an efficient and not unkindly private employer, with the corollaries of a vanished dividend, a limited output and no advantage to anyone whatever, except the official. That experience has produced in the mind of the working man a gospel of despair: namely, that he is not and cannot be the arbiter of his own fate; that he cannot earn sufficient wage to keep himself and his children; but that from the cradle to the grave he must be clothed by red tape and handled by a bureaucracy which he loathes. The practical result can best be stated in the words of a Labour Member of a London Board of Guardians: 'The continuance of the high 'standard of relief in so many forms is destroying the power 'of the working classes to work.'

The first breach in the edifice erected by the Poor Law Report of 1834 was effected by the transfer of some of the able-bodied poor in the shape of the unemployed from the Guardians to other authorities in 1886. The second was the remission of school fees by the Education Act of 1890, which was carried to give the poor more money to feed and clothe their children. Then came a halt, but at the beginning of the century from 1905 the new views prevailed. In 1905 the Unemployed Workmen Act was carried, in 1906 the Provision of Meals (Children) Act, in 1907 the Education Administrative Provisions Act, in 1908 the Old Age Pensions Act, in 1911 the National Health Insurance Act, which was followed by the National Insurance for Unemployment. Then came the war with its vast and inevitable outpouring of money, which fell not only on the just but also on the unjust, and the subsequent development of the Housing Acts, the Unemployed Dole and the ever increasing overlapping and confusion of accounts with the inevitable concomitants of malingering and fraud.

As long ago as the winter of 1912 there were signs that the new social legislation was a complete failure and could only hobble along with the help of the despised Poor Law. In January of 1913 therefore, I made an appeal that we should have a proper system of public accounts, which was of course

strenuously resisted by the worst official offenders. Nevertheless, by the help of supporters of all parties, creeds and classes, an incomplete return was obtained in 1913, another in 1916, and two slightly more complete in 1919 and 1920. So much are the authorities averse to calling a spade a spade that these returns are camouflaged under different titles, the last (No. 160, 1920) being entitled 'Total Expenditure under Certain Acts of 'Parliament.' They are for want of a comprehensive name often known, I believe, as the Drage Returns.

A glance at the legislation, the administration, and the attitude of the beneficiaries and the public, will show that we are on the road to ruin, and that it is not only economy and efficiency which are wanted, but a moral revolution or return to an English principle which was accepted as indubitable through the whole of the much abused Victorian age. The principle is, in the words of a well-known writer, that the receipt of public relief has the same effect on a man as the loss of her virtue on a woman. He is never the same. The Report of 1834 expresses the result in the following terms : 'The change that is made in the character 'and habits of the poor by once receiving parochial relief is quite 'remarkable : they are demoralised ever afterwards. The 'disease is hereditary and when once a family has applied for 'it they are pressed down for ever.' The Commission might have added that the disease is contagious, for when once one family receives relief, the neighbours are only too apt to apply also.

The sound feeling which prevailed generally before 1905 was eloquently voiced by the following letter which appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* on May 30th, 1921. 'Twenty years ago 'I lived in a poor street in the East End of London where we 'were all poor, yet everyone would have regarded it as the last 'possible crime that could be committed to be in receipt of 'public assistance. In every case there was a feeling of 'degradation, not only for oneself, but if any member was in 'receipt of State funds in any form.'

Take Parliament. The Leader of the House first proposed that the remission of income tax, which hitherto has embraced £100 out of the £400 salary of members, should be extended to the whole salary. In face of the public outcry that proposal was dropped but in its place a new construction was officially placed

upon the existing law so that members might still get the same benefit. And this it appears is to be made retrospective. On the kindred issue of free railway passes there was a wild and apparently general rush of the members present to get vouchers for their railway fares. This was recorded by the Press the night this bounty was announced (May 12th). The 270 vouchers (Hansard, June 13th) tell their own tale, which rather detracts from the value of later recantations made in view of the popular outcry. No wonder there are proposals for extending payments of salaries to County Councils and other local authorities, or at least for an extension to all of the fatal principle of payment for time lost, which was introduced for members of Local Insurance Committees.

Take the administration. The Treasury is the chief official watchdog. At the beginning of the century the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury received £2,000 a year, which was raised after five years' service to £2,500. In 1913 there was one Secretary at £2,500 ; in 1914 there were two joint Secretaries at £2,000, for which there was a precedent ; in 1917-18 there were three Permanent Secretaries at £2,000. At the present time their duties are performed by three Controllers at £3,000 each and one superman who controls them at £3,500. These rises were given and paid in 1920 without the knowledge of Parliament, and while Parliament was still ignorant a bonus was asked for in addition, which is £500 at least for each of these lucky persons. The rises in salary were retrospective, to date from January, 1920, and apparently the bonuses were also. What is more, the bonus in these cases is practically permanent, as far as one can judge from the debates in Hansard, because it depends on the return of the cost of living to the rate of 1914 ; and both bonus and increase are counted for pension.

There is a Spanish proverb to the effect that if the abbot sings well the chorister will sing in tune. Thanks to a Whitley Council, composed of civil servants, the minor officials have made as good a bargain as the abbots of the Treasury. Under the Whitley award a junior clerk of 18 or 19, whose commencing salary is £100, receives a bonus which brings it up to £255, a salary which, as an old member of the House pointed out to the Government, is not paralleled in any bank or insurance company. All this was done on the same scale throughout

the civil service without the knowledge of Parliament, which humbly consented to ratify *ex post facto*.

The increased charge which this bonus places upon the taxpayer is, according to Hansard June 17th, 1921, £40,000,000 annually. The result to the unfortunate ratepayer is not yet apparent in the returns, but any reader of the local newspaper can see that in his district it is an increase of about 75 per cent. Meanwhile, professors, tutors, and lecturers at universities like Oxford and Cambridge are receiving the same pay as in 1880, and have themselves to make both ends meet because they have no political or administrative 'pull,' and are unable 'to combine 'to blackmail the Government.' (Hansard, March 18th, 1921.)

After this, one is not astonished to find that the Ministry of Health, after the example of the tailless fox, circularised the local authorities advising them to follow suit and giving its sanction beforehand, without any consideration of the fact that in many localities there might be no need either of increase or bonus.

As for any fruit of discussion or enquiry by Select Committees, a perusal of Hansard's Debates is illuminating. The present Leader of the House said, when he was a private member in 1918, that there was no more wasteful body than the House of Commons: 'It is quite idle to pretend we are in favour of economy, we are 'not.' The same fact appears from the memorandum of the late Speaker made to the Select Committee on National Expenditure in 1918, in which he says : 'The House of Commons 'has become one of the chief spending departments of the State. 'Up to about 1900 there was considerable criticism of financial 'details in Committee of Supply. . . . Since that time 'the criticisms have generally been the other way. . . .The 'advocates of economy get no look in and have no ties binding 'them and no influence with the Whips.'

But how many advocates of economy are there and are they sincere ? 'It is quite true,' said the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1919, 'that one section of members calls for economy here, 'and another section calls for economy there, and so on over the 'whole sphere, but at any given point there is always a majority 'for spending more not less.' The truth leaks out, when in 1920 one finds the Chancellor of the Exchequer saying, in an illuminating phrase : 'You cannot, when you have things like 'National Health Insurance, Old Age Pensions, and a National

' Unemployment scheme and a National Health scheme, exercise ' or offer the same blunt and uncompromising refusal to proposals ' for new expenditure as you could in days when it was expected ' by all parties that such measures were altogether outside the ' proper sphere of Government activities.' But if there were many, or indeed any, real advocates of economy in any direction, we should not have such references as in debates in 1920, to ' the small attendance and total apathy of feeling in debates on ' economy,' or the statement made by one of the leaders of the Opposition in 1921 (May 26th) :—' The aspect of the House, ' with few members present at the debate, was not very encouraging. ' It had been so right through this Parliament. Whenever the ' important subject of economy was discussed the benches ' were practically empty.' The only occasion when they were filled was apparently when members' own emoluments were considered and then the tone of the discussion was symptomatic. Advocates of economy were greeted with interruptions in which the terms ' dirty dog,' ' dirty humbug ' were used, according to Hansard, without objection being taken to them as unparliamentary.

Indeed, readers of the debates cannot escape the impression that advocates of economy are intimidated. Even when they support the Government in economy by votes, the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the day complains they do not speak in its support ; and, further, how many of them vote ? In the debate on old age pensions on May 12th there was only a Government majority of 12 against a Labour proposal to add £15,000,000 to the £27,000,000 already voted. Yet the Government had two years ago a majority of 249, and even now they are said to have a majority of 170. The advocates of the increase openly stated that this was not a final demand and that they desired to increase the pension from 10s. a week to 20s. and reduce the pensionable age from 70 to 60, whereas those who spoke against the increase expressed their sympathy with it and only pleaded that the times were unfavourable to any increase of expenditure. But scattered here and there in the debates will be found references to ' abusive letters,' ' lurid resolutions,' and threats made to those who vote against increases to civil servants, and statements like that of one member, who found that his opposition to the increase of the wages of postmen led to his election literature

being delayed in the post during a parliamentary contest, a fact not calculated to increase the courage of the weaker brother member.

As is generally known old age pensions are administered by officials of the Customs and Excise Department, of the Post Office, and by Local Pensions Committees. The administration is estimated to cost in the current year £1,056,883. The divorce of old age pensions from the Poor Law is a mere farce to throw dust in the eyes of the public. The pensioners have from the first obtained medical treatment and medical comforts from the Poor Law gratis, and now are by law allowed to apply to the Guardians when necessitous. One result of the divorce, and of the refusal of the Custom Officers to supply the Guardians with information, is that pensioners have died of starvation and neglect. Another result has been to familiarise a wide section of the independent poor, who certainly could not plead destitution, with obtaining outdoor relief from the State in ever increasing numbers, with the result that they apply for further money whenever it is available.

The unemployed dole has an even more corrupting effect. The Thames Police Court magistrate had a case before him on May 18th in which a man in receipt of £3 a week wages was convicted of obtaining 14s. 6d. unemployed dole, and the magistrate observed : ' It has been said from this bench over and ' over again that such doles lend themselves to and almost induce ' fraud. There are persons, no matter how well off, only too ' willing to obtain something for nothing. Doubtless the fraud ' will continue while the taxation brought about by such legislation ' breaks the back of the ordinary citizen of the country.' Such cases are only too common, as readers of the daily press know well, and regrettably include those in receipt of war pensions. A case was reported at Westminster Police Court six months ago in which a labourer summoned for assault was receiving a full disablement pension (£2 12s. 8d.) with unemployment dole of £1 a week and good pay from a sick club, or something like £5 a week with unemployment insurance added. In fact, according to the old saying, you may have as many paupers as you choose to pay for.

But we are not in a happier position when we come to look at current legislation and its results. We were told that old

age pensions would empty the workhouses, but the only result was that in certain London workhouses the places of the outgoing pensioners were immediately filled by beneficiaries under 70. We were told that Poor Law expenditure would diminish, yet between 1911 and 1919, in the time of the greatest expenditure of money on every branch of social reform, Poor Law expenditure increased in England and Wales from £15,000,000 to £18,400,000, The case of Ireland is, or ought to be, notorious. Ireland with a population of 4,390,219 has been drawing £3,829,193 for old age pensions for 187,104 pensioners, while Scotland, with a population of 4,760,904, draws only £1,669,734 for 90,500 pensioners. Is this a phenomenal longevity or a phenomenal death rate, or is it laxity or is it fraud? Where is the Treasury watchdog who is responsible through the Customs and Post Office for the administration of old age pensions, because forsooth politicians do not like to call old age pensions by its right name of outdoor relief and associate the recipients with the more efficient administration of the Guardians.

Old-fashioned people will be astonished to find education as a department of public assistance

On ne s'attendait guère
À voir Ulysse en cette affaire

but it is only necessary to look at the Provision of Meals Act, and the Administrative Provisions Act which gives medical inspection and medical treatment gratuitously, and to study the reports of Education Authorities. The London County Council for instance long ago made arrangements for remitting the charges of meals to children under the Act of 1906 in necessitous cases, and it was stated in the Council's Report for 1910: 'necessitous children are not necessarily 'ill-nourished at the time of application though they would 'become so were relief withheld.' The change of principle is definitely set out in the Report. 'Formerly education was 'in the main confined (1) to the growth of character, (2) to the 'growth of mind. Now it looks increasingly at the social 'problems which present themselves for solution in the case of 'the individual child, the problem of physical deterioration, 'of under-feeding, of impoverished homes and unsuitable 'employment.' That is to say that the educational system has become part and parcel of the Poor Law. Not a word is

said about the duties of the parent. So much so that a London workman was heard to say, in reply to enquiries after his children : ' They are not my kiddies, they are London County ' Council kiddies.'

Meanwhile this educational administration has been reviewed by the Select Committee of the House of Commons on National Expenditure (White Paper No. 248, published December, 1920). It appears that the expenditure on education from rates and taxes which was last year given as £56,000,000 for 1919 (White Paper No. 160, 1920), will this year amount to £97,200,000. The Prime Minister stated (' Hansard,' Dec. 9th, 1920) that the Act of 1918 had so far only cost between £400,000 and £500,000, but the *Times Educational Supplement* (July 29th, 1920) estimated the cost of education in the near future at £100,000,000, a figure which has thus nearly been realised, and the eventual cost at £120,000,000. So we have to face a probable addition of £23,000,000 under this head. The Select Committee was impressed by the atmosphere of financial laxity under which questions involving education are apt to be considered. They find that no satisfactory estimate can be given of the cost of the schemes under the Act of 1918, but that the additional cost will be very great. It appears that under this Act neither Parliament nor the Board of Education nor the Local Authority (between which the Act establishes a partnership) has adequate control over its own share or over the combined expenditure. The general attitude of the Board has been one of enthusiasm for the promotion of education with too little regard for the cost, and its object has been to stimulate the so-called laggard authorities to spend more. The Board, it was represented, relies on the local authorities to secure economy in expenditure, but it is not only bound by the Act to enforce on the local authority certain new duties and obligations, if necessary by mandamus, but also has been in the habit of holding back Exchequer Grants if its requirements were not complied with. These have been within my own recollection in some cases unreasonable.

' If,' says the Committee, ' economy is desired and a cessation ' of rapidly increasing expenditure, your Committee considers ' that those parts of the Education Act, 1918, which involve ' increased expenditure should be suspended and the financial ' provisions of the Act should be revised and amended.'

It is needless to say that this recommendation has not been carried out. Indeed, a member of Parliament observed in 1920, without contradiction, of these Committees that 'they produced 'no less than fifteen reports. They sat for two years and not 'one single one of their recommendations has ever been carried 'out. It is a perfect waste of time to appoint these Committees.' It is true that one recommendation of these Committees has this last Session been carried out, partly if not as a whole, namely, the recommendation to appoint an Estimates Committee, which the Speaker thought 'might establish a funk in the Departments'; but that Committee has been strictly warned off policy, though the last Committee on National Expenditure definitely lays down the maxim that: 'Policy controls expenditure.' Further the appointment of 'an official corresponding to the Comptroller 'and Auditor General was considered' by the Speaker to be 'essential,' but I have seen no notice of the appointment of an official with such powers.

One may add that even the vast sums mentioned above of over £97,000,000 do not cover the whole of the expenditure on education, for it appears that agricultural education has a vote to itself under the vote for the Board of Agriculture, hitherto with no cross references. This is an interesting illustration of the finding of a previous Select Committee on National Expenditure that 'no vote or account includes the whole cost of the 'service to which it relates.' The bureaucracy generally succeeds in covering its tracks, as anyone who has tried either to study the public accounts or to get information from Ministers is only too well aware.

Before leaving education it may be remarked that the Committee state that owing to the vast field of their enquiry they have not examined into 'the quality or efficiency of the education 'provided or its value to the community.' It ought to have added that this was in 1909 seriously called in question by the last Royal Commission on the Poor Laws. The Commissioners refer to 'one criticism which has been made with almost absolute 'unanimity. There seems to be outside the circle of the teaching 'profession a very strong general feeling that the education of the 'children in the elementary schools is not of the kind which 'is helpful to them in after life.' Mandeville, who wrote in 1733, anticipated the doubts now widely felt as to purely intellectual

education. Education should fit a man for his position in life, and Mandeville observes: 'Going to school is in comparison 'with working idleness, and the longer boys continue in this 'easy sort of life the more unfit they will be when grown up for 'downright labour, both as to strength and inclination.' This view was supported by a practical agriculturalist quoted in the House of Commons ('Hansard,' April 12th, 1921): 'If boys 'are not taught to work till they are 15 they will never learn. 'If they have to attend continuation schools in town centres 'till they are 18 they will be a long way above day manual labour.'

With regard to National Health Insurance (which was introduced with the usual electoral bribe of something for nothing, 9d. for 4d., and which is merely an imitation of the German system with many, if not all, of its faults, and without any due consideration of the difficulties), we are face to face at the outset with the general indictment of a well-known public servant, Sir Arthur Newsholme, K.C.B., M.D., who has publicly stated that this system 'is not actuarially, financially, or medically 'sound,' and 'has involved expenditures in administration 'entirely incommensurate with the benefits received.'

Sir Arthur is no doubt ready to give chapter and verse for the whole of his indictment, but so far as finance is concerned it is borne out by official documents before us. An early report of the Select Committee on National Expenditure pointed out that the annual cost in administration per 1,000 persons insured was for England £28, for Scotland £36, for Wales £51, and for Ireland £59. Further, the return No. 160 of 1920 shows that the administration has not become perfect since it was transferred from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who is called 'the 'Guardian of the Taxpayer,' to the Minister of Health, who is termed 'the Guardian of the Ratepayer,' for the administration is there recorded to have cost £4,294,896 out of a total expenditure of £20,311,102 for the year in question. A slightly more favourable estimate was published by the Minister of Health in 1919 (Dec. 31st) from which it appeared that the total cost of National Health from its inception to December, 1919, was in round figures £190,000,000, that the amounts paid in benefits were £99,000,000, and that the administrative cost was £25,000,000. A general statement like the above is of no value for comparison with the cost of private enterprise,

but experts suggest that the payment of £25 for administration out of every £100 expended in benefits is excessive, considering the large amount of effort rendered voluntarily and also that partly paid for from other sources.

The use of Insurance Funds for Poor Law and other purposes has been strongly commented on in times past. As long ago as 1912 Dr. Arthur Latham made the following statement at a Conference of the Sanitary Institute :—

> 'The meaning of sanatorium benefit had been greatly extended. For instance, overcoats, under-clothing, food and fuel had been provided under its regulations. Public Health and Poor Law funds were being relieved but the sanatorium funds were being depleted and in consequence the real object of sanatorium benefit, viz., the prevention of disease, was being severely handicapped. If this use of the availing funds did lasting good, criticism might be tempered, but the net result was that sanatorium benefit was merely Poor Law medical relief under another name, a rechristened form of outdoor relief.'

But generally speaking it is the Poor Law which is the crutch on which the new system of public relief now called Social Reform learns to limp along. In one Union alone, Mr. Bailward tells us, in a single year nearly 700 certificates were given to inmates of the infirmary to draw benefits under the Insurance Acts, and the Guardians only recovered something for their maintenance in less than a dozen cases. There are many recorded cases in which women, either married or single, have come into the lying-in-ward for their confinement and have subsequently claimed maternity benefit after their discharge. The Insurance Act was meant of course to ensure proper treatment for the women in confinement but in these cases it is the Guardians who have provided for their wants. In fact, social legislation has increased and not lessened the demand for relief, although in addition to the Poor Law taint we now hear of a 'panel taint' and a 'sanatorium taint,' and 'the Labour Exchange 'taint,' which is beginning to apply to those who seek the Unemployed Dole as well as those seeking work. Before long there will no doubt come a 'pensions taint' for the old age pensioners who now draw £26,000,000 from the State, for what twenty years ago would have been called 'out-door relief.' In spite of the cries of politicians and agitators, the dislike of the working-classes to receiving public relief is not entirely eradicated.

There are some extraordinary facts revealed in the return No. 160 of 1920, as to the Unemployed Workmen Act. In one year in Scotland £9,406 was expended for the benefit of fifty-nine unemployed; while, as I learn from another source, in another year £4,465 was expended by the Central Unemployed body for London, although no unemployed person was assisted in the London area during that year. The Unemployed Insurance was extended at Christmas, 1920, one of the excuses given being that after the war there was a surplus of £20,000,000. In June, 1921, it was announced that all this had been swallowed up and that £10,000,000 more had been supplied by the Treasury.

There is no doubt that the whole system will have, before long, to be reviewed and a careful account rendered not only of the Unemployed Insurance, but also of the Dole, to the calamitous effect of which testimony is given above. Enquiries are always resented but they should undoubtedly be pushed further, both as to the beneficiaries and as to their resources. A recent question in Parliament elicited the fact, unknown to the public and also to some, at any rate, of the administrators of the National Relief Fund, that grants therefrom were being used to induce women to enter domestic service. Sums up to £10 have been given for outfit (though £3 is according to experts ample) from a fund subscribed by the public for the relief of civilian distress arising out of unemployment due to the war. In other words another self-respecting and self-supporting section of the community is being pauperised.

The Housing Acts are the one large group of Acts which remain. Here the loss has been enormous in a province where private enterprise could make a profit. The deficit to the State for each year on each house was originally (1918) put at a modest sum. This sum rose first to £28 and then to £36 in 1919. In 1920 £50 was the figure given and now this year it is officially stated to be £60. The number of houses to be so built officially is placed at 300,000, but experts still put the number required at 1,000,000 ('Hansard,' May 12th, 1921). Given a loss of £60 a year on 300,000 houses we have an annual deficit of £18,000,000, apparently apart from capital subsidies to private builders, and other obligations. The aggregate loss to the State has been estimated at £700,000,000 in the course of the next sixty years. There are also the large

increases of officials which induced the present Minister to compare the housing section of his department to a cuckoo's egg put into the nest of the Ministry, that large bird having pushed the little chicks of health out of the nest.

But the State is not the only loser. There is the loss to the ratepayer and that loss is not confined to loss on outlay. It was stated in December, 1920, that the loss to the London County Council on houses then being built was expected to be £90 per house, the rent being £30 instead of £120, required to avoid a loss. Part of this loss will be met by the State, but the Council in addition to its share of the loss on rent will lose on rates, for these houses will be rated at £30 and not on the true rateable value of £120.

A Report to the Council published in May, 1921, puts the loss to the London County Council on new houses being built on the Bellingham and Becontree Estates as two-thirds of the outgoings. It is obvious that the lucky tenants of the new houses are also going to receive ' something for nothing.'

The attitude of the Housing Section of the Ministry of Public Health, its large salaries and the general waste need not occupy too much space. They are only too well known to every reader of the daily press. Two examples may however be given. In July, 1919, Lord Downham, Chairman of the London County Council, stated in the House of Lords that ' on the London ' County Council we were informed by the Housing Board that ' we were not to enquire too particularly into the cost, that we ' were to build houses at any cost. I said : " At any cost ? " ' and the answer was " Yes : never mind the cost." ' In May, 1921, the Auditor General reported (White Paper No. 102, 1921) *inter alia* that £132,972 was paid by the Department to two firms for the increased cost of manufacturing pig lead under a special process and that the indicated profits of one of the firms during the 21 months during which this subsidy was paid amounted to £62,678.

We have seen that Parliament sanctions expenditure which it disapproves. It even winks at expenditure in the sphere of public assistance which it has not sanctioned (' Hansard,' August 9th, 1919, p. 750). From the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech and an interruption it appears that unemployed benefit was from the first paid to people innocently

out of work in consequence of a strike by others, that this was not sanctioned by Parliament, that Parliament was aware of this illegal action and took no steps to make good its authority. This kind of action continues. In 'Hansard' (Dec. 20th, 1920, p. 430) it appears that the then First Commissioner of Works took £150,000 from the Civil Contingencies Fund, a fund established for supplying certain funds abroad if at that time Parliament was not sitting. It was stated and not denied that this sum was taken 'during a year when Parliament has sat for ten months 'out of twelve,' and further an old member said : 'The use of 'that fund for a purpose which is new, from a source which is 'novel and has never been sanctioned by any Government or 'by any Parliament ever since Parliament existed, namely, 'the building of houses and a banking arrangement by which the 'Right Honourable gentleman could advance money to builders, 'cannot be defended.' To quote from the speech made by another member earlier in the year, the very reading of these extracts fills the taxpayer with 'a feeling of despair, anger, and 'mystification.'

What are the remedies and what is the first step to be taken ? Undoubtedly the first step is to obtain definite detailed information as to the amount spent and as to the beneficiaries, whether they are officials drawing undue salaries or poor persons drawing doles from varied sources, and if so what sums and from what sources. Such a return I have been trying to get for more than eight years, and in spite of the opposition of interested officials such a return was issued in 1913, 1916, 1919 and 1920. But it is still very incomplete.

The public has a right to know how public money is spent, and one would think that honest men, whether politicians or officials, would be only too glad to render an account of their stewardship. But more is wanted. Every business man knows what he has spent and he also knows for what he is liable. Therefore the returns must contain estimates of the central and local commitments under existing Acts of Parliament. In a word we want not only to cope with existing extravagance, overlapping and fraud, we also want to know whether we can meet our future bills. There will be no doubt further opposition to overcome, but we have enough information to stimulate a desire for more with a public which has learned to take the measure of both politicians and officials.

It will, however, take the electorate some time to grasp the facts and their meaning and then there will be one step more to the culminating point, when it becomes clear that the taxation and the rating from which all this wasteful expenditure is provided, however much the fact may be disguised, falls in the long run most heavily on the working-man. Taxation and rating eat up capital, the fund on which industry and wages depend. It is from the superfluity of private capital that the funds to provide railways and most modern inventions that have made life easier have come. As soon as the State lays its hand on telephones or telegraphs, on railways, agriculture, coal or sugar, officials increase with undue salaries and profits wither into loss.

Once the facts are known and their meaning is grasped the honesty, determination and common sense of the English people will provide the remedy. They will compel the institution of a small Royal Commission to ration the expenditure and provide through local administration a proper system of deterrence, not only for the wrongdoers but also for the profiteers of our system of public assistance.

We have to bring back the thrift, independence, self-help and self-reliance of years gone by. This is the great moral struggle on which the future not only of our people but also of our Empire depends. The question is whether each Englishman is master of his own fate, able to earn his own living by his own exertions, or whether he is going to be content to follow the false prophets and cry to the State in each emergency for help. Will he reject the gospel of despair or will he be content to drift helplessly along the road which led the Athenian and the Roman Empires to ruin ?

Geoffrey Drage.

THE PUBLIC PURSE.

1. Solvency or Downfall. By VISCOUNT ROTHERMERE. Longmans, Green. 1921.
2. A Reform for the Civil Service. By Sir STEPHEN DEMETRIADI, K.B.E. Cassells. 1921.
3. The Zealots. By Lt.-Col. Sir JOHN KEANE, D.S.O. John Murray. 1921.

'*Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just man is always a loser in comparison with the unjust. . . When they come into office the just man neglects his private affairs and perhaps suffers other losses ; but he will not compensate himself out of the public purse because he is just. Moreover he is hated by his friends and relations for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. All this is reversed in the case of the unjust man.*'—PLATO'S *Republic. Bk. I.*

THE above extract from the argument between Socrates and his friends on the meaning of justice incidentally shows how the public purse has been treated from time immemorial. In theory the public purse exists only for the public benefit ; in practice it is constantly drawn upon to satisfy private demands. This practice in no way depends upon the form of government. As the Socratic dialogue very rightly indicates, the real distinction is between the just and the unjust steward. If however it be asked why throughout the centuries there should have been—and why there should still continue to be—so many unjust stewards of the public purse, the answer is that it presents peculiar temptations to the unjust man. A private purse is defended by its owner for his own private advantage ; but nobody has any equally clear private advantage in defending the public purse. Even the largest taxpayers, if they can draw something for themselves from the exchequer, gain more than they will lose by the additional taxation which that payment to them will involve. An income tax as high as twelve shillings in the pound still leaves a comfortable margin of eight shillings out of every pound that the taxpayer contrives to transfer to his own pocket out of the public purse. In practice, however, the issue rarely presents itself so clearly as this. The essential distinction is that the defence of the public purse is a universal and consequently a vague interest ; whereas the interest of those who

attack that purse is personal and definite. Therefore, except at those rare times when a nation is fortunate enough to possess rulers with a strong sense of public duty, there will be no effective defence of the public purse until a point is reached where the approaching exhaustion of what seemed to be an inexhaustible reservoir becomes visible even to the least far-seeing.

We have reached that point in England to-day. Even our politicians have taken alarm. Towards the end of May the Cabinet authorised the Treasury to issue a circular requiring the departments to cut down their future expenditure by 20 per cent. Plans for this reduction were to be presented not later than July 31st next. As a sign of grace the circular was encouraging, but it obviously failed to meet the situation, because the reductions which it contemplated were only to take effect next year. Yet economy is needed in the present year, at least as much as in any future year. The current rate of expenditure far exceeds the current yield of revenue, and the authors of this circular at the time it was issued must have been aware that a heavy deficit in the present financial year could only be avoided by an immediate reduction of expenditure. Happily within a few days the Government became still more alarmed. One of the paragraphs in the circular of May 25th stated as a reason for the proposed 20 per cent. reduction in departmental expenditure in 1922–23 that additional charges would have to be met in that year under the Agriculture Act of 1920. Barely a fortnight later an announcement was made in the House of Commons that the Government had decided to repeal the Act and to repudiate the obligations which it involved. Simultaneously it was announced that the Government had decided to reduce the insurance benefit from twenty shillings to fifteen shillings a week on the ground that the expense incurred was more than the State could bear. Thus we have a crude reversal of steps taken less than six months previously. The private citizen is justified in feeling and in expressing indignation when public men show so little power of foresight that they light-heartedly adopt in December a policy which they have to reverse in the following June.

The plain truth is that from the date of the Armistice down to the issue of the Treasury circular on May 25th the custodians of the public purse have done nothing to protect it from the insatiable demands of that vast army of schemers who have

persuaded themselves that they and their schemes can live for ever on manna dropped from Downing Street. Yet ever since the Armistice the financial situation of the country has been so serious that just men—to use Plato's word—would have realised that it was their duty to cut down expenditure so that revenue might be available for the reduction both of debt and of taxation. Instead they have allowed the situation to grow steadily worse, until suddenly at the eleventh hour they wake up with a start, realising that the nation is heading for bankruptcy.

During the whole of this period that the nation's money has been so recklessly wasted there has been no lack of voices from without to warn the government of the folly of the course they were pursuing. Among these voices, perhaps the most persistent, and certainly one of the most effective, has been that of Lord Rothermere. For two years he has been writing steadily in his weekly paper, the *Sunday Pictorial*, urging the imperative necessity of drastic and immediate economy in public expenditure. He has now republished a selection of these articles in a handy volume bearing the well-chosen title 'Solvency or Downfall.' Among other merits, this timely book contains a multitude of facts and figures which can be drawn upon by all who wish to help in the patriotic work of preventing governmental waste. Of necessity, there is some repetition in the articles, but though that may be a fault from the artistic point of view, it is not a fault for the purpose for which the book is intended. If the lesson of public economy is to be taught to the general body of the nation the arguments and statements which drive home that lesson must be repeated again and again.

Lord Rothermere's motto is economy without exception. He attacks equally imperialist schemes for creating a new British Empire in the Near East and social reform panaceas based on the theory that the State ought to be a fairy god-mother to everybody. The former cause of expenditure wins partial support from Conservatives and much abuse from Radicals ; the latter is blessed by Radicals and Socialists, and only hesitatingly criticised by Conservatives who are afraid that they may lose votes if they frankly oppose the policy of universal pauperism. Therefore, those who insist that the nation in its present financial condition cannot afford either foreign adventures or domestic charity can count on little support from any of the existing political

parties. For that reason Lord Rothermere did wisely to follow up his journalistic campaign by organising a campaign in the constituencies on the single issue of the absolute need for economy in public expenditure. The success already achieved by his own son—'The first Anti-Waste M.P.'—to whom this book is dedicated, and subsequently by Sir Thomas Polson (in Dover), by Mr. Erskine (in St. George's, Hanover-square), and by Admiral Sueter (in Hertfordshire), suggests that the needs of the nation are better understood by the general body of voters than they are by the politicians who govern the country.

One of the chapters in the book is entitled 'The Mistakes ' of Mr. Chamberlain,' and of necessity frequent reference is made in other chapters to the extraordinary manner in which the late Chancellor of the Exchequer interpreted the duties and conducted the business of his office. Lord Rothermere's frank criticisms are fully justified. With every desire to be charitable to a politician placed in a difficult position, it would be dishonest here to refrain from saying that the personality of Mr. Chamberlain is one of the leading causes of the perilous financial situation in which the nation now finds itself. He showed only too clearly during his period of office that he did not understand either the gravity of the problem which faced the exchequer, or even the primary conditions of sound public finance. Occasionally indeed he made speeches which suggested that he did realise that the situation was serious, but his action did nothing to enforce his words, and frequently he cancelled one speech by another in the opposite sense. On August 7, 1919, speaking in the House of Commons he said : ' If we were to continue spending at the rate ' we are spending now, it would lead us straight to national ' bankruptcy.' Within three months, on October 29, he again addressed the House of Commons on the financial situation. In the interval there had been no reduction of expenditure ; there had been no financial change of any kind. But Mr. Chamberlain's mind had changed completely. Instead of repeating his warning against impending bankruptcy he spoke in the cheeriest of tones and told the House that he could see no necessity for increased taxation, either in the year then current or in the succeeding year. Yet when he made his next budget speech in April 1920 he put forward proposals for £198,000,000 of new taxation.*

* ' Solvency or Downfall,' p. 74.

The same incapacity to formulate, and to continue to hold, any settled financial policy marked his dealings with such matters as the Excess Profits Duty and the proposed levy on capital. With regard to the latter problem he began by taking up in April 1919 what seemed to be a well-considered attitude, and appealed to the House ' to lend no countenance to so hazardous and in my ' opinion disastrous an experiment.' A month later he said that his views were unchanged. But when October arrived he had so far shifted his ground that he expressed his willingness to consider a proposal for a special levy on war wealth. Yet obviously what was called war wealth was a form of capital, and a levy upon it was subject to the same objections as those which Mr. Chamberlain had formulated with regard to a general levy on all capital—in particular the widespread depreciation of credit that would result from the forced sale of securities in order to pay the levy. The proposed war levy further involved the patent injustice that a man who had saved money during the war, possibly from a sense of patriotic duty as much as from considerations of personal prudence, would have his savings confiscated; while a war ' profiteer ' who had spent his gains as fast as he made them would pay nothing. Yet this palpably unjust scheme, begotten of Socialist envy and mob folly, received the expressed approval of the responsible finance minister of the nation. That approval lasted for a period of six months or more, and then the scheme was quietly dropped.

In the matter of the Excess Profits Duty Mr. Chamberlain unfortunately went beyond expressing opinions. In one of his budget speeches, April, 1919, he announced that he proposed to continue this duty for another year ' as a temporary and only as ' a temporary measure,' and in making that announcement he emphasised the inherent defects of the tax, its essential unfairness, its encouragement of wastefulness, and its discouragement of enterprise.* The tax then stood at 40 per cent.; a year later the same minister raised this tax to 60 per cent. There is little doubt that this increase of a tax, which demonstrably discouraged enterprise, was one of the contributing causes to the trade depression that began in the autumn of 1920. Mr. Chamberlain's excuse for increasing this tax, after he had so strongly denounced

* ' Solvency or Downfall,' p. 79.

it and so clearly implied that it would disappear altogether, was the imperative necessity for reducing the floating debt. On that necessity he expressed himself with the utmost emphasis in his budget speech of April, 1920. Yet as a matter of fact the floating debt has not been reduced ; on the contrary it has continued to grow.

The mischief of Mr. Chamberlain's administration of the Treasury lay not only in what he did but in what he failed to do. At all times it is the duty of a Chancellor of the Exchequer to safeguard the public purse, to oppose to the utmost of his power schemes for unnecessary expenditure, and above all to prevent public money being spent for private purposes. These are his duties at all times ; but a special obligation rests upon him to be rigid in the discharge of these duties at a time when the nation is oppressed with the burden of war debt, when the currency is depreciated by a mass of uncovered paper money, and when budgets can only be made to balance by treating as revenue the sale of capital assets. At such a time it might have been imagined that any man holding such high office would have realised the obligations that pressed upon him. Instead we find Mr. Chamberlain openly declaring that he had no intention of fighting his colleagues on questions of expenditure.* To this declaration at any rate he adhered. There is no evidence that during his tenure of office as Chancellor of the Exchequer Mr. Chamberlain made any effort of any kind to prevent the reckless waste of public money, although he had himself in the speech above quoted declared that unless expenditure were curtailed national bankruptcy would ensue.

A little incident which has been brought under my notice by various correspondents illustrates the spirit in which Mr. Austen Chamberlain, and unfortunately many other public men, regard their obligations towards the public purse. About twelve months ago a large number of letters were sent out requesting the recipients thereof to transmit any information they possessed with regard to Mr. Joseph Chamberlain to the gentleman who is engaged in writing a biography of that deceased statesman. The envelopes containing these letters passed through the post free of charge, franked by the official stamp of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

* ' Solvency or Downfall,' p. 75.

It is to be feared that the spirit which this incident discloses runs through the public service. Many highly placed civil servants habitually use government stationery for their private correspondence, and some frank their private letters with the departmental stamp. In the same spirit Cabinet Ministers during the war, and since, have coolly arrogated to themselves the use of motor cars at the public expense, without obtaining any parliamentary authority for this virtual addition to their salaries. If Ministers of the Crown will thus draw upon the public purse to save themselves the cost of a few twopenny letters or a few taxicab fares, it is not surprising that they will allow millions to be ostentatiously spent to meet some temporary political clamour or to be silently absorbed by a well-organised bureaucracy.

It is this spirit in high places that is the ultimate cause of the disastrous financial situation in which the country now finds itself. The cynic may say that a country has the politicians it deserves, but it is equally true that a politician may by his own personality do much to guide the nation upwards or downwards. Lord Rothermere very justly contrasts the spirit displayed by Mr. Austen Chamberlain with the financial example set by Mr. Gladstone, and closely followed by his immediate successors. The spirit of 'squandermania' is in fact of quite recent date. It may be said to have had its origin with the advent to power of Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Winston Churchill. Some two years after the general election of 1906 had placed the Liberal Party in office, pledged to public economy, these twin spendthrifts secured a dominant influence over the policy of the party. At once money began to be poured out like water. I ventured to call attention to this new development of Liberal policy in the course of a debate in the House of Commons on June 8th, 1909, and said that these two ministers in their dreams pictured themselves as oriental despots, riding through crowded streets and scattering to the mob the money of the taxpayer. Both have continued to display the same spirit ever since. During the war the national exchequer lost unnumbered millions through Mr. Churchill's grant of the famous 12½ per cent. bonus. Since the war the public purse has suffered even more seriously through Mr. Lloyd George's repeated concessions of wage increases which could not be defended on economic grounds. The

collateral results of this policy have been perhaps even more serious than the enormous loss to the exchequer. Large bodies of previously hard-working and fairly hard-headed citizens have become obsessed with the idea that there is an inexhaustible store of wealth in the national treasury and that by frightening the Government they can secure this money for themselves. They have learnt to believe that the best way to grow rich is not by working, but by abstaining from work, until terrorised ministers cut the strings of the public purse. That way lies national ruin.

But if Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Winston Churchill are the primary authors of the policy of doles and subsidies, which has depleted the exchequer and disorganised the industrial life of the nation, the blame for the continuance of that policy since the Armistice must mainly rest upon the Conservative politician who was entrusted with the control of the Exchequer. Mr. Chamberlain was, in effect, as he now is in name, the leader of the Conservative Party ; his followers in the House of Commons largely outnumbered any other political group and if he had chosen to exercise his power he could have called a halt to the policy which was leading the country in his own words ' straight to ' national bankruptcy ' ; he preferred to continue that policy. The nation has to pay the price ; what the ultimate cost will be no one can yet predict.

Of all the recent actions of the present leader of the House of Commons, none throws a worse light on his personal attitude towards public expenditure, as well as on the attitude of the Government, than the manner in which he has handled the proposal for increasing the payments made to members of Parliament. It is important to recall the fact that when the proposal that members of Parliament should vote salaries to themselves was originally made by the Asquith ministry in 1910 it was opposed by Mr. Austen Chamberlain on constitutional grounds. It is also important to remember that the new departure then made has never been sanctioned by a specific Act of Parliament. Very craftily the Asquith ministry, instead of submitting this fundamental change in the constitution to the fullest possible consideration, merely put down a vote for the required sum of money in the ordinary estimates. That vote was carried in Committee of Supply in the House of Commons against the opposition of Mr. Chamberlain and of most members

of the Unionist party ; it was then, after the formality of the report stage, incorporated in the Consolidated Fund Bill which gives formal sanction to all the expenditure of the year. That Bill is always rushed through the House of Commons at the end of the session, and cannot be amended in the House of Lords. Thus the authors of this new departure deliberately evaded the safeguards that the law provides before the smallest measure of ordinary legislation can be passed. No subsequent effort has been made by any succeeding ministry to rectify this abuse. The £400 a year which members of Parliament draw out of the public purse is merely voted by themselves in Committee of Supply, generally *sub silentio*. This method of procedure itself implies a confession that ministers and members are aware that the country does not approve of this diversion of public funds to the private use of the persons elected to control those funds.

In passing it may be noticed that a similar issue arose last year in Australia. The members of the Commonwealth Parliament wanted their salaries raised. Some members urged that this was a question which ought to be submitted to a referendum of the electors under the machinery provided by the Australian Constitution. This suggestion was, according to the *Sydney Daily Telegraph* of December 10th, 1920, opposed by the Australian Prime Minister on the ground that the experience of the referendum held upon the same issue in the State of South Australia indicated that if the electors were consulted they would reject the proposal. Acting on this advice the majority of ' honourable ' members coolly voted the money to themselves.

The excuse put forward for the innovation made here in 1910 was that it was necessary to create parliamentary salaries, for otherwise it would be impossible for poor men to sit in Parliament. That excuse was historically false. In the Parliament of 1906 the Liberal ministry of which Mr. Asquith was a member had been asked and had refused to provide for the payment of members. Yet there were many poor men in that parliament. The change in Liberal policy was produced by the Osborne judgment, which deprived trade unions of the legal power to pay representatives in parliament. That judgment created a temporary difficulty for about twenty or thirty members. To deal with that difficulty the Asquith ministry first asked

Parliament to vote salaries to all the 670 members, excepting ministers, and then proceeded to repeal the Osborne judgment by a special Act of Parliament. The excuse for the payment disappeared ; the payment continued.

This being the history of the payment of salaries to members of Parliament, out of money entrusted to their custody, it might have been imagined that the leader of the Conservative party, who had himself strongly opposed this departure from English traditions when proposed by the Liberals, would have set his face against any further extension of the practice, even if he had had to fight a majority of the House. Instead we find Mr. Chamberlain spontaneously proposing, as leader of the House, that members should be relieved from the payment of income tax on their salaries and should in addition receive free railway passes. Without even waiting for the sanction of a vote in Committee of Supply he used his ministerial authority to provide money for the railway passes so that members might get away for the Whitsuntide holidays at the public expense, although at that very moment the general body of citizens were being urged by the Government not to travel on account of the coal strike. How the money then spent will be accounted for when the charge is presented to the Accountant and Auditor-General has not yet been explained.

Mr. Chamberlain's action with regard to the proposed exemption from income tax showed an equally grave, if not even graver disregard of the obligations of a minister of the Crown. When it became evident that the feeling of the country and of the House itself was against this proposal he nominally withdrew it, but instructed the officials of the Inland Revenue Department to devise a scheme by which the same end might be secured without parliamentary approval. This was done, and Mr. Chamberlain was able to tell members that they could get the money without even voting it. The officials in due course presented a report arguing that, although the payment of £400 a year was voted to members by themselves as a ' salary,' it might be looked upon as an allowance for the expenses they incurred in the discharge of the duties they had undertaken, and therefore relief from income tax might be asked for under the general law. These complaisant officials—possibly bearing in mind their own huge bonuses—further suggested that members of parliament might claim a

refund of income tax paid during the previous three years. The type of public man who will compensate himself and his friends out of the public purse is evidently the same to-day as in the time of Plato.

Happily the general body of the nation is now awaking to the danger in which we are all involved by the combined depredations of our politicians and our bureaucrats. Not only is there now a general consensus of opinion that there must be an immediate reduction of expenditure, but many minds are at work upon the problem of how to combat the forces which are always working against economy. In particular much attention has been lately directed to the lack of any effective control over departmental expenditure. Apparently every government department is, under present conditions, able to spend whatever it likes. Approaching this problem from the official side rather than from the political side, two recent writers have put forward schemes intended to provide a permanent barrier against waste. Sir John Keane, whose experience in the War Office justifies him in speaking with authority on the inner working of government departments, lays special stress on the method of accounting for money spent. Already, on the initiative of Sir Charles Harris, an important reform in this direction has been undertaken by the War Office, with the purpose of showing what each unit of the service actually costs. To quote Sir John Keane (p. 36) :—

'The new army accounts, though not yet perfect, are at least organic and comprehensible. They show cost in the terms of commercial units. The veterinary hospital accounts tell you the cost of the horse per day ; the bakery the cost of the bread per pound baked ; the supply depot the cost per ton handled ; the motor-repair depot the cost of repairs on the basis of a motor-car unit ; the battalion the cost per man a day, built up in nine groups, comprising pay, clothing, supplies, and other integral components.'

The Samuel Committee on National Expenditure recommended that this system of accounting, which is a matter of routine in every decently conducted private business, should be introduced throughout the public services. Except in the War Office nothing has been done. According to Sir John Keane the opposition to the reform comes largely from the Treasury officials, for if a reasonable system of accounting were established in all the spending departments they could be freed from the meticulous criticisms of the Treasury and judged on broad

results. But if that were done a large part of the work of the Treasury officials would disappear. Probably opposition also comes from the other departments, for their vested interests also would suffer if the figures revealed the true costliness of their operations.

The accounts now presented to parliament do not even show in clear form the total cost of each department. For example, the votes for the different departments include no item for stationery ; the cost of stationery for all departments being charged to the Stationery Office in a lump sum. Consequently, no department has any direct incentive to economise in its consumption of stationery. In turn the Stationery Office, if it were ever asked to apologise for its inflated figures—which have risen from £743,000 in 1905-6 to £4,187,000 in 1921-22—would plead the irresistible demands of the other departments. The same consideration applies to buildings and furniture, which are charged not to the department using the buildings or furniture, but to the Office of Works. Here the cost has risen in the same period from £2,701,000 to £12,917,000. Again, no department debits its own estimates with the cost of postage ; the postage for all departments is charged in a lump sum to the Post Office. On the other side of the account the figures are equally deceptive. Most departments receive money as well as spending it. Some of the money they receive is credited to them and appears in the departmental vote under the heading Appropriations-in-Aid ; other money received by different departments is paid into the Treasury direct and appears in the public accounts as an item of national revenue. No principle determines how these various receipts shall be treated. For example, the court fees paid into the County Courts are treated as an Appropriation-in-Aid, so that the apparent charge upon the public exchequer for these courts is considerably reduced. On the other hand the fees paid into the High Courts are treated as national revenue and are accounted for by the Inland Revenue Department under the head of ' Fee ' and Patent Stamps.' The figures are still further confused by the fact that the salaries and pensions of all judges are borne upon the Consolidated Fund, while the other costs of our various courts are charged to the Civil Service estimates. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that in the case of the County Courts, the net charge on the Civil Service estimates, which ten years ago was only £5, has now risen to £378,636.

As a very small step towards getting a more logical and more useful system of public accounts the present writer succeeded in 1909 in persuading the Treasury—which, at that date, still regarded itself as the custodian of the public purse—to issue a concise return showing the income and outgo for each separate department, so that the gross and the net cost of each department could be immediately visible to every reader of the return.* The Committee on National Expenditure recommended in 1920 that this return, which covers about 38 pp., and can be very quickly compiled, should be re-issued. The government declined to carry out the recommendation on the ground of expense! Even the smallest effort to secure publicity for the real facts is resisted by ministers and officials.

The greatly improved system of accounts which Sir John Keane advocates—especially if accompanied, as he suggests, by the appointment of non-official auditors—would certainly tend to improve our public services and to stop some of the inexcusable waste that now goes on; but it would not carry us far without other reforms. The Civil Service itself needs drastic reform. As at present constituted it is one of the greatest obstacles to good administration. To quote Sir John Keane: 'It is hardly 'conceivable what officials can do when they are fighting a 'reform which threatens their bread and butter.' Sir Stephen Demetriadi, who has a plan of his own for reforming the Civil Service, is equally emphatic with regard to the power of resistance possessed by officials. He says (p. 77):—

> 'A Cabinet minister may tell us with all the authority of his position that if the official heads of the department cannot effect an immediate reduction in their staff they will have to make way for others who can. But twelve months later we find that the staff total has actually increased. Does this mean that the Cabinet has changed its policy? Not at all. It means merely that when we really come to facts, as distinct from verbiage, the Civil Service rules itself.'

Sir Stephen Demetriadi's remedy is the appointment of a 'Civil 'Service Council' to supervise from day to day the work of the departments. This Council, which would consist of carefully chosen men, representing the public and not the Civil Service, would in cases of proved inefficiency have power to call for the

* National Income and Outgo. H. of C. paper No. 93 of 1909.

compulsory retirement of a permanent official on commuted pension. That proposal cuts at the root of one of the worst evils of the Civil Service, namely that at present there is no means of getting rid of an official, however incompetent he may be. On the other hand, if the power of dismissal were entrusted to the Cabinet it is certain—politicians being what they are—that the power would be used, as in the United States, on every change of government to get rid of officials appointed by the outgoing ministry in order to provide places for the supporters of the victorious party. Of the two evils the latter is undoubtedly the greater. Therefore the idea of a non-political council to exercise a business control in the public interest is attractive, but it is doubtful whether such a council, even if created, would long be permitted to act freely according to its own judgment. An analogous problem is presented by the Civil Service Commission, which was created by statute and given independent powers in order that appointments to the Civil Service should be made solely upon the Commissioners' judgment of the merits of the candidates. Yet there is reason to believe that political pressure has frequently been brought to bear upon the Civil Service Commission in order that jobs might be found for particular candidates. For this reason Sir Stephen Demetriadi's little book is useful rather for indicating the evils to be removed than as showing a practicable method of removing them.

The truth is that the English Civil Service, as it was until recent years, had not only the defects of its merits, but also the merits of its defects. It was a permanent body ; its members were moderately well-paid, but had complete security for life ; they had little or no chance of securing promotion by extra effort, but they had few temptations to dishonesty ; their conditions of service forced them to take a routine view of life, but most of the work on which they were engaged was of a routine character. Provided the Civil Service had been confined to the comparatively few duties which it was called upon to discharge thirty years ago, its constitution would have left little room for serious complaint.

The root of the present trouble, and of the universal outcry against bureaucratic methods and official limpets, is that new duties have been entrusted to the Civil Service for which it is fundamentally unsuited. Not only are these new duties badly

performed, but they themselves create opportunities for the Civil Service to impose in its own interest further charges upon the public purse. Each new task that a government department undertakes means an addition to the staff of that department. This addition is welcomed by all the heads of the department because of the Civil Service practice of estimating the value and the salary of a departmental chief by the number of his subordinates. Consequently there is a steady pressure from every department for an enlargement of its functions, and in many cases the enlargement involves a charge upon the State which is immensely greater than the mere cost of the additional bureaucrats.

A typical illustration is furnished by the Ministry of Labour. This gigantic department had its origin in 1909 when Mr. Churchill, then at the Board of Trade, started a system of Labour Exchanges with the idea that the mobility of labour could by that means be increased and unemployment reduced. Experience quickly proved that the idea, however superficially attractive, was altogether ill-founded. There was, in fact, no need for new machinery to distribute labour ; all the distribution possible was being effected by the existing machinery built up by employers and by trade unions. In practice the only men who applied to the Labour Exchanges for work were the unemployables—decent workmen kept away.

If any private firm had made a miscalculation of this character the blunder would have been admitted and the loss cut as quickly as possible. But that is not the way with politicians or with bureaucrats. The exchanges having been started must be kept alive, and the maintenance of their existence was rendered possible by entrusting to them the administration of the unemployment insurance scheme. They thus became agencies, not for finding work, but for paying out money. They no longer lacked visitors, though the better type of workman was still revolted at the idea of going to beg at a government office for an out-of-work dole. I have beside me a letter dated December, 1916, from a correspondent who describes himself as a 'workman in a northern naval base.' He indignantly condemns the unemployment insurance scheme, which had then been working in some trades for several years, and says :—

'No self-respecting man on leaving the yard will trouble the

Exchanges for work. He will consequently receive no benefit. . . . This scheme of insurance may be good for the Germans, but it will not commend itself to the English.'

It has not commended itself to any of the inhabitants of Great Britain, except to those officials who are paid to administer it. The more lavish the expenditure, the larger does their department become, the greater are their individual chances of promotion or of increased salary. Therefore the Ministry of Labour is for ever inventing new schemes for spending public money by giving doles on one excuse or another to persons who prefer to sponge on the State rather than to fend for themselves. By this means, starting from zero in 1910 the department had by 1914 built up a staff of 4,400 persons. By April 1, 1921 that staff had risen to 24,354 persons. The estimated expenditure for which the Ministry of Labour will be responsible in the current year is £18,325,405. Of this total no less than £4,950,801 is required for administration.*

A similar record is furnished by the Ministry of Health. This body was evolved largely by the enterprise of Dr. Addison out of the old Local Government Board. It is responsible for a vast amount of expenditure, professedly intended to prevent disease, though in one notable case—venereal disease—the department objects to the prevention of the disease and prefers to advocate measures which involve the employment of an expensive medical staff. Taking the United Kingdom as a whole the various forms of expenditure which come under the control of the Ministry of Health in England, and of the corresponding bodies in Scotland and Ireland, amount to £31,227,000 in the current year as against £314,000 in 1905-6. In sixteen years the expenditure has increased a hundredfold.

These are samples of the way in which public expenditure grows directly the State undertakes to do for the individual what he ought to do for himself. Doubtless in some cases the work is better done ; doubtless also in some cases the community gains as well as the individual who is directly benefitted. But the price is too heavy. It is not merely a matter of debiting the

* In answer to a question in the House of Commons on June 30th, 1921, Dr. Macnamara stated that girls up to the age of 18 employed in a Labour Exchange receive a salary of £52 a year, plus £85 16s. for bonus ; at 18 they receive £75 salary, plus £123 15s. bonus.

public purse with a charge which ought to be borne by the private citizen, but two other evils result. First the citizen is taught not to be self-supporting ; he is taught to look to the State for a dole instead of looking to his own hard work and his own careful spending for his own salvation. Such teaching ultimately involves the mental and moral degradation of the whole race. Secondly, the system of spending public money upon private needs automatically destroys all natural check upon waste. If the individual has to pay for himself he will try to get full value for his money ; if the State pays nobody cares what the relationship is between cost and result. The officials who control the expenditure actually gain, as above explained, by the magnitude of the outgoings even if there are no results worth having ; the recipients of the money are only eager to get as much as they can. The inevitable consequence is a vast amount of public expenditure which is sheer waste and nothing else.

There is no way of preventing these evils except by abandoning the present-day delusion that the State can act as a universal providence, and insisting that the individual must rely upon himself for his own maintenance and for the upbringing of his own children. If we can get back to this sound principle, upon which the economic and moral strength of every nation must ultimately rest, we shall be able to re-establish not only less expensive but also more wholesome methods of government, and our public men will once more take a greater pleasure in guarding than in robbing the public purse.

EDITOR.

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THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA

1. The New Financial Consortium in China. Blue Book, Miscellaneous, No. 9. 1921.
2. The Economic History of Manchuria. Compiled and published by order of the Bank of Chosen, Seoul. 1920.
3. China, Japan and Korea. By J. O. P. Bland. Heinemann. 1921.

IN these days of government by parties in a hurry, it has come to pass that the destinies of cities, states, provinces and islands may be lightly decided at conference (or even breakfast) tables, by politicians who know little of their history and nothing of their geography. The lack of accurate information, not to say elementary education, displayed by some of the most prominent of modern statesmen, no longer creates surprise. Those who followed the discussion of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by the Imperial Conference this summer, and studied the utterances of public men on both sides of the Atlantic concerning the fundamental facts of the Far Eastern question, could hardly fail to be impressed by the superficiality of the knowledge displayed, by the almost hypnotic influence of current catchwords, and by the breezy readiness of all concerned to record and accept resolutions which resolve nothing. The lack of serious preparation, which characterised many of the proceedings of the conference, was typically illustrated by the fact that its initial deliberations were conducted under the impression that the Anglo-Japanese Treaty had been actually denounced,

by virtue of the notes addressed by both Powers to the League of Nations in July, 1920. The cheerful insouciance of the proceedings was further manifested by the unanimity with which the conference accepted the *obiter dictum* of the Lord Chancellor when, reversing the opinion of the law officers of the Crown, he declared that the treaty had not been denounced by virtue of these notes, and that it would therefore continue to run automatically for another year. The spectacle of the Elder Statesmen of the British Empire, solemnly discussing for days the unnecessary extension of an undenounced treaty, affords an instructive object lesson in the methods and results of popular government. In an official communiqué vouchsafed to the press, after the Lord Chancellor's providential triumph over the powers of darkness in high places, the public were informed that Lord Curzon had never regarded the notes to the League of Nations as constituting a denunciation of the Treaty of Alliance. This being so, the mystery deepened ; for if the Minister for Foreign Affairs was aware all the time that Mr. Lloyd George and the Dominion Premiers were talking to no purpose, why did he not promptly descend upon the conference, like a god from a machine, and say so ? Why leave the process of enlightenment, and the applause, to the Lord Chancellor ?

The deliberations of the conference on the subject of the Alliance made it abundantly clear that, generally speaking, our statesmen and our diplomats are disposed rather to dodge the realities of the situation with a formula than to face them. The problem which immediately confronts the Empire to-day is, how to secure an international agreement for the limitation of armaments before naval rivalry in the Pacific precipitates another war. It is generally agreed that, in order to attain this object, an understanding, based on reciprocity of goodwill, must be reached between the United States and Japan. Great Britain, as ally of Japan on the one hand, and as kinsman of the United States on the other—greatly concerned besides in the reduction of naval expenditure—is obviously indicated for the role of mediator. The first object of our diplomacy should therefore be to bring America and Japan to a reasonable appreciation of each other's point of view, to a reconciliation of conflicting interests, and to a general acceptance of a common policy for the political and financial reconstruction of China. But these objects can

never be attained by vague aspirations towards ' harmony with ' the new international spirit ' or lip-service to the creed of effective substitution of ' mutuality and co-operation for the ' intense spirit of competition.' Statesmanship can only hope to find a *modus vivendi*, and induce the genuine confidence which must precede any agreement for disarmament, by facing the problem of the Far East in a spirit of clear-visioned sincerity. There are no doubt in Japan, as in Great Britain, those who believe in the words of Mr. Secretary Lansing that ' the war has brought ' Great Britain, France, Japan, the United States and some other ' countries into a state of harmony and helpfulness,' but practical statesmanship has still to reckon with the possibility that this belief is premature, and that nations, like individuals, may fall from a state of grace.

Predominant among the plain facts of the Far Eastern problem is the position of paramount influence which Japan has established, and steadily consolidated, in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and the growing tendency of public opinion in the United States to challenge that position. The attitude of the State Department at Washington in this matter, which first found clear expression under President Wilson's administration, may be ascribed partly to increasing recognition of the commercial interests at stake, and partly to chivalrous sympathy for the helplessness of China ; but it is also manifestly due to an undercurrent of alarm at the rapid rise of Japan to the rank of a first-class Power, whose domination over Asia, if unchecked, might enable her to lay claim to the mastery of the Pacific. Here we have the real crux of the Far Eastern problem, a point at which the instincts and interests of two powerful nations conflict so directly, that statecraft of the highest order, combined with a genuine desire for peace on both sides, will be required for its satisfactory adjustment. Under these circumstances, the cause of peace has everything to gain from a clear and dispassionate statement of the incontrovertible facts of the situation.

In the first place no good purpose can be served by shutting our eyes to the truth that, whatsoever other compromises and concessions Japan may be prepared to make in order to facilitate the reduction of armaments (which her rulers would undoubtedly welcome), nothing less than coercion, imposed by superior force,

will ever prevail upon the Japanese Government to abandon their position of economic and strategic advantage in Manchuria and Mongolia. If, in order to conciliate public opinion in the United States, England should incline to oppose Japanese expansion in this region, and to insist upon the restoration of China's undiminished authority and rights therein, as laid down by the Treaty of Portsmouth, it is conceivable that Japan might deem it politic, as in 1895, to profess acquiescence as a matter of temporary expediency, but the result would assuredly be to create throughout Japan feelings of resentment against England, as deep and bitter as those which Russia, France and Germany evoked when they united to compel victorious Japan to restore the Liaotung peninsula to defeated China. The final and complete abandonment by Japan of her 'special interests' and paramount position in Manchuria is unthinkable for any one who has seriously studied the recent history and present economic conditions of Dai Nippon. An avalanche of public indignation would overwhelm any government which dared to entertain the idea, and no Japanese statesman could countenance it; for that way ruin lies, and the extinction of Japan as a great Power. Her position on the Asiatic mainland, which her rulers regard as vital to her economic existence and national security, has been built up at the cost of two wars, and, if needs be, the nation will fight as one man to preserve it.

Before proceeding to consider the present tendencies of British policy in regard to this question, it will be well to turn back a few pages of history and to examine briefly the circumstances and events which have led up to the present position of Japan in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. In the first place, it must be remembered that the nation's policy of expansion is no new thing. As far back as 1859, the plans of the military party at Tokyo included the gradual annexation of Formosa, Korea, Saghalien, Manchuria, and Eastern Siberia. But although the fulfilment of this policy, so far as it has gone, has largely depended upon the efficient activities of the military party, the motive force behind it is not militarism (*i.e.*, the love of war for war's sake) but acute economic pressure; and, as in England, this pressure has been greatly increased, as the result of competitive industrialism, during the past thirty years. Finally, the fact must be recognised that the energy which Japan

has displayed in developing her position on the Asiatic mainland, since her victory over Russia in 1905, is a natural, if not an inevitable, result of Great Britain's and America's Asiatic-Exclusion Acts, which debar the teeming population of the Island kingdom from seeking new places in the sun, overseas. Some outlet for these surplus millions, or some new resources for feeding them at home, Japan's rulers must find ; and the nation which deliberately seeks to prevent them from so doing, must accept, sooner or later, the responsibility for war.

When, in 1895, Russia, France and Germany united to deprive Japan of the fruits of her victory over China, they did so, not because of their sympathy for the vanquished, but because the exposure of China's pitiful weakness had aroused their predatory instincts. Having dispossessed Japan of Port Arthur, Russia proceeded to occupy that strategic point as a base from which to over-run and absorb Manchuria, Mongolia, and Korea. Threatened by so formidable a coalition, the Elder Statesmen of Japan made a virtue of necessity and, biding their time, prepared for the war which Russia's designs upon Korea made inevitable. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (January, 1902) put the seal upon these preparations, enabling Japan to face the ordeal by battle with Russia without fear of being attacked in flank or rear. Incidentally, in considering the present status of Manchuria it is worthy of note that, nine months before the Alliance was concluded, Germany had shown her hand in support of Russia's predatory advance, by declaring (with reference to the Anglo-German agreement of October, 1900), that the geographical term ' China,' could not be held to cover Manchuria. Russia's road then lay open to the fulfilment of Mouravieff's dream of a great Empire of the East. In 1905, her continued military occupation of strategic points in Manchuria provided Japan with a valid *casus belli*. Once more the victorious flag of the Rising Sun flew over the battlements of Port Arthur. And it is of interest to recall the fact that, throughout the campaign which ended in the expulsion of Russia from Korea and South Manchuria, public opinion in the United States ran strongly in favour of Japan.

The Treaty of Portsmouth (September, 1905), which recorded the terms upon which peace was restored between Russia and Japan, contained many pious professions of the desire of both

parties henceforth to protect and preserve China's sovereign rights in the region for the possession of which they had been fighting. Both governments pledged themselves, in particular, 'not to 'obstruct any general measures, common to all countries, which 'China may take for the development of the commerce and 'industry of Manchuria.' Nevertheless, it was perfectly obvious to all except the wilfully blind, that when by this Treaty Japan took over from Russia the 'leased' territory of the Liaotung peninsula, the South Manchurian railway, and all the collateral mining and other undefined rights and privileges thereto pertaining, the process of 'geographical gravitation' in this region had by no means been arrested; the war had merely changed its direction. Before the struggle, Manchuria had been rapidly gravitating towards Russian Siberia; henceforth, all the region served by the South Manchurian railway was inevitably destined to gravitate, like Korea, towards Japan. How swift and complete the process has been, the reader may judge for himself, by studying the 'Economic History of Manchuria,' a work compiled by the Bank of Chosen in commemoration of its first decade of prosperous existence.

Three months after the signature of the Treaty of Portsmouth, the Japanese Minister at Peking without flourish of trumpets concluded another treaty, whereby China gave her consent to the transfer by Russia of the 'leased' territory and railway, thus recognising the fact that Japan had succeeded Russia in South Manchuria. The published text of this treaty (December 1905) contained nothing derogatory to China's dignity or sovereign rights, but by one of its several 'supplementary' clauses, secretly signed by Na Tung, the notoriously venal head of her Foreign Office, the most important advantage recovered for her by the Treaty of Portsmouth was surrendered to Japan. By this clause, China agreed not to construct any railway in Manchuria which might compete with the South Manchurian line. Events speedily proved that this undertaking would effectively prevent the Chinese Government from availing itself of the assistance of British or American capital for the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria. Having surrendered the position, through sheer lack of courage and honesty, the Chinese Government, as usual, endeavoured to retrieve it, by the traditional device of setting one barbarian against the other. The history

of the Fakumen and Chinchou-Aigun railway concessions, granted to British and American capitalists by China, is too long to recapitulate here, but it has an important bearing on the present situation in Manchuria and Mongolia, as revealed in the international 'Consortium' correspondence between the American, British and Japanese Governments last year. Suffice it to say that both these railway concessions were explicitly vetoed by Japan, on the ground that they would compete with the South Manchurian railway, and that this veto proved effective. America's subsequent efforts to secure the principle of the 'open door' by means of Secretary Knox's scheme for the 'neutralisation' of Manchurian railways (November 1909), merely served to bring Japan and Russia together for the better protection of their respective claims to 'special interests' in Manchuria and Mongolia. On the 4th July 1910, a formal agreement was concluded between the two Powers, which virtually sealed the fate of China's loosely-held Dependencies. Their joint protest, addressed to the Chinese Government, on the subject of the Chinchou-Aigun railway, plainly intimated that their objections to the admission of other nations' activities in this region were based on political and strategical expediency. The Treaty of Portsmouth was therefore a dead letter; and the fact was not seriously disputed by any of the Treaty Powers.

There is no denying that Japan's policy in this matter could not be reconciled with the avowed purposes of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; nevertheless Sir Edward Grey, when confronted with the fact, declared that His Majesty's Government had no desire to examine the provisions of the Treaty 'too microscopically'; and the United States were evidently not prepared to give China anything more than moral support. When, in April 1911, the Chinese Government concluded a loan agreement with the 'Four Nations' Consortium to finance certain schemes for the development of Manchuria, again Russia and Japan intervened, protesting against fulfilment of this agreement, and successfully insisted upon participation in the operations of the Consortium, under conditions which would enable them to keep its activities within the limits imposed by their own 'special interests.'

Having composed their differences, Russia and Japan, secure from interference by other Powers, proceeded to develop their

respective spheres of interest by energetic processes of 'peaceful 'penetration' and by a re-interpretation of the *status quo*, which steadily undermined what was left of China's effective authority in these regions. The Chinese revolution (October 1911) greatly accelerated the process of geographical gravitation, especially in Mongolia. In January 1912, the Russian Minister at Peking presented a note to the harassed Chinese Government, insisting upon the 'independence' of Northern Mongolia. The nature of this independence was sufficiently indicated by the Russian Government's expressed intention to assist the Lama ruler of Mongolia with a loan and to build a railway from Kiakhta to Urga. There is good reason to believe that, as part of the new *entente*, Japan had undertaken to allow Russia a free hand in Northern Mongolia, as an offset to Japan's annexation of Korea and the admission of her claims in Eastern Inner Mongolia.

When Great Britain renewed her alliance with Japan in July 1911, both the Russo-Japanese agreement and the annexation of Korea (whose independence had been solemnly and repeatedly guaranteed by all the Treaty Powers) were already accomplished facts. It is also important to note that, a year before the alliance was renewed, Sir Edward Grey had publicly recognised the purport of the Russo-Japanese *entente* and its immediate results. On the 11th June 1910, he declared in the House of Commons that His Majesty's Government 'recognised that Russia and 'Japan had special interests in Mongolia and Manchuria'; and no one who had studied the development of those interests could seriously maintain that they implied no diminution of China's suzerain rights. The preamble to the new Treaty of Alliance continued, it is true, to assert the independence and integrity of China and the sacred principle of equal opportunities, but the facts of the actual situation were sufficient to relegate these pious intentions to the category of platitudinous shibboleths. The truth was even then apparent that England, in renewing the alliance, was less concerned for the integrity of China than for the security of the British Empire, and fully realised the importance of preventing Japan from being drawn into the orbit of German *welt-politik*. The uncompromising veto pronounced by Japan in the matter of the Chinchou-Aigun railway, and her subsequent refusal to submit the matter to the Hague, afforded conclusive proof, if proof were needed, that she was determined

to prevent the establishment of any vested interests except her own in South Manchuria. In this situation Great Britain and the United States acquiesced, neither Power being disposed to challenge the Russo-Japanese coalition in defence of China's sovereign rights, the more so as China herself did nothing to protect, and much to compromise, them. America's attitude at this period was fairly expressed by President Roosevelt's declaration on the subject of Korea, namely, that 'it was out of 'the question to suppose that any other nation, with no interest 'of its own at stake, would do for the Koreans what they were 'utterly incapable of doing for themselves.'

With the Great War came the cessation of Russia's expansionist activities in the Far East. Since then the situation, from the Japanese point of view, has been one of heaven-sent opportunities, tempered by anticipation of new difficulties and new dangers. So long as the final issue of the struggle in France remained in doubt, her policy was to take every advantage of the disorganised state of China to extend and consolidate her position in Southern Manchuria and to make the most of the opportunities created by Russia's débacle, to secure for herself new coigns of vantage in Mongolia and Eastern Siberia. The means adopted to secure these ends, beginning with the 'twenty-one demands' imposed upon China by her ultimatum of May 7, 1915 were undoubtedly high-handed and reprehensible; beyond all question they constituted a violation of China's sovereignty at many new points and a denial of the principle of equal opportunities. Some allowance must be made, however, for the fact that the rulers of Japan were clearly bent on insuring themselves at this juncture against the possibility of a German victory; it is also important to remember that, although Great Britain addressed strong representations to Tokyo in regard to the demands of 'Group V' (which aimed at establishing Japanese political and military control in China proper), no protest was raised, either by England or by the United States, against the demand for an extension of the Liaotung Peninsula 'Lease' from its original term of twenty-five years to ninety-nine years. There is no doubt that when the alliance was renewed by Great Britain in 1911, His Majesty's Government was cognisant of Japan's intention to take the first favourable opportunity of securing an extension of this lease and of the South Manchurian railway concession.

Long before the war it was obvious that under no circumstances could China expect to recover possession of the Liaotung Peninsula upon the expiry (in 1923) of the original Russian lease agreement, or that Japan would voluntarily surrender the railway system which, since 1905, she had steadily developed by means of new concessions and rights granted (generally in return for loans) by the Chinese Government.

The collapse of Russia in 1917 and the consequent suspension of the Russo-Japanese agreement of 1910 have produced a new situation in Manchuria and Mongolia, a situation which, because of the uncertainty of Russia's future, creates many new problems for Japan, and causes her statesmen to walk delicately. The nature of these problems is such, that modifications of her expansionist policy and of her general attitude towards China may reasonably be expected. But whatever concessions she may be prepared to make to international sentiment in negotiating the renewal of the alliance, with a view to averting the danger of national isolation, I am fully convinced (after discussing the question with most of the leading men in Japan) that nothing short of decisive defeat in a life and death struggle will ever induce her rulers to abandon their claims to a privileged position of economic and strategical advantage in Manchuria and Mongolia.

The Japanese Government makes no secret of its conviction that the protection of its rights and ' special interests ' in this region is vital to the existence of the nation. It regards the validity of these rights and vested interests as defensible, in the same manner and for the same reasons, as the British position in Egypt and Gibraltar ; or as the United States' application of the Monroe doctrine to prevent the establishment of non-American interests in Mexico or South America. The attitude and arguments of Japan's representatives at the Versailles Conference afforded ample evidence of the nation's determination (reluctantly recognised by President Wilson in the matter of Shantung) to insist on recognition of their ' special interests ' in China as an equitable *quid pro quo* for their tacit acquiescence in the British and American Asiatic Exclusion Acts. There was evidence of the same determination in Viscount Ishii's special mission to the United States in 1917 and in the specific reference to Japan's ' special interests ' recorded in his agreement with Mr. Lansing.

The ' China Consortium ' official despatches, published as a blue-book this summer, reveal a tendency on the part of His Majesty's Government to approach the problems of the Far East in a sentimental rather than a practical spirit. The whole correspondence reflects the desire of Downing Street to conciliate public opinion and the powers of high finance in the United States, and in so doing to overlook certain irretrievably established facts ; incidentally also it illustrates the truth that, since the government of Great Britain has passed out of the hands of Parliament into those of the executive, our foreign policy is liable to be determined by sudden impulses of sentiment rather than by the deliberate judgment of the legislature. To the student of Far Eastern affairs, this Consortium correspondence is of more than passing interest, not only because of what the despatches express, but because of what they imply. They express, on the one hand, Japan's diplomatic recognition of the political results of Russia's disappearance from the scene and of America's increasing weight in world politics ; on the other, the recrudescence of international finance as a dominating factor in world-politics. The arguments adduced by Lord Curzon in opposing Japan's proposal to exclude Manchuria and Mongolia from the scope of the Consortium's operations, practically amount to an endorsement of the claim advanced by the British financiers of the Consortium, that ' the international position ' has been fundamentally changed by the peace Conference in ' Paris, and that any former claims to spheres of interest or ' spheres of influence are no longer admissible.' The Japanese, according to the same despatch, are invited to accept the position that ' a new start is to be made, with a clean slate.'

Apart from the lamentable fact that the Versailles Conference has definitely recognised a new sphere of Japanese influence in China proper (Shantung), it is difficult to perceive upon what grounds the argument can be seriously advanced that either the results of the Peace Conference or the ' clean slate ' theory justifies the assumption that Japan should hand over to the Consortium rights and interests which the Consortium itself, and the Powers behind it, had recognised even before the war. The pre-war Consortium, with the approval of the Governments concerned, definitely admitted ' the special rights and interests ' of Japan in the regions of South Manchuria and the Eastern

' portion of Inner Mongolia,' in June 1912. In 1917, by formal treaty, the American Government placed on record the admission that ' Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part ' to which her possessions are contiguous.' Now, however, in supporting the views of the new Consortium and the American Government's re-born desire ' to throw open the whole of China ' without reserve to the combined activities of an international ' group,' Lord Curzon commits himself to the remarkable statement that ' Manchuria and Mongolia are important provinces ' of China ' and thereafter to the Wellsian argument that ' with ' the establishment of the Consortium a new era is about to dawn, ' in which conditions have changed,' and it is therefore proposed that ' the Powers should work together in harmonious and friendly ' co-operation rather than in competition.'

The Japanese Ambassador's despatches throughout this correspondence indicate a desire to temporise and to avoid all contentious side-issues, while carefully refraining from any admission which might tend to prejudice or diminish Japan's position in the region under discussion. Had Viscount Chinda been inclined to logomachy, Lord Curzon's despatches invite palpable hits at many a vital point. *Imprimis*, His Lordship might have been advised that Manchuria and Mongolia are not, and never have been, ' provinces ' of China. He might next have been asked to explain by what line of reasoning His Majesty's Government, having required China to abandon her claim to effective suzerainty over a large portion of Tibet, is justified in asserting the validity of that suzerainty (and more) in Mongolia, a dependency, similar in all respects to Tibet, which has lately proclaimed its independence of the Chinese Republic ? As for the Consortium's ' new era ' argument, His Lordship might have been reminded that this is by no means its first appearance on the Far Eastern stage. The prospect of replacing unprofitable competition by ' harmonious and friendly co-operation ' was similarly invoked by Sir Charles Addis, as the British representative of international finance in 1908, to justify the admission of Germany to participation in Great Britain's vested interests in the Yangtsze valley ; but the results of that experiment can hardly be cited as justification for the belief that the causes of conflict between nations are likely to be eradicated by any working agreement between financiers. Finally, to come nearer home,

the Japanese Ambassador might reasonably have suggested that if Lord Curzon really shared Mr. Lansing's belief in the New Era, as an effective solvent of the differences which threaten the world's peace, the beneficent activities of the Consortium should not be confined to China; why not apply them to Mesopotamia, Mexico, Egypt, Palestine and other countries, where the principle of harmonious co-operation appears to be imperfectly realised?

To turn from academics to the realities of the situation, it cannot be seriously expected that the Japanese Government will admit that the proclamation of a 'New Era' by the exponents of international finance justifies Great Britain in asking her ally either to agree to the revision of certain clauses of the Treaty of Versailles (*i.e.*, concerning Shantung), or to abandon her position in Manchuria and Mongolia, a position which, as I have shown, has been repeatedly recognised in the past. If His Majesty's Government seriously proposes that Japan should restore the *status quo ante bellum* in that region, something more cogent must be adduced by way of argument than that 'the international' position has been profoundly changed by the Peace Conference.' Also it must be evident, even to statesmen in a hurry, that if Japan is expected to surrender rights and interests which her rulers have declared to be vital to her economic existence and national security on the plea that the era of harmonious co-operation has dawned, the same plea will entitle Japan to call upon her harmonious colleagues to rescind their Asiatic Exclusion Acts and give the dawn a chance.

The American Government, not being a party to the Treaty of Versailles, may be justified in declining to recognise that treaty's settlement of the Shantung question; but it should be borne in mind that, if so, Japan may be equally entitled to ask for the re-opening of the 'racial equality' question, which was only dropped by her representatives at Versailles because President Wilson concurred in the Shantung decision. Great Britain is evidently not in a position to revoke that decision, and the Empire as a whole has nothing to gain by re-opening the question of Asiatic immigration. At the outset, therefore, it would seem that British support of the United States in this matter can scarcely go further than vague generalisations concerning the blessings of co-operation and the new era. We certainly cannot

challenge Japan's position in Manchuria and Mongolia without putting back the hands of the clock and violating all the traditions which have hitherto governed the relations between nations, not to say allies. The aim of the State Department at Washington (as expressed in a Memorandum to the Japanese Ambassador on March 16, 1920) would appear to be to restore the position in Manchuria and Mongolia to that which was laid down by the Treaty of Portsmouth and, regarding these Dependencies as integral and homogeneous parts of the Chinese Republic, to insist upon their future development, for the benefit of China, by international co-operation on a basis of strict equal opportunity. But, as I have shown, the Treaty of Portsmouth became a dead letter within three months of its signature, and for ten years the 'special rights and interests' subsequently asserted and consolidated by Russia and Japan (both members of the Consortium) in their respective spheres, were either definitely recognised or tacitly admitted by all the Powers concerned.

The attitude of the Japanese Government, as displayed in these despatches is one of watchful waiting, tempered by doubts. Japan has joined the Consortium in the same spirit as that in which she has joined the League of Nations, a spirit of courteous scepticism. The idea of carrying out the reconstruction of China by means of an international syndicate of financiers, who (except in America) cannot possibly find the capital required, carries no more conviction at Tokyo than the idea of a League of Nations, in which the United States has no part. But, while giving the Consortium the benefit of many doubts, the Japanese Government subscribes to the general idea of co-operation and pooled interests in China proper, provided that nothing in the Consortium's projected operations shall infringe the special rights and interests of Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia and thereby jeopardise the economic existence and national security of the country and the peace of the Far East. As Viscount Chinda was careful to explain to Lord Curzon on more than one occasion, 'public opinion in Japan would not approve of applying 'the principles of internationalism to any enterprises in this 'region which might conflict with Japan's vested interests'; in other words, the policy which prompted the Japanese Government to veto the Chinchou-Aigun railway, has not been, and will not be, rescinded.

Lord Curzon, endeavouring to perform the diplomatic feat of holding with the hare and running with the hounds, of conciliating America while reassuring Japan, could find no better way of solving the problem than by asking the Japanese Ambassador to 'devise a formula to meet the case.' (The instinct, which prompts official diplomacy to dodge realities with formulæ, is as old as the ostrich.) The Japanese Ambassador, always willing to oblige, supplied a formula (16 March, 1920) which left matters precisely where they were. The Japanese Government, it said, welcomed the establishment of the new Consortium; but

'in matters relating to loans affecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, which in their opinion are calculated to create a serious impediment to the security of the economic life and national defence of Japan, the Japanese Government reserve the right to take the necessary steps to guarantee such security.'

Lord Curzon found this formula 'ambiguous and general in 'character'; in particular, he found it 'impossible to believe 'that it should be essential for Japan alone to construct and 'control' certain railway lines lying to the west of the South Manchurian railway. This in itself is passing strange, for the archives of the Foreign Office since 1907 contain ample evidence of this intention on the part of Japan and of its recognition by His Majesty's Government on more than one occasion. His Lordship's pained surprise is only intelligible on the assumption that he has been led to regard the New Era and the clean slate as established facts of universal acceptance.

Disappointed with the Japanese formula, Lord Curzon proceeded to devise one of his own, in which it is declared that

'His Majesty's Government would subscribe to a written assurance, to the effect that the Japanese Government need have no reason to apprehend that the Consortium would direct any activities affecting the security of the economic life and national defence of Japan, and they can firmly rely on the good faith of the Powers concerned to refuse to countenance any operations inimical to such interests.'

The virtue of this assurance lies obviously in its application, and leaves the crucial question still unsolved, namely, with whom shall rest the decision whether Japan's special interests are, or are not, affected by any particular enterprise? The Japanese may be excused for wishing to know by what means Lord Curzon can

possibly guarantee that not only the international financiers, but the Foreign Offices behind them, will always prove of one mind and sweetly reasonable. The Japanese Government, however, having achieved their purpose of ' bringing the Powers concerned ' to an understanding of their interpretation ' of the scope and purposes of the Consortium, are content, for the rest, to rely upon the friendly assurances of Great Britain, ' and upon their ' adequacy to safeguard the interests of Japan.' And so the discussion ends, leaving the whole question exactly where it was after Mr. Lansing and Viscount Ishii discussed it in 1917; that is to say, upon the knees of the gods.

If, in conclusion, we turn, from the jejune discussion of diplomatic catchwords and *clichés*, to stern realities, the vital fact of the situation remains, that nothing short of compulsion by greatly superior force will ever induce the rulers of Japan to abandon their position of economic and political ascendancy in Manchuria and Mongolia. That position has been built up at the cost of much blood and treasure, and the Japanese Government, compelled to make provision for its rapidly increasing population, regards its maintenance as a matter of inexorable necessity. In discussing this question, which is for them the crux of the Far Eastern problem, the statesmen of Japan are not likely to overlook the fact that the population difficulties which they are attempting to solve by expansion on to the Asiatic mainland have been greatly intensified by the Anglo-Saxon exclusion policy. In any event, it may safely be predicted that, if England seeks to make the renewal of the Alliance conditional upon the restoration of China's complete sovereignty in Manchuria and Mongolia, the Alliance will never be renewed. Therefore the practical question which confronts the statesmanship of the Empire and Dominions may be stated as follows: Is the future of these Dependencies to be regarded as a matter of sufficient importance to the Empire's commercial and other interests to justify us in alienating the goodwill of the Japanese people by declaring them (as Lord Curzon has done) to be ' a geographical ' area of China ? '

Sentimental considerations apart, what real benefit would accrue to the world at large from this policy, even if it were in fact possible to induce Japan to abandon her claims throughout this territory and to restore it to the unfettered control of the

Chinese Government—a government which the Mongols have successfully rejected and defied, and which is notoriously incapable of exercising anything resembling effective authority even in China proper? Would the Consortium guarantee this region from becoming the happy hunting ground of the Tuchuns' rabble armies, of brigands and of Bolsheviks? Are the Powers behind the Consortium prepared to indemnify Japan for lawlessness and loss of trade on the Korean border? If, as the Chinese suggest, the British Government now brings pressure to bear upon Japan for the purpose of revoking some or all of the concessions extracted by her from China by the 'twenty-one' demands' of 1915, by what formula do the Powers propose to overcome the fact that the present Chinese Governor-General of Manchuria and his henchmen, the party in power at Peking, are supporters of Japan's 'peaceful penetration' and that they have materially increased her vested interests in return for subsidies and loans? In other words, how is it possible to protect the sovereign rights of a nation whose rulers are prepared to sell them?

As a matter of practical politics, the undefined nature and extent of Japan's 'special interests' in this region should afford valuable leverage for the adjustment of the general situation in the Far East. Tactfully used, this leverage should enable the Powers interested in the future of China to induce Japan to co-operate with goodwill in an international scheme of financial and administrative reconstruction, to restore China's unfettered jurisdiction in Shantung, and to abrogate all claims (such as those advanced in the twenty-one demands) to preferential advantages of any sort in any part of the eighteen provinces. In view of the strength of Japanese opinion on the subject of our Exclusion Acts (which they regard as discriminatory and unjust) leverage of some sort will be indispensable if, as Mr. Lloyd George has declared, Great Britain desires a renewal of the Alliance. Those who argue that this leverage should not be obtained at China's expense may usefully be reminded that China's birthright in Manchuria was virtually lost when Li Hung-chang, for value received, gave Russia Port Arthur and a right of way for her railway through the heart of this fertile and thinly-populated land; also, that Japan's position has since been extended, and at the present moment is being steadily consolidated,

as the result of venal acquiescence on the part of China's rulers. If there were any reasonable prospect of China developing some satisfactory measure of national unity and financial stability in the near future, there might be some hope of checking the present process of geographical gravitation in her northern dependencies, but of this there is no sign. Therefore, things being as they are, it should be the aim of British statesmanship (1) to secure a clear definition of the geographical area within which Japan claims special rights and interests; (2) as regards railway and mining enterprises, to secure the limitation of these interests under conditions which shall prevent any further encroachment upon China's rights as suzerain or sovereign Power, and shall effectively safeguard the principle of equal opportunity for the trade and industry of all nations.

J. O. P. Bland.

THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTIC EXPERIMENT

This article was written before the failure of the crops over wide areas in Russia became manifest. The argument is therefore based exclusively upon facts observed and inferences drawn before the famine began.
Editor.

THE Russian Revolution is an economic movement on a scale unprecedented in the whole history of the world. To begin with an indication of primary importance, the condition and movement of population. The question as to whether the growth of population is necessarily a sign of economic progress has been and may be debated at length. But here we are not concerned with these somewhat futile academic discussions. The population of Russia is dying. In urban and semi-urban localities, *i.e.*, in those which produce no food or an insufficient quantity, the population is dying for want of food. In rural districts it is dying because sanitary conditions have become incredibly worse.* The abolition of private property and of the freedom of economic intercourse has undermined productive forces and destroyed production. The process began with the demoralisation of labour; production came to a standstill, and the towns, ceasing to be the centres of production, became mere agglomerations of consumers. As such they were useless to the village population. Thus a breach was formed in the normal economic relations between town and country and extended with enormous rapidity. The villages became isolated and restricted to their own economic processes. In other words, they reverted to primitive economy. The towns, acting through the Communist State, interfered with this primitive economy of the villages by an assertion of authority, sometimes using armed force. The villages, deprived of the normal influx of goods, yet economically stronger than the towns, greedily bartered and purchased all sorts of urban articles. The townsfolk flocked to the country, settling themselves when possible on the land;

*Rural ('Zemstvo') medicine, the pride of Russian civilization, which carried the development of general medical assistance to a hitherto unknown degree, has been completely destroyed by the Revolution.

industry decayed, the industrial proletariat diminished. This process can be traced in all branches of industry, except in two forms of production which developed to an appalling extent, namely the writing of incoming and outgoing official correspondence and the printing of the paper which passes current as money. The torrent of paper turns the wheel of the Soviet rule over the steadily decaying national economy of Russia. The output of official correspondence has steadily increased, the amount of labour employed has simultaneously grown and there has sprung up an enormous, new, bureaucratic proletariat closely and essentially connected with the communist régime. Here at any rate the advocates of State socialism can point to the realisation of their ideal of the centralized direction of labour. In other spheres of employment the contrary process has generally prevailed ; the amount of labour employed has declined ; industry has been deserted by the skilled workers ; many industries have gone back to the primitive ' Kustar ' (house-industry) type, and are now carried on in a number of small workshops. Owing to their smallness these enterprises are immune from nationalisation, which destroys the very nerves of an industrial undertaking, namely the personal initiative and the personal interest of the owner.

The picture is at the first glance of a confused character ; for side by side with the reversion to home-industry in order to escape from the pressure of the socialist régime, there has been a development of ' enlarged ' undertakings. Outwardly this enlargement resembles the concentration or centralisation of production which often occurs under capitalistic conditions and may or may not be regulated by combinations. But there is a profound difference between capitalistic concentration and Soviet concentration. The enlargement of undertakings under capitalism is an outcome of the pressure of productive forces working under conditions of free competition. It is a result of the process which Marx described as the ' anarchy of production,' an inevitable concomitant and necessary sign of the growth of the productive forces of capitalism. On the other hand the concentration of certain industries in communist Russia has been imposed upon the Soviet government by the lack of raw materials and the demoralisation of labour.

We must note, by the way, that Soviet communism is in some

respects the direct heir of what is called war-economy, war-socialism or war-regulation, and in this connection a very curious correlation may be noted. The uprush of socialist and communist ideas and tendencies observable of late throughout the world is indisputably connected with the extension of State activities during the war. Yet in reality, leaving aside mere formal resemblances, war-socialism is essentially unlike either that form of socialism which according to Marxian theory was inevitably to develop out of capitalism, or the system of syndicates and trusts which capitalism tends to develop. War-socialism had to deal with a lack of goods occasioned by a special and temporary factor, viz., the economic strain of the war; it was called upon to counteract the effects of insufficient production. On the other hand Marxian scientific socialism was pictured by its inventors as having to control not lack but plenty; it was expected to fight over-production by some adequate and rational scheme of adapting the powerful productive forces of capitalism to the actual requirements of society. The combines, syndicates and trusts which spring up in capitalist society set out to accomplish the same task, namely to control abundant production and to fight over-production. The economic folly and historical ineptitude of the Russian communist experiment are both illustrated in the fact that Russia hopelessly lacks that very surplus of capitalistic production which is the fundamental premise for the Marxian economic conception of socialism, as both the grave-digger and the heir of capitalism.

Industrial and economic regress under the communist régime reveals itself on all sides. One striking sign is the substitution of wood for mineral fuel. From the world-historical point of view this means a return to the first half of the eighteenth century; for Russian metallurgy it is a return to the 'seventies of the nineteenth century. As far as the textile industry is concerned the decrease of production is suggestive of a still earlier period.

Thus in the whole field of industrial activities we observe an appalling quantitative falling off of production, coupled with its technical deterioration, and backed by an extreme demoralisation of labour and a decrease in individual output. It is untrue to suggest, as has frequently been done, through ignorance or prejudice, that this retrogression of Russian industry is the result of the war. Whatever view may be taken of the

general influence of war on the economic life of a country, the Great War, while it produced an artificial scantiness in Russia as well as in other countries, at the same time strengthened the collective productive capacity of the country. It certainly did place an immense burden on the national economy, but so long as a government preserving law and order and a bourgeois economic organization existed, there were no signs of a general and absolute economic impoverishment. Indeed the stimulating influence of the war showed itself perhaps even more clearly in Russia than elsewhere. The increase in real wages during the war was always just in advance of the rise in prices. The standard of living of the labouring masses consequently improved. This is true of the industrial proletariat; with still greater confidence it can be said of the peasants. In Russia as everywhere the war meant an excessive and—from the economic standpoint—an 'unproductive' destruction of capital and expenditure of man-power. But on the other hand it raised the productive energy of the country and improved the economic position of the lower classes.

The revolution, which brought in its trail the establishment of communism by violence, produced the exactly opposite effect. Temporarily, and at the expense of capital savings, it brought about an ephemeral and fictitious improvement of the workers' lot. At the same time it demoralised labour and undermined the very foundations of production. Nor was this backward movement confined to urban industry; it spread also to agriculture. Here the pernicious effects were produced by three factors; first the destruction of private, highly capitalized estates—a destruction which was in no way made good by the creation of so-called 'Soviet farms'—secondly, by the elemental, unaccountable peasant movement towards 'levelling,' and thirdly, by the above referred to breach of all normal economic connection between towns and villages. This last factor compelled the agricultural producer to confine himself to satisfying his own wants; consequently he diminished his production and avoided marketing any produce. The productive activities of the villager and the food supplies of the town dweller were simultaneously curtailed.

The economic vacuum which the communist government has created and now has to face is appallingly evident in the

domain of finance. Under the communist régime public and private finance are theoretically as well as practically indistinguishable. If by any miracle a communist organization of industry could lead to industrial prosperity, communist finance would also be prosperous. But in an economic vacuum there can be no finances at all. This is clearly seen in Russia. Whatever efforts are made by the old officials of the once brilliant financial administration of Imperial Russia, the foundations of which were laid by the legal genius of Speransky, and fixed in practice by Kankrin, Reutern, Bunge, Vishnegradsky and Witte, even they—or as many of them as are now in the service of the Soviet government—can impart no real financial significance to the verbose formulæ of the Soviet public economy. Marx, who knew Russian economics and economic history none too well, used to say jestingly that in Russia there was only one factory that really worked well, namely, the State factory of paper money. To-day his followers are enthro ed in Russia and for the glorification of his ideals they have carried the production of paper money to a figure undreamt of in the days of the Tsars, and on this ever-expanding and ever-depreciating volume of paper they are basing the national economy of Russia.

Yet not exclusively so. The public economy of Soviet Russia rests not only upon the production of paper money but also upon the appropriation of the gold reserve accumulated under the bourgeois régime. While issuing paper money the Communist State at the same time eats up the gold stock which it inherited from the former régime. Thus in the domain of finance the communist government exists as a parasite at the expense of the savings of the past.

The reaction towards primitive economy produced in Russia by the communist régime and outlined above has no parallel in the history of the world, either in its dimensions—for no historical precedents of this kind are to be compared in their magnitude with the Russian experiment of the twentieth century —or in the acuteness of the process. The acuteness is primarily due to the fact that the transition was not a spontaneous process arising out of economic, social and political actions or changes, but was dictated and imposed on the people from above by the powerful armed hand of the Communist State. In the second place it was accomplished in a very short period of time in the life of the nation

A distant analogy can be found only in the economic evolution of the ancient world during the period of the decline of the Roman Empire—a process which was spread over several centuries and whose dimensions and details are not easily discerned. Some elements in this evolution—granted all the differences between Imperial Rome and Soviet Moscow—reveal a striking similarity. Both then and now the fundamental economic characteristic is a reaction towards primitive economy. In Rome as in Moscow the citizens were practically enslaved by the State ; they became its serfs. In both cases the economic policy of the State bears eloquent testimony to what the greatest of the modern historians of antiquity, speaking of the famous edict of Diocletian concerning maximum prices, has described as the ' insanity of power.' But the communist insanity of the Moscow government differs from the insanity of Imperial Rome in that in the earlier there is some method, as in the madness of Hamlet. The reaction of antiquity towards primitive economy was an elemental outcome of a series of processes, their natural sum-total, and not a result of some consistent programme or plan of economic organization. The Russian process is quite different. Here everything is the outcome of a certain programme, of a definite system, of a preconceived idea.

This system or programme must be examined on its merits. Before however we proceed to such an examination we must point out another characteristic feature of the process so far described. The communism of Lenin and his colleagues is no doubt based theoretically on the sociological and historical doctrine of Marx. The essence of that doctrine is that the productive forces of capitalism will continue to expand until they themselves compel the establishment of Marxian socialism. In other words socialism or communism will be the fruit of a development of productive forces inside capitalism itself. The economic reality of communist Russia is a cruel mockery of this conception of Marxism. The communism of Marx and Lenin had perhaps, or even certainly, its psychological origin in the emotions aroused by capitalism ; but communism as realised in Russia not only does not signify the victory of a more perfect economic formation. On the contrary, it has led to an unheard-of economic regress, has realized itself—to use a biological term favoured by Marx himself—in a genuine regressive metamorphosis of the national economy as a whole.

Hence arises a further alternative: either socialism (or communism) is not a higher economic formation compared with capitalism, or else what has been accomplished in Russia has nothing to do with socialism or communism. The latter alternative obviously does not fit in with the real spirit and character of Soviet legislation. In so far as there exists a theoretical conception of socialism or communism* it has been consistently carried out in the Soviet legislation. In other words, the economic policy of the Soviet government is entirely subordinated to the socialist programme. The essence of the theoretical conception of socialism is the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, and their transference to the community, represented by the State or other public organizations. Outside this conception, which expresses the essence of socialism in a more or less precise juridical formula, socialism becomes either something too indefinite and elusive to have any clear meaning, or else something very partial and empirical. There is a well-known saying ascribed to Sir William Harcourt: 'We are all socialists now.' But if everybody is a socialist, socialism as a separate category ceases to exist. Soviet legislation on the contrary strictly complies with the primary conception of the theory of socialism.

* In economic literature these terms have been used in different senses, but these different uses are concerned either with the philosophical problems of the social 'world-outlook,' or with nuances of the same basic idea. Both words—socialism and communism—refer to the same fundamental conception. As to the expression 'State capitalism,' there exists with regard to it a logical and historical misunderstanding. If this expression is supposed to stand for the social order opposed to private capitalism, *i.e.*, for the transference, complete or only partial, of the rights of ownership of capital from private individuals to the State—'State capitalism' and 'State socialism,' or simply socialism, are identical. But the expression and the conception 'State capitalism' had in the mouth of their originator a quite definite sociological and political meaning. The expression was coined by the elder Liebknecht who used it in one of his speeches to describe an order of things under which the rights of ownership of the means and instruments of production are to some extent handed over to the State while the political power does not pass into the hands of the proletariat. 'State capitalism,' which Liebknecht opposes to genuine socialism, is socialism without the proletarian dictatorship. To speak of State capitalism under the Bolsheviks is simply absurd.

Doubtless it may be argued that the Russian experiment in socialism was carried out in a social environment which was not ripe for socialism and therefore unsuitable for an experimental test. In different surroundings and in different conditions the experiment might have produced different results, positive instead of negative. This is the argument used, either implicitly or more or less explicitly, in the name of socialism, by its various representatives when challenged with the economic failure of Bolshevism. In effect the socialists assert that socialism is not responsible for Bolshevism.

This statement cannot be accepted without further discussion. However backward—compared with the western countries—Russia may have been in respect of her economic conditions and her civilization, the socialist experiment carried out by the Soviet government has put to the test not only Russian civilization but also those general principles on which socialism in every country is based. From this standpoint the Russian experiment is of the greatest importance just because it is a consistent experiment in socialism. For the first time in history—if we leave aside the so-called Jesuit State in Paraguay—socialist principles have been applied in practice on a vast scale and during a considerable period of time. If the experiment has led—as undoubtedly it has—not to an advance but to a regression of Russian national economy, this result cannot be ascribed to the general backwardness of Russia; clearly the backwardness of Russia does not explain the fact that the establishment of Marxian socialism has driven Russia still further back.

To pass to some of the outstanding facts: it was not an accident that the principles of socialism were in the first place applied to the large mining and industrial enterprises, which were the typical outcome of capitalism and in turn had produced a typical proletariat. For here the actual psychological conditions were most favourable to the application of socialist principles and it is here therefore that we ought to trace its effects.

In the development of Bolshevism two stages or periods stand out distinctly. In its first stage Bolshevism represents on the one hand the elemental enthusiasm and intoxication of the masses moved by their primitive instincts; on the other, a conscious gambling on the part of the leading circles of the communist party who make political use of these mass emotions and instincts.

This is a period of violent destruction of the bourgeois régime, a communist siege of the old structure of economic and political relations. Such a siege requires large masses, 'electrified' to the highest point of intensity by demagogical agitation; for what is needed is a crushing blow.

The second stage or period of Bolshevism is a period of construction by State-coercion, of the creation of a new order in spite of, or at any rate without, the participation of the emotions and the will of the masses—almost exclusively through the agency of an organized self-conscious party-minority. In the first stage not only the leaders and the party organization are active, but also the masses; in the second stage, action comes from all the upper, the dominant, class in Soviet Russia, *i.e.*, the communists.

These two stages or periods are also clearly outlined in the industrial policy of Soviet Russia. The characteristic of the first period—elemental and demagogical—is the enticement of the masses by the prospect of immediate profits arising out of the seizure of capitalist undertakings, the seizure to be effected under the ideological banner of 'workmen's control.' The property of the various bourgeois entrepreneurs (individual or collective) is seized by their own workmen; industrial sovereignty passes into the hands of the workmen and is exercised by them in their own immediate interests. The Soviet Government fairly soon realized that 'workmen's control' would be utilized not for the benefit of the community, but for the benefit or supposed benefit of more or less accidental groups of workmen; that it was quite senseless from the socialist point of view, and would either lead to industrial anarchy, or else, by a roundabout way, to the restoration of the bourgeois economic régime.

Thus, to the period of 'workmen's control' succeeded that of the State management of industry. There is no doubt that the transition from workmen's control to State management constituted from the point of view of socialism a great step forward. Apart from this political consideration, the change in organization meant a certain relative improvement in the industrial conditions. In the same way the substitution of personal for collective management, which took place, in practice produced increased efficiency. Nevertheless in spite of the improvement produced by these two reforms the productivity of labour steadily diminished.

This fall in productivity compelled the communist government to adopt a new policy in the sphere of production of which the two fundamental features are: (1) the introduction of bourgeois amendments into the socialist conditions of labour; (2) the introduction of military methods of dealing with labour, leading up to its partial or complete militarisation. The introduction of bourgeois amendments into the socialist régime began with the substitution of piece-work for time-work, coupled with the system of premiums. Thus was abandoned the chief militant demand of the proletariat for equal remuneration of labour, the demand which has ever been the war-cry of all socialists and particularly of the Bolsheviks when they led the working masses in their attack against capitalism. In response to that cry, the Provisional Government at the beginning of the revolution abolished piece work. This was the beginning of a general demoralisation of labour, for the inner discipline of labour rests primarily upon the principle of a conformity between the personal efficiency and effort of each individual worker and his remuneration.

Parallel with this transition to slightly 'bourgeoisised' industrial conditions proceeded the militarisation of industry. This found its expression in the governmental prolongation of working hours, in the subjection of labour to a severe military discipline and in the introduction of a general 'conscription' of labour.

Thus to the short period of 'workmen's control' succeeded the epoch of State management of industry and in this epoch State equalitarian socialism of the bookish type was rapidly transformed by the introduction of bourgeois principles and militarist practices. These changes were absolutely necessary to enable the Soviet government to achieve at least some minimum of results in the sphere of industry. As a Russian communist writes:—

'The industrial front is the most important front of the Russian Revolution and every citizen must become a labour conscript. Deserters will find no quarter. That is what labour conscription, what the militarisation of labour means! Who will deny the proletarian State this right during the period when private ownership of the means and instruments of production and exchange is being abolished? Who will deny it the duty to demand from everyone a certain amount of

labour in the interests of the community ? No one except miserable Philistines, absolute fools or dishonest demagogues ! '*

Both the bourgeoisation and the militarisation of labour introduced into the Soviet régime fundamental inconsistencies, while at the same time producing no tangible economic results. The hoped for improvements were prevented by the active and passive resistance of the workers.

In order to understand the general trend of this policy of the communist government and of the popular reaction to it, we must return to the problem of socialism as it is posed by the communist revolution. The essential conception of socialism, as has already been said, is the abolition of private ownership of the means of production (in the widest sense of the word) and their transference to the community, personified by the State or by other public organizations. The means of production having become common (State) property are collectively used through the centralised regulation of the whole economic life. But these changes are not by the majority even of socialists desired for their own sake ; they are desired as a means to an end. Socialists hope and believe that by the abolition of private property and the socialisation of the machinery of production they can secure for all the members of the community the greatest possible equality in the enjoyment of wealth, and an increase in the amount accruing to each member of the proletariat. It is only this re-distributive and equalising purpose of socialism that interests and attracts the masses. They are not interested in socialism so far as it merely provides or aims at providing a purely organizing and technical solution of the productive process. In effect after proclaiming the liberation and equalisation of labour, Soviet communism has ended by enslaving labour and establishing a differentiation of payment. It was compelled to do so since the problem of production stood menacing before it.

While eating up the stocks, the heritage of the bourgeois régime, Soviet communism was approaching nearer and nearer that fatal line where the economic vacuum which it had itself created stood unveiled. Hence arise all those efforts towards reform and

* *A. Lozovsky*. ' Trade Unions in Soviet Russia ' quoted by L. Trotsky in ' The Task and the Part of the Trade Unions ' in the collective work, ' The Party and the Unions.' Petrograd, 1921, p. 257.

evolution which characterise the economic régime of Soviet Russia at the present moment. Reform or evolution is necessitated by the fact that on the one hand the militarisation of labour and the bureaucratisation of economic activities make the communists themselves anxious. They realise that the workers are growing more and more restive under military and bureaucratic rule and they are encouraging the resuscitation of trade unions and appealing to them to aid the Soviet government in building up the socialist economic régime. At the same time it is hoped that the bourgeois principles of personal interest in production and individual economic responsibility will play the role of a healing tonic, and provide that arsenic which if properly administered can raise the tone of socialist economics without killing socialism itself.*

Yet from the communist point of view, to base productivity on the differentiated remuneration of labour, is to abandon entirely the equalitarian basis of the Soviet socialist régime. The fact that the Soviet government is looking for an escape in this direction cannot be explained in a purely historical way by the low standard of civilisation in Russia. The abandonment of the principle of equality is due to the fact that the bourgeois principle, which can be defined as the principle of estimating human beings according to their personal efficiency, is an indispensable motive force in economics ; it cannot be eliminated without cutting the very roots of economic life. Russian communists by means of their gigantic experiment have now re-discovered for themselves this essential fact. In making their experiment they cleverly combined a spontaneous mass movement with concentrated State action and hoped thereby to be able to blend the levelling motive of socialism with the idea of State organization, based upon collective ownership. They have failed.

The Russian experiment has in fact clearly demonstrated that the idea of socialism as a system of social organization, if it is to

*Avdeiev, in the collective work above quoted, says (pp. 201-202) : ' The idea of communism is that all workers should receive equal remuneration ; yet we do not comply with it, because the overwhelming majority of the workers still stick to the prejudice, inherited by them from the capitalist society, which demands that the more skilled and responsible is the work, the higher should be the remuneration.'

be an economic success, must utilise to the fullest extent all bourgeois and anti-levelling motives. In other words, the Russian experiment has shown that socialisation for the purpose of achieving equality, if such socialisation is feasible at all, can be accomplished only if the principle of economic inequality be in practice admitted and systematically applied. Either socialism spells economic decay and regress, or it must be ' bourgeois.' This is as much as to say that socialism, regarded as a conceivable method of economic organization, is incompatible with socialism conceived as an equalitarian ideal. If you aim at equality you destroy economic efficiency ; if you aim at efficiency you must renounce equality. Many have more or less vaguely felt or anticipated this on the strength of general theoretical assumptions. Russian experience has fully and clearly, at the cost of terrible sufferings, demonstrated the fact ; it has revealed what may be called the ultimate tragedy of socialism. Herein lies the universal significance of the Russian experiment. As a solitary Russian thinker said long ago : ' It seems as though we (Russians) live ' in order to teach mankind some great lesson ' (Chadaev).

This curious relation of contrast between the organizing and the levelling idea in socialism further accounts for the futility of the bourgeois correctives which the communist government introduces into the socialist industrial régime. For the communists socialisation is only a means ; equalisation is the end. For them and for the masses, whose psychology the government cannot ignore, equalisation is of much greater interest and moment than the bourgeois methods necessary in a successful economic organization. Here is to be found the deep cause of the futility of all efforts made by the communist government to check the demoralisation of labour. The passion for equality and demoralisation are merely two aspects of the same phenomenon. Against the demoralisation of labour only bourgeois principles and bourgeois sanctions are of any avail.

The bourgeois nature of the trade union expedient tried by the Soviet government is not at once obvious. The communists, as though of set purpose, have introduced the question of trade unions in such a manner as to obscure the essence of the matter. Just as when abolishing private ownership of the means of production the communist government was unable to alter the economic nature of the individual worker, so it has

been unable to change the general character of the working classes employed in industry, or to remove their need for professional associations of some sort which might occasionally be made use of against the Soviet government in its capacity of employer. At the present moment the average Russian workman is becoming alive to the fact that he belongs to a class. Yet this class consciousness is directed not against the bourgeoisie, which no longer exists, not against the employers, who have been abolished, but against the Soviet bureaucracy, which has become and could not help becoming a separate class face to face with the classes of unskilled and skilled labourers. The trade unions, or rather the working masses who have been lumped together by the communist government into trade unions, aspire to become free workers' associations, that is to say, to return to the character and form they possessed in the bourgeois system. The communist government has to take into account these aspirations which have clearly acquired a certain elemental force, but it tries to take the sting out of them. Workers' professional associations are recognised up to a certain limit defined by the political and police considerations of the Soviet government, but they remain very far removed in character from the trade unions in Western Europe under the 'tyranny' of capitalism. The trade unions which are permitted to exist by the Soviet government are in no sense independent bodies; they are entirely controlled by the State, and workmen are compelled to belong to them.

Another expedient of the Soviet government was to concede freedom of trade to agricultural producers. This freedom for agriculture was instituted at a moment when, owing to the communist régime, urban industry had been reduced to such a low level that the towns could offer little or nothing to the country districts. The demand of the starving towns for food was almost limitless; prices measured in paper money rose rapidly; but neither town nor country was able to satisfy its wants. In order that freedom of trade in agricultural produce may bring at least some relief to the non-agricultural population it is necessary that the economic life and industry of the towns should be freed from communist control, at least to the same extent to which the economic life of the country districts, on account of their inaccessibility for the Soviet government, has relatively

been always free. But such emancipation of the towns and of urban industry from communist control would be tantamount to the collapse of the communist régime.

To prevent misunderstanding it must be added that the freedom of trade proclaimed by the communist government for agricultural produce means something very different from the commercial liberty existing in capitalistic countries. Trade in the bourgeois sense of a specific social function carried on by specific agents never has been and is not now recognised and admitted by the Soviet government. All that freedom of trade in the Soviet sense means is that starving consumers are graciously permitted to buy from the immediate producers, usually by some crude form of barter.

In this connection, it is impossible completely to overlook the system of concessions to foreigners which the communist government is establishing in order not to be stifled by the economic vacuum it has itself created. After having impoverished, exterminated and expelled the national bourgeoisie, the communist government now invites bourgeois 'Varangians' from abroad. This is a twofold testimony to the extreme weakness of the Soviet government. On account of political and police considerations dictated by the instinct of self-preservation, it cannot admit the national bourgeoisie to resume its economic activities in Russia; yet at the same time to stave off insolvency the Soviet government is forced to look for help to the foreign bourgeoisie. This invitation to foreign capitalists demonstrates both the extreme weakness and the profound cynicism of the Soviet government. It is a twofold betrayal, a cynical betrayal of national dignity, and a still more cynical betrayal of socialist ideals.

It only remains to compare what may be called the political purposes of the communist system with the economic purposes. In the language of the party the communist system established in Russia is called 'the dictatorship of the proletariat.' In reality, it is a military and police dictatorship exercised by the leaders of the communist party with a view to the compulsory establishment of communism.

The economic purpose is the aim, the political régime only a means. But by destroying all economic life and creating in its place an economic vacuum the Soviet government has upset

the relation between its economics and its politics. Economics in Soviet Russia now drag out an illusory existence, while the reality is a powerful political organization resting upon the army and the predominance of a party held together by an iron discipline. At the same time—such is the paradox of the Soviet régime—this seemingly powerful political organization cannot abandon its illusory communist economics, for it is on them it chiefly rests. Supposing indeed that the Soviet government at once or gradually abandoned its economic system, and underwent a process of evolution, as the saying is. Immediately it would lose the support of those privileged communist elements on which it directly depends, and, what is more important, it would open a way to the formation of groups openly hostile to itself. The strangling of economic freedom, the confiscation of property, and the denial of liberty to the urban population are the chief causes of the economic decline and regress of Soviet Russia. But at the same time this strangling is a *conditio sine qua non* of the political domination of the communist party. If this condition were removed the Soviet government could not last, from the purely police point of view, even for a few days. The denial of economic and personal liberty is maintained no longer for the original economic and social purposes of the system, but because the government itself is politically dependent upon the maintenance of these restrictions. As Aristotle in his 'Politics' truly remarks, some forms of oppression and humiliation of the people are necessary for the preservation of a tyrannical government. The communist government or dictatorship of the proletariat can hold its own only so long as the communist régime exists. Therefore the communists find it impossible to abandon methods which are economically disastrous, for those same methods are politically indispensable for the preservation of the government.

One involuntarily calls to mind the lessons of the eighteenth century and the traditions bequeathed by the great French Revolution. It was not by accident that the Declaration of Rights of 1789, in enumerating the rights of man and the citizen, included in them the right of property. Indeed this genuinely great revolution was marked by a passion for economic freedom. This was only logical and natural. The Russian economic experiment is instructive in that it has again borne witness to

the fact which the men of the eighteenth century fully and clearly understood, but which our contemporaries, it seems, have begun frivolously to forget, namely that the right of property and the economic freedom of the individual are the necessary attributes, and at the same time the main guarantees, of personal liberty.

Why has State enslavement in Russia been carried to a limit which even Russians never knew before? Precisely because the Soviet régime not only abolished the liberties of public life, but also abolished individual property and private trade, and thus cut at the very roots of the tree of personal liberty and personal dignity. In communist Russia not only is there no free press—freedom of the press was only established in Russia in 1905—there is no private press at all. The railways built by the capitalist society continue to exist, but freedom of communication—one of the expressions of economic freedom—has been abolished more completely than ever before in the history of Russia.

The Russian experiment has in fact demonstrated a truth—which to most minds is sufficiently indicated by elementary reasoning—namely that the abolition of private property and the consequential prevention of trade involves the destruction not only of economic freedom and economic prosperity but also of individual freedom in all its manifestations.

PETER STRUVE.

LABOUR AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

1. Labour as an International Problem. Edited by E. JOHN SOLANO. Macmillan. 1920.
2. International Labour Legislation. By Prof. H. J. W. HETHERINGTON. Methuen. 1920.
3. The International Labour Hand Book. The Labour Publishing Co. and George Allen & Unwin. 1921.
4. The International Labour Review. Geneva: The International Labour Office (monthly).
5. The Workers' International. By R. W. POSTGATE. The Swarthmore Press. 1920.

TWO stormy years have passed since the covenant of the League of Nations was signed with a golden pen. What it has accomplished politically will not be here discussed; time and experience, alas, have shattered many pious hopes and fond imaginings. The sole purpose of this article is to review the operation of Part XIII. of the Treaty, which established the International Labour Organization on a permanent basis.

To start by attributing to this Organization powers of dispensing sovereign panaceas for industrial disorders as did certain statesmen, not of Great Britain alone, when impressing their achievements upon the public, would be most unfair. We must in justice adopt a much more modest standard, such as the Rt. Hon. G. H. Barnes, one of Great Britain's delegates at the Peace Conference, supplies in the essay he contributed to Mr. Solano's book.

'The object, (he writes) of the work of the conference will in all cases be the same, namely to educate public opinion and enlist sympathy in all countries for the task of establishing industry throughout the world upon a foundation of fair remuneration and healthy, decent conditions of life for the workers.'

It was really at the instigation of Mr. Barnes that these labour provisions came to be inserted in the Peace Treaty; he writes therefore with special weight and authority.

In another passage he says:—

'The conference holds in it the seeds of a vast and far-reaching international combination, not only of workers but of governments and employers; indeed of all the human forces of industry. The express

object of their co-operative efforts is to establish the production of wealth throughout the world on a foundation of justice and welfare for the workers.'

For the ultimate accomplishment of this noble ideal, Mr. Barnes rightly relies on educated public opinion, first actuating and then directed by the machinery of the Organization—it being as he truly says 'always in the last resort the impelling force in 'effecting changes in human relations.'

That an immense field, in which enemies of civilisation are daily sowing tares, awaits the husbandry of the Organization, will not be denied by any one possessed of the least experience in labour problems, domestic or international. The time has therefore come when we may fairly claim to review its work, and to test prophecies and promises by the touchstone of reality and fact. This I shall attempt to do, by going to essentials; I shall try to avoid carping criticism; no one believes more strongly than I do in the saving grace of such an organization, and in the powers which it can exercise for the redemption of industrial humanity under wise and impartial guidance. Where criticism is levelled, it will at any rate be directed with constructive motives.

The first general Conference of the International Labour Organization was held at Washington in October 1919. The Governing Body appointed at that Conference held its first meeting on January 27th 1920, when it appointed M. Albert Thomas to be Director of the International Labour Office. The time that has since elapsed is too short to warrant a final judgment; it is however long enough to show the trend of events. And taking a broad and general survey, I do not hesitate to say that giving the Organization every credit for what has in that brief period been effected, its work and its future stand to-day in jeopardy.

The chief danger which threatens the Organization is the almost universal ignorance on the part of the general public, at any rate in this country, of its very existence. Even in better informed circles where some vague conception of the Organization's place in the scheme of post-war reconstruction is to be found among the medley of confused recollections of the Treaty of Versailles, there is no enlightened appreciation either of its objects or its mission. One is indeed startled to see at times in the public press the Organization mistaken for some of the

red ' Internationals ' which are engaged in countering its work and disseminating communism and revolution.

Readers can with advantage reflect on how seldom they hear any public reference to the Organization, or any passing allusion to it in the course of private conversation. Without widespread public information there cannot be any active public opinion, and without the latter there can be no life or driving force behind the Organization ; it may just as well retire from business and save Great Britain the heavy expense incurred in contributing to its maintenance and upkeep.*

For this lack of public information the Organization itself is responsible and also, so far as Great Britain is concerned, the British Government. The publicity arrangements of the Organization are extraordinarily ineffective. It was provided by Article 396 of the Peace Treaty that the International Labour Office should edit and publish in French and English and in such other languages as the Governing Body might think desirable, a periodical paper dealing with ' problems of industry and employ- ' ment of international interest.' Of the making of books there is no end, especially we may add when the costs of their production have not to be met from sales. The Office accordingly issues in French and English (usually long after the face date of publication) *The International Labour Review* which acclaims itself : ' A scientific popular publication containing articles, ' statistics and information relating to labour and industry.' As this *Review* bears no publisher's name, presumably the International Labour Office is directly responsible for its publication. Be that as it may, it is a matter of the greatest difficulty to obtain a copy of the *Review* in this country ; booksellers never have it, will not take subscriptions for it, and decline to procure copies to order. On the large, varied and expensive staff which M. Albert Thomas has appointed for the International Labour Office, a business publisher and a publicity agent have been forgotten.

Apparently the Organization relies on this *Review* as its medium of popular appeal to the general international public. On

* Full information with reference to the International Labour Organization can be obtained in very convenient form in ' The Permanent Labour Organization—Constitution and Rules ' (1/3), published by the International Labour Office.

that supposition it compares unfavourably in price, human interest, graphic touch, and journalistic skill with its competitor *The Labour Monthly*—a magazine of international Labour, and a mouthpiece of red internationalism. The *Review's* attempt at evolving a popular science of labour and industry seems largely to consist in presenting undocumented and ill-digested tables of comparative international statistics without—in such connection an unpardonable omission—a clear explanation showing precisely the different bases on which the statistics are compiled and collated in the different countries. But there is one saving touch of unconscious humour—a table appears with regularity in every issue stating the *par* values of the pound (£), the dollar, and the franc in the currencies of 31 principal countries—it forgets all about the depreciated values at present rates of exchange, which is a matter of real significance to international labour.

The International Labour Office also publishes a weekly *Official Bulletin* in English, French and German. This, while devoid of popular interest, is of service to the investigator in that it purports to give a precise statement of the current work of the Office, and also of the action taken by the different countries that are members of the League of Nations to give effect to the recommendations and draft conventions of the annual general Conference. The Office further publishes day by day in French and English *The Daily Intelligence*, which appears to consist mainly of current press clippings relating to labour questions. In addition it publishes a large number of 'studies and reports' on subjects which the Office considers of immediate importance in the field of labour and industry, such as the texts of laws, decrees, orders and regulations affecting labour in the different countries of the world, in continuation of the series formerly published by the old privately conducted International Association for Labour Legislation at Basle; the reports made by the Office to the International Labour Conference on the various items in its agenda; verbatim reports of the proceedings thereon; and the text of the draft conventions and recommendations adopted by the Conference. Many of these publications are no doubt necessary for the dissemination of technical information among employers, trade unions and governments, but amongst them all I see few of any value in educating and stimulating public opinion generally on international labour questions and their relation

to this country, nor in marshalling it in solid and sympathetic support behind the Organization.

For the ignorance and apathy of the British public the British Government must bear no small share of responsibility. There rests on it as the virtual progenitor of the Organization a peculiar obligation to further by every possible means its prestige and influence and to ground its foundations deep in the sympathies and suffrages of the British people. When M. Clemenceau announced at the opening general session (*séance plénière*) of the Peace Conference, to the surprise at any rate of the French public, that, added to the two commissions, one to investigate who and what was responsible for the war, and the other to report on the crimes committed in the war, there would be a third to deal with international labour legislation, the liveliest speculation centred round the last, which was a veritable 'bolt from the blue.' But in that atmosphere of general candour that seemed to surround all confidential negotiations at Versailles it soon transpired that the conception was one emanating from the British Government. To their credit let that be recorded; it was a far-sighted and statesmanlike recognition of evolutionary tendencies. No one who has given any consideration to the matter can doubt that if industrial peace and progress are to be secured and maintained, especially under the complex organization of modern industry which brooks no national boundaries, there must be uniform principles applied so far as practicable to the solution of the same labour problems in all countries connected by close political, social, economic, or commercial ties, or acting as common producers for the same foreign market.

M. Arthur Fontaine, Director of Labour to the Ministry of Labour in France, and chairman of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office has in his 'Review of International 'Labour Legislation' in Mr. Solano's book emphasised this and clearly traced out the attempts by private persons, public authorities and governments to secure uniform international labour conditions. Starting from the year 1818, when Robert Owen addressed his, at the time much criticised but now forgotten, memorial to the plenipotentiaries of the Holy Alliance, he comes down to 1906, when by diplomatic negotiation following on the spade and shovel pioneer work done by the International Association for Labour Legislation, the Berne Conventions were

signed by a number of important countries. These conventions, of which one prohibited the industrial employment of women at night, and the other prohibited the manufacture and sale of matches made with white phosphorus, really mark the beginning of international labour legislation. Those who wish to follow the history of the international organization of the workers from the days of the ' Federation of the Just,' for which Marx and Engels wrote the ' Communist Manifesto,' up through the chequered careers of the First International and the Second International to the Third or Moscow International, which met for the first time in Moscow on March 2nd 1919, should read Mr. Postgate's little book, ' The Workers' International,' compiled, the author says in the preface, after recourse to minute books and other original documentary sources.

Different justifications for international labour regulation appeal to various schools of thought. An employer feels he may be driven from foreign markets and even undercut in his home markets if he has to maintain a standard of wages and of working conditions higher than that to which his foreign competitor is bound to conform. The worker feels, although organized labour does not put it so, that he is prevented from enforcing by trade union action a high standard of wages and working conditions if foreign ' sweated ' goods are to be allowed to be manufactured and sold in competition with the products of his labour. The international jurist is continually striving for the same general principles of law and administration and for their practical application with such uniformity as circumstances reasonably admit under a common sanction. The humanitarian, frequently ignoring hard reality, visualises one cosmopolitan community where justice and social sympathy measured in terms of some one set of units reign supreme. The syndicalist and communist of course disdain international labour regulation as so much grout poured into the decaying fabric of modern society and serving merely to delay its much to be desired disintegration.

It is well to appreciate how far the British Government proceeded on their own initiative in regard to the incorporation in the Peace Treaty of machinery for the international regulation of labour. There were few or no constructive suggestions in that direction emanating from organized labour. The resolution of the Socialist and Labour Parties of the Allied Nations passed

at the conference of February 14th 1915, whilst registering their resolve to fight until victory was achieved, described the European conflict as a monstrous product of the antagonisms which tear asunder capitalist society, and expressed the hope that before long the working classes of all the different countries would find themselves again united against militarism and capitalist imperialism. Reparation and self-determination were the themes of the resolution ; there was no suggestion whatever of international regulation of labour conditions. The lengthy document known as the ' Memorandum on War Aims,' which was approved by the British Labour movement on December 28th 1917, and adopted by the Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference in February 1918, deals exhaustively with ' making the ' world safe for democracy,' territorial adjustments, economic relations, the problems of peace, the restoration of the devastated areas and reparation of wrong-doing ; but the only reference to the question of international labour regulation is the following modest passage inconsequentially tacked on to the end of the section on economic relations :

' The British Labour Party urges upon the Labour Parties of all countries . . . the need for an international agreement for the enforcement in all countries of the legislation on factory conditions, hours of labour and the prevention of ' sweating ' and unhealthy trades necessary to protect the workers against exploitation and oppression.'

There was no mention of an international organization and curiously enough in ' Labour and the New Social Order ' ordered by the Labour Party Conference in June 1918 to be issued as the Party's official programme on post-war reconstruction there is not, amidst all the wealth of proposals for home, foreign and colonial policy, one single reference to international labour regulation.

But to revert to the Peace Conference. The Commission on International Labour Legislation was appointed on January 31st 1919, under the presidency of Mr. Samuel Gompers ; it presented its report on March 24th of the same year. There were two lines of quite divergent policy advocated before the Commission, one that the Peace Treaty itself should lay down the specific wages and conditions of employment, welfare and so forth which should prevail in all States, members of the League of Nations—an obviously impracticable and wholly inexpedient

proposal; the other, the British suggestion that all such matters should be from time to time discussed and determined by a permanent authority for international labour regulation, representing the governments of the States who were parties to the League, and the employers' and workers' organizations in those States. The British members of the Commission were able to submit a well thought out and practical scheme for the constitution and procedure of such an authority—a constructive achievement for which Mr. H. B. Butler, C.B., the Deputy-Director of the International Labour Office is entitled to the chief credit. The scheme embodied proposals which had previously been discussed with several British trade union leaders, including the Rt. Hon. Arthur Henderson and the Rt. Hon. J. H. Thomas. As is customary in such junctures there was a compromise. The Commission agreed first on certain declarations of principle in regard to a number of industrial issues, and secondly to the constitution of a permanent international labour organization on the lines of the British scheme, with administrative powers wide enough to include the subject matter of those declarations and any other question of international labour importance.

The Peace Treaty reverses the order; it first constitutes the International Labour Organization; it then commits the signatories to certain controversial declarations of principle. The declarations, I venture to think, were a mistake; the whole position ought to have been left open for the International Labour Conference to review. One declaration, for example, subscribed to by the British Government in the Peace Treaty was 'equal pay for equal work.' At that moment a War Cabinet Committee was actually sitting in London trying to ascertain what that highly ambiguous and controversial formula involved—an instance of how the right hand of a government seldom knows what the left hand is doing.

Then there arose a further issue in regard to the powers of the International Labour Organization over labour legislation and administration in States, members of the League. The British scheme proposed that any draft convention adopted by the International Labour Conference by a two-thirds majority of the individuals entitled to vote thereat must be ratified by every State participating, unless within one year from the adoption the national legislature should have expressed its disapproval of the

draft convention. Therefore a State, irrespective of whether its own government representatives voted in favour of the convention or not, would have been bound to submit any draft convention so approved to its national legislature within the year. The French and Italian delegations claimed to go much further ; they contended that States should be under an obligation to ratify conventions so adopted, whether their legislative authorities approved them or not, with a right of appeal to the Executive Council of the League of Nations, which however could only invite the Conference to reconsider its decision. Whatever might be the attitude of the French or Italian legislatures, there is not much doubt that the British House of Commons would never tolerate such a complete negation of its legislative powers. In the end the Commission by a majority decided in favour of making ratification by any State of a draft convention of the Conference a matter subject to the approval of the national legislature or other competent authority.

On April 11, 1919, a plenary session of the Peace Conference incorporated with certain modifications the Report of the Commission on International Labour Legislation into the Peace Treaty as Part XIII. thereof.

Perhaps one ought here shortly to describe in broad outline the International Labour Organization as finally constituted. The Organization itself consists of the International Labour Conference and the International Labour Office with its Governing Body. The Conference is composed of four representatives of each State that is a member of the League of Nations ; two of the four are delegates of the government, and the other two represent the employers and the workpeople of the State. The Conference meets at least once a year, to consider an agenda framed by the Governing Body of the Office. The latter may frame its proposals in regard to each item on the agenda in one of two forms, either as a recommendation of principle to be submitted to the member States for consideration with a view to effect being given to it by national legislation or otherwise, or of a draft convention for ratification by the member States. Delegates vote individually, and a two-thirds majority of votes of the delegates present is necessary for adoption by the Conference of a recommendation or draft convention. The only limitation on the discretion of

the Conference is the provision in Article 405 of the Treaty :—

> 'In framing any recommendation or draft convention of general application, the Conference shall have due regard to those countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect development of industrial organization, or other special circumstances make the industrial conditions substantially different.'

Each member State is bound under ordinary circumstances within a year from the end of the Conference, and in exceptional circumstances within 18 months, to submit any recommendation or draft convention so adopted 'to the authority or authorities 'within whose competence the matter lies for the enactment of 'legislation or for other action.' If on such submission the authority or authorities decline to give effect to a recommendation, or to ratify a draft convention, the member State is free from all further obligation. On the other hand should the member State fail to effect such submission any other member State may refer the matter to the permanent Court of International Justice, but the Treaty is not clear as to what power the Court has to deal with such a contingency.

The International Labour Office is established at the seat of the League of Nations, *i.e.*, Geneva, as part of the organization of the League ; it forms the administrative machinery of the Conference, has such powers and duties as are assigned to it by the Conference, and is controlled by the Governing Body which consists of twenty-four persons who hold office for three years—twelve being representative of the member States of the League, of whom eight are nominated by the member States of the chief industrial importance and four nominated by the member States selected for the purpose by the government delegates to the Conference, excluding the delegates of the eight member States mentioned above. The other twelve persons are elected—six of them by the delegates to the Conference, representing the employers, and six of them by the delegates to the Conference representing the workers.

The power of the Conference to compel the enforcement by any member State of legislation passed by its legislature to give effect to any recommendation of the Conference which that State has accepted, or the observance by any member State of any draft convention which that State has ratified, is derived mainly from the force of international public opinion. Certain coercive

provisions are incorporated in the Peace Treaty but their practical effect is very doubtful. They only apply to the non-observance of conventions. If any State fails to observe a convention which it has ratified and another State complains, the Governing Body may secure the appointment by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations of a commission of inquiry which may report upon the alleged default, and indicate the measures, if any, of an economic character against the defaulting government which it considers to be appropriate, and which it considers other governments would be justified in adopting. An appeal lies to the permanent Court of International Justice. Economic measures so adjudged appropriate may be taken by any member State against a defaulting State. While these provisions apply to the non-observance of a convention by a member State which has ratified it, there are no coercive provisions of any kind applying to the case of a member State refusing or refraining to enforce legislation of its own, passed to give effect to a recommendation of the Conference.

The British Government is admittedly the parent of the Organization ; and in the eyes of the League owes a special duty to its offspring, namely to advocate the claims, advance the prestige, and emphasise the authority of the Organization among the people of Great Britain. Why the parent which so egregiously spoiled the child in its early life should now send it to Coventry needs explanation. The British Government has indeed of late behaved as though it were thoroughly ashamed of its offspring and would abandon it without compunction on the nearest door-step if a convenient occasion presented itself. When did the Organization find a place in a speech of a Cabinet Minister ? What bye-election government candidate ever stars it as one of the achievements of the Coalition ? A conspiracy of silence seems to have been deliberately adopted.

Is that attitude permanently possible ? Whether by the consolidating process of evolutionary growth, or under the disruptive stress of revolution, national industrial aspirations will more and more in the future express themselves internationally, and even if that be regarded by some as a disease of modern civilisation, the remedy cannot be local if the disease is general. The stern alternative before the Government is, either themselves to maintain the evolution of general industrial

problems on constitutional lines through the agency of the International Labour Organization, or as the price of inaction to see one of the revolutionary Internationals harness their fiery steeds to the lumbering vehicle.

Few people have any adequate conception of the prodigious growth of these Internationals during recent years.* They begin with the Second International, pledged to the gradual nationalisation or municipalisation of industries and to the establishment of a Socialist Commonwealth through the conquest by Labour of governmental power ; to it the British Labour Party is affiliated. It has passed a resolution approving of the International Labour Organization. Then there is the Third International, or the Communist International, as it has now re-christened itself. This is generally known as the Moscow International. Its object is the establishment of the Bolshevist regime throughout the world. Next comes the International Working Union of Socialist Parties which is open to all Socialist parties not members of the Second or Third Internationals ; its aims are class-war and the ultimate domination of the working class through direct action (mass strikes, armed rebellion, etc.) (*sic*). To it the Independent Labour Party of this country has given its allegiance, with a reservation however against the use of force.

Amongst the organizations more definitely trade-unionist there is the International Federation of Trade Unions, commonly known as the Amsterdam International with an affiliated trade-union membership of 24,000,000 persons, of whom six and a half millions are in Great Britain and eight and a half millions in Germany. This was the organization from which Mr. Samuel Gompers and the American Federation of Labour withdrew because of its international political aspirations. At its London Conference in 1920 it passed a resolution in favour of international mass action for the realisation of a new social system ; it too has resolved to co-operate with the International Labour Organization. As a competitor to the Amsterdam International there is the 'Red' Trade Union International of Moscow, sometimes

* Much useful information will be found in Part II of that most excellent little book, 'The Labour International Handbook,' edited by Mr. R. Palme Dutt, the Secretary of the International Section of the Labour Research Department.

called the International Council of Trade and Industrial Unions, which works in conjunction with the Third International and was formed to precipitate social revolution, establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, and effect the destruction of capitalism and the bourgeois State. One of its declared objects is to conduct a determined struggle against the International Labour Office. Failure and neglect on the Government's part to support the cause of the International Labour Organization is driving moderate Labour into some one of these Internationals, or out of one less extreme into another more so.

The final test of what the Organization accomplishes is the degree to which member States, each in their respective countries, enforce, by law or administrative regulation, the conventions and recommendations of the Conference which have been ratified or accepted by the State, but that test cannot be applied for some time. Still the Organization has already given earnest of what it can effect. The first Conference at Washington in October 1919 was held under the most inauspicious conditions, for at that very time the United States Senate were refusing to ratify the Peace Treaty, and criticising no part of it so bitterly as the labour provisions. Professor Hetherington who attended the Conference gives a luminous account, interspersed with some candid comments, in his book 'International Labour 'Legislation.' In the face of trying difficulties, the Conference won through. It adopted draft conventions in respect of

(1) an 8-hour day and a 48-hour week ; (2) unemployment ; (3) the employment of women before and after child birth ; (4) the employment of women during the night ; (5) the minimum age for admission of children to industrial employment ; (6) the night work of young persons employed in industry. And recommendations in respect of (1) unemployment ; (2) reciprocity of treatment of foreign workers ; (3) prevention of anthrax ; (4) protection of women and children against lead poisoning ; (5) establishment of government health services ; (6) application of the Berne Convention of 1906 prohibiting the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches.

That represents no small achievement. The second Conference was held in Genoa in June, 1920 ; draft conventions were then adopted in regard to (1) the minimum age for admission of children to employment at sea ; (2) unemployment indemnity in case of loss or foundering of the ship ; (3) establishment of

facilities for finding employment for seamen. In addition recommendations were passed concerning hours of work in the fishing industry and in inland navigation; the establishment of national seamen's codes; and unemployment insurance for seamen.

How far the various member States have ratified these conventions and accepted the recommendations will be announced at the third Conference at Geneva this October. Great Britain so far has formally ratified the Washington Conventions (2), (4), (5) and (6); and the Genoa Convention (1). These were either covered by pre-existing British legislation and administrative practice, or were provided for by the Women, Young Persons and Children (Employment) Act passed in 1920. The Government refused to ratify Washington Conventions (1) and (3) for the sound reason stated in the House of Commons on May 27th 1921 (Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 142, C. 483).

Short as the life of the International Labour Organization has been, sufficient experience has been gained to enable a close observer to make some suggestions for strengthening its influence and increasing its efficiency. First and foremost it must evince no bias or partiality towards socialism; if any British industries are to be 'socialised,' according to the recipe of any particular blend of industrial thought, that is a political adventure which ought to receive its inspiration, and gather its stimulus, only from a ballot-box expression of the British electorate's views. Whatever other nations may do or think, or for that matter the International Labour Organization itself, we shall claim to tread our own path according to the conceptions of British genius, however illogical they may seem to the continental mind.

The inside, and not even decorously suppressed, views of the directorate of the International Labour Organization with regard to socialism give rise to some misgiving. Under the Peace Treaty the Organization is practically a law unto itself. M. Albert Thomas, the Director, writes in Mr. Solano's book :—

'Another important point is the relative autonomy which is 'granted to the International Labour Organization. It is not 'merely a section of the League of Nations, nor a section of its 'permanent secretariat. On the contrary it has the power to 'initiate its own policy and to carry it out as a completely

'independent body.' When one looks at the list of the studies and reports published by the International Labour Office and appended to each number of the *Review*, one would never imagine that there were three parties concerned in industry as at present organized : the employers, the workers and the public. These publications emphasize the importance of the industrial and political aims of the workers—a perfectly fair procedure, if equal treatment is meted out to the other two parties. But that is not done in these publications and the interests of employers and the public seem to be of little concern to the Office. It is impossible to forget that its distinguished director was one of the foremost of French Socialists ; his personal predilections are not likely to have changed.

The autonomous position which the Office asserts, and the use which it is making of it, are undoubtedly arousing hostility among those sections of the public that follow its proceedings. The Office is prosecuting inquiries both of a political and of an economic nature, basing its right to do so on the convenient fiction that they are labour questions. The Peace Treaty confers neither expressly nor by implication any such powers upon the Office. A few illustrations will suffice. At the instance of certain Spanish trade unions and without any authority from the International Labour Conference, the Office announced its intention of prosecuting an inquisition into the freedom of action accorded by the Spanish Government to trade unions. The Spanish Government protested that of such a matter it intended to be the judge, and curtly intimated that the prosecution of any such inquiry would involve the withdrawal of Spain from the International Labour Organization. The inquiry was abandoned.

An amusing instance was afforded by Poland. Perturbed by Soviet propaganda, the Polish Government requested the Office to conduct an inquiry into the Soviet regime in Russia and insisted on its right to do so. This however came to nought, not from any disinclination on the part of the Office to act but because of the contumacy of the Moscow autocracy and its refusal to co-operate ! When however later the Office wanted for its own reasons to conduct an inquiry into the Upper Silesian impasse, its right to do so was traversed strenuously by the Polish Government. At the present time the Office is arranging for a bombastic international inquiry into production, a matter which

appears to be wholly outside the purview of its functions under the Treaty. These inquisitions, and especially the usurpation of powers to conduct them, go far to prejudice the influence of the Organization ; they are precisely the functions which would be exercised by a Super-International Parliament of Labour, to which some of the more extreme sections of socialist opinion unsuccessfully tried to elevate the Organization at its birth.

Passing to matters which are admittedly within the proper jurisdiction of the International Labour Office, there are certain respects in which one would welcome a deeper and higher appreciation by the Office of what its legitimate functions are. The Office, as has already been explained, determines the agenda for each meeting of the Conference, and in respect of each item on the agenda prepares for the information of the Conference a report and draft of the particular convention or recommendation in regard thereto which it suggests the Conference should adopt. What is plainly intended by the Peace Treaty is that the Conference should be fully and fairly informed by the Office of the whole of the circumstances surrounding the question in regard to which it is asked to pledge itself and of the case for and the case against the course recommended by the Office, a condition of things demanding on the part of the Office what lawyers in this country call *uberrima fides*, or what ordinary folks call common candour. But the Office apparently recognises no such obligation as being incumbent on it, and is not above assuming the invidious status of a partisan.

What the Office professes to do may be set out as follows :— A question is placed upon the agenda. The Office draws up a questionnaire ' relating exclusively to the possibility of elaborating ' draft conventions or recommendations on the question at ' issue and to the provisions which it may or may not seem ' necessary or possible to include in them ' ; it invites replies thereto from the various governments ; on receipt of them it draws up an explanatory report and formulates its proposed recommendation or convention.

That is the profession. What is the actual practice ? Take as an illustration the question of ' the prohibition of the use of ' white lead in painting ' which is on the agenda for the forthcoming Conference at Geneva. This raises the following issue :—

Does the whole of the evidence justify the Conference in saying that the injurious effects of white lead are of such a character that no regulations governing its use can prevent their occurrence and that therefore the only course is to prohibit the use of white lead altogether and to replace it by some substitute ?

The questionnaire circulated by the Office in regard to this item is prefaced by a report which should be read at length. It is impossible to imagine a less judicial document, or one where all the attributes of an open mind are so conspicuously absent. It is wholly and uncompromisingly prohibitionist. At times to maintain its absolutism it is guilty of *suppressio veri*. The assertion is made—baldly and boldly—that there are efficient substitutes for white lead, but all reference is omitted to the fact that in certain countries governmental commissions have found rightly or wrongly that there is none. It alleges without proof that statistics demonstrate the increasing need for prohibition, but gives no explanation of the chaotic condition of the available statistics, and makes no reference to the amazing diminution in lead-poisoning cases in Great Britain since 1900 as the result of our Home Office regulation. The choice is stated to be between prohibition or no prohibition, but the fact is glossed over that Austria, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Germany and Great Britain have adopted regulation with very great success. If such is a fair example of the scientific method and impartiality of the technical department of the Office, it inspires but little confidence. This kind of partisan report is exactly typical of the polemical socialist, who suppresses all evidence that conflicts with his preconceived views and asseverates and reiterates without qualification that capitalism is the cause of every ill from which society suffers, that it cannot be regulated, and that the extermination of capitalism is the only remedy. To prohibit the use of white lead in painting would inflict most serious injury on England and Australia, and force us to buy zinc substitutes from foreign monopolists. If the life and health of the worker can only be safeguarded by prohibition at such cost, there undoubtedly should be prohibition, but it should be adopted as the result of an impartial and comprehensive inquiry into all sides of the case and not of an unfair presentation of one aspect only. It was not without reason that the question of the prohibition of white lead for painting degenerated in France into a political and not very elevating controversy.

Socialist friends of the Office vindicate the conducting of these inquisitions and assert the right of the Office to lead the way instead of contenting itself with the compilation of an impartial presentation of the full case for and against each item on the agenda. They point to the preamble to Part XIII of the Peace Treaty which runs as follows :—

'Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice ; and whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice ; hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled ; and an improvement of these conditions is urgently required : as for example (and then a number of matters are specified) ; and whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries ; the High Contracting Parties, moved by sentiments of justice and humanity, as well as by the desire to secure the permanent peace of the world, agree to the following (namely Articles 387 to 427 which provide for the constitution of the International Labour Organization).'

Conditions of labour in torrid climes are no doubt affected by heat, probably in all countries by the political constitution ; would then the scientific department of the Office be entitled to launch an inquisition into the question of neutralising the sun's rays in India, or replacing the monarchy of Siam by a republic ?

It is much to be deplored that this preamble was ever interjected into the scheme for the creation of the International Labour Organization, which was otherwise complete and logical without it. That its interpellation makes otiose redundancy is evident by comparing the improvement of conditions, which it states are urgently required, with the methods and principles declared by the High Contracting Parties in Article 427 to be of special and urgent importance. That it springs from an entirely different source from that of the rest of Part XIII is obvious if one compares the language in which a particular improvement in conditions is described in the preamble and the different language in which the same thing is described in Article 427. Then again the category of urgent improvements in the preamble is materially different from the category which Article 427 contains. The explanation is very simple. The 'Second International' was sitting in convention at Berne at the same time as the

Commission on International Labour Legislation was sitting in Paris. A 'Labour Charter' was drawn up at Berne, leaders of the Second International were consulted in regard to Part XIII of the Treaty and there is no doubt that the preamble was their contribution.

My next criticism is one which will no doubt expose me to the charge of unregenerate British insularism. Although industrial conditions in this country are far from perfect, they are much in advance of those in any other country, and our industrial law and regulations are administered by our government departments—the Home Office, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Health—with impartiality, freedom from political bias and devotion to efficiency unsurpassed in any other country in the world. Nor is there any other country which has the wealth of industrial experience possessed by our own. That being so I am not content to see another country, even though it is our brave ally, France, possessing through the director of the International Labour Office and the chairman of the Governing Body the virtual control of international labour administration. This I say with the greatest respect for M. Albert Thomas and M. Arthur Fontaine, and admiring as I do their wide industrial experience and other distinguished services in the cause of international labour. But clearly both the director and the chairman ought not to be chosen from the same member State.

One essential condition to the success of international labour regulation is co-ordination of our home labour administration, close touch between the latter and the Organization in Geneva, and continuity of policy and personnel. There is surely something wrong when one finds the British Cabinet instructing Mr. Barnes by cable to agree to the 48-hour convention at Washington, while at the same time the Ministry of Transport was negotiating an incompatible working-week agreement with the railway men, the completion of which compelled the British Government afterwards to refuse to ratify the convention. The good faith of Great Britain is not enhanced in the eyes either of home Labour or of foreign States by such a *volte-face*. An inter-departmental committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Montagu Barlow, who has the interests of international labour most warmly at heart, is now charged to effect the requisite co-ordination. His capable direction will doubtless ensure that such a contretemps is not

likely to occur again. And there may yet come a day when the reins of labour administration, now entwined in the coils of the Home Office, Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Health administration, may be gathered into the hands of the Ministry of Labour, where they undoubtedly ought to be. But British interests require, to my mind, more definite safeguarding. It is not sufficient merely to have as at present a delegate on the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, who deals from time to time with international labour questions as a diversion from or addition to his ordinary departmental work. The government delegate of Great Britain on the Governing Body, would naturally be one of the two British Government delegates at the Conference ; he ought to be a person permanently appointed for that purpose, and his sole duty should be to deal with international labour. There are certain fundamental requirements ; he must have personal experience of all the varied phases of labour administration in this country ; must personally know and be known by the employers' organizations and the trade unions ; and must possess some knowledge of political influences and cabinet vagaries. Above all he must be an accomplished linguist. In industrial affairs, as in all other human relations, official correspondence is singularly unilluminating ; it is what a man says and how he says it, and more often what he does not say, that gives the information.

There are some minor modifications of constitution and procedure, of which both the Conference and the Governing Body stand in need. The present system of election to the latter, under which European member States possess twenty out of the twenty-four members of the Governing Body manifestly calls for amendment, and this, no doubt, will be effected at the forthcoming Geneva Conference. Again, the system of voting at Conferences whereby the State of Panama has precisely the same power as Great Britain needs reconsideration.

An International Labour Organization is inevitable, and I think, essential. The choice lies between Geneva and Moscow. Can any friend of humanity hesitate to say which it ought to be ? It will take a strong effort by all member States to secure Geneva, with the forces now at work urging towards Moscow. The Geneva International Labour Organization deserves the support of every thinking citizen of this country, but in our own interests

we must insist that it emancipates itself from Socialist entanglements; that it maintains an attitude of strict yet sympathetic impartiality; that it renounces its claim to break through the boundaries of labour questions and passing across the gaps, to conduct free-booting incursions into the political and economic affairs of member States. Otherwise Geneva will become merely a stage on a roundabout road to Moscow.

LYNDEN MACASSEY.

THE GOVERNMENT OF LONDON

1. European Cities at Work. By FREDERIC C. HOWE. T. Fisher Unwin. 1913.
2. Municipal Government in Continental Europe. By DR. ALBERT SHAW. T. Fisher Unwin. 1895.

THE London County Council sent, in December 1920, a deputation to the Prime Minister to urge the importance of appointing a Royal Commission to enquire into: (1) the particular services which should be brought under a single administration throughout Greater London; (2) the area of Greater London which should be unified in respect of those services; (3) the authority to which should be entrusted the administration of those services; and (4) the relation of that authority to other authorities in that area. The Prime Minister, after hearing those who spoke for the Council, said that the *prima facie* case for an enquiry was overwhelming. The Royal Commission has now been constituted, with Lord Ullswater as Chairman, and with the following reference:—

'To enquire and report what, if any, alterations are needed in the local government of the Administrative County of London and the surrounding districts, with a view to securing greater efficiency and economy in the administration of local government services and to reducing any inequalities which may exist in the distribution of local burdens as between different parts of the whole area.'

This reference is rather less clear and explicit than that which the London County Council desired, but no doubt, from the nature of the case, the enquiry must evolve on the lines indicated by the Council.

The London County Council was driven to its conclusion that large re-organisation of some kind is necessary by ever-increasing practical difficulties in administration on the present lines. These are due to the great growth of London since the present administrative county was formed, to modern and copious legislation which has much extended the sphere of municipal activity, to developments in means of transport and locomotion, and to other causes. Old forms no longer suit new things. The old bottles will not hold the new wine.

What is meant by existing London from the administrative point of view, and what by ' Greater London ' ? The boundaries of the existing administrative county were drawn in 1855, for a population of then about 2½ millions, long before the birth of the County Council. They were defined in order to constitute the districts which should send representatives to the Metropolitan Board of Works, a body created to carry out certain purposes which lay beyond the frontier of the cities of London and Westminster, or of any of the old vestries. They were defined very casually, and on no sound principle. Why, for instance, were Woolwich and Lewisham included, and not West Ham ? The Local Government Act of 1888 made this area a county, without altering the boundaries or attempting to include some continuous suburbs which had already straggled up along main roads outside it. The ' Greater London ' referred to in reports by the Registrar-General is that area within a radius, roughly speaking, of fifteen miles from Charing Cross, which constitutes the Metropolitan Police District. The County of London contained at the census of 1921 a population of 4,483,249, in an area of 116.9 square miles ; the metropolitan police area contained a population of 7,476,168 in a space of 691.8 square miles. Thus the county population is nearly two-thirds of the whole, and it is a steadily diminishing proportion.

Anyone who travels by train or road from the centre of London can see the division of character where ends the continuous house-to-house mass and un-built-over spaces begin to intervene between one crowd of houses and another. These spaces increase in size until at last the traveller sees only patches of villas, outposts of the great city, mixed up with the first country farms and cottages. Since the legal boundaries were formed in 1855, continuous London has flowed over them on every side, except for a small area in the west, now being rapidly absorbed, and a rather large area in the south-east. Boundaries which in 1855, and even in 1888, left plenty of margin are now decidedly too small. Huge is the growth of practically continuous town districts outside the old county boundaries. Croydon, for instance, has been swollen from about 30,000 in 1861 to 190,000 in 1921 ; Tottenham from 10,000 to 137,000 ; West Ham from 38,000 in 1861 to 301,000 in 1921 ; Willesden from 4,000 to 195,000 ; East Ham has converted 3,000 into 143,000.

While the population of outer London has been growing, that of innermost London has been diminishing, and that of the whole county area has also shown a tendency to decrease. For the first time at the census of 1911 a slight decrease appeared in the total population of the whole area administered by the London County Council. At the census of 1921 this decrease had more than doubled, and stood at 38,436, while in Greater London the increase since 1911 was 224,810. As means of locomotion have been improved and extended, the fate of the old City, once swarming with people who lived as well as worked there, has fallen in some degree upon all the innermost surrounding boroughs. Private dwellings have more and more ceased to be, and their place has been taken by great commercial buildings, shops, warehouses, and offices, crowded by day and empty at night. Yet in occupation and interests the population of inner and outer London are almost one. For fifteen miles and more round Charing Cross hosts of men and women work daily in the inner area but dwell and sleep in the suburbs. There would be a vast difference between a census taken at mid-day and one taken, as now, at mid-night. In the day hours the suburban dwellers use the streets, drains, and other advantages maintained at the cost of those who own or occupy houses and buildings within the County of London. These last, in revenge, more and more use the roads maintained by surrounding authorities.

Obviously, if an area contains a population one in character and interests it should have, both for reasons of economy and efficiency, a single administration for those services which are not, like local parks, or libraries, or side-roads, almost entirely limited to single parts of the area, but are of use to the whole, or to large portions of it. Services of this kind are main roads, water supply, electric power supply, main sewers, tramways, higher education. In the case of a police force or fire brigade, unity of organization and command is essential. Modern motor transport and telephone systems make it possible to use smaller numbers in these forces with greater effect, since they can be sent much more rapidly than before to more distant scenes of action.

The government of Greater London has not developed with changes in population and means of transport and communication, and with the requirements imposed by modern legislation. The present situation resembles that in Germany before the creation,

in 1871, of the modern Reich. There was the Prussian kingdom, vastly greater and wealthier than any other State, and round its frontiers a number of other principalities and powers of varying size and weight. The German States met in conference and made agreements for various trade or military purposes, but there was no real parliament or executive to transact the common affairs of Germany, only endless negotiations and special arrangements.

Or again, the comparison might be made with the American States before the Federal Union was effected, or with the Canadian, or Australian, or South African States or Provinces before a central executive and legislature for affairs common to all had been established. Practical difficulties with regard to customs duties, railways, and other matters led to federal union, in the interest alike of efficiency and of economy, both in time and money. The County Council of London, representing a population of nearly $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions, is itself the central power in a federal union of borough councils within its area. These last discharge the more purely local duties, while the County Council has charge of interests transcending the limits of any one borough, such as education, main sewers, fire brigade. In some affairs, such as housing, or street-widening, the County and Borough Councils can act either separately or co-operatively. The County Council sanctions loans by borough councils and advances capital to them. This federal system works well enough within the boundaries of the administrative county, but all around it lie a great number of independent neighbours of every possible kind and dimension. There are the County Councils of Kent, Essex, Surrey, Middlesex, within whose jurisdiction, for some purposes, parts of the Metropolitan Police Area fall. There are county boroughs, large as large cities, like Croydon, and urban districts of every size. If any of these wish, for instance, to be connected with the London sewage system, special agreements have to be made. One way of meeting the difficulty is the creation of *ad hoc* authorities with rating powers, for the whole area. But distinct *ad hoc* rating authorities usually lead to extravagance, because, intent on its own special object, each taxes the ratepayer without regard to his other burdens. This was the best reason for abolishing the London and other School Boards. If the War Office and Admiralty could raise their own revenue independently of the general budget, this nation would be even nearer to bankruptcy than it is at present.

Mr. Ronald Norman, in the admirably lucid exposition of the case for inquiry which he made to the Prime Minister on behalf of the London County Council, gave three instances of the difficulty, or impossibility, of the present situation. One was that of housing. Under the recent, now half-abandoned, national policy, it became the statutory duty of all local authorities possessing housing powers to build a great number of new houses for the poorer classes. The London County Council possesses these powers, and so do also 121 other authorities within the Metropolitan Police Area of 'Greater London,' boroughs inside the county and local authorities outside it, and they can all, if they choose, acquire sites for building outside their own boundaries. The prospect was one of wild chaos. On most of its frontiers the London County Council and the Borough Councils would have had to build outside their own boundaries because there was no sufficient space within them. Then the outside authorities said: 'If you build in our territories for your people, this will involve us in dreadful and incalculable expenditure on building and maintaining schools, drainage works, street maintenance and other things, which will not nearly be met by the rates on cottages of this class and assessable value. You, who possess all the great commercial buildings and houses of high value, will not have the power, even if you had the will, to contribute to this cost, the direct consequence of your action.' The outside authorities therefore proposed that a new *ad hoc* authority, representing all authorities in Greater London, and with power of raising a rate for the whole area, should be constituted. When this proposal was made in conference the London County Council did not see its way to join in a cumbrous body representing 122 local authorities, nor, very rightly, is it in favour of the creation of more *ad hoc* operating and rating authorities. But, on the other hand, if an authority like the London County Council proposes to build outside its own boundary, every authority ruling over the occupied territory can throw, if it pleases, endless difficulties in the way of estate development by means of its power over roads, drainage and like things. All this involves delays, negotiations, bargaining, and trouble.

The second instance given was that of electric power supply. An Act passed in 1919 contemplates the creation of an *ad hoc*

authority, representing the whole Greater London area, to supply and control this force which, by its nature, is the very reverse of local and demands unity of treatment in the interests of efficiency and economy. The proposed authority is to be an operating body, and to be efficient must be small. At the same time all the authorities concerned with the burden of existing undertakings are to be represented. In the Greater London area there are eighty-four such authorities. How, asked Mr. Norman, is one to make an efficient working body out of so many? This is one of the things so very much easier to enact in Parliament, in order to conciliate opposition and carry a measure smoothly through, than to work out in practice.

Then again there is the case of new arterial roads leading out of London. These are urgently needed in order to relieve the congested traffic which now, with the advent of motor-power, in addition to purely local traffic, swarms in and out of London from and to places near or far away. Now, within Greater London, there are almost 130 local authorities having power with regard to roads. A complete arterial road scheme has been devised in conferences between these authorities, but actually to make any road under that scheme involves agreement by negotiation with every authority through whose territory the road passes. However much it may agree in theory, no suburban authority really much wishes for a new or greatly enlarged road to be made through its territory. Before it looms vaguely and spectrally the vast modern cost of keeping a road in good condition; there is the thought that such a main road will chiefly be used by outsiders who do not contribute to the local rates. It is the most natural thing in the world that a local authority, when it comes to the point of action, should oppose as many delays as possible to the construction of a new road. Much in this line can be done by adjourned discussions, conscientious desire for more information, renewed conferences, slowness in replying to letters, and appeals to that proved and trusted retardator, a government office. In the end inevitably emerges the idea of another *ad hoc* authority, notwithstanding the sound arguments against it. If a thing must be done, and there is no one authority with power to do it, and adjacent authorities cannot agree within a reasonable time, a new special authority has to be created.

Town-planning is closely akin to road-making, and also

to housing. It seems obvious that these modern powers should be exercised by a single authority of some kind.

Such are the difficulties of the present situation. As Mr. Ronald Norman said in summarizing the case to the Prime Minister :—

'These are real difficulties, and they must be met if the work of Greater London is to be done efficiently. Day after day almost, certainly week after week, Parliament is throwing new and important duties upon us, which frighten me sometimes, and you cannot expect that we can efficiently carry them through if we have only antiquated tools to work with ; it is not fair. These difficulties can only be settled in one of two ways : either by a series of isolated experiments, which must result in a perfect chaos, a welter of competing authorities, on which the County Council may, or may not, appoint its representatives, but which would leave the County Council as a sort of Electoral College, doing nothing itself, merely appointing persons to represent it on other bodies ; or they must be solved on a single coherent plan for all the services which are purely municipal services. We impress upon you as strongly as we can the urgency of the problem, and the importance of solving it upon a coherent plan.'

The question is large indeed. Nothing less is involved than the best way of providing for the health, education, means of transit, security—so far as these things depend upon common organization—of a population equal to that of Canada, largely exceeding that of Ireland, Scotland, Australia, or many of the smaller independent European nations. Something else is at stake also : the cause of real local self-government against the increasing encroachments of central bureaucracy. This goes beyond the question of London and concerns the local government of the country as a whole. All students of this subject have noticed that in Germany there is far more real local freedom and self-government and less central control than there is in England, and many think that if Germany recovers from the ruin caused by the ambitious errors of her central government, it will be largely due to the efficient self-government of her cities. German cities, under a general law (in Prussia the Act of 1853), can do anything which concerns their own welfare, within their own area, so long as they do not run up against any national law. German cities also have adequate power to raise their own revenue, and that not, like English cities, by a single direct tax, most unjust in its incidence, but by a variety of means ; they are self-supporting and independent of the national exchequer, and of the control

which financial dependence brings with it. They are true republics within the limits of municipal action. An American writer, Mr. Frederic Howe, attributes to this freedom the fact that the German city has become 'the model of the world.'

'For the German city is free, free to own almost anything, free to control the individual and his property, free to borrow, free to experiment, free to develop as it wills. Its bonds to the State rest so lightly that it is almost unconscious of its chains. The citizen is a subject of the city, just as he is a subject of the State and the Empire. And his devotion to his city is very much like his devotion to the Fatherland.'*

It may almost be said that a German city can do anything which an individual can do. A German city can, like an individual Englishman, but unlike the London County Council, buy and hold land for no definite purpose, or develop it as a garden city, or sell or lease it, without the slightest reference to, or permission of, the central State authorities. It can build or endow a theatre, or lay down tramways, or run an omnibus service without the sanction of any parliament or central government department. Englishmen will be surprised to discover that the corporate freedom of Berlin is far greater than that of London. A citizen of Berlin or Frankfort would, on the other hand, be astonished to hear that when, last year, the London County Council wished to run omnibuses to link up dead ends of tramways, they had to seek power from parliament, and were refused it, except within quite useless limits. What concern have the parliamentary representatives of Great Britain with the omnibuses of London? Yet Germany has always been represented as the home of autocracy, and England as the home of local freedom and self-government. Another writer, Dr. Albert Shaw, says:—

'There are, in the German conception of city government, no limits whatever to the municipal functions. It is the business of the municipality to promote in every feasible way its own welfare and the welfare of its citizens.'†

Power was not in Germany, as in England, doled out to cities in drops, each costing money to lawyers, by a jealous parliament, but was given once for all and in full abundance. The German Reich, in virtue of the large home-rule existing in its constituent

* 'European Cities at Work.'

† 'Municipal Government in Continental Europe,' p. 323.

states and in its cities, has been the very home of full and free corporate action. In the opinion of every observer, the result has been that in almost every respect of lay-out, sanitation, art-beauty, convenience, means of civilised recreation, practical and artistic education and culture, and also in just civic pride and patriotism, and sense of full responsibility, German cities have so far excelled those of, probably, any other nation. At any rate German cities did so excel before the war and the ensuing change in German fortunes ; and this firm fabric contributed much to the long stand made by Germany against vast odds. We were out-paced by Germany between 1870 and 1914 in the march of civic civilisation, and were not too proud to pay to the German cities, in some of our modern legislation, the homage of imitation. Unlike the German cities, those of England are bound by petty restrictions due apparently to central officials who prepare for a guileless parliament measures connected with local government. English local authorities, although elected by the same people as those who elect the House of Commons, can do nothing which they have not express statutory power to do, either under general laws or under expensively obtained special Acts of Parliament. This is the distinction between English and German cities. German cities can do all that they desire to do within their own limits, English cities only what they are expressly authorised to do. Even where the latter have power its exercise is, in many cases, shackled by innumerable clauses in the Acts providing that this or that step will require the sanction of this or that ministry. Ask the reason for all these apparently unnecessary servitudes, imposed upon democratically elected bodies, and you will be told that, although, perhaps, London or Liverpool or other big cities and counties might be trusted, yet there must be one rule for all, and you have to consider the case of small cities or boroughs which have sometimes to be restrained from prodigality, and, more often, to be goaded into activity, by the superior wisdom of Whitehall.

Of all plans for making State interference and control necessary, and for decreasing the sphere of local freedom, there is none so excellent as that of allowing local authorities inadequate means of independent revenue, placing upon them duties which their revenue will not meet, and then filling up the deficit by grants from the national exchequer, and requiring control as a

condition of grants. In this country a local authority can only raise revenue, apart from any profits (too often replaced in these days by losses) from tramways or other municipal undertakings, by means of the rate on house-occupiers, a tax of singularly unjust incidence and therefore unpopular, and difficult to press beyond a certain limit. Mr. Goschen, over thirty years ago, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, took certain steps in a better direction, that of giving to local authorities some share in revenue of an excise and licence kind, but this policy has not been followed up or expanded to meet the needs of the times. It would be quite possible to give the local authorities sufficient means for meeting their expenditure without grants from the national exchequer. Those extremely local sources of revenue, schedule A. of the income tax and the old inhabited house duty and land tax, and most of the licence duties, might be transferred to them in lieu of grants. They might be allowed to tax local advertisements, and the power of taxing places of amusement might be transferred to them. They might even be allowed to raise limited revenue duties upon goods entering a town, as the Port of London Authority now does; or, like the old City of London duties on wine and coal, which were removed in 1894, after they had paid for the building of the Thames Embankment.

Socialist writers and wire-pullers oppose any proposals of this kind. They are foes to local freedom and adherents of the central machine largely because they control that machine and can make it move in the direction which they desire. In education local authorities have long lost all independence as the result of receiving financial assistance from the central government; but till lately 'housing' was a matter in which local authorities had a very fairly free hand. Dr. Addison's Act made it impossible for even the largest local authorities to carry out schemes of the size and cost thereby demanded by means solely of the additions which they could make to their one and unpopular source of revenue, the rates. Much the larger part of the cost had to be defrayed from the national exchequer, and with the grants came inseparably control. Every step then had to be submitted to the approval of the Ministry of Health; the purchase and lay-out of estates, the exact design and dimensions of houses, the terms of contracts with builders. The local authorities had to increase their own staffs to deal with the emergency, and the Ministry of

Health had vastly to increase the strength and cost of its staff, in order to check and oversee the work of the local authorities. In this way one more sphere of local freedom and free will has been quite recently lost, while the total cost of administration has been increased.

If it be asked why local authorities should not have sufficient means of raising revenue by local taxation adequate to meet that which is expected from them, the answer again is that great cities or counties could, perhaps, be entrusted with such powers, but that they could not be given to small authorities, and that it is not possible to give such power to the first and not to the last. Thus, both in the sphere of finance and in that of exercise of administrative powers, the plea for the gift of greater freedom to local authorities is countered by the objection that many of them are not large or wise enough to be entrusted with it without injuring the public interests. One might, for instance, it is said, give a much larger allowance of administrative and financial independence to a whole county than to some small city within it, which for historical reasons has been allowed to have full county powers, and therefore discharges the same functions as does the council of the whole county. In law the position of a great county with perhaps a million people is the same as that of an ancient city with, say, 30,000 inhabitants, therefore the central control over their action must be the same except that, in practice, it may be exercised less stringently over the county than over the city. As the law now stands, the London County Council possesses the same housing powers as does some rural district authority in Merionethshire, with the result that the authority representing $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions of people and the authority representing twenty thousand must equally submit their housing operations in every stage for the sanction of officials belonging to the Ministry of Health.

The opponents of local liberty might possibly concede that without harm London, or Liverpool, or Birmingham, or Glasgow might be placed upon a self-supporting financial basis without the aid of exchequer grants. But they contend that if the whip-hand given to various government departments by the grant-in-aid and control system were taken away, many smaller authorities would cease to be active in the cause of social progress, and their territories would relapse into Cimmerian darkness, whence they

have even now only partially emerged under the wise guidance and strong pressure of the headquarters bureaucrat. This is the old argument between the benefit of freedom and the benefit of efficiency. German municipal examples show that it is possible to reconcile a high degree of local municipal freedom with a high degree of efficiency, and that the two are in fact most intimately connected. Can the same thing be done in this country, and under what conditions? If, to some extent, one must either sacrifice efficiency to freedom or freedom to efficiency, it would be natural to most Englishmen to sacrifice efficiency to freedom, believing, as they do, that, in the end, if we lose freedom we shall lose energy, and losing energy we shall, in the long run, lose efficiency.

One way of meeting the argument that larger powers and wider freedom can be given to great cities and counties than to small ones is to draw a line between the two classes of local authorities and to give a higher degree of self-government and revenue-raising power to the larger bodies while the latter were kept in their present position. It would be like the distinction made in the British Empire between fully self-governing Dominions, and Colonies or Protectorates not yet entrusted with fully self-governing powers. The London County Council might be given a sphere of free action equal to that of the municipality of Berlin, while Exeter or Ipswich was kept under the present tutelage. The objection is that distinctions of this kind are invidious and difficult to draw, and that inequality of treatment is sure to produce dissatisfaction. Differing schemes of government can be adopted for Colonies widely separated by distance and circumstance, but not for the homogeneous population of this small island.

The alternative method is, by a general measure, to re-arrange the areas of municipal administration in the same way as that in which the country has been re-divided into new electoral districts for parliamentary representation. Indeed the local government divisions might in many cases be made to correspond with the parliamentary divisions as in fact they used to do to a very large extent in the days before the first Reform Bill. Such a measure would meet with much opposition from the small local bodies which would be absorbed by neighbouring giants. But in any case that process of absorption must often take place

when a town outgrows its old boundaries; only at present the re-arrangement of boundaries has to be effected by a special Act of Parliament in each case, at immense cost to the ratepayers.

The Prime Minister. when he received the deputation from the London County Council, threw out this remark :—

> 'With regard to the matter you have put forward, you have put one of the most difficult problems of modern civilisation; and that is how you are to deal with the difficulties of rapidly-growing cities that cannot find room for their limbs within their own domains, and have got to extend beyond them. In the old days it used to be settled by cities that were states, which always struck me as far and away the simplest method of settling the problem. They owned the territories outside and they controlled the populations, and extension was a very easy matter for them. But I am afraid we cannot hope to renew the experiment, although there have been suggestions that something of that kind should be attempted under the name of devolution : that you should convert London into a state from being a city. But that is not what you are putting before the Government to-day.'

It would be easy to point out the historical causes why English cities were never in the position of those in Italy, or the Low Countries, or Germany, little republics ruling as many of the small towns and villages round them as they could control by strength or policy, while admitting, at the most, a shadowy allegiance to an emperor, king, or prince. In England the towns, though more truly self-governing in the Middle Ages than they are now, never controlled in an administrative sense the adjacent areas of which they were the commercial centres. For market and social purposes the natural unit is a town of some size, and, perhaps, on the average an area of five or six miles round it. Cross that limit and you will usually find yourself within the sphere of attraction of another town. Towns are like a constellation of stars, each with its satellites. But for administrative purposes, as things stand, a town is rigidly confined within its streets and immediate, more or less built-over, suburbs, while the rest of its natural territory falls within the administration of the county council in some matters, and adjacent rural district councils in others. Thus men bound together in every other way, and constantly meeting at market, and in the streets and shops of the local centre, are divided in matters of administration. A man living three miles from a municipal or county borough, if he wishes to have a hand in the educational administration of

his district, must go, perhaps by tedious, cross-country, local trains, to a council sitting in the county capital, perhaps twenty or thirty miles away. If his interest lies in roads, he must be a member of that council in respect of main roads, and of his rural district council in respect of secondary roads. It would be natural and convenient to him to do all this work in his own neighbouring town where he has other business, but he cannot. If towns, under the present system, are often areas too small for purposes of good administration, counties, on the other hand, are usually too large. It is difficult, in a county of any size, to get the best men to travel long distances, at modern railway fares, to do unpaid work. Men with enough leisure and income are becoming rare. The result is that rural county councils and their committees cannot be assembled frequently, and the work practically falls into the hands of officials supervised by a few members of the council who live in or near the county town, and are so good as to give much time for little honour and no pay. This device meets the difficulty and saves trouble, but it is not exactly in harmony with the idea of democratic municipal self-government. Besides, in a large county, so much more diversified than a large town, there is not at the central seat of administration sufficiently intimate knowledge of persons and circumstances throughout the whole area.

One county council, at least, is trying to meet this difficulty, in educational matters, by establishing District Education Boards. Each of these is to act in a town of some size and its natural market area of surrounding villages, and, practically, to do all the educational administrative work, subject to confirmation by the central county education committee. In one or two counties it has been deemed advisable to have more than one county council, in Sussex, for instance, and, of course, in Yorkshire. It would probably be true policy to redistribute areas of municipal government throughout England and Scotland, equalising the more rural districts so far as possible upon a basis of population and the natural, social, and commercial relation of towns and their environment. To the great cities a sufficient margin for expansion should be allotted. On these lines counties would disappear as administrative units, and the smaller towns and rural districts would be merged in larger units. The extinction of these last two species would be no cause for sentimental regret.

There might be some reason of sentiment for regretting that a county should no longer be co-terminous with an administrative authority, but county patriotism is an ancient feeling, strong enough to survive the loss of that modern institution, a county council. Yorkshire and Sussex have no less county patriotism than other counties as a result of the fact that their affairs are not administered by a single county council. The Frenchman, in sentiment and patriotism, is always a Norman, or Breton, or Burgundian, although his local affairs are more conveniently administered by his department.

The advantage of comparatively equal administrative areas would be worth having. The objection would be removed that too small towns could not be entrusted with a larger freedom and diminution of central control from Whitehall; the conduct of local affairs like road-construction and maintenance, water and power supply, drainage, etc., which transcend the limit of small districts, would be facilitated; men who cannot devote much time to unpaid active work in a too distant county centre could do so in their more adjacent centres, and could bring to bear more personal knowledge and acquaintance with persons and circumstances. Then also a certain narrowness of vision too often found in men all working in one town or rural district would be lessened when dwellers in a town and its surrounding natural area of country were combined in consultation and action.

If the whole of England were divided into new but natural administrative areas of the kind suggested, neither too large nor too small, there would still be certain affairs which concerned more than one of them, especially roads and road transport. It would be possible to establish for such affairs secondary bodies, representing groups of district authorities. But in view of the vast change in the use of roads, it would probably be the right policy to place upon the national government and tax-payer the construction and maintenance of the great through roads, as in France, leaving other roads to local authorities. For every reason, it would be better to have clear division of function and duties between the central State and the local authorities rather than to continue the present system of unequal partnership and money grants, involving a close control which diminishes freedom and responsibility, causes waste and delay, and makes it necessary to maintain great and costly central staffs in London. Clear

definition and clear division both of functions and of finance, as between central and local authorities, should be the basis of any scheme of reorganisation. Without this we are well on the way to complete State centralisation and the consequent destruction of local freedom, activity and energy. This was one of the roads which led the Roman Empire to ruin.

London government is a special and most difficult question. In the continuous area of London and its far-thrown suburbs, natural unity is combined with immense dimensions; special treatment is therefore necessary. The London County Council wisely suggested no solution of its own. The question is now *sub judice*, and it rests with the members of the Royal Commission to find a solution of the difficult problem submitted to them.

BERNARD HOLLAND.

COAL AND SMOKE

1. Gas Regulation Act, 1920.
2. The "James Forrest" Lecture. By Sir George Beilby. Institution of Civil Engineers. 1921.
3. Oxygen in Gas Production, *Trans. Inst. Gas Eng.*, 1919-20. By H. J. Hodsman and J. W. Cobb.

THE settlement effected in the recent prolonged coal strike is responsible for a fairly prevalent sentiment of optimism on the fuel question, but unfortunately that optimism is not shared by those most responsible for the conduct and development of some of our largest industries. The position apparently is that we can count with some certainty upon a steady and perhaps increasing supply of dear coal, but that the cheap coal on which the manufacturing methods and complicated organization of many of our industries have been based is to be counted as a thing of the past. The extent to which improvements in the utilisation of fuel can stave off threatened danger, and indeed disaster, may be argued at length. But such improvements, however valuable in themselves, and however effective at home, will clearly not affect either the trade in exported coal, or the transport prices for other commodities which are dependent upon that trade. The cost of coal in other countries and the development of foreign coal fields are in this connection of much more importance.

There is happily more than a possibility that continued stagnation in some great industries, plainly consequent upon the high price of fuel, may compel an all-round recognition of the fact that the coal industry itself cannot hope to market its product under present conditions and that its existence is conditional upon the lowering of price. Something of this kind has already entered into the terms of settlement of the coal strike. It may be necessary to do more, but the cost of any re-adjustment, however necessary, is appalling so long as even the slightest result is only obtained, not by a reasonable conviction derived from a consideration of facts, but as the price paid for defeat at the end of an exhausting struggle. The industrial consumer is not alone affected by the present high price of coal; the purchasing power of every householder for other commodities is

lessened thereby. Probably a remedy for the present unfortunate position of affairs will only be found by progress along two lines—the co-operation of masters and men in economical production of coal, and the application of sound and scientific methods to the elimination of waste in its utilisation. Both offer great possibilities and it is difficult to say which of the two will quantitatively prove the more important. The writer can only speak with any special knowledge on the latter theme.

An interesting and illuminating review of the fuel position, not only as regards this country and coal, but dealing with other lands and fuels, was given by Sir George Beilby in his 'James 'Forrest' lecture of 1921. It was there pointed out that the Germans had already faced the problem, arising in their country as in ours from the increasing cost of mining coal, by an extensive development of the brown-coal, or lignite, industry. The output of lignite in Germany last year was 111 million tons. Extensive deposits of great thickness occur and can be worked opencast at a much lower cost than ordinary coal by mechanical excavation. Germany's example is being followed not only by Central Europe, but to some extent in Victoria and in Canada.

With regard to oil Sir George Beilby stated that in 1920 the world production was about ninety-seven million tons, to which total the United States and Mexico contributed eighty-eight per cent. The figures seem large, but they only represent seven per cent. of the fuel output of the world by weight, or ten per cent. in heating value. The American demands are increasing, and it is only the rapid development of production in Mexico that has enabled them to be met. The future in the United States would be black if it were dependent upon the supply of oil from wells alone, but according to Mr. J. O. Lewis, Chief Petroleum Technologist of the United States Bureau of Mines, the American requirements can be met by recourse to the distillation of oil shales, of which large deposits exist.

The possibilities of fuel alcohol were discussed by Sir George Beilby. The subject is specially fascinating because the production of alcohol, by fermentation and distillation, from plants represents the rapid emergence in a highly utilisable form of heat energy stored from the sun's rays—the rays of a year ago, not those of past ages. Mr. Walter Long's Committee and the Fuel Research Board (with Sir Frederick Nathan as Power

Alcohol Investigation officer) have both enquired into this subject. In tropical countries experiments are on the way which promise from plant materials the double production of alcohol and paper, enough for local requirements. Indeed it is plain that fuel alcohol can be made almost anywhere—at a price—but there is nothing forthcoming which warrants any faith in alcohol as a fuel for large scale use in this country.

The utilisation of peat has been followed up both in Germany and Ireland. Too much is not to be expected. The peat deposit in a good bog twenty feet deep is only the equivalent of a 12- or 14-inch seam of coal. Even an output of 1,000 tons a day of air-dried peat involves the laying out and development of an enormous surface. So that although, by mechanical extraction and after-drying, peat has been obtained economically and used successfully in boiler firing, its potentialities as a coal-replacing fuel are very limited. Where however peat or lignite can be used, an equivalent amount of coal is liberated for export or other uses.

When the general survey is complete, we are left with coal as the fuel upon which this country must depend. Moreover the great bulk of it is bituminous coal which burns with a smoky flame under ordinary conditions, such as those of an open fire. The months of the recent coal strike have made it plain for all to see what this has meant for our city atmosphere and life. We have seen the depressing effect of mean streets and buildings wonderfully diminished by the lifting of the smoke pall; the urban garden became a clean and pleasant place without its covering film of soot. The arguments, calculations, and experiments of the enthusiastic advocates of smoke abatement have derived a new force in many quarters from this wide-spread demonstration. The importance of economic considerations remains and is, indeed, enhanced, but interest was never before so keen in the discussion of how the warmth and comfort of fire and light may be maintained, and the wheels of power kept running, without incurring the penalty of smoke and soot.

The answer up to a certain point is simple; beyond that, baffling and difficult. In the great bulk of industrial operations the emission of smoke is unnecessary. Take for instance the operation of steam-raising. From 75 to 100 million tons per annum, or about one-half of our total coal consumption, is,

according to Mr. Brownlie's recent analysis, used in steam raising. It is the first operation in the ordinary method for the generation of power and is a means of supplying heat for many low-temperature and chemical processes. The emission of smoke in steam raising is almost always a sign of either careless working, over-driving, or bad design ; but it is very common, particularly where coal has been very cheap, as at collieries, and bad habits have been acquired. To cure it would mean in most cases a simultaneous realisation of a higher thermal efficiency—not an expenditure but a saving. There would be no harm but great good done by bringing to bear more useful and effective pressure upon manufacturers to prevent emission of smoke in steam-raising, through inspectors who were not merely detectives but competent and friendly technical advisers. Mr. Brownlie's very extended tests on steam raising plants in a number of grouped industries, quoted by Sir George Beilby, indicate that low efficiencies (and no doubt smoke also) are much too easily accepted, and that a ten per cent. saving in fuel is a low estimate of what would be possible by the reorganization of existing plants. This would mean $7\frac{1}{2}$ million tons. Fuel saving and smoke prevention would go together in steam raising, and the same applies to most large industrial furnaces.

As a rule industrial furnaces which turn out smoke are of an old type. They have been allowed to persist largely because they have done their work in the past, although with a large expenditure of fuel and heavy labour in stoking, and because they were usually simple to erect. They have been often used for minor operations and the waste involved has not been sufficient to merit special attention and study from busy responsible members of the staffs concerned. The rise in the cost of fuel, and the unwillingness of men to undertake heavy work, is now justifying and often compelling attention to these furnaces. The merits of producer-gas firing have been appreciated and realised with most of the big furnaces, but the small furnaces are often too isolated and too small in their individual fuel requirements to be supplied with producer-gas, unless it be a cool washed gas which can be conveyed readily in cast iron or steel pipes. Washed producer-gas of the Mond type meets this requirement and allows the highest known recovery of ammonia as a by-product of its manufacture, but only when worked on a large scale, and in

common with all producer-gas it has one great defect for some kinds of furnace work. Made as it is by gasifying coal completely in air and steam it is heavily loaded with the nitrogen of the air and carbon dioxide, which form sixty per cent. of the resulting gas. Consequently it cannot give a high temperature unless the air used for its combustion is pre-heated, and effective pre-heating introduces a complication in design which is often out of the question for small furnaces. Costs of installation and up-keep would become too high to be sufficiently off-set by the saving in fuel.

A combination of fuel economy and absence of smoke from these smaller furnaces will probably be secured by two methods. In many instances, by simple alterations, coke can be made to do the work of coal, but the modifications in design necessary to effect this have not received sufficient attention. In nearly every case, a higher grade of gas than producer-gas, made in a way which does not involve the introduction of nitrogen in quantity, would be satisfactory if it could only be supplied at a reasonable price. This consideration limits the application of town gas as now made and distributed. It is true that in some districts like Birmingham where a large number of small furnaces have to be heated (in the metal industry) large quantities of town gas are supplied for industrial use ; the convenience, cleanliness, rapidity of working, ease of control, and thermal efficiency have rendered possible the attainment of ultimate economy. But so long as the unit of heat in gas costs some four to six times as much as in coal the replacement of coal by town gas must be delayed. The difference is often too great to be made up by greater efficiency in utilisation.

As bearing further on the emission of smoke from industrial furnaces and in justice to some of our industries, it must be said that it is difficult to carry out some processes successfully on a commercial scale without the emission of smoke. They require a strongly reducing atmosphere to prevent waste of metal by oxidation, and sometimes demand the surface impregnation of steel by carbon. The latter is a particularly difficult condition to satisfy without the formation of smoke, but there is too great a disposition to take its necessity for granted and to adhere to traditional methods, largely because the product is one of high value ; any unsuccessful experiment is therefore apt to prove very costly, while the item of fuel saving on the other side of the

balance sheet is not sufficient to tempt the individual manufacturer to take the risks purely from the motive of direct pecuniary gain.

This is a matter which calls for public-spirited or combined action. With a cheap gas, carburetted, or provided with supplementary oil supply for use at critical periods, the desired effects could almost certainly be obtained and the emission of smoke eliminated or at least regulated and minimised. Heating on this principle has met with some success in isolated cases, but a systematic attack on the difficulties of the problem will have to be undertaken before a centre of industry like Sheffield ceases to be wrapped in an eternal fog, the blackness of which is taken with some basis of truth as a gauge of industrial prosperity.

So far the smoke of industry has been almost solely considered, but the clearing of our town air during the coal strike, to which reference has been made, became so remarkable and obvious because of the thousands of house fires which were extinguished during that period and ceased to be small tributaries of pollution. About forty million tons of coal per annum are used raw in this country for domestic purposes. There are two principal methods by which this may be avoided, and both have their advocates. The first method is to continue the use of open grates and solid fuel, but to render the fuel smokeless by subjecting the coal to a preliminary process of low-temperature carbonisation at a temperature of 500 degrees to 600 degrees Centigrade, much milder than that used in the ordinary manufacture of coal gas which may be taken as 800 degrees to 900 degrees Centigrade. The second is to abolish the open grate and use gaseous fuel in appliances designed for the purpose. Both methods aim not only at smoke prevention but also at the recovery of by-products.

The unfortunate commercial history of the low-temperature carbonisation process is only partially due to inherent defects. It has undoubted merits which may be summarised thus :— the principal product, semi-coke, burns more easily than ordinary coke in a domestic grate without the smoke of bituminous coal, and, according to the recent tests of Dr. Fishenden, with a rather higher radiation efficiency, that is, with the radiation of a higher percentage of the total heat of combustion into the room. The process gives twice as much liquid tar as the ordinary gas works process, and so answers to the increasing demand for home-produced liquid fuels ; moreover the tar contains more of the

lighter oils. Gas and ammonia are also obtained. The demerits are, however, formidable. The semi-coke is very liable to be friable and to crumble in transit; this crumbled coke is a very unsatisfactory fuel and it is one of the aims of the gas manager to avoid its formation. The gas made, although rich, is from the nature of the process small in quantity—only about half the volume of that obtained in ordinary gas making, and a quarter of what is being made by the more advanced methods. The thermal and monetary costs of carbonisation have to be incurred whether coke or semi-coke is made, and the products have to bear that cost. Therefore as the volume of gas is reduced a greater proportion of those costs falls upon the coke, and it is difficult to see how coke can carry the increased financial burden. Stated thermally, the position is that gas can be taken as twice as efficient as coal for continuous uses and much more so for intermittent use, but coke cannot be made to do much more than coal. The sacrifice of gas to coke in the process of manufacture is not, therefore, to be undertaken lightly.

As regards by-products, ammonia is not so much a product of low temperature as of medium temperature carbonisation. Tar oils will be forthcoming in quantity in low temperature carbonisation but not necessarily in greater quantity than in such a gas-works apparatus as the continuous vertical retort, where indeed the coal is subjected to low temperature carbonisation at the top of the retort, while the exposing of the descending charge of coal to an ascending current of gas makes for higher yields of gas and ammonia. It is true that the tars from the low temperature process are rich in light oils, but these contain very little benzene or the other so-called aromatic compounds which form the basis of the manufacture of coal tar colours, drugs, and explosives. They will probably find a use as motor spirit, but the unsaturated compounds which consume sulphuric acid in purification introduce an element of uncertainty even there for the time being. It would appear that the success of low temperature carbonisation and the general use of its principal product—semi-coke—instead of coal would be conditioned by the payment of a considerably enhanced price which would have to be regarded as the purchase money for freedom from the smoke nuisance.

Sir George Beilby, who has interested himself in low

temperature carbonisation for many years and has done useful work upon it, has been examining the process again at the Experimental Station of the Fuel Research Board. The official report thereon has not yet appeared, but in the 'James Forrest' lecture he discusses some of the pros and cons. He laments that the realisation of the process seems always to move a little further into the future, lays stress upon the uncertainty arising from the fluctuating price of fuel oil, and concludes with the cautious verdict: 'My own belief is that low temperature 'carbonisation can only be established on a sound commercial 'basis with low operating costs and a very moderate margin of 'profit.' For our purpose it appears therefore that while the production and use of smokeless semi-coke instead of coal may be attractive from its apparent simplicity and may be practicable in certain circumstances, it would be unwise to place any general reliance on that method of dealing with the domestic smoke nuisance. No claim for thermal economy as against the use of raw coal can be sustained for it; nor indeed is any such claim made as far as the present writer is aware. The financial aspects are unpromising. Nevertheless the investigation of different forms which the process may take, and of different possibilities in combining it with other processes is being followed up, and it is hoped that something useful may emerge.

The alternative method mentioned above was the use of gas. In a previous article to which reference may be made* reasons were given for the belief that so far as thermal economy is concerned a strong case could be made out for gas. The case was summarised thus:—

'The total domestic consumption of coal is estimated at 35,000,000 tons per annum. If the whole of it were replaced by a gas carrying 50 per cent. of the total heat energy of the coal, then, since gas is at least twice as efficient in use as raw coal, it would only be necessary to carbonise as a maximum the same quantity, 35,000,000 tons, of coal at the gas works instead of distributing it, while the residual coke would be available for replacing coal in other uses, thus effecting a real conservation of coal, and the light oil, fuel oil, and other chemicals would have been obtained in the most efficient manner known.'

A comparison (and contrast) was there made with electricity the claims of which in the opinion of the writer had been

* 'Coal Conservation,' EDINBURGH REVIEW, January, 1919.

over-stated and over-pressed by the Coal Conservation Committee. In addition it may be said with truth that the concomitant advantages of the use of gas, including of course complete freedom from smoke, make it ultimately cheaper than coal for many uses, as is being recognised to an increasing extent. The check on the replacing of coal by gas comes however too soon. A satisfactory state of affairs would be reached if gas were used quite generally instead of coal throughout the house, excepting perhaps in one small fire used primarily as a refuse destructor and preferably burning coke. What stands in the way of attaining this ideal is the price of gas necessitated by the present cost of production.

In the light of what has been advanced above, and of similar considerations, the conclusion may safely be drawn that domestic and industrial requirements alike require further development in the economies of gas production, if the replacement of raw coal by gas and the consequent abolition of smoke is to be realised to the full. Until recently progress was legally barred by the surviving application of the illuminating standard for gas, based upon the necessity—which existed before the days of the incandescent mantle and before gas came into extensive use as a heating agent—of securing an adequate lighting effect from the gas in a flat-flame burner. Fortunately the whole position has been radically changed by the passing of the Gas Regulation Act of 1920. The liberality of spirit and knowledge of actual requirements displayed in this measure may be attributed with certainty to the fact that before the Act was framed the matter was referred by the Board of Trade to Sir George Beilby and the Fuel Research Board, who were asked to make recommendations upon it. They did so, but only after calling into conference representatives of the public and other interests concerned, who threshed out the technical and other questions involved at some length. The recommendations embodied several new principles to which statutory force was given by the Act.

In the first place the illuminating standard was completely abolished. Quality was to be specified by the number of British thermal units generated by the complete combustion of a cubic foot of gas (the calorific value) and not by the candle power obtainable without a mantle, which was rightly deemed to have became a matter of little importance. Technical developments

in the manufacture of gas were encouraged by the provision that the standard calorific value could be declared by the gas maker, and would presumably be one which made for economical production. It was assumed that gas would be made and supplied of a lower calorific value than had been permitted in the past. The basis of the charge was to be made the ' therm ' : that is, the consumer was to pay simply for the number of British thermal units which were carried by the gas he used, the ' therm ' being 100,000 British thermal units. The justice of allowing wider calorific limits and charging by the ' therm ' depends upon the principle of thermal equivalence, that is to say that 100,000 British thermal units are of the same value whether carried, for example, by 200 cubic feet of gas having a calorific value of 500 B.Th.U. per cubic foot, or by 250 cubic feet of gas with a calorific value of 400 B.Th.U. per cubic foot. This equivalence could not be assumed from *a priori* considerations, but it is in accord with much experience and with the results obtained in a detailed investigation of the subject by a joint Research Committee of the University of Leeds and the Institution of Gas Engineers.

The Act contains penal clauses intended to secure the accurate attainment and maintenance of the ' declared ' calorific value, whatever it may be. The Research Committee's results would lead to the conclusion that deficiencies experienced with gas-fired apparatus are far more likely to result from imperfect adjustment of the apparatus to the quality of the gas burned in it, or from fluctuations, than from any inherent defect in gas of a particular calorific value. The consumer is further protected by a clause requiring—

' the undertakers, in the case of alteration in the declared calorific value, to take at their own expense such steps as may be necessary to alter, adjust, or replace the burners in consumers' appliances in such manner as to secure that the gas can be burned with safety and efficiency, except in the case of any consumer who objects to such alteration, adjustment, or replacement by the undertakers.'

Other clauses make it permissible to supply a special quality of gas separately for industrial purposes, where it is thought advisable, and ' empower any undertakers to obtain a supply of ' gas in bulk from any source, whether situated within or without ' their authorised limits of supply.' This clause will be of special importance for towns and villages situated near by-product

coke oven plants, the gas from which is almost always very imperfectly utilised.

The basic importance of this Act and the power for good which it confers can be best appreciated by a brief review of what is involved in the carbonisation and gasification of coal by different processes. The method of manufacture almost exclusively used until recently was to heat coal, out of contact with air as far as possible, in horizontal fireclay retorts to a temperature of about 800 degrees Centigrade. Volatile matter was expelled from the coal and about 10,000 cubic feet of gas per ton were so obtained, with a calorific value of 500 to 650 British thermal units per cubic foot. This gas carried some twenty-two to twenty-four per cent. of the heating value of the original coal, but fifty per cent. was left behind in the coke. It is however clearly established that for nearly every purpose the value of a heat unit in gas is very much greater than in any solid fuel. It is therefore very desirable that the 'fixed carbon' in the residual coke should be gasified as far as possible, if the gasification can be effected by any process which does not involve too heavy an expenditure on fuel and plant. It is in accordance with this principle that the manufacture of water-gas from coke has sprung up.

The simplest way of gasifying coke is to blow a mixture of air and steam through it. The gas so obtained—known as producer-gas—is useful and is indeed the principal fuel for large industrial furnaces, but the amount of incombustible nitrogen which it necessarily contains, derived from the air, renders it useless for some applications, increases to no purpose the cost of its distribution, and renders it unsuitable to constitute a public supply for general use. The calorific value of a producer gas is about 120 British thermal units per cubic foot, if made from coke, and 130 to 150 if made in the same way from coal.

In the manufacture of water-gas the principal defect of producer gas is avoided by using the air and steam alternately, in two stages. In the first stage an air blast generates heat in a bed of coke; the gas made in that stage is a poor producer gas containing the nitrogen of the air; it is put to subsidiary uses or wasted. In the second stage a steam blast abstracts the heat generated in the coke and produces the required water gas. This consists essentially of carbon monoxide and hydrogen in

approximately equal quantities; it has a calorific value of 300 British thermal units per cubic foot. The alternated air blast is necessary to counteract the cooling effect of the steam which otherwise would soon bring the process to a stand-still. The new Gas Act, by legalising the public supply of gases of a lower calorific value, in effect makes it possible to gasify the fixed carbon of the coal as water-gas, and this can be mixed to any desired extent with the retort-made coal gas of higher calorific value. Incidentally the Act allows also the extraction of benzole or motor-spirit from coal gas, since the benzole is no longer needed as an illuminant. The calorific value of the mixed gas varies from 650 to 300 according to the relative amounts of coal gas and water-gas which it contains.

Although a desirable result can thus be attained by carbonising coal in horizontal retorts, and gasifying coke in a separate water-gas plant, the employment of the two separate processes has obvious disadvantages. To avoid these disadvantages the newer retorts of the continuous vertical type are so designed that it is possible to make some additional water-gas from coke, and to double the total yield of gas per ton of coal, by using steam in the retort itself. This process is very satisfactory in many ways according to the results obtained by the Research Committee and more recently by the Fuel Research Board. But a limit is placed upon the use of steam, long before the gasification of the coke is complete, by the high thermal and monetary cost of transmitting the heat required through the badly conducting walls of the retort. In this respect the ordinary separate water-gas generator is better, since all heat required is developed inside the generator from the coke during the air-blowing stage of the process.

The two sound principles of internal heating, and of completing the gasification of the coal (and coke) in one apparatus, are both applied in the so-called 'complete gasification' plant, which in several forms and countries is under trial at the present time, and may be regarded as the latest type of existing plant. It is in effect a water-gas generator, designed to deal with coal instead of coke, and complicated to some extent by the necessity of arranging that the coal shall be carbonised in the upper part of the generator before it is subjected to the action of steam in the lower. The gas made is of course something like a mixture of coal-gas and water-gas, and the yields claimed amount to 60,000

cubic feet of gas per ton of coal. Although this form of plant is not yet sufficiently worked out to be regarded as standard and established, the difficulties experienced with it are only such as may be expected with confidence to succumb to skill in design, construction, and working. It has, as above stated, the supreme merit of combining the principles of internal heating and complete gasification.

Such a plant might be regarded as likely to realise the ideal of a process which will produce gas so cheaply and simply as to allow nearly the whole of our domestic heating and a certain portion of our industrial heating to be done by gas instead of coal, but for one great defect which has still to be removed, namely the intermittent working of the water-gas process. The system of alternate blowing with air and steam produces gas for supply only while the steam-blast is in operation. This involves considerable loss in thermal efficiency and necessitates complications in construction and operation, all tending to increase the cost of the gas produced. It is unlikely that more than sixty heat units can be so obtained in the gas for every 100 existing in the coal gasified.

But there is one quite simple way in which these deficiencies could be eliminated. If it were practicable to use oxygen instead of air for gasification the process could be carried on continuously as in an ordinary gas-producer. The alternating blasts of air and steam would be replaced by a continuous current of oxygen and steam; the nitrogen of the air which, as explained above, is the sole reason for the use of the alternating blast, would then no longer be present. The amount of oxygen necessary would be that required to maintain the heat in the charge against the cooling effect of the steam. Calculations show that making allowances for the probable losses of heat from such a plant, a thermal efficiency of gas production of 90.1 per cent. should be obtainable in complete gasification.* Using the lean coal taken for the calculations, 69,100 cubic feet of gas with a calorific value of 352 British thermal units per cubic foot would be obtained from a ton of coal, and with an expenditure of 179 cubic feet of oxygen per 1,000 cubic feet of

* The thermal efficiency of gas production is the ratio of the heat carried by the gas to the total heat involved, that total being the heat carried by the gas plus the heat used in gasification.

gas made. If for any reason, such as a large local demand for coke, the process was not carried to complete gasification but stopped at carbonisation (as in an ordinary gas retort or coke oven) the efficiency of gas production would be practically the same, the gas would be naturally much smaller in volume but richer—20,900 cubic feet per ton, with a calorific value of 427 British thermal units per cubic foot—and the oxygen consumption would be lowered to 107 cubic feet per 1,000 cubic feet of gas made. The thermal economies of the plant would be supplemented by monetary economies in construction and upkeep arising from the simplicity, elasticity and capacity for large production from a small unit. The advantages of a water-gas plant as compared with a retort-plant would be realized and vastly extended.

The commercial feasibility of the very promising process outlined above seems to be primarily dependent on one factor and that is the cost of oxygen produced on a really large scale. Present costs in this country are quite prohibitive for the purpose. A private communication gives 12s. 6d. per 1,000 cubic feet as the cost of production in a plant producing 100,000 cubic feet in twenty-four hours. The whole (advertised) daily production of oxygen in the country is only two million cubic feet—the volume output of a modest city gas works. But theory and practice both indicate that the separation of oxygen from air cheapens very rapidly as the scale of operations is enlarged, and it would have to be enormously enlarged to meet the requirements of the oxygen gasification under discussion on any extended scale. The Nitrogen Products Committee of the Ministry of Munitions came to the conclusion that the running costs of a plant making 24,000 cubic feet of oxygen (98 per cent. pure) per hour are 10d. and 12d. per 1,000 cubic feet. 'This estimate is only relatively 'optimistic. The United States Bureau of Mines have been 'interested in experiments on a development of air-separation 'from which even lower costs are anticipated.'* This is the Jefferies-Norton system, which has been tried on a large scale during and since the war for separating helium from certain natural gases in Texas for proposed use in air-ships. The

* See 'Journal of the Society of Chemical Industry,' 1919, May 31, 1920, 113 R.

problem here to be solved is an extremely severe one, for the proportion of helium obtained is only from half to one per cent. In a private communication, Mr. F. E. Norton informs me that the results obtained in the separation of helium indicate that a plant making 24,000 cubic feet of oxygen per hour would deliver the oxygen at a cost of thirty cents per 1,000 cubic feet. He anticipates however that a plant of ten-fold capacity would produce at five cents per 1,000 cubic feet—the interest and depreciation charge being then the main item of cost. The cost incurred by the use of oxygen in complete gasification or in carbonisation can be seen expressed in several ways in the following table :—

Cost of Oxygen Required.

Price of Oxygen per 1000 c. ft.	For Carbonisation. Per ton of Coal.	For Carbonisation. Per 1000 c. ft. of Gas.	For Carbonisation. Per 100,000 B.Th.U. in Gas.	For Complete Gasification. Per ton of Coal.	For Complete Gasification. Per 1000 c. ft. of Gas.	For Complete Gasification. Per 100,000 B.Th.U. in Gas.
s. d.	*d.*	*d.*	*d.*	*d.*	*d.*	*d.*
12 6	342	16.0	3.75	1850	27	7.6
1 3	34.2	1.6	.37	185	2.7	.76
10	22.8	1.06	.24	124	1.8	.51
$2\frac{1}{2}$	5.7	.26	.06	31	.45	.13

Thus it appears that if the cost of oxygen could be counted at the tabulated figure of 10d. per 1,000 cubic feet its use would add 10s. 4d. to the cost of a ton of coal completely gasified, 1.8d. per 1,000 cubic feet of gas or .51d. per 'therm.' The results given above as obtainable from the use of oxygen were necessarily derived from calculation. The process has not yet been tried and can only receive satisfactory trial on a very considerable scale. Calculations have however since been made in a very different way on the same subject by E. A. W. Jefferies* with substantially the same results, excepting that he arrived at a richer composition for the gas as a result of assuming the use of better coal, and gave much more detail as to estimated cost of oxygen and gasification plant using oxygen.

* A paper read at the Annual Meeting of the New England Association of Gas Engineers.

There is then some reason to hope that in the near future a process of gasifying coal which comes very near the ideal will result from the use of oxygen. Some of its advantages have been already indicated, but may be stated more generally. If it is possible to put practically the whole of our coal-fuel into gaseous form, in an economically sound manner, an important saving of transport and fuel will be attainable. The fuel value of the coal, scarcely impaired, would be delivered to the neighbourhood of the consumer, who could then apply it efficiently for heating, power, for lighting—choosing for each application the most economical method. This method of distributing fuel plainly contrasts very favourably in its elasticity and potential economies with any proposals involving the sacrifice of most of the heat of the fuel before distribution (as in the generation of electricity) which would make ultimate efficiency for nearly all heating processes an impossibility. The cost of distribution in pipes, and the fuel consuming capacity per unit of area, would determine the radius of the district which could be served economically by gas from any one centre. Other questions would arise. The biggest item of plant concerned would be that for making oxygen, and it might in some cases prove most economical to centralise the oxygen plant and distribute oxygen to neighbouring gasification plants. This would particularly apply where the oxygen was made by the air-separation process which was being worked at the same time for the production of nitrogen.

Little has been said of the recovery from coal of by-products by the process described, but although detailed discussion is out of place it can be safely taken for granted that the plant for continuous gasification in oxygen could be so designed as to make the position very strong on this side also. ‘ In view of ‘ the consideration put forward the assertion may be made with ‘ confidence that the provision of a cheap supply of oxygen ‘ would be one of the most effective ways of promoting economy ‘ and efficiency in the utilisation of coal supplies,’ and would go far to solve the smoke problem. It is for that reason that the writer has felt justified in dealing with this particular matter at some length.

One advantage to which no reference has so far been made of gasifying coal instead of using solid fuel, is that gas, whether made by the older or newer processes, can be readily freed from

nearly all the sulphur compounds which it contains. On the other hand the percentage of sulphur in carbonised coal is usually about the same as in the coal itself (some one or two per cent.) and no method of reducing it appreciably has ever met with any success. So long therefore as coal, coke, or semi-coke is burned in open fires, large quantities of sulphur oxides will probably be poured out to exercise their corrosive and destructive effects. Smoke abatement advocates are apt to be too easily satisfied in this respect. No doubt enormous benefits would result from the abolition of visible smoke, but if that were done by the use of solid fuel the sulphur evil would remain. It could be countered by the use of gas. Moreover the coal of the country would thereby be made the source of the sulphur required for the manufacture of sulphuric acid, and dependence on imported sulphide ores would be diminished or eliminated.

Finally, reference may be made to an apparently minor matter which has threatened the whole situation. The way in which the provisions of the new Gas Regulation Act make for fuel economy and advances in the technique of gas production has been already explained. Plainly the Act is deliberately framed to allow of gas being made from the fixed carbon of coal, and not solely by the expulsion of volatile matter. It is however a plain fact that the only combustible form in which fixed carbon has been gasified on the manufacturing scale is that of carbon monoxide. To limit the percentage of carbon monoxide permitted in a public gas supply would therefore be tantamount to blocking the operation of the Act in the direction in which it promises to be most beneficial. Stated somewhat differently, limitation of carbon monoxide carries with it directly a corresponding limitation of the gasification of fixed carbon and is, to any extent to which it becomes operative, a direct check to the cheapening and extension of public gas supply. Hence the danger which lay in one provision made in the Act, that the Board of Trade should make an enquiry ' into the question whether it is necessary ' or desirable to prescribe any limitations of the proportion of ' carbon monoxide which may be supplied in gas used for ' domestic purposes,' and ' may, if on any such enquiry it appears ' desirable, make one or more special orders under this Act ' prescribing the permissible proportion.' The enquiry has been made and evidence taken by a small special committee. The

main argument for restriction may be stated in the form that since carbon monoxide is undoubtedly and incontestably a poisonous gas, and since hygiene is more important than economic advantage, the proportion of carbon monoxide in a public gas supply should be limited to one which does not threaten either health or safety.

The reasons against restriction are numerous. The economic advantages offered by the new Act have been shown to depend on freedom to supply gas containing more carbon monoxide. Even on the side of hygiene the position is not so simple as might appear at first sight. The danger from carbon monoxide has to be placed against the bettering of health throughout the whole community which would result from the progressive abolition of smoke, by gas replacing raw coal for heating purposes. It is not as if it were practicable in any circumstances to supply gas containing little or no carbon monoxide, since ordinary straight coal gas may contain ten per cent. or more. The worst service that could be done to the community would be to place it under a false impression of immunity ; to give it the wrong idea that a gas is supplied or can be supplied which may be allowed to leak into a room with impunity. The fewness of accidents which occur, considering that the whole urban population is exposed throughout life to the danger, such as it is, from coal-gas, is no doubt largely due to the fact that everybody has been trained to regard an escape of gas as dangerous. The only fatal accident that ever came directly under the notice of the writer was with an industrial gas containing only nine to ten per cent. of carbon monoxide, the dangers of which were not fully appreciated. In distributing a gas like water-gas or coal-gas containing an admittedly poisonous constituent like carbon monoxide a certain amount of risk must of course be taken. It had to be taken in the electrical industry when electricity came to be distributed at any considerable voltage, and it was taken, or all the advantages of an electrical supply as we know it to-day would have been lost. The risk may, however, be countered by :—

1. Ensuring that the public is fully alive to the fact that an escape of gas is dangerous.

2. Preventing any escape of gas as far as possible by good gas fitting.

3. Making it easy to detect any appreciable escape by insisting on a characteristic smell, and

4. Attaining a standard of ventilation which would minimise the danger even if a leak occurred and was not detected.

These things should all be done in any case and are being done to a great extent already. The alternative step of limiting the carbon monoxide is to pay too big a price for the questionable privilege of unpenalised slackness. We cannot afford it. It is not surprising in view of these and other considerations which were placed before the special committee that the recommendation it has just made is against statutory limitation of carbon monoxide in public gas supply, although room is rightly left for the question to be again raised if experience shows the need. It is further recommended that the distribution of an odourless gas shall be made an offence. This bogey seems therefore to be laid, and the new Gas Regulation Act leaves the way open for technical and commercial skill to provide that cheap and plentiful supply of gaseous fuel which would determine so largely the continued attainment of cleanliness, hygiene and economy in the utilisation of coal.

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THE CLASSICS IN EDUCATION

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5. The Classics in British Education. (Reconstruction Problems, No. 21. Ministry of Reconstruction. 1919.
6. Value of the Classics. Edited by A. F. WEST. Princeton. 1917.

'WHEN in doubt, appoint a committee.' It is the trump-suit which governments lead when perplexed by the obstinate questionings, not of invisible things, but of audible 'educationists.' But committees are also formed by those who are free from the torments of doubt. The present story begins with the Neglect of Science Committee, which was called into being as the result of a public meeting held on May 3rd, 1916, when the deadlock on the Western front was making Englishmen impatient and irritable. The champions of physical science had already had their say in the columns of the *Times* and the *Educational Supplement*. The May meeting on the Neglect of Science brought the Humanists into the field, and within twenty-four hours their manifesto had been sent to the press. It was urbane and dignified, closing with the gentlest of reminders that 'the teaching of physical science is compulsory in all state-'aided schools, that of Latin, and of course of Greek, in none.' Six weeks later a conference was held between representatives of the Classical, English, Geographical, Historical and Modern Language Associations, and the views expressed were crystallised in a series of six resolutions. In the circular eventually issued on August 31st, these resolutions were explicitly stated to represent not the full views of the associations concerned, but 'rather a 'common measure of their views,' and were accordingly couched in somewhat vague and general phraseology. The signatories thought it necessary to apologise for the use of such contrasted

terms as ' humanistic ' and ' scientific,' and enunciated the pious sentiment that ' humanistic ' studies should be scientific, and ' scientific ' studies humane.

Meanwhile the Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) had appointed two committees, which were to inquire into the position of natural science and modern languages respectively in British education ; both of these reported in 1918, and we shall have more to say of them. It is more important to note the efforts which were made to bring the ' Scientists ' and ' Humanists ' together for a free discussion of the questions about which they might be supposed to differ.

In the autumn of 1916 a committee appointed by the British Academy proposed a conference with the representatives of the five associations named above. This took place at the British Museum on October 13th, and a Council for Humanistic Studies was formed, comprising representatives of the British Academy, the Five Associations, the Societies for the Promotion of Hellenic and of Roman studies, the Royal Society of Literature, the Royal Geographical Society and the Royal Historical Society ; Lord Bryce was elected president, and Sir Frederic Kenyon chairman. It was intended that this body should enter into relations with a similar organization, formed on the initiative of the Royal Society, and representing the interests of natural science. This is known as the Conjoint Board of Scientific Societies, about sixty of which appoint representatives. In the first instance, however, an invitation from the Neglect of Science Committee to a conference was accepted, and a meeting took place on December 8th between five representatives of each body. At this meeting a serious attempt was made to deal with the question of school curricula and time-tables, but the basis of agreement proposed by the Neglect of Science Committee did not, on the whole, meet with the approval of the Five Associations, to which it was referred ; it must also be observed that though one-fourth of the school time up to the age of sixteen—at which point it was agreed that specialisation might begin—was allotted to ' languages other than English,' the question of Greek and Latin was not raised. It was not until January 26th 1917, that the sub-committee on education of the Board of Scientific Societies and the Council for Humanistic Studies held their first meeting, under the presidency of Sir E. Ray

Lankester. The object of its promoters was (as they stated) to arrive at a basis of mutual understanding which would enable representatives of all branches of education to co-operate in a general educational policy, while leaving them free to advocate the claims of their own particular subjects: such advocacy (it was hoped) would not in future take the form of 'decrying 'the claims of competing subjects.' The conference may fairly be said to have attained its object, for it was found possible to obtain a unanimous vote in favour of the following resolutions :—

1. The first object in education is the training of human beings in mind and character, as citizens of a free country, and any technical preparation of boys and girls for a particular profession, occupation or work must be consistent with this principle.
2. In all schools in which education is nominally continual up to or beyond the age of sixteen, and in other schools so far as circumstances permit, the curriculum up to about the age of sixteen should be general and not specialised; and in this curriculum there should be integrally represented English (language and literature), languages and literatures other than English, history, geography, mathematics, natural sciences, art and manual training.
3. In the opinion of this conference, both natural science and literary subjects should be taught to all pupils below the age of sixteen.
4. In the case of students who stay at school beyond the age of sixteen, specialisation should be gradual and not complete.
5. In many schools of the older type more time is needed for instruction in natural science, and this time can often be obtained by economy in the time allotted to classics, without detriment to the interests of classical education.
6. In many other schools more time is needed for instruction in languages, history and geography; and it is essential, in the interests of sound education, that this time be provided.
7. While it is probably impossible to provide instruction in both Latin and Greek in all secondary schools, provision should be made in every area for teaching in these subjects, so that every boy and girl who is qualified to profit from them shall have the opportunity of receiving adequate instruction in them.

These resolutions certainly evince a genuine desire to 'substitute 'co-operation for hostility' in the educational activities of the representatives of humanism and science; and their significance is scarcely diminished by the fact that the executive committee of the Board of Scientific Studies, to whom they were referred,

suggested three amendments which were, however, not discussed. The first proposed to omit the specification of the elements of the curriculum in resolution 2, the second, to substitute ' with ' advantage to the best interests of education ' for ' without ' detriment to the interests of classical education ' in resolution 5, the third, to omit the last clause of resolution 7.

After the lapse of a year the conference reassembled in order to discuss the practical application of the principles accepted in January 1917 in regard to school examinations and those which admit to a university as well as to scholarships. Six meetings were held in the course of 1918, and a series of resolutions were passed, which were eventually issued with explanations in pamphlet form. Controversial topics were successfully avoided, and it is interesting to note that the conference passed no direct resolution upon the subject of compulsory Greek. The report, however, states that the nature of the solution desired by it was plain.

' The usual arguments against compulsory Greek are equally valid against compulsory geometry or compulsory science or compulsory history. If it is absurd to exclude a student from a degree in science because he cannot acquire an illusory smattering of Greek for examination purposes, it is equally absurd to exclude a student from a degree in arts because he cannot acquire an illusory smattering of physics or chemistry.'

The evil of unsatisfactory entrance examinations at Oxford and Cambridge ' is not remedied by the simple exclusion of Greek,' and therefore ' the recommendations of the Government ' committees on the teaching of science and of modern languages, ' which recommend the abolition of compulsory Greek without ' reconsidering the examination as a whole, are not very helpful.' But the opposition of many of those who object to :—

' a policy which places their subject in a worse position than mathematics (which are at present compulsory) or science (which many people would make so) . . . would be removed if a guarantee were obtained that every student aspiring to a University degree had received a general education in which both science and the humanities were substantially included, and if a knowledge of both Greek and Latin were required for those faculties which cannot properly be studied without a knowledge of the classical languages and literatures.'

A compromise on similar lines was adopted by the University of Oxford in 1920 ; but the knowledge of Greek history and literature

required in the literary faculties is gained by the study of translations.

The time was now ripe for a government committee. Already in April 1917, Mr. Fisher had received a deputation from the Classical Association, headed by Lord Bryce, which was important in that it represented not merely the depositaries of the old classical tradition, but the secondary schools under the Board of Education and the Workers' Educational Association. Mr. Fisher's reply showed that he had grasped the importance of the principle laid down in the seventh and last resolution of the January conference, viz., that provision should be made in every 'area of accessibility' for classical teaching suited to the needs of those able and anxious to profit by it. To this end the Board of Education proposed to institute a system of advanced courses, not only in classics, but in science, mathematics and the modern humanities, and to provide for the transfer, where necessary, of promising pupils to the schools where such special teaching was available. With this promise the deputation, chastened by the warning that the Board was 'not in a position to impose curricula upon schools,' and that though it might bring influence to bear by means of grants, yet, as George Washington said, 'influence is not 'government,' was forced to be content.

The long-desired committee was appointed in November 1919. It has laboured more abundantly than its fellows, holding 85 meetings and examining 140 witnesses and a number of memoranda, and with the assistance of its indefatigable secretary, Mr. Christopher Cookson, it has produced a report of 308 pages, which is as full of matter as an egg is full of meat, and adds to its other merits the crowning virtue of unanimity. When the report of the committee on the teaching of English appears (and we understand that it is in the press) the Minister of Education and all students of that subject will at any rate have the data of the problem presented to them in an authoritative form. The pity is that His Majesty's Stationery Office have thought fit to issue each report in a different *format*, so that they can by no possibility be brought under a single cover!

The importance of the report on classical teaching lies largely in its fully documented statement of the present position. The notion that the classics, 'having occupied the educational ground 'betimes, have been able to dig themselves in and to hold an

'almost impregnable position, due not to their merit as educational 'instruments, but to the accident of priority,'* must be abandoned. In February 1920, the committee addressed a questionnaire to 788 boys' schools (including some mixed schools) of the Head Masters' Conference and of the Head Masters' Association and received replies from 612, containing 160,149 pupils. Of these schools only 161 teach both Latin and Greek, while 360 teach Latin only as a regular part of the curriculum, and in 91 neither language is taught. Ten per cent of the pupils are to be found in the schools which make no provision for classical teaching, and a further 54 per cent. in schools where no Greek is taught.† The number of pupils learning Latin is 44.3 per cent. of the whole, that of those learning Greek 4.4 per cent. A similar questionnaire was sent to 396 girls' schools represented on the Head Mistresses' Conference; the replies received from 343 (containing 101,498 pupils) showed that eighty-three schools taught both Greek and Latin, 233 Latin only, and 27 neither language. Six per cent. of the pupils were in schools of this last category, and a further 67 per cent. in those making no provision for Greek; while the number learning Latin was 27.5 per cent., and those learning Greek only 0.4 per cent. Taking boys', girls' and mixed schools together only 2.8 of the pupils are learning Greek and only 2.3 per cent. carry Latin beyond the first examination stage.‡

A further questionnaire, addressed to the local education authorities of England and Wales, produced replies from 358; but no complete statistics seem to be available. It appears, however, that though in most areas the number of boys and girls

* Report of committee on 'Natural Science in Education,' p. 5. It is true that this is put forward as the statement of an extreme view, but the committee adds, 'There is truth in this.'

†There may be a few pupils in these schools who take Greek as an extra subject out of school hours.

‡ The position of Greek in the great public schools receives no special treatment. It is perhaps too early to forecast the effects of the abolition of compulsory Greek at Oxford and Cambridge, and the conditions, no doubt, vary widely; but we are informed that in one of the largest and most famous schools in England (which we forbear to name) only four boys are learning Greek in the sixth form, and only about forty in the whole school.

learning Latin has increased in the last few years, this increase is small in proportion to the increase in the total number of pupils in provided schools, and that in 1917-18 Greek was being taught in 33 out of a total of 444 such schools. These facts are the more disquieting, since, as the report points out, it is with the schools provided and maintained by the local education authorities that the future of national education lies ; their number is likely to increase with the growth of population, ' whilst the ' process which has transferred many of the old grammar schools ' to the provided list threatens to end before very long in their ' complete absorption.'

Can it be said that the Board of Education is exerting its influence as fully as the weight of its authority and its control of grants enable it to do on the side of classics ? Here, again, the report gives an admirable survey and a studiously fair criticism of the facts. The regulations of the Board prescribe that certain subjects shall be taught in all grant-earning secondary schools ; these include (amongst others, physical science being one) the English language and literature and at least one language other than English. Neither Latin nor Greek, it will be noticed, finds a place in the list ; and by the latest regulation (dating from 1906) it is laid down that a curriculum including *two* languages other than English, but making no provision for instruction in Latin, may be approved if the Board is satisfied that it is to the educational advantage of the school that Latin should be omitted. It is, however, fair to add that the Board *generally* makes its approval conditional on the accessibility of a Latin-teaching school with reasonably low fees in the area. The result is seen in the fact that, in 107 schools in England recognised for grant or as efficient* by the Board, Latin is not taught ; but the majority of these are within reach of a town containing Latin-teaching schools. The case of Greek is naturally worse, since it is not protected by the regulations of the Board. It appears that whereas there is no geographical county in England without a Latin-teaching school, there are three (including the North Riding of Yorkshire) in which there is no boys' school in which Greek is

* Schools not in receipt of grants may, if they submit to inspection by the Board, be ' recognised as efficient,' and the Board can thus exercise some influence over their curricula.

taught as a form subject, and eight where the same may be said of girls' schools*.

There are however some bright spots in this darkness. What can be done under favourable conditions may be illustrated by the case of Bradford. In addressing Mr. Fisher as a delegate of the Classical Association, Mr. W. Edwards, the head-master of Bradford Grammar School, which contains about 640 boys, many of whom are public elementary school boys who hold free scholarships, provided by the City Council, gave some remarkable figures. In ten years his pupils won 102 open scholarships at Oxford and Cambridge, of which 33 were for classics, as against 30 for science, 25 for mathematics, and 14 for modern history. With one or two exceptions, these scholarships were won by boys who would never have had the opportunity of obtaining a classical education if Latin and Greek had not been taught at their local school; and of the 33 classical scholarships, no less than 23 were won by boys who held free places in the school, most of whom came from public elementary schools.† But, as Mr. Edwards pointed out,

'Step across the border of the Borough of Bradford . . . and no boy has the chance of obtaining a classical education unless he can afford to pay full fees and expenses out of his own pocket, simply because he is then in another area of educational administration, and there is no accessible school which gives classical education within the control of that education authority, and there is no combined scheme which will enable him to be transferred into the Educational Authority of Bradford.'

The Board of Education has so far not been altogether happy in its efforts to secure the provision of classical teaching for those who are capable of profiting thereby. The scheme of advanced courses from which much was hoped, has proved disappointing

* It was stated by Mr. Mansbridge, of the W.E.A., in 1917, that there were only eight schools in Lancashire where Greek was taught.

† Mr. Edwards' statement may be supplemented by the details given on p. 123 of the report, which shew what can be done under the present none too favourable conditions. 'In July 1920 at Bradford Grammar School all the boys who took Latin up to the first examination were also taking Greek; at St. Olave's, Southwark, 40 boys out of a total of 470; at Wolverhampton Grammar School, 44 out of 520; and at Bristol Grammar School, 80 out of 700 were learning Greek, a proportion which compares favourably with that in some of the non-local public schools.'

on account of its rigidity. By the regulation of 1917 the main subjects of study must be selected from one of three groups, viz. (1) classics ; (2) modern studies ; (3) science and mathematics. The special grant made for such advanced courses is substantial, and head-masters (who are but human) naturally aim at keeping the number of pupils taking the courses as high as may be. Seeing that most schools can only hope to maintain a single course, the path of least resistance leads either to modern studies or to science and mathematics ; and we are not surprised to learn that out of 385 advanced courses at present recognised 35 only are in classics, 142 in modern studies, and 208 in mathematics and science. There are wide areas (such as the eastern and southern counties) and large centres of population (such as Newcastle, Hull and Portsmouth) in which no advanced course in classics is recognised.* Again, the rigid regulations of the department exclude Latin as a main subject from the modern studies course, the effect of which is (as the committee point out) that ' in girls' schools Latin is in process of being killed.' Few we think will fail to endorse the recommendation of the Committee that the present system of advanced courses, having done its work, should be abolished, and that a generous grant should be made for advanced work in any combination of subjects approved by the Board.†

In the last resort, however, it is not the Board, but the local education authorities which will have to solve the practical problem of ensuring (as they are enjoined to do by the Act of 1918) that ' no children or young persons should be deprived from receiving ' the benefits of any form of education by which they are capable ' of profiting through inability to pay fees.' It is evident that, in order that classics may have a fair chance as against other subjects, a system by which pupils with a classical bent may be transferred to schools, not necessarily under their own local education authority, where they can obtain the required teaching, furnishes the only solution. The committee have examined this question of transfers (which bristles with practical difficulties)

* In the whole of the area controlled by the London County Council there are only two boys' and one girls' school with an advanced course in classics.

† We understand that tentative steps in this direction have been taken by the Board since the issue of the report.

at some length, and it is to be hoped that their recommendations will receive attention in the proper quarters.

The report contains valuable sections on the position of classical studies in Scotland, Ireland and Wales, each of which has its own peculiar features and problems. In Scotland it is satisfactory to note that the Education Department, by its regulations of 1920, clearly recognises that it is the duty of every State-aided secondary school to provide instruction in Greek for those pupils who desire it; also that it has grasped the fact that if the classics are to be taught, there must be fully qualified teachers, which is secured by the regulation that the principal teacher of classics in any secondary school must be qualified to teach not only Latin but Greek. The result is that there are over 150 schools in Scotland with a teacher who is capable of teaching Greek, even if that language is not actually being taught at a particular date; and that although there are 'Greekless' areas' (which Prof. Harrower, of Aberdeen, has mapped out), they are neither so large nor so important as those of England. There is a school at Stornoway in the island of Lewis, attended largely by the sons of fishermen and crofters, in which nearly 30 pupils are learning Greek, and those in the highest class are reading Homer, Æschylus and Plato. From Wales the reports are less satisfactory: 'the position of Greek,' says the committee, 'in Welsh schools is deplorable.' In 1920 only one advanced course in classics was recognised (at Monmouth Grammar School), and only 33 pupils out of 6,183 offered Greek in the Central Welsh Board's examinations.

In Ireland the recent revival of Irish (largely, of course, political in its purpose) has been a severe handicap to classical study*: but on the other hand the influence of the Catholic Church has provided a counterpoise, at any rate in the schools where the early training of the clergy takes place, and in 1911 the Catholic hierarchy made Greek at matriculation or senior grade compulsory for entrance into Maynooth.

The report deals somewhat less fully with the universities than with secondary education, but it does well to emphasise the fact that classical scholarships—which, as they say, 'constitute

* The committee were, however, informed by one witness that in his opinion the introduction of Irish had had a more prejudicial effect upon French than upon classics.

' in fact a vocational inducement, analogous to that offered by ' science '—are the main prop of classical studies in secondary education, and that while a large number are offered at Oxford and Cambridge, the specific provision for classics by this means at the modern universities and university colleges is meagre in the extreme. Manchester University awards two scholarships, Liverpool and Birmingham one scholarship each in classics. Leeds, Sheffield and Bristol Universities, and the university colleges of Reading, Nottingham, Bangor, Cardiff and Aberystwyth (the last three being constituent colleges of the University of Wales) award none, though classics may be offered as an optional subject. It may be added that the new State scholarships established by the Board of Education in 1920, which are tenable by pupils from grant-aided schools at universities and other approved places of higher education, must inevitably be awarded mainly for mathematics, science and modern studies: out of 200 awards made in 1920 only 15 were allotted to classics. May we hope that a consideration of these facts will lead to a general agreement that it would be neither just nor expedient to divert the ancient classical endowments of Oxford and Cambridge to other uses? In fact, while some differentiation in function between ancient and modern universities is no doubt desirable, it would seem that at the more recent foundations the scales are too heavily weighted against the classics, and we should endorse the committee's recommendation that ' all possible steps ' should be taken to provide at the modern universities a larger ' supply of scholarships available for classics.'

So far our attention has been directed to what may be called the ' departmental ' aspects of the subject; but it is impossible to evade the broader issues. Granted that the committee are right in their finding that the classics occupy no predominant position in English education; that ' the position of Latin . . . . ' presents very disquieting features ' in some schools; and that ' in the majority of secondary schools Greek is not taught, or, ' where it is taught, is threatened with extinction,' should the State allow the present processes to continue or endeavour to arrest them? The answer which each of us gives to this question will depend on a judgment of value. No doubt there will be some who, in virtue of their equalitarian principles (the present writer would call them prejudices), would object to any form of privilege

being accorded to the classics, urging that they must stand or fall upon their intrinsic merits. But the question is not so simple. The true statesman is one who not only sees (which many others do), but also foresees (which most do not) ; he can *create* ' survival ' value,' and it is his business to do so. ' Privilege ' may be a means to the future end ; it is a question of method, not of principle. It may be urged in defence of the institution of private property, even in the unlovely forms with which modern industrialism has clothed it, that it enables a minority to hold certain moral and spiritual values in trust for the unborn generations for whom industrialism will be a nightmare of the past ; and the ' privileged position of the classics ' may likewise be justified in that it enables a minority of that minority to maintain some of our highest intellectual possessions intact until the day when spiritual values are no longer in danger of being determined by the processes of commercial exchange. This was the true reason for the retention of compulsory Greek, and some will no doubt think that its abolition was premature. That however is a question to be settled by the opportunist in the best sense—the man who knows both *where* to draw the line and *when* to rub it out again.* But we sincerely hope that the Minister of Education, whose duty it is to collate the reports of the four committees, will not accept the contention of the committee on modern languages that compulsory Latin should also disappear, in order to arrive at ' complete equality for the living ' and the dead.'

It would be difficult to better, and unfair to summarise, the introductory section of the report in which the positive value of classical studies is estimated ; but that is only what we should expect of a committee which included Professor Gilbert Murray and Mr. R. W. Livingstone.† The judgments of the committee seem to us admirably balanced. The true value of the linguistic study of Latin and Greek is made clear. It leads the learner—

* The committee express themselves cautiously on this point (p.188) and express the belief that ' the situation is not without compensating advantages.' The statistics given on p. 233 shew that the effect of the abolition of compulsory Greek at Trinity College, Dublin, in 1903, has been very serious.

† Mr. Livingstone's ' Defence of Classical Education ' is a book which every student of this question should read.

if the teacher knows his trade—to think out the real meaning of words and phrases before translating them, and this induces a habit of mind which is free from the domination of catch-words. It shows him how and why 'language is the most complex and 'subtle expression and self-delineation of the human mind 'that exists'—and of no language ever spoken is this so true as of Greek, which if not 'living' in the conventional sense of the word, is far more *alive* than the languages of modern Europe. But purely linguistic study is not and should not be the main object of classical education. The proper study of mankind is man (and not energy, as an eminent physicist would have us believe): and education should therefore teach how man came to be what he is, and especially how his spirit grew from childhood to manhow—as it did in Greece and Rome.

And for this, as the committee rightly say, a new outlook is needed.

Mr. H. G. Wells was not without justification in some of the criticisms which he passed on the classical education enjoyed by Mr. Gladstone and his contemporaries. 'Their staple training 'was the study, without any archæology or historical perspective, 'of the more rhetorical and poetic of the Latin and Greek classics. 'Such a training prepared men not so much to tackle and solve 'the problems of life as to plaster them over with more or less 'apt quotations.'* But we think that Mr. Wells would find little to quarrel with in the following passage from the report (p. 156):—

'There are certain aspects of ancient history which have lately assumed greater importance. On the one hand there is the conception of the history of Mediterranean civilisation stretching back from the present day into that remote past in which history merges in archæology and anthropology, and there is a growing consciousness that the whole record forms one *continuum* of which the latest product can be scientifically explained only by an understanding of the ultimate origin. On the other hand, for us the lines of communication pass through Greece and Rome, and we are beginning to realise more fully than ever that most of the questions that press upon us at the present day—in politics, sociology and economics, in law and government, in literature and art, and even in science—first presented themselves to Greek and Roman thinkers and statesmen. Many of the problems of democracy, of internationalism, of industrialism, to name no others, were known

* 'Outline of History' (two-volume edition, p. 525).

to the ancient world. Because the forms in which they then emerged were less complex, because they can now be studied without reference to the passions excited at the time, and because Greece and Rome offer the spectacle of civilisations running their course from start to finish, the study of their history may form the best preparation for that of our own difficulties.'

We fully endorse these views. The committee on modern languages (on p. 30 of its report), in an eloquent and interesting passage, endeavoured to show that 'the history and literature 'of a modern people (France was the instance selected) may do 'for our own pupils what the history and literature of Greece 'and Rome have done for many generations of their most 'enlightened ancestors': but they could not have penned the last sentence of the passage quoted above, and it contains the gist of the matter.

It must be left to those who can find time to read the report as a whole to study the valuable suggestions which are put forward as to the methods of teaching which the new outlook requires. We are glad to note that the committee recommends that

'opportunity shall be taken, wherever possible, of giving the pupil some acquaintance with the main results of archæological discovery; and that to this end it is desirable that (*i*) a member of the staff shall have a competent knowledge of the subject; (*ii*) school libraries and museums should be suitably equipped; (*iii*) encouragement should be given to visits to museums, Roman sites, etc.; (*iv*) there should be organized co-operation between schools and education and museum authorities.'

In this connection the committee looks for aid to voluntary bodies such as the Classical Association and the Hellenic and Roman Societies. We could wish, however, that the suggestion of joint action by such bodies had been developed. There is need of a central council of classical studies, upon which, besides the bodies above-named, the British Museum, the Schools of Athens and Rome and the Society of Antiquaries should be represented; the Board of Education would, it might be hoped, appoint a *liaison* officer, and assist in keeping the council in touch with local authorities and governing bodies.

The committee also suggest as 'a promising vein which has 'been very little worked,' the history of Greek scientific thought and discovery, which they think (and no doubt rightly) might become the means of bringing the ablest boys on the classical

and science sides of a school to understand and respect each other's point of view. Here we find a point of contact with the report of the Committee on Natural Science, which suggested that boys of 16-18 not specialising in science (many of whom, therefore, would probably be students of classics) should attend courses on scientific subjects suited to 'stretch the wits of the cleverer 'boys' and included in its list of suggestions the history of science, *e.g.*, of astronomy from the Greeks to Newton, and the method and philosophy of science, historically treated, with special reference to the work of Aristotle and his predecessors, Archimedes, Galileo and Bacon. Sir Thomas Heath, in an interesting address on 'Greek Mathematics and Science,'* shows good cause for the study of the Greek mathematicians by classical as well as mathematical learners: and his excellent edition of the First Book of Euclid in Greek deserves to be widely known and used. To quote his preface:—

'When compulsory Greek is gone, the study of Greek will be no whit less necessary to a complete education. Generation after generation of men and women will still have to go to school to the Greeks for the things in which they are our masters; and for this purpose, they must continue to learn Greek. Again Euclid can never at any time be more than apparently in abeyance—he is immortal. Elementary geometry will also continue to form part of a complete education; and elementary geometry *is* Euclid, however much the editors of text-books may try to obscure the fact.'

But we must be careful not to rest the case for imparting a knowledge of Greek to students of physical science merely on the fact that its terminology is almost wholly made up of Greek word-forms. The truth lies deeper. Not only have we the right to say that 'there is only one road to science and that it was 'the Greeks who found it'; that, it may be urged, is a matter of 'purely archæological interest.' We may also say that the Greeks furnished the human mind with the tokens by which it may discern false roads from true, as well in the twentieth century A.D. as in the fifth century B.C. A modicum of Greek learning will enable a man to understand what is meant when he is told that consciousness is an 'epiphenomenon': but he who has entered more deeply into the spirit of the Greeks will reply

* Delivered at Leeds on March 5, 1921, to a joint meeting of classical, mathematical and scientific associations.

(after the manner of Socrates) *εἶεν· τὸ δὲ ἐπιφαινόμενον τοῦτο, τίνι φαίνεται*; It is impossible to read recent presentations of the theory of relativity or of the fundamentals of modern physics without feeling that they have yet to be purged from their dross by the fires of philosophical criticism, and that this must and will be the work of those who have been trained in their youth to handle the word of Greece, which is 'living and powerful, ' and sharper than any two-edged sword.'

Mr. Wells has said with truth that 'human history becomes 'more and more a race between education and catastrophe.' The scientific and humanitarian movements, roughly parallel in their course during the nineteenth century, have diverged rapidly in the twentieth; and though the poet might find inspiration in

'every engine exquisite that sings
the soul's new triumph over soulless things,'

what we saw and heard in 1914-18 above and upon the battlefields of Europe was a tribe of monsters which recalled

'those dragons of the prime
that tare each other in the slime.'

We look to education to restore the broken unity by instilling into the learner the love of knowledge and the love of man: and this, too, is a Greek idea. *ἦν γὰρ παρῇ φιλανθρωπίη, πάρεστι καὶ φιλοτεχνίη.**

* Hippocrates, 'Praecept,' 6 (ix. 258 ed. Littré).

H. Stuart Jones.

THE MILITARY MIND

1. The Realities of War. By Sir Philip Gibbs. Heinemann. 1920.
2. G.Q.G., Secteur I. By Jean de Pierrefeu. Paris. 1920.
3. The General Staff and its Problems. By General Erich Ludendorff. Hutchinson. 1920.
4. General Headquarters, 1914—16, and its Critical Decisions. By General Erich von Falkenhayn. 1919.

BEFORE the world was plunged into war in August 1914 an expression often heard in conversation, and as frequently read in the public press, was, ' Germany is a nation of soldiers.' By constant iteration the phrase was widely believed, and yet it was fundamentally untrue. Since the Tartar hordes, real nations of soldiers moving forward relentlessly to carry out by military means a national purpose, there has been no such thing in the world as ' a nation of soldiers.' There have been nations whom soldiers and the soldier spirit have dominated and used for their own ends, such as the France of Napoleon, the Prussia of Moltke, the Germany of Ludendorff, but there have been no ' nations of ' soldiers.' The mounted bowmen who wrecked the polity of Asia in the Middle Ages and shook Christian Europe to its foundation were the last ' nation of soldiers ' the world has seen. Since then nations have been composed in the main of civilians, among whom are found a minority of men whose lives and thoughts are quite other than civilian lives and thoughts—and they are that nation's soldiers. It matters not a rap whether the ranks of the national army are filled by voluntary enlistment, affecting but a small proportion of the population, or by compulsory service which passes through those ranks a larger proportion of the population ; the fact always remains that in every country, outside the ranks of the professional army and untouched by it, is the bulk of the population, men over military age, men of military age but surplus to requirements, youths and children and women. Broadly speaking, it is correct to say that even in July 1914 when the nations of Europe, armed and organized as never before, were about to spring at one another's throats, this world was a civilian world in which was to be found a minority of one sex, as a matter of fact a small minority, which consisted of soldiers.

If we look back at the last war, the greatest war which has afflicted civilisation since the collapse of the Eastern Empire, a war which involved as combatants more men than any previous war since the Asiatic migrations, we note that one of its most characteristic features was the vast number of civilians who were involved as combatants compared to the small number of professional soldiers engaged. The reason for this seeming paradox is the fact that during the nineteenth century most European nations had adhered to the principle of the ' Nation in ' Arms,' while none could afford to indulge in the luxury of maintaining in peace precisely such an army as they would require in war. Now the ' Nation in Arms ' is, or let us hope we ought to say, was, an expedient for fighting wars, and, if possible, winning them, by using for the purpose large numbers of civilians who had been passed, for a longer or shorter time, usually two years or three years, through a school in which the instructors, who knew their work thoroughly and were real professionals, gave their civilian pupils a brief course in the best methods of killing men and endeavoured to inculcate certain lessons of discipline, *esprit de corps*, and patriotism which it is essential for civilians to assimilate if they are to do and endure in battle things which are fortunately remote from their every-day avocations. Before the war the body of men in the world most like a body of soldiers was a British unit in India, were it a cavalry regiment, a battalion of infantry, or a battery of artillery : the men in such a unit had been in the ranks a sufficient time to be permeated by the spirit of an army. Next to that we would place a unit of the German army because there a more intensive training of more malleable material had produced in a shorter period a standard of efficiency almost equally high, to outward appearance, say to the eye of a newspaper correspondent at manœuvres, although the spirit was not of the same fine temper. As a matter of fact, both these soldierly-looking bodies of men, the British unit in India and the German unit on its parade ground in peace time, were, as fighting machines for the purposes of modern war, unsupported façades.

The first battle blew great gaps in their ranks, gaps which had to be filled by civilians, viz., reservists or former soldiers who had become merged in the civil population. Further battles —and in 1914 and 1915 battles followed fast, and were always bloody—necessitated further drafts, until eventually the war

was fought in all armies by civilians rapidly trained to the technique of killing, and more or less imbued with such elementary ideas of discipline as the tradition of a terribly short-handed and over-worked officer corps could inculcate in the brief time available. In every army improvisation followed on improvisation as the tale of slaughter mounted up, while courage, that most splendid of human virtues, was found to be an attribute of decent manhood, and not the special prerogative of a military caste. In every nation the most unexpected men were most superbly brave and displayed a fortitude and endurance which posterity, if not subjected to the same grim and prolonged test, will have difficulty in realising—and those men were and remained civilians. That is a fundamental fact of the war which is now part, and no inconsiderable part, of the experience of the human race. It is a fact to be taken into account by those whose duty or inclination leads them to study the history of the Great War.

Out of this human fact there arises a psychological problem which the historian must take into account. It is one which if not appraised correctly may lead to wrong judgments on important incidents in the war, perhaps even to an inability to explain the whole course of the war which presumably is the first duty of an historian : that problem is the action and interaction of the military mind and the civilian mind. Obviously the school of command requires a longer course than the school of the commanded ; less knowledge, less experience is required in the latter than in the former. In the conditions of modern war, a few weeks of intensive training will make of a civilian a private soldier able to kill an enemy in such manner as may be required of him, and a few months will make a non-commissioned officer ; we have all seen it done. Of necessity the training of a regimental officer takes longer and postulates better educated material to start with.

When one comes to the question of command, using the word in its wider sense of unit commanders, formation commanders, up to the higher commanders of armies and groups of armies, including the great body of staff officers without whose skilled assistance command in modern war is not possible, it is obvious that a higher standard of professional attainment is necessary if the military machine is to function. Clearly the requisite period of training increases from the bottom upwards—from the private soldier to the field-marshal.

There is a large class of the population of every country—it is very large in this country—which is confident that, from its own inner consciousness and without training or experience, it can successfully resolve the greater problems of war, with or without the help of a small scale map ; but the history of war, whether in Europe or America, does not justify those pretensions. When we appreciate how near to disaster the amateur strategy of President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George brought their respective countries, we realise that before giving orders in war, some period of apprenticeship is desirable. How long that period is cannot be defined ; all one can say with certainty is that it does require unremitting application for a certain time which in the case of Napoleon (a professional soldier) was short, and considerably longer in the case of most commanders who have won battles. Except in the British army, the four and a-half years the late war lasted do not seem to have been considered in any army a period long enough for a non-professional soldier to qualify for important command. In the British army, two army corps—Canadian and Australian—were commanded with conspicuous ability and determination by lieutenant-generals who were not professional soldiers, and who in no other European army would have been given a chance to prove their worth. During the last phase of the war, that body of British soldiers which incarnated most perfectly the old traditions and disciplined self-sacrifice of the regular army—we mean the Guards Division—had as its General Staff Officer, first grade, a scholar of Winchester and New College, who was not a professional soldier, though he proved himself a most able staff officer.

It would be untrue, however, to argue from these and a few other brilliant exceptions that the British army, any more than any other army, welcomed departure from established precedent or admitted to itself consciously that, even in a war fought in the main by great masses of civilians, the military mind was not a *sine qua non* in commanders and senior staff officers. All we venture to claim is that on this one point the British military mind was not quite so rigid as the German and French military mind. On the contrary, we do not think that there is any essential difference between the military minds in any nation : the real difference is between the military mind and the civilian mind in every nation. This difference is important to the historian and

to every student of operations, for it contains within itself a dangerous element of friction.

Clausewitz (' On War,' Book I, Chapter vii.) in analysing the effect of friction in war, says :—

> ' Friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to that which distinguishes real war from war on paper. The military machine, the army and all belonging to it, is in fact simple, and appears on this account easy to manage. But let us reflect that no part of it is in one piece, that it is composed entirely of individuals, each of which keeps up its own friction in all directions. Theoretically all sounds very well ; the commander of a battalion is responsible for the execution of the orders given ; and as the battalion by its discipline is glued together into one piece, and the chief must be a man of acknowledged zeal, the beam turns on an iron pin with little friction. But it is not so in reality, and all that is exaggerated and false in such a conception manifests itself at once in war. The battalion always remains composed of a number of men, of whom, if chance so wills, the most insignificant is able to occasion delay and even irregularity.'

Especially, we would here interpolate, when the junior officers and men in the ranks are not professional soldiers.

The German philosopher of war, in his next sentence, goes on to say : ' The danger which war brings with it, the bodily ' exertions which it requires, augment this evil so much that they ' may be regarded as the greatest causes of it.'

While admitting readily that the fear of death, the unspeakable horrors of a battlefield and the depression of nervous energy consequent upon fatigue are by far the greatest elements of friction which impede the success of any given operation, we now wish to direct the reader's attention to an element of friction which was not so apparent in the days of Clausewitz as in those we have just lived through, viz., that which results from contact between the military mind and the civilian mind, and from their inherent antagonism.

' This enormous friction, which is not concentrated, as in ' mechanics, at a few points ' (Clausewitz, Vol. I, p. 79) has, in a great modern war, three main surfaces of contact: first, that extensive but well-defined surface in the army itself where the military mind of the higher command is brought into contact with the civilian mind of the commanded through the whole hierarchy of command, composed of generals and professional officers, both staff and regimental ; secondly, another surface,

less well-defined, which is represented by the mentality and feelings of the population at home, following with aching hearts the fate of their own flesh and blood exposed to the terrible ordeal of modern war, and brought in contact with the military mind by official *communiqués*, the despatches of war correspondents and private letters from the front. The third surface of friction is narrower, and is comprised in the relationship between the civil government at home and the higher command in the field—the friction on this narrow surface can be so intense however as to throw the whole machine out of gear ; perhaps at no point is the lubricant of a common understanding and mutual forbearance more urgent in the national interests, or more difficult to achieve.

It is not easy to define in a few paragraphs those two complex psychological states which for brevity we have called ' the ' military mind ' and ' the civilian mind.' Fortunately our task is simplified by the fact that in 1920 there were published in London and Paris respectively two books which have been widely read and much discussed by those interested in the psychological aspects of the war. In ' The Realities of War,' by Sir Philip Gibbs, we have the impressions and reflexions of a highly competent British civilian, whose duties as a newspaper correspondent brought him at frequent intervals into contact with all the different types of men who composed the British armies in France throughout the war, from Commanders-in-chief and Army Commanders to regimental officers and men of the new armies. With courage, and, we believe, with perfect loyalty to truth as he saw it, Sir Philip Gibbs has painted a terrible picture of the horrors of modern war. Consciously or unconsciously he has taken a subjective view of the events and incidents he has described and of the men he met and spoke with. While discounting its value as history, which it does not pretend to be, this fact gives his book importance for our present purpose, which is to see how the military mind functioning in war presents itself to the civilian mind. The other book, entitled ' G.Q.G. ' Secteur I,' to which we would refer the reader, is by a French man of letters, M. Jean de Pierrefeu, who for three years was attached to the Grand Quartier Général to write the daily *communiqué* which was the official channel by which the people of France were informed of the events of a war which concerned them so closely. M. de Pierrefeu's work, unlike that of Sir

Philip Gibbs, did not lie among the troops or bring him into contact with all the varied elements of the French army in the same way that the English correspondent was brought in touch with the British army. On the other hand, as an integral portion of French General Headquarters, commonly called ' le Grand ' Q.G.,' M. de Pierrefeu had exceptional facilities for observing the higher command at work in days of defeat and victory and through long periods of alternate suspense and hope, until the final triumph in 1918, and this intimate daily contact with the men who were controlling the French military machine gives to his book a special value. Taken together, these two works, by two highly competent and accurate observers of different nationalities, are important documents on the psychology of the military mind.

In their broad judgments on the qualities and defects of the military mind we find Sir Philip Gibbs and M. de Pierrefeu in agreement. We find the former saying :—

' I met many other generals who were men of ability, energy, high sense of duty and strong personality. I found them intellectually, with few exceptions, narrowly moulded to the same type, strangely limited in their range of ideas and quality of character.

" One has to leave many gaps in one's conversation with generals," said a friend of mine after lunching with an army commander.

That was true. One had to talk to them on the lines of leading articles in the *Morning Post*. Their patriotism, their knowledge of human nature, their idealism, and their imagination were restricted to the traditional views of English country gentlemen of the Tory school. Anything outside that range of thought was to them heresy, treason, or wishy-washy sentiment.

What was mainly wrong with our generalship was the system which put high command into the hands of a group of men belonging to the old school of war, unable, by reason of their age and traditions, to get away from rigid methods and to become elastic in face of new conditions.' (p. 46.)

M. de Pierrefeu's opinion of the ' brain of the French army,' the men he lived with day in and day out for three years and observed at close quarters conducting the major operations of war, is summed up in a chapter called ' Psychologie du " breveté " ' —the French equivalent of our ' p.s.c.' or ' passed Staff College.'

He says :—

' L'officier breveté est presque toujours du type dit réactionnaire. Il a pour toutes les formes du progrès un éloignement instinctif et une

crainte profonde des opinions avancées. Sa mentalité rappelle celles des gens qu'en province on désigne sous l'épithète de " bien pensants."' (Vol. I, p. 44.)

And again :—

' Mais si la valeur morale des officiers, et particulièrement des brevetés, doit être placée trés haut, il n'en est pas de même de leur valeur intellectuelle. La baisse de la culture qu'on doit déjà déplorer dans l'ensemble du peuple français se fait plus fortement sentir encore chez les militaires. Spécialistes, ils restent assez indifférents aux manifestations de l'activité intellectuelle, en dehors de leur spécialité . . . . L'absence d'idées générales chez eux est surprenante comme la faiblesse de leur esprit critique ; volontiers, ils s'en tiennent aux premiers éléments tels qu'ils leur restent dans la mémoire, extraits des manuels de classe qu'ils ont eu entre les mains avant le baccalauréat. C'est à dire qu'ils n'ont pas continué à s'instruire, faute de temps ou faute de goût.' (Vol. I, p. 50.)

And again :—

' Dans toute cervelle militaire une croyance ferme existe, à savoir qu'un breveté est apte à remplir tous les emplois. De même que la philosophie englobe toutes les connaissances au dire des philosophes, la science militaire, qui est en même temps un art et une vocation comme chacun sait, rend apte celui qui l'a reçue à exceller dans toutes les branches de l'activité humaine.'

Even the American staff is reported by M. de Pierrefeu to have suffered from some of the defects he has noted in the case of their French brethren :—

' Chose surprenante, les brevetés de ce pays neuf, ou ce qui y correspond, se montrèrent aussi infatués d'eux-mêmes que les nôtres. Un homme que je ne veux pas nommer, parce qu'il est bien connu en Amérique, me disait : " Je suis stupéfait de voir qu'il vient de se constituer brusquement, à la faveur de la guerre, une aristocratie militaire américaine qui méprise tout le reste de l'Amérique, alors qu'il y a un an l'officier de carrière n'occupait là-bas qu'une place assez modeste dans l'hiérarchie sociale."' (Vol. II, p. 214.)

No higher command or general staff in the great war has escaped the keen edge of civilian criticism. If we find Sir Philip Gibbs telling us that

' G.H.Q. lived . . . in a world of its own, rose coloured, remote from the ugly things of war. They had heard of the trenches, yes, but as the West End hears of the East End—a nasty place where common people lived. Occasionally they visited the trenches, as society folk

go slumming, and came back proud of having seen a shell burst, having braved the lice and the dirt' (p. 201). . . . . 'The German high command blundered atrociously in all the larger calculations of war, so that they brought about the doom of their Empire by a series of acts which would seem deliberate if we had not known that they were merely blind.' (p. 369.)

This is a judgment from which no one will dissent who has read with unbiassed mind the works in which Generals Ludendorff and von Falkenhayn have sought to justify themselves to the nation they pushed over into the pit of complete military disaster. The unfitness of these eminent chiefs of the great General Staff to express opinions on questions of external and internal national policy is only equalled by the frequency (and prolixity) of their memoranda to the Imperial Chancellor, and by his abject acceptance of 'the opinion of the General Staff' on matters on which neither their education nor their experience of affairs entitled them to a hearing. National psychology was a closed book to the ablest of the German soldiers. Ludendorff knew how many guns and how many men were required on a given front to break down the enemy's resistance—he was an intelligent and well trained soldier and that was a question within his competence as such—he did not know, and could not by any possibility know, that when he smuggled Lenin into Russia, in order to knock Russia out of the war by fomenting revolution, he had sounded the death knell of the German army. Sir Philip Gibbs is right in saying that one of the most important admissions in history was made by Ludendorff when he wrote, 'Looking 'back, I say our decline began clearly with the outbreak of the 'revolution in Russia.' Yet he, Ludendorff, had promoted that revolution because it seemed to him, at the time, expedient to eliminate the Russian army from the chess board of war.

The word 'expedient' brings us back to a fundamental criticism of the military mind which is implicit but not expressed in the pages of Sir Philip Gibbs and M. de Pierrefeu. In page after page both these civilian critics of the things they have seen suggest, rather than definitely impute, a shortness of vision on the part of generals which led constantly to operations being undertaken in view of the expediency of the moment and without sufficient regard to consequences, especially psychological consequences. For instance, Sir Philip Gibbs is very caustic

in his criticism of the loss of life incurred in certain holding attacks near Ypres and on the Somme, designed to prevent the Germans moving men from those regions to the main theatre of operations near Loos in 1915. It is not the justice or otherwise of those criticisms which concerns us now but the fact that Sir Philip Gibbs, a most intelligent civilian observing events at first hand, should think them worth making, which is of interest as showing the difference between the military and the civilian mind. They are too long to quote but we invite our reader's attention to them—he will find them on pages 136 and 137 of 'The Realities of War.' They show a subjective view of operations, while the military mind must always take an objective view. The cold objective view of the Operations Section of the French General Staff (the 3*e* Bureau with which M. de Pierrefeu makes us so intimately acquainted) would have shocked Sir Philip Gibbs no less than it upset his French colleague, who tells us that, at the time of the great German thrust on Noyon in March 1918, when the danger to Paris itself was grave :—

'J'entendis plaisanter deux officiers qui venaient d'expédier une énorme besogne et s'en montraient satisfaits. Pour ceux-la, assurément, l'intérêt du jeu dominait et masquait ce que la situation avait de douloureux. Il y a, parfois, chez quelques militaires, passionnés de leur métier, une absence de cœur qui choque. Le sol qu'on défend ou qu'on conquiert n'a plus, pour eux, la valeur sentimentale qu'il revêt pour nous ; c'est un morceau de l'échiquier. Et peut-être sont-ils ainsi dans l'état d'âme qui convient pour agir avec lucidité.' (Vol. II, p. 138.)

In describing the terrible happenings on the British front during those same momentous days, when the Fifth Army was fighting its last glorious fight back over the old heroic fields of 1916, Courcellette, and Delville Wood, and Mametz, and Montauban, Sir Philip Gibbs says sadly :—

'That meant the loss of all the old Somme battlefields, and that struck a chill to one's heart. But what I marvelled at always was the absence of panic, the fatalistic acceptance of the turn of fortune's wheel by many officers and men, and the refusal of corps and divisional staffs to give way to despair in those days of tragedy and crisis.'

Sir Philip Gibbs has said many hard and cruel things of British generals and British staff officers. The general tenor of his book is to convey to his reader an impression, which we

believe to be profoundly untrue, that, taking them all round, our generals were bad and their staffs incompetent. We have not dealt with his charges in detail because we are now only concerned with the fact of the impressions left on Sir Philip Gibbs' mind as a civilian observer of the war and not with his work as a contribution to history, which is quite another matter. We are therefore the more glad to be able to quote this paragraph, which proves, if proof be needed, that in relation to the operations of war British commanders were able to think objectively on the very battlefield itself. Heaven help an army whose commanders and staff officers take the subjective view of war which is right and proper in Sir Philip Gibbs and M. de Pierrefeu. There is a military mind and there is a civilian mind—there is room for both in the world—but on and near a battlefield the former must dominate or the enemy will win.

A feature of the military mind which seems to have struck a cold chill to the hearts of Sir Philip Gibbs and M. de Pierrefeu alike was its invincible optimism. Now in war there is a right place for pessimism, not the pure and unadulterated pessimism of temperament, which is useless in any relation of life, but that modified form of pessimism which is of the intellect and impels to careful and balanced scrutiny of every step contemplated while an operation scheme is being worked out. This caution which insists on reasonable margins for safety, which demurs at accepting rosy appreciations that do not take adequately into account the courses open to the enemy, is the wise pessimism of the council chamber while deliberations are proceeding behind locked doors. The moment a decision has been reached, an operation scheme has been approved and orders to carry it out have been issued (or received, as the case may be), it is a military crime for any responsible commander or staff officer to allow any trace of pessimism to appear. Time and again in the history of all wars has a badly conceived operation achieved success if it has been carried out by subordinates loyally and with resolution. The converse is also true and many a good scheme has failed through half-hearted execution by subordinate commanders who did not believe it could succeed. Sir Philip Gibbs accuses the optimism of the military mind of sacrificing thousands and thousands of lives. Perhaps he is right, though we would prefer to word the charge differently, and to say, instead, that in a

war lasting four and a half years many mistakes were made by commanders of all ranks, in every army, which led to unnecessary casualties on a scale proportionate to the magnitude of the war and the numbers engaged. In decrying the optimism of the military mind he omits to note that in the British and French armies it was in the end justified.

As a matter of fact we find him (p. 391) quoting a sentence from Ludendorff on the British offensive in Flanders in 1917 which could not have been written about a higher command imbued with pessimism or which displayed irresolution. Ludendorff says :— 'We knew that the wear and tear of the 'enemy's forces was high. But we also knew that the enemy 'was extraordinarily strong and, what was equally important, 'possessed extraordinary will-power.' The critics of the British higher command should note those words : 'what was equally 'important.' Napoleon would probably have said, 'what was 'more important.' Marshal Foch would certainly have said so.

On the subject of the optimism of the military mind M. de Pierrefeu is, as we have said, at one with Sir Philip Gibbs. Where the French observer saw it at its best was in the 3rd Bureau of the Grand Quartier Général—the Operation Section of the General Staff. His account of the working of that vital portion of the French military machine is a psychological study which no student of the war can afford to neglect.

Perhaps it may be considered that we have emphasised unduly the reaction on the minds of Sir Philip Gibbs and M. de Pierrefeu of the optimism of the military mind. We do not think so, as we believe that the great masses of civilian minded men in uniform who formed the armies with which this war was fought felt about it just as Sir Philip Gibbs felt, when he floundered his way up to the shell craters held by our men in the mud of Flanders, and as M. de Pierrefeu felt when in contact with 'the Young Turks' of the Operation Section of the Grand Q.G. It makes a fundamental cleavage between the military mind and the civilian mind, and as such it is a fact of importance.

From this cursory examination of the problem of the military mind in relation to the civilian mind one fact emerges—they are essentially different. The reaction of the former upon the latter was unsatisfactory both in England and in France. To judge by the specimens of letters captured in German trenches, which

Sir Philip Gibbs quotes, the same unsatisfactory relationship prevailed in the German army—after all our poor battered common humanity is much the same under khaki, horizon blue and field grey, and the professional soldier is much the same whether he passed through the Staff College, the École Supérieure de Guerre, or the Kriegschule. To whatever nation we may belong the question remains insistent : ' How are we to reduce the friction ' between the military mind and the civilian mind ? ' One solution is ruled out, blotted out by the blood shed in four and a half years of war, and that is the militarization of the civil population. Germany tried it : she failed to achieve it and is now an inchoate thing that was once an empire, saddled with a war debt she can never pay.

The militarization of the civilian mind being ruled out, what remains ? The only promising line of approach to a solution is the education of the professional soldier to a fuller comprehension of the general character of the nation to which he belongs. In this process of education—and be it remembered that *educare* means to lead out, to develop, not to stunt, or to kill, or to impose—the soldier must not let go of any particle of his faith which makes for victory in war, only he must learn a wider comprehension which will lead to a wider tolerance. Unconsciously we find ourselves using phrases which would be apt if used in an attempt to bring together the votaries of two opposing sects holding the same general religious creed. After all, the theological simile is not so far beside the point, for what is a professional soldier ? Is he not the ' religious ' of an order belonging to the same creed to which the civilian as a layman professes obedience—the creed of patriotism ? In all armies the general body of really professional soldiers, that is to say the corps of officers and, to a less degree, the corps of non-commissioned officers, are not unlike the members of a monastic order. Not only are they dedicated to a purpose in a sense different from that of the general body of laymen—in their case the honour and service of the country—but from their youth upwards they are cut off from the general body of the community. In the British army this is more markedly so than in other armies now that the German army has ceased to exist ; not only is there a tradition that the officer must be a certain kind of man, affiliated, even though often at a remote degree, to the ' governing class ' but as a matter of

fact usually cut off from his own class by frequent changes of station when serving at home and still more by long periods of service in India or the Colonies.

The inevitable result of the circumstances in which British officers grow up and reach the maturity of their thinking powers is that they are thrown in upon themselves and are dependent upon one another for their amusements, their association and consequently their thoughts. Can it be wondered at that the British officer is a man run into a mould and frozen into its shape ? Go into any mess in the British army and see what newspapers and reviews the officers read. They are the same—those which their seniors have read, and those seniors' predecessors, and so on back to Waterloo and the Peninsula. In an England which has steadily moved away from that particular point of view, the life, reading and conversation of the officers' mess of a battalion of the line, of a cavalry regiment, or a brigade of artillery do not tend to minimise friction between the military mind and the civilian mind. Such a training, such a youth and middle age, must inevitably produce the type of general that Sir Philip Gibbs describes so caustically ! The great bulk of the officers of the army are in a way isolated from the community. Frequent changes of station make it difficult, if not impossible, to enter fully into the life of the community they happen to find themselves stationed among. A regiment stationed in York sees and knows nothing of the real life of Yorkshire, which does not consist entirely of hunting or of a few tennis parties in and near the town of York. And so it is all over the kingdom.

In this connection we must note that service in India, where half the army spends half its time, is from this point of view, wholly bad. At no time does an officer in India get away from the official hierarchy. An Indian station club is a very different thing to a London club. Indian clubs are curious places in which subalterns say ' Sir ' to field officers, and think and speak as their seniors think and speak, and so, day by day and night by night, make themselves more unfitted for eventual contact with the pulsing life of England, when in due course they in their turn shall have become generals and, in the next war, have to reckon with, perhaps play upon, the psychology of great masses of men who, though dressed in khaki, are, at heart, just so many thousand English civilians.

Perhaps it is not too much to say that the psychology of civilians wants studying by soldiers, and that the psychology of soldiers wants studying by civilians—with a view to change. For four and a half years of strain and horror the military mind acted on the civilian mind without grasping the reaction. Perhaps the time has come for the civilian mind to take in hand the military mind, if it does not wish to go through the same experience again. If the second world-war can only be postponed for thirty years it ought to be possible to produce a breed of generals and staff officers who, besides knowing how to beat their enemy, will also know something about Englishmen and Scotsmen and Irishmen and Welshmen—in their primitive condition of civilians—always remembering that a great war is a war of civilians, in which the soldiers are a small directing minority on either side.

BYRON IN ENGLAND

Astarte. By the late Earl of Lovelace. Christophers. 1921.

BYRON'S short life was a marvel among the lives of men. No part of it however is so amazing as the London interval between his return from his first pilgrimage in 1811 and his departure on his last pilgrimage in 1816. Surely never before in any man's career were thrust, into so brief a term, so many viscissitudes of fortune. When Byron came back from his first pilgrimage he had not a single friend in all England of his own birth and rank. The first to welcome him home was Dallas, a quasi-connection of his family and the son of a physician. When he arrived at Newstead, the only intimates whom he could invite there were old Cambridge chums—budding college fellows, country parsons and town dandies; and this head of a house 'knightly or noble' since the Conquest owed his first introduction into the aristocratic society of England to Tommy Moore, the son of an Irish tradesman. Then 'Childe Harold' appeared; and the next morning the young, poor and neglected nobleman 'awoke to find himself famous.' He became in an instant the 'hot press darling' of London drawing-rooms; no fashionable function was complete without him; the greatest ladies of the land raved over his poetic genius, and still more, over his personal beauty; and his amours among them became the talk of the town. Then he married; and, after a brief year of matrimony, his wife quarrelled with him about exactly what nobody knew. She deserted him; and immediately the buzz of adulation turned into a bray of hate. The aristocracy closed its doors in his face; the mob howled its execrations at him in the street; and the great ladies, who not long before were honoured by being presented to him, picked up their skirts as they passed, lest they might suffer contamination by touching garments with him. That bell-wether, fashion, had tired of her pet lamb; and had driven him from her; and the whole human flock, knowing as little as she did of the cause of her displeasure, followed her lead like brainless sheep.

What manner of man then was this Byron, who could become

so quickly the idol, and as quickly the outcast of England? We have now far more ample materials for answering this question than had his contemporaries. We have his own and his friends' and his enemies' letters and recollections; biographies by writers who have sought out and sifted all available evidence; and lastly that extraordinary work at the head of this article, in which a half-mad grandson tries to brighten his grandmother's, by blackening his half-mad grandfather's, reputation. With such a mass of facts before us, we should be able to form a more or less confident opinion of Byron's true character; even though, as we must admit, it was more perplexing and contradictory than that of almost any other great artist in words, music, or colour.

All that such of his contemporaries as wished to form a fair opinion of him had to rely upon, besides the public gossip about his adventures and amours, and the libels which appeared in the newspapers and which he himself sometimes anonymously supplied, was the picture of him which he himself drew in his poems. As to this it should be remembered that even when an author does not make himself his own hero, the writings of a man of genius are never a satisfactory indication of his character. Because in his works Swift wished to outrage conventional opinion, he is regarded as a savage misanthrope; because Steele innocently recorded all his own follies, he is regarded as a tipsy fool; and because Addison always posed as the champion of virtue, he is regarded as an earthly saint—views of their respective characters which do not squarely easily with the facts. But when a writer of genius makes himself constantly the hero of his writings, this shows that he has a theatrical bent of mind; and we may be sure that the picture which he draws of himself is a fancy one—what in his own imagination he thinks he is, or what he wishes the world to imagine him to be. And no minstrel ever so constantly made himself the hero of his lays as did Byron. His verse is largely autobiographical. He is the most concrete of poets, writing of little or nothing except himself and the things he himself has seen, thought or felt; his invention is chiefly displayed in the colour and glamour with which he adorns, magnifies, and sometimes transforms, his recollections. And his peculiar fancy was to wish the world to imagine him a villain. It is not strange, then, that his contemporaries should regard him as a man capable, if not guilty, of every crime; or that they should be mistaken.

The Byron whom we now know is a weird enough being; but by no means an all-round criminal. We see him a man in many ways of a generous nature, charitable to the poor, zealous for his friends, and self-sacrificingly devoted to what he believed to be the cause of liberty and justice. But his self-will, his temper, and his animal passions, were violent to a degree; and his early upbringing had not taught him even to try to restrain them. That early upbringing fixed not merely his moral but his intellectual character. He was the child of his memory; and the earlier his recollections, the more vividly he remembered them, the more his imagination coloured them and the deeper they sank into his nature. Those who would understand Byron must study the influences under which he passed his years of infancy.

That infancy was spent in Scotland; and to his last day the remembrance of

> 'Scotch plaids, Scotch snoods, the blue hills and clear streams'

was a delight to him; and made him love the land and all its people. Like other feelings of his, this affection was liable to temporary reversal through resentment. When the EDINBURGH reviewed unkindly his boyish poems, everything Scottish became instantly anathema to him. But though 'he rhymed at Scots 'to show his wrath and wit,' he soon repented of his unfaithfulness to his earliest allegiance; and found that, by his outbreak of anger, he had

> 'Scotched not killed the Scotchman in his blood
> And loved the land of mountain and of flood.'

Just as his early Scottish surroundings fixed for ever his national affections, so his early Scottish training fixed for ever his moral and religious opinions. Owing to the unfitness of his mother and the incapacity of his schoolmasters, this was left entirely in the hands of his nurse, May Gray. She seems to have been a woman deeply religious in her narrow Calvinistic way; that is, she believed implicitly that every word in the Bible was the word of God; she believed in original sin brought into the world by man's first disobedience through the temptation of woman, and in the doctrine of predestination; and she taught her young charge to believe as she believed.

In the years of his manhood Byron rhymed at all these beliefs, just as he rhymed at Scots; but all the same they, like his love of

Scotland, remained till his last day part of himself. All his life he carried everywhere with him his Bible. He had it ever by his bedside ; and as his valet, Fletcher, wrote, ' it was his first ' companion in the morning.' In the theological discussions which he had with Dr. Kennedy in Cephalonia, just before his last visit to Greece, he said, ' I believe in predestination and ' in the depravity of the human heart in general and mine in ' particular,' which may be said to be a succinct statement of the prime doctrines of strict Calvinism. Before that, he had refused absolutely to allow his daughter, Allegra, to be educated by the Shelleys because he feared they would teach her that there was no God. Before that, Scott had prophesied (Byron not dissenting) that he would yet end his days in a monastery. Mary Mitford, with the clearer vision of a clever woman, prophesied that he would die a Methodist. As a matter of fact his death might have been that of a Methodist. Fletcher tells how during his last illness, he quoted, when delirious, passages from Scripture ; and how his last conscious words were a pious response. ' All ' is over,' muttered the dying poet. ' I hope not,' answered Fletcher, ' but the Lord's will be done.' ' Yes,' whispered Byron, ' not mine.'

A central principle of strict Calvinism is that it was woman who brought about the Fall of Man by tempting him. This principle is held the most firmly by some Calvinistic women. Nothing is stranger in human nature than the way these women insist on the especial wickedness of their sex, and their consequent unworthiness to hold any position of honour or authority in religious affairs. A distinguished acquaintance of my own, who is a Scottish laird, but has made unto himself a second home in Italy, told me that once, when on a visit to his native land, an old lady upbraided him, because that he, a born Presbyterian, should prefer to live most of his life among Papists. In defence, my friend contended strongly that there was really no vital difference between Protestant and Catholic on the essentials of Christian belief. The silence which followed his arguments led him to think he had convinced the old lady, till it was broken by her saying firmly, ' Ah, man, but I canna abide that Virgin ' Mary.'

May Gray seems to have had much the same prejudice against her sex. Woman, in her view, brought about the first fall of man

and was quite capable of repeating the operation. That view she planted firmly in Byron's infant mind; and, like every infantile impression, there it remained till his dying day. To him woman was ever the temptress of man. In a letter to Moore, written in the heyday of his career as a man of *bonnes fortunes*, he says, 'I have also, more or less, been breaking a few favourite 'commandments; but I mean to pull up and marry.' The only commandment which Byron ever showed much inclination to break was the seventh; and, when he broke it, his invariable defence was that of Adam: 'The woman tempted me.' It proved a bad defence in Adam's case, and it proved no better in Byron's; but at any rate in both cases it was true.

It was a man of this character, of twenty-three years of age, who—after a boyhood spent in comparative obscurity and in complete misery, and two years spent in travel—was suddenly made the idol of the most magnificent society in the world. All that was then known about him by his idolators was that he was a peer and a poet—a peer who had made one good speech and a poet who had published two much better poems; in one of which, he, as a stern moralist, had called all other poets to repentance; and in the other of which, he, as a satiated profligate, had told how he had fled from Paphian girls and pandering parasites to seek over the seas relief from sin. Clean minded Walter Scott admired the first poem though he was scourged in it; but he was shocked at the boasts of past profligacy contained in the second. The most magnificent society in the world took a different view. It did not like the first poem, which showed a shocking want of reverence for some of its most distinguished members; but it was delighted especially with the professed profligacy of the second, which showed its mind was scarcely clean.

Recently we have had the bad fortune to pass through nearly five years of universal war. During those years we had the good fortune to be reigned over by a king and a royal family of stainless lives. Yet we see all around us what demoralisation those years have brought to all classes of society. The world into which Byron came was approaching the end of twenty-five years of universal war. The regent and most of the royal family were leading lives, scandalous in themselves, and more scandalous as examples to the nation. From our own experience we can make a guess as to the effect on the morals of the people of this double

disaster. And the class which Byron entered was the one worst affected and infected by the long war and the royal example, as it was closer to the throne than the middle and working classes, and more deeply involved in the war. The army of that day was not composed of the whole nation, as in our late struggle, but only of aristocratic officers and riff-raff rank and file. As a result the high world—which was Byron's world—was probably never before so openly profligate since the days of the second Charles.

A few details of the chief families who welcomed Byron to their homes will make this clear. The first house whose doors were thrown open to him was Holland House, that stately mansion and park now consecrated by the memories of Addison, Fox, Sheridan, Byron and Macaulay and likely in the near future—unless secured for London University—to be desecrated by the speculative builder. Well, the châtelaine of that residence and the companion of its owner was the divorced wife of another man. The second house to throw open its doors was Melbourne House, the home of the Lambs. Its châtelaine had several children of whom her lord cherished only the first. The reason why his lordship did not cherish the others may be surmised from an anecdote related by Byron himself. Once at Cambridge he entered a room where were George Lamb, a younger son of Lady Melbourne's, and Scrope Davies. He noticed that the relations between the two young men were strained ; and he asked the cause. 'Davies,' answered Lamb, 'has been suggesting 'doubts as to my legitimacy.' 'Yes,' said Davies, 'I have been 'telling him he's a damned adulterine bastard.' The third great mansion in which Byron was received was Devonshire House. The Duke of Devonshire was living there in undisguised adultery with his wife's dearest friend, Lady Betty Foster, who on his wife's death became herself the Duchess. As for the Harley family, to indicate the character of the Countess of Oxford, who was to be the heroine of one of the last of Byron's English amours, it is sufficient to say that her children were compendiously described as 'The Harleian miscellany.'

These then were the kind of fair ladies into whose homes 'Childe Harold,' assisted by Tommy Moore, introduced the youthful poet. When we remember this, we can understand how it was that the personal character was perhaps an even better

passport into high society than the genius which his poems revealed. The ladies whom he met found that, if his feet were of clay, his head was of pure gold, with beauty of features without as golden as the brain within. It is not strange that such ladies should at once adore such an idol ; or that his life among them afterwards should prove a rapid succession of love chases in which they, from his first ' victim,' the daughter of an earl, to his last ' victim,' the daughter of a nobody, were invariably the huntresses. If he had been a Joseph, he could hardly have escaped, even at the expense of his coat, the pursuit of so many wives of Potiphar.

It would be nauseating to follow the course of all these stalkings of Byron ; but one must be shortly traced because of its bearing on his marriage and separation. That one was the first of which we know, the long and notorious intrigue with Lady Caroline Lamb.

Lady Caroline was the only daughter of the third Earl of Bessborough and his wife, Lady Henrietta Spencer, whose name, it is important to remember, was associated with a grave family scandal. Owing to this, Lady Caroline was strangely brought up, spending six of her earliest years with a servant in Italy, and afterwards being allowed to run wild about Devonshire House the residence of her mother's sister. Later when her grandmother, Lady Spencer, took her in charge she was so full of eccentricities that her guardian suspected insanity. In her twentieth year Lady Caroline married William Lamb, who by the death of his brother, had become heir to the second Lord Melbourne. Her marriage did not end her eccentricities, which soon made her one of the best known women of the flamingly fashionable world. When she read ' Childe Harold ' she demanded from Samuel Rogers an introduction to the author. Rogers, apparently anticipating trouble, tried to put her off by telling her that Byron had a club foot and bit his nails. She declared that, if he was as ugly as Aesop she must know him. When later she was led up to be introduced to him (for already Byron had become such a royalty in smart society that it was customary to present the ladies to him not him to the ladies), she turned suddenly and walked away. All the same before many days were over, he was practically installed as an inmate at Melbourne House, where Lady Caroline and her husband lived with Lady Melbourne. Not content with so much enjoyment of his society, she followed

him everywhere he went, and poured out her affections for him so publicly that he remonstrated with her on her ' want of common ' conduct.' At length she bored him ; but the colder he became the hotter grew her pursuit of him. Again and again, disguised now as a page now as a carman, the infatuated creature would steal into the poet's lodgings ; and at last, in reply to a sneer of his, she, in the midst of a fashionable rout at Lady Heathcote's, tried or pretended to try to cut her throat. Her relatives took her to Ireland where she received a letter from him (dictated, it is said, by his new love, Lady Oxford) roughly breaking off all relations with her. Half mad with fury, the woman scorned took her revenge in writing a novel, intended to reveal Byron's, but rather uncovering her own, shame. Byron summed up the whole story in ' Beppo ' in one line :—She ' played the devil ' and then wrote a novel.'

Byron himself however supplied her with an instrument by which in the end she inflicted upon him a far more terrible retribution for his scorn than ever the poor, wild, kindly woman desired to inflict. Her last raid upon his rooms took place when he was living at the Albany. Evidently he was determined at any cost to get rid of her ; and for this purpose he told her then, as she herself afterwards told others,' things I cannot repeat,' and all ' my attachment went.' The last part of her statement was false ; the first part almost certainly true. What was it he told her ? Undoubtedly the thing most likely to shock her. When we remember the scandal about her mother, we can have little doubt what that was.

But if Byron, in order to shake off Lady Caroline did accuse himself of incestuous relations with Augusta that is no proof that any such relations actually existed. He was utterly reckless of his own reputation, and when he was out to shock the world or anyone in it he stopped at nothing. A man is capable of anything who is capable, as Byron was, of sending anonymously false libels on himself to the newspapers. It was sufficient that he knew a hint of incestuous relations would horrify Lady Caroline ; and he wanted to horrify her beyond measure. Probably he never thought of the reaction on poor Augusta. If it did cross his mind, he probably felt that the circumstances under which the statement was made would prevent its repetition. If so he little knew his woman.

In her statement Lady Caroline says she could not repeat the things he told her. But she did. At the time of the separation, when stories of the relations between him and his sister were flying about, she wrote to him vehemently denying that she was the source of them. He did not reply to her letters, and he did not believe her probably for the good reason that she was the only person to whom he had told such stories. And after she had seen his funeral pass her gates in its sad progress to Hucknall Torkard, in her agony she came near confessing. ' I am very sorry ' she wrote to John Murray, ' that I ever said one unkind word against ' him.'

While all this was going on, Byron remained on the most friendly terms with Lady Melbourne. That estimable woman was not altogether pleased with the intrigue between him and her daughter-in-law ; and to divert him from it she thoughtfully suggested that he should employ his time in seducing two other ladies of their common acquaintance. Byron did not take the hint ; and so the resourceful mother-in-law resorted to another device. She had a niece, the only daughter of her brother, Sir Ralph Milbanke. Anna Isabella Milbanke was very unlike her cousin, Lady Caroline. She was plain, highly proper, far from fashionable, and a bit of a blue stocking ; why should Byron not marry her ? Byron, who was always thinking of ' pulling up and marrying,' was struck by the suggestion. He was ready enough to amuse himself with flighty, amorous dames like Lady Caroline and the Countess of Oxford ; but it never entered his head to marry a woman of this kind. His ideal of a wife was a woman above all suspicion of vices and full of domestic virtues. Miss Milbanke fulfilled that ideal to a T. Years afterwards, when she had long abandoned him, he could talk with pleasure to Medwin of ' her simplicity and retired modesty.' So after a short acquaintance he proposed to her. She rejected him ; but it was a rejection which gave him liberty to apply again. He did apply again ; and unfortunately for him, his second application was graciously granted.

Until shortly before he made his second application Byron's pecuniary affairs were much embarrassed. This was due chiefly to his small estate and youthful extravagance ; but partly also to his generosity and his pride. He was lavish in making princely presents to Augusta and poorer friends, and he held that it was

beneath his dignity as a peer to accept payment for his poems. But when he made his second application he was, for once in a way, in pocket ; a purchaser who had contracted to buy Newstead had backed out of the bargain and had to pay him a forfeit of no less than £25,000. He made his proposal to Miss Milbanke by letter ; and at the same time he wrote to Moore, hinting at what he had done, and adding that, if it proved unsuccessful—

'I am off to Italy next month. . . . I have a few thousand pounds, which I can't spend after my own heart in this climate and so I shall go back to the South. . . . I want to see Venice, and the Alps, and Parmesan cheese, and look at the coast of Greece or rather Epirus from Italy, as I once did—or fancied I did—that of Italy when off Corfu.'

His proposal was successful. But still, before long, he was off to Italy, and saw the Alps and Venice and for years looked towards the coast of Greece from Italy. How different his life might have been had his proposal been unsuccessful, and he had been off to Italy with an unblackened reputation, an unembittered spirit and an unbroken heart!

When Miss Milbanke accepted Byron she was no child ; she was only four years his junior ; and, considering the comparative rate of development of men and women, was probably as old in nature as he was. She must also have known of his questionable morals ; his most notorious escapade had been with her own cousin. His narrow means were known to everybody. Being the thoughtful person she was, it may be assumed she had considered both of these points. The only one of them which seems to have caused her or her people any anxiety was the second. Her fortune in hand amounted to only one thousand a year ; and her expectations were dubious. They depended on the will of her mother's uncle, Lord Wentworth, and he had illegitimate children and other legitimate nieces. Yet this plain and poor young lady and her parents thought it reasonable to require Byron, who, had he been a fortune hunter, might have aspired to the wealthiest heiress in the land, to settle £60,000 as a provision for her. The comment of Byron's old college friend Hodgson, afterwards Provost of Eton, seems very just. 'Her 'parents,' he writes to a friend, . . . 'certainly to me appear 'to be royally selfish persons. Her fortune is *not* large at present ; 'but he settles £60,000 upon her. This he cannot do *without*

' *selling Newstead* again ; and with a look and manner I cannot ' easily forget, he (*Byron*) said " You know we must think of ' " these things as little as possible. . . . Bless her (*Miss* ' " *Milbanke*), she had nothing to do with it." ' No doubt her mother was the chief extortionist ; later Hobhouse felt bound to declare that her rapacity was ' indecent ' ; but Lady Byron too had a tight fist. Long after Byron was dead, and when Lady Byron was, independent of the settlement, a very wealthy woman, while his sister, Augusta, was in miserable circumstances, Lady Byron stuck fiercely to the settled funds ; and quarrelled bitterly with poor Augusta, because she, who had some contingent interest in them, wished to have some influence in their management. It may be a consolation to Lady Byron's admirers to know that, if her marriage was a matrimonial failure, it was at least a pecuniary success.

Nearly all we have been told of the married life of Byron and Lady Byron rests on the authority of Lady Byron. Without imputing wilful falsehood to her, I like not that authority. Lady Byron was one of those persons who can persuade themselves that anything is true which they wish to believe, and this weakness increased with years. We must then take Lady Byron's accounts (and especially the later ones) of the appalling honeymoon at Halnaby and the insults of the early months of the marriage with mental reservations. Unfortunately there is no need to do this as to her account of his mad misconduct during the few months preceding the separation. His conduct then was so bad as to be unbearable. Its only excuse, and it is a poor one, is that he was then driven half mad with pecuniary embarrassments and doping himself with laudanum and drinking himself silly at Douglas Kinnaird's brandy parties.

Undoubtedly from the very beginning of her married life Lady Byron had trials ; but these were only such as must be expected when a very ordinary woman marries a very extraordinary man, especially if the extraordinary man is of the poetical persuasion. And Byron was a very extraordinary man, even for a poet. It is doubtful, even if Byron had had no financial worries or bad habits to exasperate his temper, whether an ordinary woman who expected him to behave like those ' nice ' husbands, Tom, Dick and Harry, could have lived with him. Poets are abnormal mentally or they would not be poets. And most of

them are abnormal physically as well. We all know of Milton's blindness, of Pope's 'long disease his life,' of Swift's giddiness and ultimate madness, of Johnson's king's evil, of Scott's club foot. Byron too was abnormal physically; his feet, though not so deformed as to be unsightly, were so made that he could not walk otherwise than on his toes. This being so, he could not take exercise like an ordinary man; and, if he ate like an ordinary man, he became grossly fat; and not being able to eat like an ordinary man, it irritated him to see his wife eat like an ordinary woman; and so before they were long married he had his meals—so far as he had any—by himself. This must have appeared to that very ordinary woman very extraordinary indeed. Then his temper, though not cruel, was at all times extremely quick; and, when his whole mind was strained in composition, the mere presence of another person in the same room drove him to a frenzy. Lady Byron would not keep out of his room, and when she saw him glaring at her, would ask was she annoying him; and he, still continuing to glare, would answer 'Yes, 'damnably.' No doubt she thought this was brutality when it was only nerves. Then his habit of turning day into night and night into day, and working when other people rested and resting when other people worked, must have upset the domestic arrangements of a woman, who, in hours as in everything else, was conventional and methodical. Only a woman of imagination could have understood such a man; and Lady Byron had no more imagination than a German *Hausfrau*. Only a woman of imagination could have understood the greatness as well as the sadness of such a fate. All wives are not Jean Carlyles, who could suffer a martyrdom of life with a man of genius for the glory which crowned it. Lady Byron was a very ordinary woman; separation was inevitable sooner or later, and was only hastened by the mad misconduct of Byron due to bailiffs, laudanum and brandy.

That mad misconduct was the cause and the sole cause of the separation; of this there can be no doubt. When Lady Byron left the poet to go to her father, she had no thought of separation. All she complained of was Byron's recent behaviour, and this she attributed, not unreasonably, to temporary insanity. Her plan was that he should join her in the country; and her hope was that with rest and quiet, and the possible birth of a son and

heir, his reason would be restored. It was only when the doctors certified that he was of sound mind that the notion of living again with a man who could treat her while in his sane senses in such a way as he had treated her, became abhorrent to her. Then the lawyers were consulted as to whether that treatment was so bad as to entitle her to a legal separation. They advised it was ; but thought it was not so bad as to prevent all hope of a reconciliation. It was then, and only then, that she herself went to her legal advisers and disclosed to them something which rendered reconciliation impossible. This disclosure could not have caused the separation, which would not have taken place if the doctors had declared Byron insane ; it only prevented the reconciliation which Lady Byron had resolved she could not have.

What was that disclosure ? It does not appear in that secret statement of her case against Augusta, which contains nothing but vague suspicions without one fact cited to support them. Lawyers do not advise on suspicions but on specific facts. What then was the fact disclosed by her to them ? My hypothesis is that it was the story which Byron had told Lady Caroline Lamb and which she had told so many others. The lawyers, who knew nothing of Byron's habit of boasting of vices which he did not possess or of his motives for horrifying Lady Caroline at any cost, would naturally take it as a confession of guilt, and it would make them regard a reconciliation as a condonation of crime.

This hypothesis explains many more things than the lawyers' advice. It explains Lady Caroline's terror. As has been said, she, during the separation negotiations, wrote letters to Byron denying that she was the source of the stories about Augusta. In these letters she also implored him not to take the matter into court. We can understand her anxiety on this point only if we assume she was contemplating the prospect of herself being summoned to testify in public what Byron had told her, and to be cross-examined as to the circumstances under which he told it and her relations with him generally. It also explains the game of bluff in which Byron and his wife engaged. Neither wished to go into court—Byron on his sister's account, Lady Byron on her cousin's. Both wished the other to believe they were ready to do so. Byron sent Hanson to demand the nature of the specific charge against him which he already knew, and

Lushington refused to disclose ' his forte ' which he knew quite well Byron already knew.

Was then the story which both Byron and his wife knew and which neither would mention, true ? Evidently when Lady Byron left Byron's house she did not believe it ; otherwise—except on the assumption that she was utterly unscrupulous—it is impossible to explain her conduct in inviting Augusta there, and begging her to remain there alone with Byron after she herself had left. But she soon contrived to make herself believe. When she had succeeded in so doing, her conduct was very different. A year after Byron left England, he threatened to return. Then his wife counselled Augusta not to receive him ; and, when Augusta demurred, she made it clear that if Augusta received him all intercourse between them ended.

The strange book, whose title heads this article, was written to prove that the story was true. It was first published privately by the late Lord Lovelace. It then contained a rigmarole of insinuations and suggestions without an atom of evidence to support them—such as that because Byron made himself the hero of his verse therefore he was guilty of all the crimes of his heroes and that love poems obviously addressed to other women were in fact intended for Augusta. As a fact Augusta figures little in her brother's poetry until he and she had parted for ever. It also contained Lady Byron's secret statement of her suspicions, and a number of letters which prove nothing. One which might prove much is not even evidence, since the name of the lady to whom it was addressed has been carefully obliterated. So far as can be seen that name consisted of four letters ; and so could not be Augusta, who nevertheless is styled the recipient. Lord Lovelace seemed aware of the weakness of his case, and tried to strengthen it by stating there were other letters containing a full confession by Augusta ; but these were so humiliating that on Leslie Stephen's advice he refrained from publishing them.

The Dowager Lady Lovelace has now published them. They are humiliating enough ; but they contain nothing approaching a full confession. They remind me more of the flutterings of a bewildered bird in the toils of a snake. They may be read to mean anything or nothing. That was Augusta's style even when she was not answering insinuations made by a person who could, at will, summon another to ruin her reputation. Byron

called it *crinkum crankum* ; and got exasperated at it from time to time. But, read fairly, the letters contain no confession ; and that Augusta herself never thought she had made one is evident from what happened years later when she had her last interview with Lady Byron. The wickedness of Augusta had by this time become an obsession with Lady Byron ; and, before disclosing it in detail to Mrs. Beecher Stowe, she was giving her friends a synopsis of it by informing them that Augusta was the real cause of all her differences with Byron. Augusta asked for an interview to explain ; and Lady Byron, evidently expecting a confession, agreed. For security she came to the interview with a witness. Poor Augusta's explanation was simply a statement that, instead of causing differences between Lord and Lady Byron, she had always worked to smooth them over—the absolute truth. ' Is that all ? ' said the disappointed Lady Byron ; and, turning away, never again spoke to Augusta. If even she thought the letters contained a full confession, why did she want another ?

Applying the legal principle that every culprit is to be held innocent till he is proved guilty—a principle which applies with tenfold strength when the trial does not take place till after the culprit is dead—I hold that Augusta was innocent. That means that Byron was innocent too ; but, if he was not guilty of crime, he was guilty of a folly not far from crime and for this he paid in full.

J. A. Strahan.

LEVER'S SUCCESSORS

1. An Irish Cousin: First published, 1889; Some Experiences of an Irish R.M., 1889; The Real Charlotte, 1895; The Silver Fox, 1897; All on the Irish Shore, 1903; Further Experiences of an Irish R.M., 1908; In Mr. Knox's Country, 1915; Irish Memories, 1917; Mount Music, 1919. By E. Œ. SOMERVILLE and MARTIN ROSS. Longmans, Green.
2. Dan Russel the Fox. By E. Œ. SOMERVILLE and MARTIN ROSS. Methuen. 1911.
3. The Enthusiast. By E. Œ. SOMERVILLE. Longmans, Green. 1921.

THE artist who commands laughter commands success, and so needs no compassion. But such artists do very often suffer undeserved disparagement; they are apt to be treated simply as entertainers when they are craftsmen whose work has rhythm and vitality, the suppleness of strong life, in a degree denied to many rivals who sniff at their too popular productions. Miss Somerville and her comrade offer a case in point. Nobody denies that they have written the most amusing books about Ireland since Lever, and many will put them above him, whether as writers or as entertainers. Nobody denies that they are Irish, that they have been part of the way of life which they depict. Yet when there is question of Ireland's output in literature, these ladies are generally overlooked. Why? They are not on the level of Yeats, Synge or 'A.E.', but they are at least as Irish as these writers, and they are at least as good as anybody else. I dismiss the suggestion that no Irish writer matters unless he or she finds, as the phrase goes, inspiration in Ireland's legendary or historic past. Miss Somerville and Martin Ross draw from the running stream of Irish life, sometimes turbid, sometimes quiet and lovely, sometimes exciting like the race of a salmon run in fine fishing order, but very seldom dull. At all events these ladies never find it dull, that is one of their charms; a large part of the contemporary literature which Ireland tends to consider important is concerned to present the dulness, squalor and stagnation of Irish existence. Signs may be observed, moreover, that even in self-conscious literary Ireland people begin to ask themselves whether the self-consciously Gaelic revival has done much good to literature; whether Mr. Yeats ever gave of his best when he was writing about Cuchulain and things and people

equally remote ; and whether, for another instance, Mr. James Stephens was not able to get in his ' Charwoman's Daughter ' something far finer from a Dublin slum than he ever found in his ' Crock of Gold ' or more recent dippings into the wealth of Irish mythology and fairy tale.

Yet I do not think their choice of subjects makes the reason why Miss Somerville and Martin Ross are set apart, elbowed out, or somehow excluded, from the recognition which Ireland owes them. There are few talents that give Ireland greater cause for self-glorification, yet Ireland, or the greater part of Ireland, declines at present to take pride in them. The reason lies in their attitude. Instinctively and naturally, and perhaps with increasing consciousness, they identify themselves with a class—a class which, as they realize, is vanishing or altering out of recognition, and which in their lifetime has been further apart from Ireland as a whole than it was in Lever's day, or Miss Edgeworth's. They are ostracised, not because they do not present Ireland *en beau* ; other writers, Mr. James Joyce for instance, are fully accepted, who paint Ireland very ugly ; one could multiply examples, from the drama and from fiction. Yet such realists or satirists never convey that they are describing qualities or attributes of a breed to which the describer does not belong. Miss Somerville and Martin Ross incessantly give us this feeling. They see, but they stand apart to see. Theirs is not the attitude of the Ulster people, frankly in opposition to Catholic Ireland ; it is the attitude of the Anglo-Irish gentry, who, however Irish, are still always in some degree a part of England, living among people who though they speak English have nothing English in their composition. Anglo-Irish people may love those among whom they live, and assuredly these writers do ; they may be fully aware of the shortcomings characteristic of their own class ; but they have ingrained in them the sense that they as a class have a natural leadership. What is more, they have known for at least twenty years that this leadership is no longer conceded and can no longer be asserted.

A perception of this serious truth underlies all the gaiety, the fun, and the delight of existence, that fill the foreground of these ladies' novels. One may admit that their vision of Ireland corresponds to the facts of Irish life, yet inevitably it does not render the whole. It is Irish life seen from a particular angle ;

moreover, when they stand apart to see, it is not upward they are looking. Ireland feels this and resents it.

Yet work in verse which is equivalent to theirs raises no hostility. Moira O'Neill's 'Songs of the Glens of Antrim' are entirely akin to the prose of Miss Somerville and Martin Ross and they resemble it in being that rare thing, work of living excellence which appeals to nearly all readers; work essentially popular. But in prose fiction you cannot so limit and select as in verse; what you think must come in, as well as what you feel. A good novel, even a good short story, is very often a social document. With Martin Ross and Miss Somerville it always is.

In one respect nobody is likely to dispute their value. Not all the recording instruments of science could have so preserved the peculiar colour and quality of the English that the Irish speak to-day—more particularly in the districts where native Gaelic idiom still affects the thought and the phrase of English speakers. Any page in their work where Irish peasants, or for that matter any Irish bred people at all, are speaking, illustrates the talk which is Ireland's distinctive charm. This fidelity to the essence has not failed since, to the sorrow of us all, Miss Somerville was left to work alone, and I take my first instance from her latest book, 'An Enthusiast.' Even comment on the weather may be a work of art, and she shows us how.

'I rose when it was making day, and says I to myself "There's rain on it," but I'm thinking now that it will shtagger on till th' evening.'

The distinctive turn of art here, is of course, 'shtagger on'—a phrase purely individual and picturesque. But there is also the lovely survival of an unspoilt English, 'it was making day,' that has lasted in an old world country; and there is the other constant characteristic of this speech in its unconscious reproduction of Irish idiom. Some sense of style leads men and women who have never known Irish themselves to say 'there's 'rain on it'—a literal translation from Gaelic.

Sometimes too the same instinct has led to uses of the commonest verbs which are not English at all yet have no exact equivalent in Gaelic. 'It'd do anyone good to hear Owen 'talking about them' ('them' being a 'flying column' of the

I.R.A.) 'He wouldn't be satisfied to be sitting down but he 'should stand up to be cursing them.' Is it absurd to think that the pictorial quality of this would lose if the speaker said 'must' instead of 'should'? At all events the fidelity to local shades of speech would be lost, which so immensely helps realization.

One more illustration must be given to show how commentary on the cattle market, a theme more hackneyed than the weather, may become, to use a phrase of Miss Somerville's own, 'nimble, 'trenchant and humorous':—

'A grand baste, a grand baste altogether: he's as handsome as a dog. Ye'll not get him in the fair of Eskragh. . . . Sure, the last fair that was in it, there was nothing at all there. Ugly rakish cattle, very hungry! I couldn't buy but two little stores, and if ye gave me Ireland's crown I couldn't put meat on them.'

Nothing of what has been quoted has any dramatic value in the story: it is merely the natural ornamentation of all this, which helps no doubt to create atmosphere, but is mainly, one feels, thrown in for love, if a worn phrase may regain something of its early value. There are however scores or hundreds of instances where the mere phrasing gives dramatic value, but these cannot be so easily detached from their context. 'The 'Silver Fox,' neither quite a novel nor a short story, is perhaps one of the least successful of these volumes; yet if anything could bring the reader under spell of a belief in evil magic connected with a certain hill and the white fox that haunted it, would not a sentence like this do it?

'Didn't Danny tell me one time he felt like a wind from the say coming betwixt his skin and his blood afther his seeing the same fox?'

Another passage in this same book—when the peasant woman comforts the English lady whose lover has, she thinks, driven this fairy-haunted Danny to his death—gains its touch of tragic dignity from this rhythmic and beautiful speech.

For it always has beauty, even when the intention and effect are comic; it is the beauty of Aristophanes or Rabelais. Now and then, too, something blends with the comedy that is not merely for laughter. There is romance as well as humour in this picture of the old O'Reilly, clan chieftain, sunk almost to peasant

conditions, who in his mountain fastness kept for his farmers' pack the old Irish breed of white hounds.

'He was seated by the fire in an angular armchair, with an old horse-blanket over his knees, and a stick in his hand; and beside him lay an ancient white hound, who scarcely lifted her head at our entrance.

The old man laboured to his feet, and, bent as he was, he towered over Flurry as he took his hand.

'Your father's son is welcome, Mr. Florence Knox, and your friend.' He was short of breath, and he lowered his great frame into his chair again. 'Sit down, gentlemen, sit down!' he commanded. 'Joanna! These gentlemen are after having a long drive.'

The clink of glasses told that the same fact had occurred to Miss O'Reilly, and a bottle of port, and another of what looked like water, but was in effect old potheen, were immediately upon the table.

'How well ye wouldn't put down a glass for me!' thundered old O'Reilly, 'I suppose it's saving it for my wake you are!' 'Or her own wedding, maybe!' said Flurry, shamelessly ogling Miss O'Reilly, 'we'll see that before the wake, I'm thinking!'

'Well, well, isn't he the dead spit of his father!' said Miss O'Reilly to the rafters.

'Here, woman, give me the kettle," said her brother, 'I'll drink my glass of punch with Mr. Florence Knox, the way I did with his father before him! The doctor says I might carry out six months, and I think myself I won't carry out the week, but what the divil do I care! I'm going to give Mr. Knox his pick of my hounds this day, and that's what no other man in Ireland would get, and be dam we'll wet our bargain!'

'Well, well,' said Miss O'Reilly, remonstratingly bringing the kettle, 'and you that was that weak last night that if you got Ireland's crown you couldn't lift the bedclothes off your arms!'

'Them hounds are in my family, seed and breed, this hundred years and more,' continued old O'Reilly, silencing his sister with one black glance from under his thick grey brows,' and if I had e'er a one that was fit to come after me they'd never leave it!' He took a gulp of the hot punch. 'Did ye ever hear of my brother Phil that was huntsman to the Charlevilles long ago, Mr. Knox? Your father knew him well. Many's the good hunt they rode together. He wasn't up to forty years when he was killed, broke his neck jumping a hurl, and when they went to bury him it's straight in over the churchyard wall they took him! They said he was never one to go round looking for a gate!'

'May the Lord have mercy on him,' murmured Miss O'Reilly, in the background.

'Amen!' growled the old man, taking another pull at his steaming tumbler, as if he were drinking his brother's health. 'And look at me here,' he went on, reddening slowly through the white stubble on his cheeks, 'dying as soft as any owld cow in a boghole, and all they'll

be saying afther me is asking would they get their bellyful of whiskey at my wake ! I tell you this—and let you be listening to me, Joanna ! —what hounds Mr. Knox doesn't take, I'll not leave them afther me to be disgraced in the counthry, running rabbits on Sunday afternoons with them poaching blackguards up out of the town ! No ! But, they'll have a stone round their neck and to be thrown below in the lough.'

If I prefer 'The Whiteboys,' from which this quotation comes, to any other of the short stories by which their authors are best known it is because something in it appeals to more than the comic sense. Yet in any one of the four volumes which contain their work in this kind you may match it for vigour, for picturesqueness and for sheer go. 'All on the Irish Shore' is perhaps not quite up to the level of the three others whose tales centre round the engaging figures of Flurry Knox, Major Yeates and their wives, with Flurry's grandmother for perhaps a supreme creation. Angling has an admirable literature which any literate fisherman enjoys ; but nothing that I ever read about fishing (not even what I have written myself) has given me the pleasure that my fresh reading of those stories brings to one equally unskilled in horse-coping and in fox-hunting. They are just as likely to delight our grandchildren's grandchildren as ourselves. 'Castle Rackrent' is as fresh to-day as when it was written and these are easier reading than anything of Miss Edgeworth's and just as good writing. Even if the horse should become an extinct animal, and there were some inconceivable Ireland in which nobody rode to hounds or bested his neighbours over a deal in horseflesh, there is an epic quality in these things that would keep them living like a border ballad.

Yet perhaps none of these stories nor all of them together should confer so much distinction on their authors as a less popular achievement. 'The Real Charlotte' is the best novel ever written about Ireland. Balzac is a great name yet one is justified in saying that this book recalls Balzac, by its essential not its superficial qualities. Charlotte Mullen, the moneylender, the masterful, intriguing, managing woman, is seen and presented as Balzac might have seen her ; and she is matched by the figure of her rival and victim who may hold her own anywhere among the portraits of women. Francie is the figure thrown into highest relief on the stage where Charlotte is the true mover of all that

passes. Broadly, it is the study of a group of people on the social border line, who have neither the breeding of what Ireland still calls gentry, nor of peasants. The four main actors in the drama have this in common—all are vulgar. There is Charlotte herself; Francie, her cousin in a younger generation, and in a sense, her ward; Lambert, the steward's son promoted to be land agent, a type of the horse-coping half-sir; and the underbred little English officer whom, because he is English, Francie, little underbred Dublin cockney that she is, takes for the last word in distinction. But vulgarity does not hinder Lambert from having passion—he too might have come from Balzac; it does not hinder Charlotte from having humour of speech, intellectual interests, and a terrible force of brain, untrammelled by any scruples. Finally, although Francie is of the four most thrown into contrast with well bred people, and her vulgarity is the most strident of all, it does not hinder us from feeling and understanding her charm. We share the tenderness for her which her creators felt; we recognise that her vulgarity is a blemish not a vice; it is a disease that might be curable.

There is no space here to give any account of a book which is far less known than it deserves to be. But it is worth noting how quickly the talent of these ladies matured. 'The Real 'Charlotte' comes very early in their list of writings: it is the work of young women and they never surpassed it in power. Also, one should note that it is the only book of theirs where sex-psychology is boldly handled. They make us feel how big, how ugly, and how dangerous a force sex is in Charlotte, who desires love none the less because she is physically repulsive. They can show us Francie, a vulgar and empty-headed little creature, brought up with the meanest ambitions, yet flinging aside a brilliant offer of marriage from a man whom she likes, because of her passion for another. Yet the passion for which the sacrifice is made lacks dignity; dignity and she are not to be thought of together; but its grip is not the less complete because it binds her to a vulgar cad. All this is very completely presented and yet with a total avoidance of physical details: it is impossible to be more frank or less erotic.

For a good many years after the publication of this rather neglected masterpiece Miss Somerville and her partner were busy with their more appreciated work. They returned to the novel with 'Dan Russel the Fox,' which is the worst chosen

title possible. 'John Michael the Foxhunter' might have conveyed something—though not much. We are told how a rich and beautiful young woman, intellectually somewhat superfine, came to Ireland for a season's hunting and was smitten with a passion for the chase, which branched off into a fancy rather than a passion for the ideal fox hunter. All the accessories are admirable. We see exactly how Katharine Rowan lost her heart to fox hunting, the glories of her first run, and her instinctive adoration for a perfect leader across country; but the interest of the story does not centre in Katharine. John Michael, unpaid huntsman to his brother, Mr. Gus Fitzsimons, is the real theme. John Michael has the traditional shyness or coldness of the hunter; and his creators know very well that Ireland has many such, with whom aloofness from women is not the result of any superficial awkward embarrassment but springs from some deep down quality that is in itself refined. The lure of the primitive which presents itself to Katharine is not the lure of predatory force: John Michael is Endymion translated into the actualities of a very second-rate Irish home. But at the end of the story John Michael remains unexplained. When a quarrel with his very unattractive brother leaves him no choice but to head for America (where an opening offers for a skilled huntsman) Katharine virtually proposes marriage on such terms that he can stay in Ireland and keep the hounds in his own name. All we know is that John Michael, though he has liked Katharine for her gallantry and enthusiasm better than any girl he ever saw, abhors the suggestion—whether from a wise instinct for irreconcilable differences, or from a decent pride, or simply because, as he says, 'I'd hate to be married,' Miss Somerville and Martin Ross do not make us able to decide.

The other two novels belong to a different category. 'Mount Music' and 'The Enthusiast' are studies of the political forces which operate in Ireland to-day; to put it more accurately, they deal with the effect produced by those forces on typical figures of the landlord class. These books are documents, not only because they show how Miss Somerville sees Ireland in its different phases under their influences, but also because they show how far the minds of Miss Somerville and her comrade were modified by the social revolution which was in progress through their whole lives.

To suggest this as their main interest, indicates that these later books are not comparable to ' The Real Charlotte ' as works of art. They are, however, thoroughly attractive novels, and if one is not surprised by the power in them to present dogs and horses as living persons, it is only because their authors have so often done it before. There are also two fox hunts in ' Mount ' Music ' as good as any in all these volumes, and that is a big word ; and never, I think, were there more abundant felicities of phrase to render the setting of a scene. Dan and his dog in ' The Enthusiast ' pass through the great lawn at night, and every now and then the terrier is turned from her quest for rabbits by ' the gusty, angrily expelled breath of a startled cow.' How that brings one to the place ! But it would be unfair to Miss Somerville to represent either hunting scenes or descriptive passages as the most important part of what she has written since she worked alone.

Yet I think that in what may be said here, there should be no separation of persons. ' Irish Memories,' published since the death of Martin Ross, gives an account of the long collaboration between these two, which makes one certain that minds which for so long moved inseparably have a continuing interaction. The same book describes admirably the environment in which these Irish writers grew, and enables us to see their point of departure, as well as to feel how strong is their traditional loyalty. To-day that loyalty is evidently driven into quite unaccustomed questionings. With the environment changed as it has been, what remains to receive allegiance ?

Up to the period of the war it would have been hard to show from their novels or stories that these writers were concerned at all with politics. They had the politics, as they had the religion, of their families. They accepted the fact that there were Nationalist politics and Unionist politics, just as they accepted the existence of classes and the relative position of classes. Nobody within their horizon thought of taking up with the politics or the religion of another class. But meanwhile relative positions were changing so unmistakably that shrewd intelligences like theirs could not but be interested in the facts. Various passages in the ' Irish ' Memories ' may suggest how their minds were working. I should venture a guess also that the movement for women's suffrage, into which Miss Somerville was drawn, prepared the way

for a general re-examination of principles. I see no hint of a changed point of view until the publication of 'Mount Music,' which appeared after the war, but clearly represented a pre-war Ireland as yet uninfluenced by Sinn Fein and physical force. It lays down no theory of politics, but it brings into realisation certain facts. The first is the nature of the religious cleavage and its omnipresence. A man like Larry Coppinger, son and heir of landowners whose families went to public schools and into the army, if he becomes a Catholic is somehow separated from his own natural associates. When he goes to his place of worship he is probably the only member of his class there, and the class is as recognisable as if its members wore a uniform. That has been true, and over most of Ireland is true. But the class so well defined had in time past certain attributes which gave it a reality of leadership. It owned the property in land. Within the past twenty years it has been bought out; it has the equivalent in money, or part of the equivalent, but it has wholly lost the power. It cannot lead on the old lines, because nobody is willing to follow it; the old lines are effaced. Yet if a member of it attempts, like Larry Coppinger, to break away from its traditional attitude, he finds himself regarded as a traitor—at least by the majority of his kind. One may take Miss Somerville as suggesting that in the younger generation there is a growing tendency to tolerate such vagaries. Christian does not refuse to be Larry's wife because he has stood for Parliament as a Nationalist, and his friend, no less a person than the local M.F.H., is said to have backed his canvass. So far so good. But Miss Somerville has not tackled the problems whose existence she indicates. Her Dr. Mangan is a powerful study of such a man as may be replacing and displacing the old landed proprietors; and they will not all get drowned in the nick of time to make things pleasant, as Dr. Mangan was considerate enough to do. Again, Larry and Christian get married, but we are not told how the difficulty with his Church about a mixed marriage is circumvented. If Miss Somerville had faced things with the sort of ruthlessness which we find in 'The Real Charlotte' she would have let Larry become the husband of Dr. Mangan's daughter and then followed his evolution.

How far the condition of things which Miss Somerville portrays accurately enough in 'Mount Music' may have been

modified by the last seven years, nobody can tell. We have no idea where we are in Ireland. But it is the case that, as she shows in 'The Enthusiast,' a great many of the generation who fought in the war and got their M.C.'s and so forth in trenches are shaken in their beliefs yet cannot replace them. They are, as they would say, 'fed up' with what Miss Somerville calls 'the 'competitive denunciation of Ireland that is the life and soul of 'so many of its social gatherings.' They want to live in Ireland and even to be of use in Ireland; but they do not see their way in the Ireland that is existing. Miss Somerville knows her country too well not to feel that her Dan has many to share his desire and his perplexity. We can all recognise many other traits in the picture of Ireland that she sketches—for instance, the genuine idealism of the Sinn Feiner, Eugene Cashen, with his mind full of a history of Ireland's wrongs, and also with his will set on keeping those whom he can influence out of courses that can help no nation or people. We can guess also how many fathers there are in Ireland who curse bitterly those who brought their sons to death and yet can neither speak out or do anything, and many like Dan are ready to turn on the Irish farmers and denounce them for allowing themselves to be 'stampeded to 'hell like a lot of sheep over a cliff.' Only that is not the whole of the picture. Miss Somerville can show accurately and with insight what is moving in the mind of the best in her own class, impelled by its own ideals of service to seek a field for work, yet thwarted either by the conservatism of the Irish farmer, which can in the long run be got over; or by the defective standards of public conduct, which at least in some measure the new leaders and their followers are disposed to reform; or worst and most hopelessly, by the ingrained distrust of all who will only go halfway with Ireland, in Ireland's present temper. There may be many tragedies like Dan's even if they lack the dramatic ending. But those who have faith in the inherent rightness of the present Irish movement regard these matters from a wholly different standpoint. Anyone who desires to understand Ireland will do well to read Miss Somerville's book, for it puts what may be called the advanced position of her class, with full recognition of the narrowing effect which a class-consciousness produces. But they should also read, say, Mr. Corkery's 'Hounds 'of Banba,' to get at what is really the mind of such men as

Miss Somerville's Eugene Cashen, whose honesty and will to self-sacrifice she can perceive. Lever in his day went through an evolution very similar to that which one perceives in the work of these his successors, though his later attitude to the Nationalism of Young Ireland was more sentimental, less severely logical and critical, than that of Miss Somerville. But in his case too the real interest of his works considered as documents will be found in the picture of Irish landlordism at a crisis in its history. If Miss Somerville does for the Ireland of land purchase and of Sinn Féin what Lever did for the Ireland of the Encumbered Estates Act, she will have rendered the world a service, over and above that of fixing on the printed page, as he did, much of the unexpectedness, the mixture of artfulness and simplicity, quickness and incompetence, which give Ireland its fascination. She and her comrade have always had, as he had, an eye for humours, a discrimination between the vulgar and the comic, with a delight in rendering the shades of both. But they have had also a sensitive enjoyment of beauty in all its manifestations which Lever did not possess ; and this I think has brought them nearer than Lever at any time came to a vision of the essential Ireland.

Stephen Gwynn.

THE STRATEGICAL ASPECT OF WAR AGAINST COMMERCE

1. Seaborne Trade. Vol. I., The Cruiser Period. (Official History of the War.) By C. Ernest Fayle. John Murray. 1920.
2. The Merchant Navy. Vol. I. (Official History of the War.) By Archibald Hurd. John Murray. 1921.
3. The Law of Naval Warfare. By J. A. Hall, LL.M. Chapman & Hall. 1921.

IF we except the Dutch wars of the seventeenth century, great battles at sea are spaced rather widely apart in the chronology of our naval campaigns. On the other hand, in every war in which Great Britain has played a part, her seaborne commerce has been attacked, almost without interruption, from the opening to the close of hostilities. It is, therefore, rather surprising that naval historians should have given comparatively little attention to operations upon which so much courage and resource have been expended.

Josiah Burchett, Ekins and James regarded sea war as a series of engagements, unconnected to any directing principle; and, though the writings of Mahan gave to naval history a significance that it had not possessed before, he dismissed with contemptuous indifference the story of how our seaborne trade had been attacked and defended for more than two centuries. To him, war upon commerce was a mere diversion, incapable of affecting the course of great events, and it was left to Sir Julian Corbett to shew how deeply naval thought had been occupied, in every sea war of which written memorials have survived, in devising plans for protecting the ocean highways against a danger that was perpetually faced, perpetually countered, and never wholly overcome. But though Sir Julian Corbett described how deeply the problem of defending trade was embedded in the principles of naval strategy, it was impossible for him, or for anybody else, to discover how far the activities of Duguay-Trouin, of Jean Bart, or of Surcouf had affected the price of commodities in England, or in what degree they had arrested the flow of British commerce, simply because no materials for a study of the kind exist. History

has recorded the ships captured by these great captains, and the anxieties of their military opponents, but that is all.

It is this gap in our economic history which gives Mr. Fayle's book a peculiar significance. For the first time in our long history as a sea people we are able to trace the effects of commerce-war upon the lives and welfare of our population ; and we owe this extension of our knowledge to Mr. Fayle's industry and clearness of mind. As his book has already been reviewed in the press, it would be superfluous to discuss the subject matter ; but its implications upon naval strategy deserve to be closely examined. Hitherto, this secular problem of sea war has been reflected in the reports of naval commanders, and the minutes of Sea Lords. We are now presented with the very matter out of which the problem is created ; and, from the materials before us, are at last able to judge what shape it assumed at the outbreak of war, how far its significance was perceived, and in what form it is likely to be repeated.

In war, seaborne commerce may be protected by two methods : (1) the trading ships may be collected in their ports of departure, and escorted by armed squadrons to wherever they desire to go ; or, (2) the routes that they traverse may be watched by cruisers whose duty it is to occupy positions where commerce raiders are likely to appear. At the outbreak of war, the Admiralty adopted the second of these two systems ; and to understand thoroughly why that solution was chosen, it is necessary to compare it with plans devised for the same purpose at an earlier date, and to see how far steam-propelled ships and telegraphy had altered the essential features of the great problem.

During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries our trade was usually protected by a mixture of the two plans ; and the manner in which the West Indian trade was brought home was fairly typical of the general system. At fixed seasons of the year, the home-bound vessels assembled in the harbours of the southern islands ; from there they moved northwards and westwards, increasing in numbers as they passed the Windward and the Leeward Islands, until they came to the last port of assembly in Jamaica. Here they were met by the covering squadron that held the station ; and the throng of ships then sailed through the Mona Passage, and steered northwards, close hauled to the prevailing north-easter, until it reached the northern, latitude of

the trades ; the squadron and its convoy then passed into the zone of westerly winds, and made for the Channel. In the opening stage of their voyage, the merchantmen were covered, but rarely escorted, by the cruisers of the Leeward Islands station ; from Jamaica to the Lizard the merchant fleet was accompanied by a full squadron.

Now during the first part of this operation, that is whilst the freight carriers were passing along the southern islands of the Spanish Main, an isolated French raider had a fairly good chance of evading the covering cruisers, and attacking the merchantmen as they sailed westwards in twos and threes ; but when once the whole convoy had assembled, the problem changed. The escorting squadron was too strong for a single raider, and if an opponent wished to attack the merchant fleet, he could only do so by sending out a force more numerous and powerful than the escort. Nor was this all. In the first phase of the operation, the flow of trade was continuous along the southern section of the route, and a raider might do great damage if he could maintain his station on the common track. But as soon as the merchant fleet was grouped, the entire trade of the islands was gathered into one mass, and a raiding squadron could only intercept it by being at a particular point on the homeward route at the very moment when the convoy also reached it.* Clearly then any plan for attacking the West India trade in the last stages of its voyage had to be nicely calculated. The naval force to which the duty was assigned had to possess a good margin of strength over the protecting squadron, and it had to time its appearance in the homeward route very accurately. On the other hand, the attacker had one great advantage. The track of the merchantman and the convoy was settled by the trade winds, and could not be varied ; so that the commanding officer of a raiding squadron, or a raiding cruiser, always knew where to look for his quarry.

This concrete example illustrates the unvarying factor that lies at the base of all plans for attacking and defending commerce : the existence of strategic points in the featureless expanse of the blue waters, points which in the conduct of sea war are as important as fortresses and natural obstacles in war by land.

* See the instructions given to Amiral Leissegues, and Amiral Willaumez, with regard to their cruise against British commerce in 1805-1806. James, *Naval History*, 1837 Edition, Vol. IV. p. 185.

Cargoes, routes, winds and ships may alter; there are always areas through which trading vessels must pass, and it is alike vital to the attacker and the defender that these areas should be occupied. A successful raid on commerce means simply, that, for a short space of time, one of these areas has been held by a raider; the successful defence of trade, that they have been secured against attack.

The importance of these nodal points of seaborne commerce consists not only in their existence, but in their relative positions. If they are far apart, trading vessels will be widely scattered along the route that joins them, in which case a raider will be forced to operate in the vicinity of the points themselves. If they are close, trade will be dense along the connecting route, which will be a good hunting ground for raiders over its entire length. Trade protection will, therefore, tend to be effected by convoy, if the areas vital to its security and free passage are numerous, closely spaced, and the attack to be parried is persistent; by covering cruisers, if the points are far apart and the attack spasmodic.

The naval campaign of the great war illustrates the unchanging nature of this general rule. So long as the German navy was able only to attack our trade at widely spaced nodal points in the great oceans, the covering system was enough; when our enemies devised a means of operating against British commerce at its home terminals, and along tracks from which our merchantmen could not be diverted, it was inevitable that the trading fleets should be protected by armed escorts. Steam propelled ships had influenced this essential factor of the problem in one respect. A steamer can steer any course between two places, and can vary her track from voyage to voyage—a power which is equivalent to reducing the number of points vital to the defence of trade.

This statement is illustrated by the track of vessels engaged in the Plate trade. In ordinary circumstances, they would clear the Lizard, pass fairly close to the Canaries, the Cape Verde Islands, Fernando Noronha, and the prominent headlands of the Brazilian coast; and so long as the ships plying to and from Buenos Aires and Montevideo followed this route, each one of these points would, in war, be a danger area, and would need to be patrolled and covered if the attack on commerce were persistent. But, given a suitable organization, vessels engaged

in the Plate trade can be instructed to give each dangerous point a wide berth. As soon as this has been done, the protecting naval force has two points to cover—the Plate area and the English Channel—instead of five or six. In this respect then, mechanical propulsion tells strongly in the defender's favour.

Modern ships have paid for their independence of winds and currents by becoming the subjects of other sources of natural energy; and a steamship's need of fuel affects every operation of naval war; but the effects of that need on war against trade are determined by one of the basic facts of sea power. Commerce raiding will always be attempted by the weaker of two naval Powers in conflict.

The object of naval war is to impose blockade, and blockade can only be enforced after a victory at sea, or the refusal of one side to dispute the command of the ocean routes. No Power that is able, or has the hope of being able, to stop the whole of its enemy's commerce will ever dissipate effort in sporadic raiding. But although attacking commerce will always be the operation of the weaker party, it must be remembered that naval inferiority is relative and not absolute. It does not, in itself, imply that all the foreign bases of the weaker Power will be blockaded and isolated as soon as war begins; and so, her raiders may enjoy a fair freedom of movement, at all events for a time. None the less, though we can conceive of commerce raiders less completely isolated than the 'Karlsruhe' and the 'Emden,' their position as hunted fugitives is an inevitable part of the game they play. The need for fuel, then, must always act in favour of the defence, to whom the ocean highways are open, and against the attacker, to whom they are obstructed.

As a set off to this heavy handicap against a raider, modern commerce has introduced a feature that tells in his favour. The rapid transit of goods by steamships has given to commerce a continuous, fluid character; and if its flow be damned, obstructed, or diverted, the dislocation that follows is dangerously progressive. If the export trade of a great port is held up, the ships lying idle at the wharves complete fewer yearly voyages, and so the export and import trades of distant countries become adversely affected; the railway trucks, loaded with goods that are not put on board, remain at their sidings, the rolling stock of the whole country is reduced, and commodities destined for export remain stationary

inland ; and, finally, the sheds and wharves get choked, so that, possibly long after the first check has ceased, its effects are still being felt in a perpetually recurring cycle of obstructions and delays. To all this must be added the total loss of perishable goods, and the financial consequences of the situation. The shipper ceases to obtain advances on commodities that are not likely to be transported ; his damaged credit adversely affects the credits of other great shippers with whom he has dealings ; and, if the situation be prolonged, the restrictive effects on commerce of a financial crisis are added to the mechanical dislocation at the port of shipment.

This delicate adjustment of modern commerce places a vast responsibility upon the dominant naval Power in war : to the duty of protecting its own ships against capture there is added the stupendous task of maintaining the flow of ocean traffic. From the moment on which hostilities begin, not only the safety, but the free, unrestricted movement of every ship on passage through the high seas has to be secured by the dispositions, energy and resourcefulness of the Naval Headquarters Staff and its subordinate commanders. In this respect, modern conditions favour a commerce raider ; for his capacity to do mischief is in direct proportion to the complexity and size of the mechanism that he attacks. His ability to damage trade is indeed often exerted with full effect before he has captured, or sunk, a single vessel, and, as this aspect of war against commerce is bound up with modern conditions, and derives its peculiar significance from the fluidity of commerce and the rapid transmission of news, it will be as well to emphasize it by concrete examples :—

(i.) At the outbreak of war, the Canadian and American coastline was hardly protected by any British ships. There were, it is true, no German cruisers within hundreds of miles ; but the American ports were thronged with large German liners which might have slipped out, and received arms and ammunition at sea. Out of the anxieties of this situation, there sprang up a crop of wild, baseless rumours, which so affected mercantile opinion that British sailings almost ceased from the St. Lawrence to Charlestown. It was only when Admiral Cradock appeared on the station that confidence revived and sailings were resumed.

(ii.) At the outbreak of war, the Leipzig, which was off the

coast of Mexico, steamed north until she reached the latitude of San Francisco. She then hovered about, and finally put in to coal. The effect was immediate. All sailings from San Francisco and Portland ceased, and, far away to the north, the Canadian grain lay unshipped in the harbours of Puget Sound. Thus, without capturing a single vessel, Captain Hann caused a dislocation that was felt six hundred miles away from his theatre of operations.

The Leipzig then moved southwards, keeping her movements very secret. During September, she made two, not very important, captures; and then steamed westwards to co-operate with von Spee. Few cruises have been less fruitful in captures or more devastating in their results. It was known along the whole coast that a German cruiser was about; and this general impression of danger was soon strengthened by the news, that three German liners had sailed from Eten, Iquiqui, and Mollendo, for an unknown destination. Shipping along the whole coast then became immovable; and the full consequences of the stoppage were only apparent, when, many weeks later, sailings were resumed. The upheaval had diminished the labour available at the ports; caused over a hundred shipping houses to close down; and so lowered the foreign exchanges of the South American Republics, that imports were declining. In other words, Captain Hann had disordered the trade and finances of half a continent.*

(iii.) The 'Emden' was the most successful of the German raiders; but her success consisted far less in her sinkings and captures than in the reports of her activities. By a combination of luck and judgment, her commanding officer was able to sink vessels in the neighbourhood of the great terminals of Indian trade, to bombard Madras, and to enter Penang; and the outcome of his exploits was, that by destroying, or seizing, about twenty British ships, and by appearing in widely separated localities, he was able to reduce the exports of India by nearly half, during the autumn months of 1914.† Figures of the kind need no comment; for it is quite obvious, that the tonnage lost by capture was an insignificant part of the injury done to commerce by the suspension of sailings.

*See Fayle, pp. 229 *et seq.* And Hurd, pp. 180 *et seq.*
†See Fayle, p. 216.

(iv.) The ' Dresden ' never operated as a regular commerce raider ; but, as she hurried down the east coast of South America to join von Spee, she fell in with two British vessels and captured them. It so happened that the fact was shortly afterwards reported at Rio ; and the outcome was that the ' Dresden,' intent only on escaping observation and joining von Spee, did more damage to the Plate trade than the prolonged and skilful operations of the ' Karlsruhe,' simply because the news of her captures was well spread, and the ' Karlsruhe's ' successes were concealed.

Doubtless the bad effects of a threat to seaborne trade are not new : they were well realised by Shakespeare, when he described how the delayed argosies ruined Antonio's credit in Venice ; but it is impossible that those bad effects should ever have been as far reaching as they are to-day. The mere fact that, in the old days, trade could be put under convoy, almost in its entirety, proves that commerce could then be carried on in jerks ; it is now of the highest importance that it should never cease to flow.

It is only by examining cases where a stoppage was averted, that we can find a general rule for parrying the threat.

In the early days of August, 1914, our trade in the Mediterranean was in jeopardy. Two German ships were unlocated, and free to deliver a serious attack upon commerce at almost any point along the vital artery of British traffic between Alexandria and Malta ; the Austrian bases were open to them ; and, in addition to these elements of danger, the light forces of the Austrian navy might, at any moment, have swept into the south-eastern Mediterranean to intensify the attack. In spite of this grave menace, the orders issued by the French and British Admiralties ignored the danger to trade, and considered only the possibility of the Algerian transports being attacked. None the less, commerce continued to flow unchecked : a certain number of vessels were held up at Gibraltar ; but that was all.

In about the middle of August, 1914, a large armed liner, the ' Kaiser Friedrich der Grosse,' began to attack commerce between the Canary and the Cape Verde Islands : an area within which three great trade routes from Pernambuco, Buenos Aires and Cape Town join together. The news of her arrival spread rapidly, and her appearance might well have caused a general stoppage ; yet commerce was not interrupted.

These are, perhaps, the two most significant cases of the flow of trade being maintained in the face of a serious threat. The instances where trade was interrupted by fancied, or exaggerated, dangers have already been reviewed ; and it is by considering the two together that we shall discover the rules that ought to guide those whose duty it is to attack, and to defend, the highways of seaborne commerce.

Stoppage of commerce is due to fear : its continued flow to confidence ; and a just estimate of how these moral forces are likely to work at great ports of shipment and commercial centres is the key to much good strategy. It would be silly to explain the suspension of sailings in San Francisco, Madras, Calcutta and Buenos Aires by saying that the local port authorities who caused it were too avaricious to be public-spirited, and too cowardly to take risks ; for general accusations of the kind are usually untrue and always incapable of being proved. None the less the explanation does lie in the structure of human nature, and is this : that a danger which can be measured will generally be faced ; but, when its extent is unknown, ignorance exaggerates it almost indefinitely ; and it was just because the ' Dresden,' the ' Leipzig ' and the ' Emden ' contrived to give an impression that shipping was in great danger, and because those concerned, by their ignorance of sea warfare, were unable to assess the danger accurately, that the effects on commerce were so far reaching. If this be well understood, the captain of a raider will know what kind of plan is most likely to be successful. If he sets himself the task of making captures off great ports, of alternating periods of activity with periods of calm, of attacking trade at points as far apart as possible, and so giving an impression that many localities are in danger, he may be confident that his plan of campaign has been well and soundly conceived.

The defender's duty is more complicated ; but his first and most pressing task is to set the moral forces described to work in his own favour ; and this is best done by ' shewing the flag ' at whatever port anxiety and uncertainty are likely to take a hold of men's minds. Just as rumours that a raider is lurking below the horizon give an impression of danger, so the presence of national ships conveys confidence and excites public spirit. The civil population in a great harbour cannot know what measures are being taken to defend them ; but, if they see a visible sign that

measures of the kind are going forward, they are ready to take risks and to face danger. This is not a mere assertion : it is well supported by facts ; for it was this display of the British flag in the Mediterranean and at the Canary Islands which saved a situation perilous to the continuity of commerce. Just before the outbreak of war, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean was at Alexandria with the bulk of his fleet. When the European situation grew dark, he sailed, and few knew whither ; but an impression of British naval power was left on the British population at exactly the right moment ; and a week or so later, a threat to our Mediterranean trade passed by unheeded at the very port most likely to be affected.

The ' Kaiser Friedrich der Grosse ' appeared off the Canaries very soon after the outbreak of war ; and an intelligent merchant in those regions might well have argued that our patrols must have been lax for her to have appeared at all. None the less, the threat was countered not by reason but by sentiment. Quick as the German raider had been, our cruisers had been quicker ; and if the threat was faced with indifference, it was only because British cruisers had been seen in the vicinity for several days previously.

This displaying of the British flag in distant waters is not only a means of averting a stoppage of trade : it is often enough the best remedy when a stoppage has set in. When Admiral Cradock restored the situation on the American and Canadian coast and re-started trade, he offered no security to those concerned and gave no promise of convoy to the captains ; nor did he take any person into confidence about his plans. He simply showed the British flag in the areas most affected, and the crisis passed away. Popular imagination has a tendency to liken the genius of a great naval or military commander to that of a cunning chess player, who reckons many moves ahead with an impersonal precision and a complete disregard of human passions. The conception is quite wrong ; for strategy is not an exact science, and a military display conducted at a time and in a manner likely to impress the imagination is, often enough, a well calculated operation of war.

But the task of defending commerce does not end with parading naval forces in the neighbourhood of great harbours ; for after the confidence of shippers has been restored, it has to

be maintained by successful operations ; and the question : How can a single raider, operating in the trackless, beaconless expanses of the ocean, be brought to action, is not easy to answer. Still, a dispassionate study of how commerce has been attacked does suggest a solution, simply because the greatest successes of raiders have always been scored in those focal points of trade to which reference has already been made.

The ' Emden ' made her captures and sinkings in the approaches to Colombo and Calcutta ; the ' Karlsruhe ' in the Fernando Noronha area ; and the German submarines in the waters round the British Isles, where the trade routes of the world converge. Conversely, whenever they left those areas and cruised about on the open routes, their sinkings fell away to negligible figures. The ' Dresden ' never remained in a focal area ; she only sank four ships, and it was by the merest luck that those sinkings had a moral effect at Buenos Aires. The ' Leipzig's ' successes and luck were the same, and Admiral von Spee, who throughout carefully avoided all such areas, accounted for an even smaller number.

Now it must be clearly borne in mind that although, by good luck, a regular commerce-raider may cause a serious stoppage of commerce by the moral effect of a single capture, her commanding officer cannot be aware of it, and will always seek for tangible results. In other words, he will be driven to those focal areas, the strategical points of war on commerce, where the quarry will be found. Clearly then, the essential rule of trade defence is to hold as many of those points as can be held with the forces available ; to cling to them tenaciously without being deterred by reports of attacks elsewhere, and to ensure that a proper organization for diverting and dispersing trade exists wherever its need is likely to be felt. Unfortunately a rule of this kind can only be approximately applied ; for the points to be held are often not points at all but wide expanses. The English Channel, for instance, is the focal point for most of the Port of London trade, and the entire Irish Sea is the focal point of Liverpool's commerce. Add to this the vast number of such points, and it will at once be apparent that sound strategy consists in good selection. There is no rule for making the best choice ; and the most scientific study of channels and coastlines will never offer a solution independently of the circumstances of the

moment. None the less, there are some general dispositions and particular operations which are unsound in themselves, and it will be as well to examine them.

It should be remembered in the first place that, when naval forces are distributed over foreign stations in peace-time, the allocation made is, in every sense, the war organization of the squadrons; and that it will nearly always be insufficient, if calculated only with reference to the armed forces of the enemy, without reckoning the volume of trade to be defended. It was, for instance, an unwise distribution of force, which left the whole of the Plate area and the entire coast of Brazil unwatched except by the 'Glasgow,' when hostilities began.

It should be remembered, in the second place, that the diversion of shipping from focal points which cannot be held, is a strategic operation requiring special training, full information with regard to the dispositions and movements of naval forces, and a knowledge of the sea. It was, therefore, insufficient to have these duties performed by British consuls and vice-consuls, acting under orders from London, or applying general instructions prepared in peace time to situations which fluctuated from day to day.

Commanding officers at sea should remember, in the third place, that searching for a movable, fugitive thing has certain common features, whatever the object searched for and whatever the locality of the search. If, for instance, an escaped convict were known to have been wandering on Dartmoor on a certain date, the police would not be likely to find him by tramping over that desolate upland a week later; and it is equally improbable that a cruiser defending trade will bring a raider to action by leaving her station for the place where the raider was last reported, if it will require several days' steaming to get there.

Finally, it should be remembered that success in war, whether by land or sea, depends in large measure upon guessing correctly what the enemy intends to do. Guesses of the kind are not made by intuition, but on a calculation of probabilities, based on a thoroughly critical examination of what is known of an enemy's movements. It is therefore, unwise to use wireless telegraphy promiscuously, and to obscure the judgment of subordinate commanders by an inundation of unsifted news, regardless of its age or reliability. For the same reason, it is only on very rare occasions that a commanding officer on a distant station ought

to be bound by orders issued from headquarters, on the strength of information received many miles from the theatre of operations.

Students of war usually picture the next conflict in terms of the last, and expert naval men are at present inclined to think that, in future, commerce will be attacked by an indiscriminate onslaught from submarines, and defended by a combination of mine-laying, patrolling and convoy. Their opinion is, in other words, that the naval warfare of 1917 and 1918 furnishes an everlasting pattern. It is quite true that the conduct of war is subject to permanent laws ; but it is equally true that every great conflict has displayed features that have not been repeated. The German submarine campaign is no exception. It was compounded with what was temporary and what was lasting, and the one must be separated from the other. We can state, with complete confidence, that the most transitory aspect of the German attack upon commerce was the foolish, un-military way in which it was conducted ; for the doctrine of indiscriminate sinking was the outcome of a narrow, bigoted, method of thought, which regarded strategy as a science capable of being studied apart from policy. The armed neutralities, and the American war of 1812, were incidents in our maritime history, warning us that command of the sea must be exercised with judgment ; and the lesson was not forgotten when we extinguished German trade with neutral States by a steady, gradual process. The German high command was deaf to the voice of naval history ; but it is unlikely that our future antagonists will be as ignorant, or as unwilling to learn.*

None the less, the successes of the German submarines rested upon an advantage which is, at all times, essential to attacks on commerce. Far from altering the basic factor of the problem, they proved how absolutely permanent that factor is ; for their

* With the results of the submarine campaign registered before him in the Treaty of Versailles, Admiral von Müller, the late chief of the German Emperor's Naval Cabinet, describes the unrestricted U-boat warfare of 1917 as a wise, politic measure (see *Deutsche Politik*, November, 1919). This view is the more remarkable in that Admiral von Müller's writings display him as a fair-minded, thoughtful and conscientious man. Von Tirpitz' description of the Chief of the Naval Cabinet confirms this impression. He furiously denounces von Müller as a teetotaler, who never imbibed the true Prussian spirit. (see *Erinnerungen*, p. 330.)

threat to seaborne trade consisted simply in their ability to remain for long periods, and in considerable numbers, upon the terminal points of British trade in the approaches to our home ports. In this they repeated the exploits of Duguay-Trouin, and of Jean Bart; for the tactics of those great captains were the tactics of von Forstner, of Hersing, and of Otto Weddigen: to avoid the open ocean, and to remain in the Channel and the Irish Sea.

It is generally believed, that German submarines destroyed commerce on a scale not reached in any previous conflict, simply because they could submerge at will. If this be true, surface raiders will probably disappear from naval war; and so, before any forecast can be made as to the nature of attacks on commerce in future wars, it is necessary to decide how far the submersible character of submarines made them such powerful engines of destruction, and how far they were assisted by other causes. The names of the more famous German submarine commanders have been coupled with those of the great French corsairs, owing to the resemblance between their methods of attack; a further comparison shows that their opportunities for doing mischief sprang from the same causes. A German submarine, after filling up with oil and stores, could arrive off the Lizard three days after leaving the Ems; and she could then operate continuously for thirty days, of which a small proportion would be lost owing to the attacks of patrol vessels and destroyers. Duguay-Trouin could reach his hunting ground in about two days, and remain there for more than two months.* Thus the real danger, in each case, lay in the ease and rapidity with which the raider reached her theatre of operations.

If this comparison between past and present suggests that the relative positions of two opponents contribute more to the intensity of an attack on commerce than the class of vessels engaged, the impression is strengthened when we compare the results achieved by large U-boat cruisers and surface raiders in the last years of the war. In either case, the attackers left the home terminals, and operated against the focal points of trade in the open oceans, and their records of destruction were as follows: The 'Moewe's' first cruise lasted ninety days; but of these only

* Consult Duguay-Trouin Memoirs.

forty were spent in active operations against trade. She sank or captured sixteen British ships, that is one-fifth of a ship per day. Her second cruise was longer ; and she was able to devote about sixty days to commerce destruction in the focal areas ; during this time she sank twenty-eight Allied ships, or about half a ship per day. The ' Seeadler's ' cruise lasted seven months, out of which about fifty days were spent on focal areas. Fifteen ships, or about a third of a ship per day, were sunk or captured.

During 1917 and 1918, large U-boat cruisers, of the ' Deutschland ' type, attacked British commerce in the Atlantic during nine successive cruises ; their average period of effective operations was eighty days, and the mean total of ships destroyed, during each voyage, was twelve, that is, they accounted for a seventh part of a ship per day.*

There can be no doubt as to the conclusion to be drawn from these figures. A submarine is dangerous to commerce in direct proportion to her ability to act against her opponents' home terminals. She is able to do this, partly by her capacity to submerge, but far more by the nearness of her theatre of operations to her home base. When once she ceases to be able to act in this way, and is driven to the focal areas, she is not quite as dangerous as a surface raider. Geography, not submersibility, is the essence of the problem.

But the comparison is not only a test of the relative values of surface cruisers and submarines as commerce raiders. It shows also that the nature of future struggles for the ocean highways can only be forecasted with the aid of positive data ; for its true meaning is that no operation of naval war can be discussed in the abstract independently of particular conditions. Before any serious attempt at prophecy can be made, the naval expert must know who his antagonist is likely to be, in order that he may base his calculations and plans upon the positive data of naval bases and relative strengths. It is only when we know for certain whether our next opponent, by his proximity, will be able to attack the terminal points of British trade, or whether, by his distance from us, he will be obliged to act against the focal areas in the open oceans, that we can foresee the nature of the campaign,

* These figures are taken from ' Synthèse de la guerre sousmarine,' by Capitaine R. Castex, of the French Navy.

or the weapons to be employed. In other words, the basic material of the problem is to be found in the configuration of the seas and continents, and the departmental records of the Foreign Office.

There are two methods of attacking commerce : the first is by isolated ships, and the second by entire squadrons. We have discussed the first at some length : the second requires a shorter examination. It was never adopted by the German High Command in the last war, and Admiral von Spee, who had a unique chance of pursuing it with success, neglected to do so ; but it must not be thought, on that account, that it has disappeared from naval war. The operation has many advantages : it imposes upon the defender great and disturbing concentrations of force, and it may produce a maximum of moral effect. The dislocation that a single raider may cause in great harbours has already been described ; obviously, if an undefeated squadron is believed to be in the approaches to a port, the results will be proportionately greater. But when a naval Power turns to squadronal raids upon commerce, it definitely admits that it is the weaker party at sea. A naval headquarters' staff may find ships for isolated raiding, and still strive for a victory with the bulk of its armed forces ; but no naval command will ever detach whole squadrons for operations against commerce, unless it has resigned all hopes of success in battle. History is quite clear on this point. Napoleon's Ministers of Marine only planned this form of war after Trafalgar ; and, in the war of American Independence, Lamotte Picquet's cruise was based on the assumption that the French fleet must avoid action.*

Obviously then in this, as in the first enquiry, we can make no forecast without political data as a basis for prophecy ; for we can only guess whether our commerce will be threatened by raiding squadrons, or raiding cruisers, after we have been told who our opponents will be and what forces they will have at their disposal ; and after we have guessed, by a study of their history as a maritime Power, whether their high command will plan operations in the narrow, hidebound spirit of the German Headquarters' Staff, or with the resourcefulness, ingenuity and cunning of the French. In other words, politics and strategy are inseparable.

* See ' L'Envers de la Guerre de Course,' by Capitaine R. Castex ; a fine example of methodical scholarship applied to polemical writing.

A story is told of a naval officer who was given the task of drawing up plans for establishing advanced bases at points of strategical importance in the North Sea. He was ordered to do this on the assumption that Germany would be the enemy; but, beyond that, he was told to leave all questions of belligerency and neutrality alone, as they were matters of high policy which did not concern him. He was merely to select bases, and draw up plans for occupying them, with the dispassionate aloofness of a scientific strategist. The naval officer replied that he was very grateful for the limitations placed on a piece of work which was likely to occupy a good deal of time, and that he would be glad if some ministerial expert in high policy would tell him whether he was to reckon on the neutral States being consenting parties to the establishment of British naval bases on their coasts, or whether they would oppose it; in the latter case, was he to assume that the neutrals would take the extreme step of mobilising their armies and defending their country, and, if they did, what peculiarities would thenceforth distinguish them from active enemies? These questions were hotly resented, and the duty transferred to another officer, who started on the working assumption that neutral States would acquiesce in anything we might want to do, and recommended Terschelling, Esbjerg and Karlskrona as the most convenient advanced bases that he could think of.

The story is not without its moral which is of wide application.

ARCHIBALD COLBECK.

THE SHIP-MONEY FLEETS

1. **The Life and Works of Sir Henry Mainwaring, Vol. I.** Edited by G. E. MANWARING. Navy Records Society. 1920.
2. **The Case of Requisition.** By LESLIE SCOTT and ALFRED HILDESLEY. Milford. 1920.

IF it be true that history, in judging the acts of governments, is apt to allow the end to justify the means, it is equally true that the badness of the means is frequently allowed to obscure the wisdom or even the necessity of the ends. It has been thus with the naval policy of Charles I. The importance of Hampden's case as a landmark in our constitutional history has given to the Ship-Money Writs an interest which overshadows that of the Ship-Money Fleets. It is natural that we should think more of the great legal and political issues raised by the levy of ship-money than of the objects and achievements of fleets whose record is in the main uneventful and inglorious. Yet the story of the Ship-Money Fleets has its own importance in the evolution of our power at sea, and to understand this importance it is necessary to ask not only how far the king was or was not justified in his attempt to raise money for naval purposes by virtue of the prerogative, but for what object the fleets were equipped, and how far those objects were achieved.

Study of this aspect of the question has been materially facilitated by the inclusion in the publications of the Navy Records Society of 'The Life and Works of Sir Henry 'Mainwaring,' of which the first volume containing the 'Life' has already appeared. Pirate, king's officer, and official, Sir Henry Mainwaring touched at all points the naval life of his time, and Mr. G. E. Manwaring, his biographer and editor, has been able to weave into his biography a wealth of material, much of it hitherto unpublished, relating to naval administration and activities under the first two Stuarts. Incidentally, he has given us the best and fullest connected account yet available of the Ship-Money Fleets.

From this point of view it is a positive advantage that Mr. Manwaring, writing as the biographer of a seaman, has left almost wholly on one side the legal and constitutional aspect

of the question. That aspect has recently been brought into renewed prominence by its bearing on the exercise of prerogative rights by the Crown during the great war, and has been admirably summarised by Mr. Leslie Scott, K.C., and Mr. Alfred Hildesley in the course of their learned discussion of 'The Case of Requisition.' But while Messrs. Scott and Hildesley are concerned solely with the legality of the Ship-Money Writs, Mr. Manwaring is concerned as exclusively with the purpose and composition of the fleets, the instructions given to their commanders, and the record of their achievements.

That the levy of Ship-Money was unconstitutional cannot be seriously disputed. The issue of the writs was justified by the king's legal advisers under the undoubted prerogative right to requisition ships for the defence of the realm in time of national emergency. It was by writs for the arrest of vessels to serve as men-of-war or transports that the bulk of our fleets had been provided in the Middle Ages, and even after the establishment of a strong permanent naval force by Henry VIII., it had been a regular practice to supplement the royal ships by requisitioning merchantmen or calling upon the ports to provide a contingent. It was however the custom 'from time immemorial' for the owners of such requisitioned vessels to receive payment for their ships at a specified rate per ton as well as wages and victualling charges.* Under James I. and Charles I. there are occasional instances of ships being demanded from the ports without payment, but such instances can hardly be regarded as overthrowing the limitations imposed by centuries of usage. That many ships were taken up by Charles on the old basis is sufficiently proved by the continual complaints of shipowners pressing for payment of the agreed rate.†

By the writs of 1634 the ports and maritime counties were ordered to provide ships not only without hire but at their own charges both as to victuals and wages. Provision was made for the levy of an equivalent money assessment where ships of the required tonnage could not be provided, and for the expenditure of this money in equipping king's ships to fulfil the necessary service. As the ships demanded were of a size which few ports besides London could supply, this amounted

* 'The Case of Requisition,' pp. 148-157 and Appendix G.

† Oppenheim, 'Administration of the Royal Navy,' 273.

in practice to the imposition of a money tax for defraying the expenses of a naval mobilisation. The writs of 1635 and subsequent years went still further, for on the plea that 'this burden of defence which relates to all should be borne 'by all,' the writs were extended from the maritime counties to the whole kingdom.

Moreover, the Ship-Money Writs were issued, not in time of war, but in time of peace, and it was on this point that counsel for Hampden chiefly relied, arguing that, though foreign relations were undoubtedly strained, there was no such immediate and imminent crisis as would justify the raising of a fleet by the exercise of the Royal Prerogative without recourse to parliament. This was of course the crux of the problem. The king's determination not to call a parliament, and the insufficiency of the ordinary revenue of the Crown, continually obliged him to strain his prerogative for the purpose of raising money, and it is not surprising that many of his contemporaries saw in the Ship-Money Writs simply one more evidence of his desire to increase his revenue without submitting to parliamentary control.

In his 'Humble Remonstrance against the Tax of Ship-Money' Prynne made a definite charge against the king of spending monies received under the writs on purposes other than the equipment of the fleet, and it has more than once been suggested that the Ship-Money Fleets were merely a pretence for the raising of money. This charge cannot be maintained. The accounts of receipts and expenditure were very carefully kept and show conclusively that the whole amount collected, with insignificant exceptions, was expended on the equipment and maintenance of the fleets annually commissioned. Nor does it appear that advantage was taken of the collection of Ship-Money to divert to other purposes money normally devoted to the navy.*

On the other hand there can be no doubt that, at a very early stage, the conception of Ship-Money as an emergency measure passed into the idea of a permanent source of revenue, to be devoted, it is true, solely to naval purposes, but strengthening the king's position by providing him with a naval force without resort to parliament. Indeed, we know that

* Miss M. D. Gordon, 'The Collection of Ship-Money in the Reign of Charles I,' in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Series III., Vol. IV.

Wentworth, at any rate, considered it as a precedent which, if happily followed, might provide the means of maintaining what would practically be a standing army free from parliamentary control.*

We are bound then to admit on the one hand that the levy of Ship-Money was a direct outcome of Charles' determination to govern without a parliament, and on the other hand that the money raised was intended to be and was in fact devoted to the specific object alleged in the writs, the equipment of the Ship-Money Fleets. Admitting the unconstitutional character of the means, we have still to ask whether the Ship-Money Fleets served any useful end.

The instructions supplied to the Earl of Lindsey, Admiral of the first Ship-Money Fleet, disclaimed all provocative intention towards foreign States. Lindsey was instructed however not to allow any Prince or State 'to keep a guard on our seas,' and if necessary to compel any such fleet to retire. Further, he was to let no ship pass by him 'without veiling bonnet and performing 'the due homage of the sea.' He was also to 'free and secure 'trade in every part of our seas' and to resist 'wrongful restraint 'of trade' by the Dutch and Spaniards. Finally, he was to prevent the French from fishing between the French and English coasts and to take care that all strangers engaged in the herring and other fisheries 'yield to us such duty and acknowledgment as 'heretofore hath been allowed.'†

In the writs themselves, and in such official explanations as Coventry's charge to the judges in 1635, great stress is laid on the insecurity of trade owing to pirates and privateers, the infringement of British neutrality by the Dutch and Spaniards, and generally 'the peril which threatens from all sides in these 'warlike times.' In all this there was much substance. For many years English commerce had suffered appalling losses from 'the plague of Dunkirk privateers and Moorish pirates who 'almost blockaded the coast except for large and heavily armed 'ships.'‡ In 1625 alone no fewer than 1,000 sailors were reported to have been captured by the Turks. The Dunkirk

* See his letter quoted by Gardiner, 'History of England,' Vol. VIII, 211.

† Printed in full by Manwaring, pp. 228-30.

‡ Oppenheim, p. 252.

privateers, ostensibly fitted out to prey on Dutch commerce, were little less formidable to English trade. In 1626 they practically blockaded the east coast; at Ipswich alone fifty-eight ships were laid up. Innumerable petitions for protection were sent up by the ports, but the quarrel between king and parliament had prevented the granting of supplies, and the ordinary revenues of the Crown were insufficient to defray the expenses of keeping a strong force permanently in commission. The Turks and Dunkirkers continued to take their annual toll, and it was probably in large measure due to the hope of obtaining some relief from these pests of the seas, that the original Ship-Money Writs met with little opposition.

The king's complaints as to infractions of neutrality by the Dutch and Spaniards were also well founded. Even while the first Ship-Money Fleet was at sea, Dutch men-of-war were attacking Dunkirkers, not only on the English coasts, but actually within English ports,* and so far was the doctrine of contraband pushed by both sides that an English ship laden with tobacco was seized by a Dunkirker on the ground of carrying 'munitions of war' to Holland.†

With regard to the fisheries Charles had not so clear a case, but the appeal was none the less popular. The claim to exclusive fishery rights in the Channel as a whole was doubtful, but there is evidence that by long custom the fishery on the Zowe, a bank stretching across the Channel between Rye and Dieppe, had been reserved for English fishermen, licences being granted sparingly to the French. During his tenure of office as Lieutenant of Dover Castle Sir Henry Mainwaring had repeatedly called attention to French encroachments on this ground, and had been active in resisting them.‡ Of far greater importance however were the herring fisheries in the North Sea.

The herring fishery and the industries and commerce connected with or based upon it had become absolutely essential to the prosperity of Holland. The fishery itself gave employment to many hundreds of vessels, and the export of cured fish to the Baltic was not only the means of supplying Holland itself with

* Cal. S. P. Dom. Charles I, Vol. VIII., pp. xvi, 273, 294, 336, 370.

† Gardiner, Vol. VII., p. 381.

‡ T. W. Fulton, 'The Sovereignty of the Sea,' pp. 65 & 749; Manwaring, pp. 90, 216-8.

wheat and shipbuilding materials, but was one of the main foundations of the entrepôt and carrying trade. By the beginning of the seventeenth century it could truly be said, 'The herring 'keeps Dutch trade going, and Dutch trade sets the world afloat.'

Meanwhile the English fisheries were decaying, and during the closing years of the sixteenth century and the opening of the seventeenth a swarm of pamphlets bore witness to the envy and alarm excited by the success of the Dutch. While some of the writers were content with inciting their own countrymen to similar exertions, others called for the prohibition of fishing by foreigners in the British seas. During the reign of Elizabeth the alliance between England and Holland kept the question in abeyance, but under James I. an attempt was made to assert the claim to exclusive privileges by forcing licences on the Dutch fishermen. The attempt ended in utter failure, the Dutch taking their stand both on ancient treaties and on the doctrine of *mare liberum* set forth by Grotius. No final solution of the question had been reached, and as both sides had reason for avoiding an open rupture it had been allowed to drift.

Charles however was determined on asserting the English claim, both as an encouragement to the English fisheries and as a means of raising money by the grant of licences. His case was a weak one, for there is no satisfactory evidence of any exclusive right to the fisheries in the North Sea having been asserted prior to the reign of James I.; but there can be little doubt that his policy was approved by the nation as a whole.*

Charles indeed was determined to assert in the widest terms the claim to sovereignty of the British Seas, as was shown by the instructions to Lindsey to prevent foreign States from keeping a fleet in commission in the Channel and to compel all foreigners to lower their topsails.

Prior to this date the question of sovereignty of the seas had been of little practical importance in English foreign policy. The earlier references to it appear to involve nothing more than the jurisdiction necessary in medieval times for ensuring the flow of trade against piracy, and the demand for topsails to be struck probably took its origin in regulations instituted to facilitate

* For the question of the herring fisheries see Fulton, 'Sovereignty of the Sea,' and G. Edmundson, 'Anglo-Dutch Rivalry' *passim.*

visit and search.* As a mark of respect to the queen's ships in English waters it had, during the time of Elizabeth, been usually yielded by the Dutch, enforced on the Spaniards, and resisted by the French. Charles however was determined that it should be consistently enforced. In part he may have been actuated by his extreme ideas of the importance and dignity of his office, but there were probably other more practical considerations. The 'honour of the flag' was closely bound up with those claims to exclusive privileges on which his fishery pretensions were based, and it is possible also that he thought the claim might be effectual in keeping the French out of the Channel.

The rising naval power of France was indeed a serious menace. Under the energetic administration of Richelieu France was fast acquiring a formidable fleet. By 1631 the French Navy List included thirty-nine ships of 200 tons and over, and the revenues of the French Crown so greatly exceeded those of England that a shipbuilding competition could not be faced without anxiety.† The Dutch were already formidable rivals; but so long as they had the Spanish war on their hands they were unlikely by themselves to challenge England upon the seas. There were however signs of a growing understanding between France and Holland, and against such a combination England would be in real danger.

The immediate danger point lay in the Spanish Netherlands. In the hands of either France or Holland Dunkirk would be a far more serious menace to the naval position of England than while still owned by Spain, a distant and declining Power. Thus, despite the havoc committed by the Dunkirk privateers, Charles steadfastly refused to recognise the Dutch blockade of the Netherlands coast. He went so far as to maintain that Dunkirk, being a port within 'the British Seas' could not be blockaded, and he allowed vessels of the Ship-Money Fleets to be employed in escorting contraband traffic and even Spanish storeships and transports to Dunkirk and Ostend.

It may be frankly admitted that the foreign policy of Charles was almost inconceivably tortuous, and was most unhappily complicated by his constant fishing in the troubled waters of the Thirty Years' War, with the object of obtaining recognition

* Fulton, pp. 39-43.

† Oppenheim, pp. 265, 219.

of his kinsmen's claims in the Palatinate ; but even under the direction of the wisest statesmanship the position of England must have been an anxious one. With Holland and Spain at war in the Channel, the growing naval power of France ready to be thrown into the scale, the fisheries question open between Holland and England, and the general state of Europe highly inflammable, there was little exaggeration in speaking of 'the 'peril which threatens from all sides in these warlike times,' and the provision of naval defence was undoubtedly wise and necessary.

Unfortunately, though he had the ships, Charles was unable to raise the money to keep them regularly in commission without resort to unconstitutional means, and still more unfortunately he was incapable of making a straightforward use of the force thus provided. At the date when Ship-Money was first proposed he was already engaged in negotiation with Spain for a secret treaty by which, in return for a subsidy, he was to equip a powerful fleet to open the Flanders ports, 'upon pretence' of suppressing hostilities by the Dutch and Dunkirkers in territorial waters. These negotiations were known only to two or three of his confidential advisers and even Sir John Coke, who drafted Lindsey's instructions, was kept in ignorance of them ; but a contemporary minute refers bluntly to the fleet as intended to co-operate with the Spaniards in raising the blockade of Dunkirk, the protection of trade to be 'the pretext of this arming.'* It would however be rash to assume that the objects set forth in the writs and the official apologia were a mere blind. Charles was undoubtedly fully alive to the importance of naval strength ; he had shown a real desire to repair the disorders revealed by the expeditions to Cadiz and Rochelle, and he was undoubtedly in earnest in his determination to assert the supremacy of England in the Narrow Seas. Indeed it is quite possible to look on the Spanish negotiations as largely a pretext for obtaining money for the equipment of a fleet.

By the time Lindsey's fleet put to sea in June 1635, the negotiations with Spain had practically broken down, though a treaty was actually signed (but not ratified) in the spring of that year. On the other hand France and Holland were now in

* Gardiner, Vol. VII, pp. 351-2, 368 ; Cal. S. P. Dom. Charles I. Vol. VIII, xii.

open alliance against Spain and a strong French fleet was in the Channel. The situation was a delicate one, as Lindsey's instructions bound him not only to enforce the 'homage of the 'sea' but to prevent a foreign fleet from cruising in the Channel. However, though Lindsey did his best to obtain touch he failed to find the French, and it was subsequently ascertained that, after joining a Dutch squadron, they had withdrawn to the Bay of Biscay. While Richelieu had no intention of yielding to the English pretensions, he was not desirous of actively contesting them, and thanks to his instructions the cruise of the first Ship-Money Fleet ended in a mere naval demonstration.

As such it might be esteemed a success. The fleet was a powerful one,* and in the existing conditions so unmistakable an example of naval preparedness was not without importance. As Sir Kenelm Digby wrote to Coke, 'Although my Lord of 'Lindsey do no more than sail up and down, yet the very setting 'of our best fleet out to sea is the greatest service that I believe 'hath been done the king these many years.'†

At any rate the success was sufficient to embolden the king to extend the second issue of writs to the whole country. They met with little opposition. Probably the majority of the nation felt with Laud, 'If it go well, the king will be a great master 'at sea, and in these active times we, by God's blessing, may be 'more safe by land.' As a result, the fleet commissioned in 1636 under the Earl of Northumberland consisted of twenty-four king's ships and three London merchantmen, and is stated to have been, on paper, the most powerful that had yet been fitted out by England. Northumberland's first instructions were to watch the French fleet at Rochelle, but up to the end of June no sign had been seen of the French, who subsequently went to the Mediterranean. In the meantime Northumberland had captured a Dutch ship under the afterwards celebrated van Galen, which had attacked a Dunkirker in an English port.

Meanwhile the season for the herring fishery had commenced. The determination of Charles to assert his sovereignty of the seas had been increased by perusal of Selden's '*Mare Clausum*,' published by the king's direction in 1635, which asserted for the King of England exclusive rights extending as far as the

* Full lists of all the Ship-Money Fleets are printed by Manwaring.

† Manwaring, p. 233.

opposite coasts, and Northumberland was accordingly ordered to compel the Dutch fishermen in the North Sea to accept licences in return for a fixed payment. In this Northumberland was not very successful, owing to the slow sailing of his ships, but about 300 licences were distributed and paid for, and a Dutch squadron which had been sent out to prevent enforcement of the English claim arrived too late.

Other ships of the fleet had been employed in convoying vessels to Dunkirk and Ostend, for which £999 was received as 'waftage,' a considerably greater amount than that collected from the Dutch fishermen, which barely exceeded £500.* Meanwhile the trade and shipping of the western ports had been held up by the Turks, who had come out of their hiding places in the Irish Sea as soon as Northumberland's back was turned, and at the end of August the admiral was instructed to despatch three or four ships to free the coast between Lands End and Scilly from their depredations.

Although Northumberland had accomplished little, Mr. Manwaring is probably right in claiming that his presence had kept the French fleet out of the Channel and that 'this in itself 'was, in the existing circumstances, sufficient justification for 'keeping a fleet regularly in commission.' Unfortunately the cruise had revealed fully the defects of Stuart administration. A memorandum drawn up by Northumberland on his return and Sir Henry Mainwaring's evidence before the subsequent Court of Enquiry contain damning proof of financial maladministration, corruption, defects in equipment, bad manning, and bad victualling; it was clear that the evils which had wrecked the Cadiz and Rochelle expeditions earlier in the reign were still rampant.†

By this time it was evident that Ship-Money was intended to become an annual charge, and the third writs issued at the end of 1636 excited much opposition. Apart from the constitutional objections, the positive achievements of the previous fleets had been so meagre that their setting forth had ceased to make any popular appeal. Nothing of moment had been accomplished in the matter of the fisheries and the plague of Turkish pirates and Dunkirk privateers had been by no means

* Fulton, p. 309.

† Manwaring, pp. 246-250.

ended. Indeed a few really well equipped light vessels of superior sailing qualities would probably have done more in this respect than Lindsey's and Northumberland's ponderous fleets. In 1637, however, part of the money received under the writs was expended in equipping Rainsborrow's expedition to Sallee, which obtained the release of 300 captives and kept the coasts free of pirates for the whole summer.*

The cruise of the main fleet, on the other hand, was wholly inglorious. The French kept out of the Channel, and the only achievements of the fleet were to compel a few Dutchmen to strike their flags; to transport ambassadors and other persons of importance; and to escort convoys to the Flanders ports. Only one merchantman under a Captain Fielding was sent into the North Sea, for the king was unwilling to face the consequences of a refusal to accept licences from the royal ships. The herring busses however were guarded by a strong escort, and Fielding's mission ended in ignominious failure. In truth the position taken up by Charles was altogether untenable. Even had his pretensions been better founded than they were, it was obvious that the Dutch would never submit to so drastic an interference with their principal industry. His claims could only be enforced at the cost of war, and war meant for Charles not only the dangers of the Franco-Dutch alliance but the necessity of calling a parliament, the one thing he had resolved not to do. In the circumstances, he would have better served both his dignity and his interests by abandoning his claims or at least keeping them in abeyance, and refraining from attempts which could not be successful and were bound to cause irritation.

Little as had been done, the real sailors were not dissatisfied with the display of naval strength. 'Methinks we have a very 'great calm both of the French and Dutch,' wrote Pennington; but the value of this negative achievement was insufficient in the general estimation, to wipe out the disgrace of Fielding's failure and the growing sense of the illegality of the tax. The decision in Hampden's case had been followed by a rapid payment of arrears due on the assessment of 1637, but in 1638 considerable difficulty was experienced in collecting the amounts due under the writs, and in 1639, though a much smaller sum was demanded, the opposition was still more active.

* Cal. S. P. Dom. Charles I., Vol. XI, xx; Oppenheim, 276-8.

The cruise of 1638 was particularly uneventful. The first employment of the fleet was to escort ships carrying gunpowder to Dunkirk, which was accomplished without opposition. In August Turkish pirates were reported on the Dorset coast and ships were despatched to drive them off; and this, for the time, was accomplished. Meanwhile trouble had broken out with Scotland, and Pennington, who commanded the fleet, was ordered to detach vessels to intercept supplies of arms and munitions which were being forwarded to Scotland from Rotterdam and Bremen. The following year, when the friction with Scotland had developed into open war, the fleet was employed in a blockade of the Scottish ports and in creating a diversion in the Firth of Forth. This duty was effectively performed up to the signing of the Treaty of Berwick on June 18th, and Pennington was then recalled to the Channel, owing to the presence of a powerful Dutch squadron.

Now came one of the most disgraceful incidents in our naval annals. The Spaniards had resolved on a determined effort to break the blockade of Dunkirk and reinforce their garrisons in Flanders, and for this purpose they had equipped a large fleet under the veteran Oquendo. The Dutch however were ready for him, and after an unsuccessful action in the Straits of Dover, Oquendo took refuge in the Downs, with Tromp hard on his heels. On this Pennington interposed to prevent hostilities in the Downs, and Oquendo took advantage of the respite to slip through a number of vessels to Dunkirk under cover of nightfall. The situation was undoubtedly delicate; the two hostile fleets lay at either end of the Downs; Oquendo refused to move, and Pennington was unable to obtain clear instructions as to his course. In fact, Charles in his desperate need of money, had determined to hold up his neutrality to auction. For £150,000 he offered to ensure the safety of the Spaniards. This sum they refused, but agreed to purchase 500 barrels of powder at a high price. Tromp's patience was exhausted, and on October 10th he attacked Oquendo's fleet in a fog and utterly destroyed it. Pennington with a very inferior force could do nothing but chase such Dutch ships as he met when the fog lifted beyond the limits of the Downs, and prevent them from returning to board the disabled Spanish ships that had run ashore.*

* Pennington's despatch is printed by Manwaring, pp. 283-5.

After this exhibition of impotence, it is not surprising that it proved impossible to collect more than about one-third of the money demanded for 1640. The small squadron put into commission was employed mainly in the blockade of Scotland, with whom hostilities had again broken out. During the summer this task was performed with an effectiveness which suggests some improvement in the efficiency of the fleet. By the end of June Scotch shipping was reported to be generally laid up, and by the end of July no fewer than eighty ships bound for Scottish ports had been captured and brought in. In the autumn, however, the efficiency of the blockade slackened, either through heavy weather or the financial inability of the king to keep the fleet up to the mark.

This was the last service of the Ship-Money Fleets. The financial pressure of the Scotch war had compelled the king to have recourse to Parliament, and one of the first acts of the Long Parliament was to declare the Ship-Money Writs illegal. This pronouncement was undoubtedly correct; but on the general question of policy there is more room for difference of opinion. Admiral Colomb, whose views appear to some extent to be endorsed by Mr. Manwaring, has suggested that a chief cause of the king's downfall was 'Charles' understanding of the naval 'conditions of the kingdom, and the want of understanding on 'the part of his opposing subjects.' This seems to be going too far. The real quarrel between Charles and his early parliaments was not that they refused to grant the money necessary for naval defence, but that they refused to grant money except in return for constitutional safeguards. The first Ship-Money Writs, issued at a time of strained relations and national anxiety, aroused little opposition. When it became clear that Ship-Money was intended to become an annual levy the opposition became active; but it was based not so much on a denial of the necessity for naval defence, as on a well-founded suspicion that the king was bent upon rendering himself completely independent of Parliament. It must be remembered that Ship-Money was only one of many unconstitutional measures adopted by Charles to raise money. Nor was he, like the Tudors, a prince whose popularity and ability could induce his subjects to wink at the stretching of his prerogative rights. On almost every point of domestic policy he was at loggerheads with a great part of his

people. His foreign policy centred round the question of the Palatinate in which no real national interest was involved, and constantly led him into intimate relations with Spain, against whom much of the old antipathy still existed. His claim to an abstract Sovereignty of the Seas, though it awoke some response in the maritime instincts of the nation, was not an object for which they were willing to pay so high a price. The one issue on which popular opinion was strongly behind the king was that of the fisheries, and here he was forced ignominiously to give way. The one proof of the value of naval defence which could be easily appreciated was the freedom of trade from molestation, and this the Ship-Money Fleets only intermittently achieved.*

It must be remembered too that the naval expeditions undertaken during the earlier years of the reign had been uniformly disastrous. The material which Mr. Manwaring has collected adds still further evidence to that already on record of the deplorable inefficiency of Stuart administration, the constant malversation, the defectiveness of the material, the abominable conditions which caused the seamen to avoid the king's service as they would the galleys; and he has shown conclusively, that despite their paper strength, the Ship-Money Fleets themselves were deeply tainted with the same evils. It was not strange that there should have been little readiness to submit to the raising of money in unconstitutional ways by a government which could make so little use of it.

Yet there can be no doubt that Charles was right in insisting on the importance of a strong navy to the national interests, and in two respects he seems to have been in advance of his time. Since the days of Henry VIII. England had possessed a permanent and formidable fleet, but except at the crisis of a war it had been a rare thing for any large proportion of that fleet to be in commission. A small Channel Guard had been held sufficient for the ordinary police of the seas, and extensive mobilization had been resorted to only for a definite expedition or as an emergency measure.† It must stand to the credit of Charles that

* In 1640 Moorish pirates were again specially active off the coast. Oppenheim, p. 278.

† A permanent guard for the Narrow Seas had, however, been proposed by the Special Naval Commissioners in 1627 on account of the danger from France. Manwaring, p. 160.

he did perceive, however vaguely, the diplomatic value of a fleet regularly in commission. His diplomacy in itself was weak and blundering but his use of the fleet as a diplomatic instrument marked a step in advance. With all their defects, the Ship-Money Fleets constituted England's chief title to respect abroad.

Further, the Ship-Money Fleets anticipated to no small extent the preference for regular men-of-war which became so marked during the Dutch wars of the Commonwealth The fleets raised in the earlier years of the reign had consisted largely of armed merchantmen, but the behaviour of the auxiliaries had been unfavourably reported on, and when Charles decided on a forward naval policy he decided also that the bulk of the fleets should be composed of vessels of the Royal Navy. It was for this reason that a money assessment was substituted under the Ship-Money Writs for the requisitioning of shipping, and while this innovation was one of the main grounds of opposition to the writs, there can be no doubt that, on naval grounds, the king's decision was justified.

For the naval policy of Charles there was much to be said. It was his and England's misfortune that his foreign and domestic policy stultified the value of his interest in naval affairs. While he constantly took up a position which could only be maintained in the last resort by readiness to fight, his neighbours were well aware that without calling a parliament he could not afford the expense of war, and that he could not call a parliament without abandoning pretensions which he regarded as sacred.* His determination to free himself of parliamentary control drove him to seek even wise and necessary ends by means which increased the alienation of his people. The defect of the Ship-Money policy was not that the force to be provided was unnecessary or extravagant, or that the financial burden was greater than the country could safely bear.† It was that Charles could never be brought to see that a government can only be strong abroad if backed up by a united nation at home, and that the wisest and most necessary policy may be rendered suspect if pursued in crooked ways and by unconstitutional measures

C. Ernest Fayle.

* See letter of Spanish Ambassador cited by Gardiner, Vol. VIII, p. 218.

† See the study in the *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* already quoted, and Gardiner, VIII, 269.

THE PARTY SYSTEM AND PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT

1. The History of Party. By GEORGE WINGROVE COOKE. 1836.
2. A Dissertation upon Parties. A Patriot King and Other Works. By HENRY ST. JOHN, Viscount Bolingbroke.
3. Works. By Edmund Burke.
4. The Political Philosophy of Burke. By JOHN MACCUNN. 1913.
5. Vindication of the English Constitution and Other Works, chiefly Romances. By BENJAMIN DISRAELI.

GOLDSMITH coined an epigram which certainly crystallized a common sentiment, if it did not perpetuate a vulgar error. To affirm that Burke gave up to party what was meant for mankind is not only to misconceive and misrepresent Burke's own position in English politics, but gravely to prejudice the place and purpose of the party system in the evolution of parliamentary government. Since August 1914 the party system has been virtually in abeyance; parties, as previously defined, are in the crucible. There are those who hold that it were better that they should remain there. Why should even the lowliest of politicians dedicate to the service of party such modest talents as he may possess? Those who argue thus may be invited to reflect on the coincidence between the disintegration of parties and the alleged decadence of the parliamentary principle. Whether it may not be more than coincidence; whether the phenomena may not be logically related as cause and effect are questions which will demand consideration in the course of this article.

With some assurance, however, it may at the outset be affirmed that the parliamentary system, as worked in England for the last two centuries, nay the whole principle of representative democracy, has fallen on days which are difficult, if not actually critical. The rapid development in the means of communication; the marvellous organization for the supply of information, if not of intelligence; the extension of the parliamentary franchise, and the diffusion of education; the increasing subordination of politics to economics; the substitution of vocation for locality as the basis of association;—all these have tended towards the

weakening of the representative principle and to the substitution of methods appropriate to a more direct form of democracy. The press, the platform, the trade union, and the caucus have unquestionably done something to decentralize political activity and to transfer discussion from Westminster to the constituencies, be they local or vocational. Simultaneously with the operation of these and similar tendencies there has been delivered a determined assault upon the theory and practice of party government. Nor are the reasons unintelligible. Party allegiance, if carried to excess, may easily obscure the claims of patriotism. Concentration upon the business of vote-catching may tempt party leaders and party managers to ignore or to postpone the higher call of country. Plainly, this is a weakness incidental to if not inseparable from party government, and it is one whose insidious growth must ever be closely watched and guarded against by patriotic statesmen. The momentous question is whether the predisposition to this malady is sufficiently serious to invalidate the claim which is preferred on behalf of the party system, and to justify the attempt to eradicate a growth which may become so malignant as to poison the whole body-politic ?

An historical retrospect may help towards an answer to a question, at all times of speculative interest, and to-day of insistent and practical significance.

The revolution of 1688 in effect transferred sovereignty from the Crown to parliament, or more strictly to the king in parliament. Parliament as then organized found itself, however, unequal to the discharge of its new responsibilities. Pass laws and impose taxes it could, but how was it to carry on or to supervise the day to day work of administration ? John Pym, with the insight of real statesmanship, had, half a century earlier, pointed the way to a solution of the problem. Let the king choose as counsellors and ministers those whom ' parliament may have cause ' to confide in.' Such was the central demand of the Grand Remonstrance of 1641. There only lay the way of escape from the dilemma which had confronted the Stuart kings and their parliaments. A century of Tudor government had prepared the way for an important step forward in parliamentary development. In particular the experience gained by the country gentlemen in the administration of local justice and in carrying into practical effect the ' stacks of statutes ' under which (as Lambarde tells us)

they ' groaned,' proved of immense value when they were called to discharge still wider duties and to assume still higher responsibilities. Invigorated by the introduction of a new type of member and forced by the creation of new and (at the time) popular constituencies, the parliament which confronted James I on his accession was a different body from the anaemic and emaciated institution which the Tudors had inherited from their predecessors. The pedantic Scot had not been many months upon his English throne before he was bluntly told by parliament that he must not expect the same consideration at their hands as had been accorded ' in respect of her sex and age ' to Queen Elizabeth. But though eager to play a more important part in public affairs, parliament was obviously in doubt as to the precise part it was to play, and as to the actual means by which it was to assert the new authority it claimed. To make laws, to vote taxes, to keep the king informed as to the state of public feeling—such, according to Bacon, were the legitimate functions of parliament. The tactlessness of James and the vagaries of Buckingham led parliament to reassert the doctrine of ministerial responsibility and from that doctrine to advance to the principle that the legislature should control the executive.

How could that control be exercised ? That was the core of the problem which the constitutional theorists and the practical politicians of the seventeenth century had to solve. Even before the outbreak of the civil war an attempt was made by Hyde, Falkland and Culpepper to solve it. Clarendon (Hyde) himself refers to the emergence of a ' cabinet,' and he and his colleagues might be said to have formed an embryonic cabinet but for the fact that the confidence of the House of Commons was given not to them but to Hampden and Pym. The outbreak of war arrested the process, and the military dictatorship which ensued upon the defeat of the cavaliers and the death of the king was not favourable to constitutional development. Cromwell, great as he was as soldier and as statesman, was wholly unfitted to play the part either of a ' constitutional ' king or a parliamentary leader. The development, thus arrested in 1641, was resumed after the restoration. The return of the Stuarts meant not only a restoration of Church and Crown, but a revival of parliament.

Almost immediately emerged once more the problem of the

Executive. It is not pertinent to the main argument of this article to follow in detail the evolution of the cabinet system; it must suffice, therefore, to say briefly that in that system was ultimately found the solution of the constitutional problem of the seventeenth century. A small committee, composed of members of the legislature, agreed on certain principles of government and on the main lines of policy, willing to accept collectively and mutually entire responsibility for the administrative acts of colleagues, united in subordination to a common leader, at once servants of the king and answerable to parliament—herein was discovered a device for reconciling the historic position of an hereditary monarchy with the advancing claims of a legislature, in part indeed elected, but almost wholly nominated by a territorial oligarchy.

Gradually elaborated, the new mechanism did not work easily until the legislature had organized itself on party lines. Very slowly was it perceived that more or less organized parties were essential to the smooth and efficient working of parliamentary government. Representative democracy as first evolved in England rests upon a dual foundation: a legislature which shall represent and be responsive to the wishes of the electorate, and an executive responsible to the legislature. This two-fold responsibility presupposes organization alike in the constituencies and in the representative assembly. On what lines is such organization to proceed?

'*Idem sentire de republicâ* was with them ('the best patriots in the greatest commonwealths') a principal ground of friendship and attachment; nor do I know any other capable of forming firmer, dearer, more pleasing, more honourable and more virtuous habitudes. . . . Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed. For my part, I find it impossible to conceive that anyone believes in his own politics, or thinks them to be of any right who refuses to adopt the means of having them reduced into practice. It is the business of the speculative philosopher to mark the proper ends of government. It is the business of the politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out proper means to those ends, and to employ them with effect. Therefore, every honourable connexion will avow it is their first purpose to pursue every just method to put the men who hold their opinions into such a condition as may enable them to carry their common plans into execution, with all the power and authority of the State. As this power is attached to certain situations,

it is their duty to contend for these situations . . . men thinking freely will, in particular instances, think differently. But still as the greater part of the measures which arise in the course of public business are related to, or dependent on, some great leading general principles in government a man must be peculiarly unfortunate in the choice of his political company if he does not agree with them nine times out of ten. . . . Thus the disagreement will naturally be rare; it will be only enough to indulge freedom without violating concord or disturbing arrangement. And this is all that ever was required for a character of the greatest uniformity and steadiness in connexion. How men can proceed without any connexion at all is to me incomprehensible.'

In this classical passage Burke has for all time presented the apology for party government. Originally indited with a view to the contemporary situation, shrewdly thrusting at the weaknesses of conspicuous individuals, and relentlessly analysing the distempers from which in 1770 the body politic seemed to be suffering, the 'Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Discontents' contains reflections, profound in their sagacity and of enduring value. But a reference to Burke anticipates the sequence of the argument.

The years which immediately followed the triumph of parliament in 1688 showed parliament, and in particular the House of Commons, at its worst. Emancipated from the control of the Crown it had not yet become conscious of its responsibility to the electorate. Unorganized, petulant and overbearing, Parliament, as Lord Macaulay observed, began to exhibit some of the worst symptoms of irresponsible autocracy. Conscious of power it manifested a curious incapacity to exercise it. Anxious to maintain a continuous control over the executive it knew not how it was to be done. The evolution of the cabinet and the gradual definition of the party system in time provided the instruments for lack of which parliament could not at first make full use of the victory it had won. During the interval—a full generation—between the deposition of James II and the accession to power of Walpole various experiments were tried. William III, though harassed and even thwarted by parliament, was his own first minister. His natural impulse was, therefore, to select his ministers without reference to their party associations. But the cabinet machine, rudimentary as it was, refused to work under these conditions. He accordingly formed in 1697 a homogeneous ministry, and the Whig *Junto* registered an

important stage in the evolution of the cabinet. A Stuart and a Tory, Queen Anne found herself committed to a Whig war, the outcome of a policy continental rather than insular in its inspiration. To carry on the war she reverted for six years to the experiment of a non-party cabinet over the meetings of which she presided in person. There was as yet no prime minister. Despite the ascendancy of the Marlboroughs the method adopted was only moderately successful, and in 1708 the Whigs succeeded in eliminating the Tory elements from the cabinet. Two years later the tables were turned and for the last four years of the reign the Tories were in power.

Despite its victory over the executive the legislature now found itself threatened by a serious rival. Notwithstanding the inequalities, the irregularities and the anomalies of the system of representation public opinion was becoming a potent political force. A wave of popular passion put the Tories into power in 1710. Of the new force thus manifested legislators and ministers were alike compelled to take account. But how was the populace to be reached, much less rationally influenced? The pamphleteer stepped into the breach. Queen Anne's reign was the heyday of the political pamphlet. The heroics of the seventeenth century found natural expression in poetry, in the epic of Milton, in the satire of Dryden. The ever-widening electorate of the nineteenth century obtained political nourishment from daily journalism and in prose fiction. The incipient parties of the eighteenth century looked for inspiration —and not in vain—to the pamphleteers: the Whigs to Defoe, Steele and Addison; the Tories to Swift and Atterbury, to Arbuthnot, Prior and Bolingbroke.

For once a passing fashion provided a permanent endowment. The transitory interests of the party leaders of Queen Anne's reign have for all time enriched English literature. Swift's greatest work was not, of course, done to the order of patrons; nor was Addison's; but Swift's 'Conduct of the Allies' has been described, not unjustly, as 'the most effective party pamphlet 'of the century.' It certainly did more to commend to the country the Treaty of Utrecht, than all the brilliant oratory of Bolingbroke.

Yet in the evolution of English politics and the gradual establishment of the party-system the significance of Bolingbroke's

tempestuous and tragic career is second to none. Endowed with almost every gift essential to success in the parliamentary arena; keen of intellect, eloquent alike with pen and tongue; with a mind richly stored, and with an immense capacity for work, his career nevertheless affords a warning rather than an example. Aptly does one of his biographers quote of him the well-known lines :—

> 'This should have been a noble creature; he
> Hath all the energy which should have made
> A goodly frame of glorious elements,
> Had they been wisely mingled; as it is
> It is an awful chaos—light and darkness,
> And mind and dust, and passions, and high thoughts
> Mixed and contending, without end or order—
> All dormant or destructive.'

His rise to place and power was rapid. Entering the House of Commons in 1701 at the age of three and twenty, he was secretary-at-war in 1704. Forced to resign, with Harley, in 1708, he came into power with him in 1710 as joint-leader of the triumphant Tories. Within twelve months he had got rid of Marlborough and had set himself to bring to a close a war which had ceased to correspond with national necessities. Within three years he had concluded peace; and shortly afterwards contrived to rid himself of an obstructive colleague and an embarrassing rival. He wanted six weeks to mature his plans before the death—already imminent—of the Queen. He was denied one. Before six days had passed the Whig chiefs had effected their *coup d'état*; the queen died; the Elector George was summoned to the throne; the Whigs were in; Bolingbroke was out; impeachment followed upon dismissal; exile upon impeachment; and hardly was King George established on the throne before Bolingbroke was eating out his heart in France.

'Lord, what a world it is and how does fortune banter us.' Fortune had indeed bantered Bolingbroke. Deprived of place and power he took up his pen, and the 'Letter to Sir William 'Wyndham' (1717); 'The Dissertation upon Parties' (1733) and 'The Patriot King' (1738) (to mention only those works which are pertinent to the present argument) attest his ingenuity and his industry.

Philosophical in form these works are in fact elaborate party

pamphlets. They were all written with an immediate object : to vindicate Bolingbroke's political position ; to regain for him power if not place, and to provide the Tory party with a policy and a programme. A brief experience of service under the Old Pretender had sufficed to convince Bolingbroke that it was not to St. Germains that the Tory party must look for the means of restoration to power, and that their only hope lay in a frank repudiation of the Stuart cause and of the doctrine of Divine Right upon which philosophically that cause rested. The 'Letter to Sir William Wyndham' written in 1717 but not published until after the author's death, was an elaborate attempt to vindicate his own conduct in relation to his party, and his party's policy in relation to the country. National in its composition and wholly patriotic in its aims, the Tory party had succeeded in bringing to a close a war which while enriching the Whig merchants was impoverishing the country and was no longer calculated to serve national interests. Bolingbroke frankly admits that the Peace of Utrecht, for the conclusion of which he was primarily responsible, was 'less answerable to the success of 'the war than it might and it ought to have been.' Still it was preferable to the continuation of a purposeless war. Besides, the succession question was imminent and it was essential that in the crisis which might ensue the hands of the government should not be tied by the preoccupation of a continental war. In plain English Bolingbroke wanted to be free to make terms either with Herrenhausen or St. Germains as party interests might dictate. But he was too late ; the Queen's death was too sudden ; the Whigs reaped the reward of preparation and promptitude ; and the Tories were forced by the partisanship of King George to put their money on the Pretender. The fiasco of 1715, inevitable in view of the circumstances disclosed by Bolingbroke, ought, he argued, to cure the Tories of any further leanings towards Jacobitism. The sole hope for the future of the Party lay in final repudiation of the doctrine of Divine right and in frank acceptance of the 'revolution settlement' and the Hanoverian dynasty.

After 1715 Bolingbroke manifested feverish anxiety to make his peace with the ruling powers. His efforts were rewarded with only partial success. He received a pardon under the great seal in 1723, but though his patrimony—thanks to the

venal offices of the Duchess of Kendal—was restored to him, he never regained his seat in the House of Lords. Such influence as he exerted over English politics was exerted, therefore, wholly by his pen. Nor was it negligible. Walpole might withstand the attacks of *The Craftsman*, nor was he shaken in his seat by the 'Dissertation on Parties'—a political tract under the thin disguise of an historical treatise; but 'The Patriot 'King,' despite the superficiality of its philosophy, was profoundly influential in restoring the morale of the party which Bolingbroke had espoused.

'For some years it formed the manual of a large body of enthusiasts. From its pages George III derived the articles of his political creed. On its precepts Bute modelled his conduct. It called into being the faction known as the King's Friends. It undoubtedly contributed to bring about that great revolution which transformed the Toryism of Filmer and Rochester into the Toryism of Filmer and Pitt.'

Mr. Churton Collins's words here quoted contain a sound estimate of Bolingbroke's essential service to his party. As a political leader he was a failure. 'Three years of eager, unwise, 'power, and thirty-five of sickly longing and impotent regret—'such or something like it, will ever be in this cold, modern world, 'the fate of an Alcibiades.' That is Walter Bagehot's caustic summary of this singular career, and if we have regard only to immediate and practical achievement it cannot be regarded as unfair. Yet it is poles asunder from the deliberate estimate of the most brilliant of Bolingbroke's successors in the leadership of the Tory party.

'He eradicated from Toryism all the absurd and odious doctrines which Toryism had adventitiously adopted, clearly developed its essential and permanent character, discarded *jure divino*, demolished passive obedience, threw to the winds the doctrine of non-resistance, placed the abolition of James and the accession of George on their right bases, and in the complete reorganization of the public mind laid the foundation for the future accession of the Tory party to power and to that popular and triumphant career which must ever await the policy of an administration inspired by the spirit of our free and ancient institutions.'

In this characteristic passage the young Disraeli paid just tribute to the influence of his predecessor.

Wherein lay the affinity between these two eminent 'schoolmasters of the Tory party'? It is not far to seek. Compare the following passages:—

'The State is become, under ancient and known forms, a new and undefinable monster; composed of a King without monarchical splendour, a Senate of Nobles without aristocratical independence, and a Senate of Commons without democratical freedom.'

So wrote Bolingbroke in 'The Dissertation on Parties.' Disraeli, in reference to the same period wrote:—

'It could no longer be concealed that, by virtue of a plausible phrase, power had been transferred from the Crown to a Parliament, the members of which were appointed by an extremely limited and exclusive class, who owned no responsibility to the country, who debated and voted in secret, and who were regularly paid by the small knot of great families that by this machinery had secured the permanent possession of the King's Treasury. Whiggism was putrescent in the nostrils of the nation.'

To Disraeli as to Bolingbroke the 'Venetian oligarchy' was anathema. In 1688 the 'small knot of great families' had usurped the power of the State and their ascendancy was confirmed by the *coup d'état* of 1714. Thenceforward for a good half-century they resisted all assaults upon the citadel of Whiggism. The breach effected in 1770 was due partly to the disintegration in the ranks of the Whig party, —to their break up into family groups, to the corruption which had indeed become 'putrescent'—partly to the persistence of George III, determined to reassert the authority of the Crown; partly to the detachment of the elder Pitt; partly to the growing influence of the unrepresented classes, but not least to the untiring literary activity by which Bolingbroke had endeavoured to reanimate the spirit of his party, and to provide them with a practical programme and a political ideal. Those efforts at last fructified, when, in 1770, Lord North came into power and inaugurated a long half-century of virtually continuous Tory ascendancy.

That half-century (1770–1830) covered one of the most momentous periods of English history: the loss of the American colonies; the dissolution of the first Empire, and the foundation of a second; in Ireland, the trial and failure of the Grattan Parliament, the rebellion, the union, and catholic emancipation;

the prolonged struggle with revolutionary and Napoleonic France ; the slow but sure recovery after the devastation of war ; the passing of the old agricultural England ; the emergence of a new industrial England ; finally, and from the standpoint of this article not least significant, the clear definition of the party system and the firm establishment of parliamentary government. In 1770 the parliamentary system was still in the balance ; by 1830 the scales had quite definitely tilted, and the principle of representative democracy was firmly established.

To this consummation Walpole had contributed much ; Pitt the younger had contributed even more. The pivot of parliamentary, as opposed to presidential democracy, is a premier. Walpole, if he filled the office, repudiated the title ; Pitt boldly claimed both. From Pitt's day onwards England has been governed by a series of first ministers. But if Pitt left an imperishable mark on the practical development of English constitutionalism, it was Burke who provided the philosophical apology upon which that singular form of government fundamentally rests. Of all commentators upon the English constitution Burke is incomparably the greatest. He penetrated farthest into the recesses of its peculiar genius and with unfaltering sagacity and insight revealed the spirit which animates the working of its institutions. If reverence be the essence of Conservatism, Burke was the greatest Conservative that ever lived. He is even more than that ; he is the central figure in the evolution of the party system. Pre-eminent as the apologist of party government Burke was at once a Whig of the Whigs, and of all Conservatives the most rational and philosophical. That he was an infallible guide to the solution of contemporary problems it would be rash and indeed untrue to affirm. On many of the subjects which gave occasion to his speeches—notably on the details of Indian administration—he was inadequately informed ; but he never touched a question without enriching the discussion by reflections of permanent value.

Illustrations will readily suggest themselves even from the writings more strictly relevant to the subject in hand. Take the 'Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Discontents' or the 'Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs,' or the 'Letter to 'the Sheriffs of Bristol,' above all the 'Reflections upon the

'French Revolution.' In the first, Burke may have exaggerated the significance of the symptoms which he diagnosed; he may have ascribed to the 'double cabinet' system a degree of organization which it did not possess, and may have credited George III with a more definite design for the enslavement of parliament than his ill-balanced brain actually harboured. Nevertheless, he pierced to the heart of the political situation; he perceived that the distemper of the time arose from the fact that the House of Commons, internally disorganized, was out of touch even with the electorate it was supposed to represent and still more with the growing force of public opinion outside. Unrepresented opinion had been the support and strength of the elder Pitt in his prime. 'Walpole' as Dr. Johnson justly said, 'was a minister given by the people to the king.' 'You have 'taught me,' said George III to Pitt, 'to look for the opinion of 'my people elsewhere than in the House of Commons.'

Characteristically, Burke shrank from the appropriate remedy—an extension of the franchise and a redistribution of seats; but he diagnosed the cause of the disease. Parliament had abdicated its true function; it had lost the 'ancient habit of control'; in particular it had failed to keep a tight hold upon the national purse strings. To radical reforms and organic changes Burke was constitutionally averse; in the fashionable prescriptions,—such as the shortening of the shorter parliaments or the exclusion of placemen—he had little faith; by giving increased publicity to the doings of parliament he would excite a livelier and more continuous interest in the constituencies, but it was to administrative and economic reform that he was inclined to look for the real remedy and above all to a reorganization of parties and a revival of party government.

'When, through the medium of this just connexion with their constituents, the genuine dignity of the House of Commons is restored, it will begin to think of its old office of control. It will not suffer that last of evils to predominate in the country, men without popular confidence, public opinion, natural connexion or mutual trust, invested with all the powers of government.'

The 'fundamentals' of the historic constitution he would not touch.

'Never will I cut it in pieces and put it into the cauldron of any magician, in order to boil it with the puddle of their compounds into

youth and vigour ; on the contrary, I will drive away such pretenders ; I will nurse its venerable age and with lenient arts extend a parent's breath.'

There speaks the authentic voice of Burke ; genuine in his liberalism ; passionate in his conservatism. It is sometimes said that Burke, a liberal by instinct and political connection, was frightened into reaction and conservatism by contemporary events in France. Such criticism is at once shallow and misleading. That Burke was literally horrified by the French Revolution is true ; it is also true that when he penned the ' Reflections ' he was not in a position to investigate thoroughly the historical causes which contributed to the upheaval nor critically to estimate the strength of the forces which operated to give to the revolution its peculiar character. He did not enjoy the advantages accorded to the modern critic by Tocqueville, Taine, Louis Madelin, Albert Sorel and Mrs. Webster ; but political instinct, almost unerring, supplied the place of laborious research. It may be that Burke in Tom Paine's trenchant phrase, ' while pitying the plumage ' forgot the dying bird,' yet the further research is pushed the more surely is the modern critic compelled to acknowledge that with all his limitations of opportunity, Burke reached by instinct a conclusion which subsequent research has more and more amply vindicated. The horror of the spectacle in France made Burke fear for England ; his fears for England, his zeal for the ordered liberty she had won, and his reverence for the institutions in which that liberty was enshrined, thrust him back upon first principles and compelled him to seek a philosophical justification for the faith he professed and the constitution he revered. Reverence, not reason nor utility, was the basis of Burke's conservatism.

' Great critics, (he wrote in 1791), have taught us one essential rule. . . . It is this, that if ever we should find ourselves disposed not to admire those writers or artists . . . whom all the learned had admired, not to follow our own fancies, but to study them until we know what and how we ought to admire ; and if we cannot arrive at this combination of admiration with knowledge, rather to believe that we are dull men, than that the rest of the world has been imposed upon. It is as good a rule at least with regard to this admired constitution. We ought to understand it according to our measure, and to venerate where we are not able presently to comprehend.'

Such an avowal may be regarded less as a proof of wisdom than

an indication of the petulant prejudice aroused in Burke by the contemplation of the crimes committed in France in the sacred name of liberty. In truth it was no transient ebullition of anger ; it was an expression of his innermost convictions. Aristotle held that man is ' by nature a political animal,' Burke insists that ' man is by his constitution a religious animal. . . . Religion ' is the basis of civil society.' But for this ' link ' between the past and the present ' men would become little better than the ' flies of summer.'

This conviction was at the back of Burke's conservatism ; it is the basis of his philosophy of the State. That philosophy is perhaps most clearly expounded in his ' Appeal from the New to ' the Old Whigs.' Where are we to look for the origin of civil society ? If it be true that it is ' the original compact or agreement ' which gives its form and capacity to a State,' it is not the ' contract ' of Hobbes, or Locke, or Rousseau, but the contract ' implied and expressed in the constitution of this country.' In this constitution contemporaries have only a life-interest.

' One of the first and most leading principles on which the commonwealth and the laws are consecrated, is lest the temporary possessors and life-renters in it, unmindful of what they have received from their ancestors, or of what is due to their posterity, should act as if they were the entire masters ; that they should not think it among their rights to cut off the entail, or commit waste on the inheritance by destroying at their pleasure the whole original fabric of their society.'

The ' people ' belauded in France ' is not a multitude told by the ' head,' ' a mere reckoned majority ' (' Appeal '). It is essential to clear thinking and right conduct to ' have an idea of what ' we mean, when we say the people.' Burke recognises the people only when great multitudes act together under the ' discipline of nature.' Only by this discipline of nature—a process long, arduous, orderly, divinely guided—can a multitude of individuals be gradually transformed into a people—a political society. Such is Burke's conception of the State, a conception not below that of Aristotle, and far higher than that of most political philosophers. It is set forth in terms in one of the noblest passages to be found in English prose :—

' Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects

of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure, but the State ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science ; a partnership in all art ; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular State is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures each in their appointed place. This law is not subject to the will of those who by an obligation above them, and infinitely superior, are bound to submit their will to that law.'

By this passage and many others of like import Burke proves his kinship alike with the greatest of the philosophers of the ancient world and with the English school who base their conception of liberty upon the rule of law. The passage stands, however, not only as illustrative of Burke's theory of the State, but as an exposition of the spirit of conservatism at its highest. Though ' prudence ' be, as Burke holds, the most indispensable attribute of statesmanship, yet ' politics ought to be adjusted ' not to human reasoning but to human nature.' Consequently the commonwealth must rest on a ' partnership not only between ' those who are living but between those who are living, those who ' are dead and those who are to be born.' This was of the essence of Burke's teaching. ' People will not look forward to posterity ' who never look backward to their ancestors.' ' Prescription is ' the most solid of all titles, not only to property, but, which is ' to secure that property, to government.' Burke is plainly poles asunder from the utilitarians and from the modern radicalism which derives from Bentham and the Mills.

Yet it would be alike ungracious and unhistorical to refuse to acknowledge the debt which English politics owed in the middle years of the nineteenth century to the utilitarian school. *Laissez-faire* provided a convenient formula for the liberalism which dominated politics from the passing of the first to the passing of the second Reform Bill. Sixty years of Tory ascendancy was

followed by nearly half a century of Liberal rule. The continuity of that rule was hardly interrupted save by Peel's ministry (1841-46) and by Disraeli's (1874-80).

The Reform Act of 1832 closed a distinct epoch in English history—the epoch which opened with the revolution of 1688. Peel made a valiant effort in the Tamworth manifesto to rally the Tory party and to re-state the principles, in reliance on which, in a new environment, conservatism might hope to conciliate the support of the enlarged electorate.

'If the spirit of the Reform Bill implies merely a careful revision of institutions, civil and ecclesiastical, undertaken in a friendly temper, combining with the firm maintenance of established rights the correction of proved abuses and the redress of real grievances; in that case I can, for myself and my colleagues, undertake to act in such a spirit and with such institutions.'

So Peel wrote in the Tamworth manifesto (1835) and the language was well calculated to appeal by its caution and common sense to the classes admitted to political supremacy in 1832. Far removed from the lofty idealism of Burke it excited the scorn of Disraeli. 'There was indeed,' said the latter, 'considerable 'shouting about what they called conservative principles; 'but the awkward question naturally arose, "What will you '"conserve?"' Disraeli was a jaundiced critic; he heartily disliked Peel whose life, in the critic's eyes, had been 'one huge 'appropriation clause,' who was a 'burglar of others' intellect' and 'no more a great statesman than the man who gets up 'behind the carriage is a great whip.'

Peel, though he collected round him a gifted group, did not re-found a party. Disraeli avowedly went back to Bolingbroke; yet his indebtedness to Burke is manifest. Here, for example, is a passage from his 'Vindication of the English Constitution' (1835) which might almost have come from Burke's own pen:—

'Those great men who have periodically risen to guide the helm of our government in times of tumultuous and stormy exigency, knew that a State is a complicated creation of refined art, and they handled it with all the delicacy a piece of exquisite machinery requires. They knew that if once they admitted the abstract rights of subjects they must inevitably advance to the abstract rights of men, and then that the very foundations of civil polity would sink beneath them . . . They held themselves bound by the contracts of their forefathers, because they wished their posterity to observe their own agreements.

. . . Man with them, therefore, was the child of the State and born with filial duties. To disobey the State, therefore, was a crime; to rebel against it treason; to overturn it parricide.'

The utilitarian philosophy of the State was to Disraeli anathema: 'in order to make their politics practical they are obliged to 'make their metaphysics impossible.'

Cynical as were many of his *obiter dicta* and intolerant as he was of solemn humbug Disraeli tenaciously held the conviction that a political creed, if it was to issue in good works, must rest upon moral principles. 'If government,' he said in 1868, 'is not divine it is nothing. It is a mere affair of the police-'office, of the tax-gatherers, of the guard-room.' Again, in his preface to a new edition of the novels (1870): 'The divine right 'of kings may have been a plea for feeble tyrants, but the divine 'right of governments is the keystone of human progress and 'without it government sinks into police and a nation is degraded 'into a mob.'

'If government is not divine' it is nothing. If the State be no more than a convenient mechanism for the maintenance of order, its citizens may and will renounce their allegiance whenever it may suit their convenience to do so. That is the root error of the utilitarian philosophy; acceptance or denial of the doctrine emphasized alike by Burke and by Disraeli is the touchstone of party affinities. The essential and permanent differentia between parties goes much deeper than loyalty to leaders, than adherence to a particular policy, than advocacy or criticism of any legislative project. Men and measures afford rallying-points; but they are essentially ephemeral. The choice of a political party is no doubt largely temperamental, but the temperament depends upon adherence, largely unconscious, to a particular theory of the State and of the relation of the individual thereto.

Political institutions are the outward and visible signs of an inward philosophy of government. The English people have in the course of centuries evolved a form of government, unknown to the ancient world and in the modern world peculiar to themselves. That constitution has, during the last one hundred years, been extensively copied—in some cases with disastrous disregard for the pre-suppositions which alone rendered its success possible in the country of origin. Parliamentary government is of all

forms of constitution the most delicate in its adjustments and therefore the most easily thrown out of gear. Depending for the most part upon conventions; perpetually adapting itself to new conditions, social and political; subject to continuous modification in detail, it demands from those responsible for its working unceasing vigilance, a clear apprehension alike of practical conditions and of philosophical implications, above all a deep, quasi-religious reverence for the inner spirit which has inspired and still informs it.

It were idle to pretend that the conditions essential to the success of parliamentary government are to-day satisfactorily fulfilled. On the contrary many of them are conspicuously lacking. A vague but unmistakable discontent is the result of the failure to analyse those conditions. The present article is offered as a preliminary contribution to that process.

J. A. R. Marriott.

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